NIST SP 800-165 日本語訳

NIST Special Publication 800-165

Patrick O’Reilly, Editor

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology

Lorie Richards

Facilities Services Division Creative and Printing Service

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-165

June 2013

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny S. Pritzker, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

Disclaimer: Any mention of commercial products is for information only; it does not imply NIST recommendation or endorsement, nor does it imply that the products mentioned are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-165 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Pub., 90 pages (June 2013) CODEN: NSPUE2

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-165

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With the continued proliferation of information, the explosion of devices connecting to the expanding communication infrastructure and the evolving threat environment, the need for cybersecurity standards and best practices that address interoperability, usability and privacy continues to be critical for the Nation. The Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for the protection of non-national security federal information and communication infrastructure. These standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics are also important resources for the private sector.

In 2012, CSD aligned its resources to enable greater development and application of practical, innovative security technologies and methodologies, and to enhance our ability to address current and future computer and information security challenges in support of critical national and international priorities.

CSD extended its research and development agenda for high-quality, cost-effective security and privacy mechanisms to foster improved information security across the federal government and the global information security community. In 2012, NIST concluded the five-year SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition with the selection of KECCAK for standardization and worldwide adoption. The selection of this cryptographic hash algorithm, an indispensable component for the information and communication systems that support commerce in the modern era, confirmed NIST’s well-respected and trusted technical authority in this field.

A strong partnership with industry is vital to the success of our technical programs. In 2012, CSD engaged the international standards community on emerging technical standards to advance continuous monitoring capabilities and to further interoperability with commercially available tools. We also devised new security testing methodologies for smart phone software app functionality. Our research in hardware-enabled security continued with the development of guidelines on mechanisms that measure and report the security state of BIOS. Our research also continued to expand into the cybersecurity aspects of cyber-physical and embedded systems, and the mechanisms for enabling and protecting public safety communications.

Our ability to interact with the broad federal community continues to be critical to our success. This interaction helps to ensure that our research is consistent with national objectives related to or impacted by information security. This interaction is most prominent in our strengthened collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common foundation for information security across the federal government. The release of Special Publication 800-30, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, developed by the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Interagency Working Group, is not only leading to more consistent ways to assess risks, but is also enabling more effective risk management and facilitating greater sharing of information across organizational boundaries.

For many years, the Computer Security Division (CSD), in collaboration with our global partners from government, industry, and academia, has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s critical information and infrastructure. We look forward to furthering these relationships in 2013 as we lead in examining the diverse cybersecurity aspects of a broad set of areas, including supply chain risk management; security analytics; cloud, mobile, and privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled security; and cyber-physical and embedded systems.

Chief, Computer Security Division & Deputy Chief Cybersecurity Advisor

Donna Dodson, Chief, Computer Security Division, Acting Associate Director & Acting Chief Cybersecurity Advisor, Cybersecurity Advisor Office, and Acting Executive Director, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Matthew Scholl, Deputy Chief, Computer Security Division and Acting Associate Director of Operations, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

Tim Polk, Cryptographic Technology Group

Kevin Stine, Security Outreach and Integration Group

Mark (Lee) Badger, Security Components and Mechanisms Group

David Ferraiolo, Secure Systems and Applications Group

Michael Cooper, Security Testing, Validation and Measurement Group

Research, develop, engineer, and standardize cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.

The Cryptographic Technology Group’s (CTG) work in cryptographic mechanisms addresses topics such as hash algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques, key management, authentication, and random number generation. Strong cryptography is used to improve the security of information systems and the information they process. Users then take advantage of the availability of secure applications in the marketplace made possible by the appropriate use of standardized, high-quality cryptography.

CTG continued its work in a number of cryptographic areas, including:

A major highlight of this year is the completion of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition and the selection of KECCAK as the SHA-3 algorithm.

CTG continued to make an impact in the field of cryptography, both within and outside the federal government, by collaborating with national and international agencies, academic and research organizations, and standards bodies to develop interoperable security standards and guidelines. Federal agency collaborators include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the General Services Administration (GSA), the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). International agencies include the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, and Australia’s Defense Signals Agency and Centrelink. National and international standards bodies include the American Standards Committee (ASC) X9 (financial industry standards), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). Industry collaborators include Intel, Dell, Hewlett Packard, VeriSign, Certicom, Entrust Technologies, Microsoft, Orion Security, RSA Security, Voltage Security, Verifone, Juniper, NTRU Cryptosystems, and Cisco. Academic collaborators include Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KU Leuven), George Mason University, Danmarks Tekniske Universitet, George Washington University, SDU Odense (University of Southern Denmark), University of California Davis, Malaga University, and Yale University. Academic and research organizations include the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology (ECRYPT) II, and the Japanese Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC).

Mr. William (Tim) Polk, william.polk@nist.gov, (301) 975-3348

Research, develop, and standardize foundational security mechanisms, protocols, and services.

The Security Components and Mechanisms Group’s (SCMG) security research focuses on the development and management of foundational building-block security mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated into a wide variety of mission-critical U.S. information systems. The group’s work spans a spectrum from near-term hardening and improvement to the design and analysis of next-generation, leap-ahead security capabilities. Computer security depends fundamentally on the level of trust that can be established for computer software and systems. This work, therefore, focuses strongly on assurance-building activities ranging from the analysis of software configuration settings to advanced trust architectures to testing tools that surface flaws in software modules. Due to the often manual and costly nature of assurance building using current techniques, this work focuses strongly on increasing the applicability and effectiveness of automated techniques wherever feasible. SCMG conducts research collaboratively with government, industry, and academia. The outputs of this research consist of prototype systems, software tools, demonstrations, NIST Special Publications and NIST Interagency Reports, conference papers, and journal papers.

SCMG works on a variety of topics, such as specifications for the automated exchange of security information between systems, computer security incident handling guidelines, formulation of high-assurance software configuration settings, hardware roots of trust for mobile devices, combinatorial testing techniques, conformity assessment of software implementing biometric standards, and adoption of Internet Protocol Version 6 and Internet Protocol security extensions. SCMG collaborates extensively with government, academia, and the private sector. In the last year, collaborations have included the University of Texas Arlington, University of North Texas, University of Maryland-Baltimore County (UMBC), North Carolina State University, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), U.S. Air Force T&E, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Labs, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Carnegie Mellon University (CMU).

Example successes from this work include a second revision of the NIST Special Publication 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, the Advanced Combinatorial Testing System (ACTS) software and documentation, the NIST BioCTS 2012 conformance testing tool and test assertions, a design for continuous monitoring systems, and a continuous monitoring prototype system.

Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger, mark.badger@nist.gov, (301) 975-3176

Integrate and apply security technologies, standards, and guidelines for computing platforms and information systems.

The Secure Systems and Applications Group’s (SSAG) security research focuses on identifying emerging and high-priority technologies, and on developing security solutions that will have a high impact on the U.S. critical information infrastructure. The group conducts research and development on behalf of government and industry from the earliest stages of technology development through proof-of-concept, reference and prototype implementations, and demonstrations. SSAG works to transfer new technologies to industry, produce new standards and guidance for federal agencies and industry, and develop tests, test methodologies, and assurance methods.

Some of the many topics the group investigates include mobile device security, cloud computing and virtualization, identity management, access control and authorization management, and software assurance. This research helps to meet federal information security requirements that may not be fully addressed by existing technology. SSAG collaborates extensively with government, academia, and private sector entities, including FY2012 collaborations with the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the White House Communications Agency (WHCA), George Mason University, North Carolina State University, Microsoft Corporation, VM Ware, Symantec, Mobile System 7, One Enterprise Consulting Group, and MITRE.

Example successes from this work include tools for access control policy testing; new concepts in access control and policy enforcement; methods for achieving comprehensive policy enforcement and data interoperability across enterprise data services; test methods for mobile device (smart phone) application security; validation of cryptography for smart phones, and several government wide technical exchange meetings on mobile device security. For the federal government’s cloud computing initiatives, SSAG led the NIST Security Working Group’s task of developing the NIST Cloud Computing - Security Reference Architecture working document, and contributed to the development of the white paper “Challenging Security Requirements for the USG Cloud Computing Adoption.” To improve access to new technologies, SSAG chaired, edited, and participated in the development of a wide variety of national and international security standards.

Mr. David Ferraiolo, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov, (301) 975-3046

Develop, integrate, and promote the mission-specific application of information security standards, guidelines, best practices, and technologies.

The U.S. economy, citizens, and government rely on information technology. Protecting information technology, including its information and the information infrastructure, is critical for the nation. As part of the Computer Security Division, the Security Outreach and Integration Group (SOIG) leverages its broad cybersecurity and risk management expertise to develop, integrate, and promote security standards, guidelines, tools, technologies, methodologies, tests, and measurements to address critical cybersecurity needs in many areas of national and international importance.

Major initiatives in this area include the development of standards, guidelines, tools, technologies, and methodologies to enable the security and risk management of the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) supply chain; Smart Grid; Electronic Voting; Cyber Physical and Industrial Control Systems; Health Information Technology; National Public Safety Broadband Network, and the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) implementation program. The group also serves as lead for the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), and provides extended outreach initiatives to stakeholders across federal, state, and local governments, industry, academia, small businesses, and the public.

Key to the group’s success is the ability to interact with a broad constituency – government, industry, academia, and the public – in order to ensure that SOIG’s program is consistent with national objectives related to or impacted by information security. Through collaboration, cooperation, and open and transparent public engagement, SOIG works to address these critical cybersecurity challenges, enable greater U.S. industrial competitiveness, and facilitate the practical implementation of scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices.

Mr. Kevin Stine, kevin.stine@nist.gov, (301) 975-4483

Advance information security testing, measurement science, and conformance.

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on cryptography for the protection of information and communications used in electronic commerce, critical infrastructure, and other application areas. At the core of all products offering cryptographic services is the cryptographic module. Cryptographic modules, which contain cryptographic algorithms, are used in products and systems to provide security services such as confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Although cryptography is used to provide security, weaknesses such as poor design or weak algorithms can render a product insecure and place highly sensitive information at risk. When protecting their sensitive data, federal government agencies require a minimum level of assurance that cryptographic products meet their security requirements. Also, federal agencies are required to use only tested and validated cryptographic modules. Adequate testing and validation of the cryptographic module and its underlying cryptographic algorithms against established standards is essential to provide security assurance.

The group’s testing-focused activities include validating cryptographic algorithm implementations, cryptographic modules, and Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)-compliant products; developing test suites and test methods; providing implementation guidance and technical support to industry forums; and conducting education, training, and outreach programs.

All of the Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group’s validation programs work together with independent Cryptographic and Security Testing laboratories that are accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent laboratory test report and test evidence, the Validation Program then validates the implementation under test. The validations awarded to vendor implementations are publicly posted on the NIST website.

Mr. Michael Cooper, michael.cooper@nist.gov, (301) 975-8077

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in December 2002, recognized the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, included duties and responsibilities for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division (CSD). In 2012, CSD addressed its assignments through the following activities:

Figure 1 (below) shows the many national and international standards-developing organizations (SDOs) involved in cybersecurity standardization. CSD participates in many cybersecurity standards activities in many of these organizations, either in leadership positions or as editors and contributors. Many of CSD’s publications have been the basis for both national and international standards projects. This section discusses CSD standards activities in conjunction with InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee Cyber Security (CS) 1, where Dan Benigni serves as Chair and U.S. Head of Delegation to SC 27.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a network of the national standards institutes of 148 countries, with the representation of one member per country. The scope of ISO covers standardization in all fields except electrical and electronic engineering standards, which are the responsibility of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

The IEC prepares and publishes international standards for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies, including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and energy production and distribution, as well as associated general disciplines such as terminology and symbols, electromagnetic compatibility, measurement and performance, dependability, design and development, safety, and the environment.

Figure 1: SDOs involved in Cybersecurity

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) was formed by ISO and IEC to be responsible for international standardization in the field of Information Technology. It develops, maintains, promotes, and facilitates IT standards required by global markets, meeting business and user requirements concerning—

JTC 1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that produce standards relating to IT security include:

JTC1 also has—

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private, nonprofit organization (501(c)(3)) that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system.

ANSI facilitates the development of American National Standards (ANSs) by accrediting the procedures of standards-developing organizations (SDOs). The InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) is accredited by ANSI.

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international and regional standards organizations, and encourages the adoption of international standards as national standards where they meet the needs of the user community. ANSI is the sole U.S. representative and dues-paying member of the two major non-treaty international standards organizations, ISO and, via the United States National Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS serves as the ANSI Technical Advisory Group (TAG) for ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1. INCITS is sponsored by the Information Technology Industry (ITI) Council, a trade association representing the leading U.S. providers of information technology products and services. INCITS currently has more than 975 published standards.

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that focus on the creation of standards for different technology areas. Technical committees that focus on IT security and IT security-related technologies, or that may require separate security standards include:

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops United States, national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses—

The scope of CS1 explicitly excludes the areas of work on cybersecurity standardization presently under way in INCITS B10, M1, T3, T10, and T11, as well as other standard groups, such as the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Travel Industry Association of America (TIAA), and Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The CS1 scope of work includes standardization in most of the same cybersecurity areas as are covered in the NIST CSD.

As the U.S. TAG to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, CS1 contributes to the SC 27 program of work on IT Security Techniques in terms of comments and contributions on SC27 standards projects; votes on SC 27 standards documents at various stages of development; and nominates U.S. experts to work on various SC 27 projects as editors, coeditors, or in other SC 27 leadership positions. Currently a number of CS1 members are serving as SC 27 document editors or coeditors on various standards projects, including CSD staff Randy Easter and Richard Kissel.

All input from CS1 is processed through INCITS to ANSI, then to SC 27. It is also a conduit for getting U.S. - based new work item proposals and U.S.-developed national standards into the international SC 27 standards development process. In its international efforts, CS1 responded to all calls for U.S. contributions and/or voting positions on all international security standards projects in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC 27 in a consistent, efficient, and timely manner.

NIST contributes to many of CS1’s national and international IT security standards efforts through its membership on CS1, where Dan Benigni serves as the nonvoting chair and Richard Kissel as the NIST Principal voting member. Internationally, there are over 100 published standards, and almost all have been adopted as U.S. national standards. There are more than 100 current international standards projects.

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role in the Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the national level. During FY2012:

NIST originally authored RBAC, and Rick Kuhn is the NIST lead in the Ad hoc group.

Within CS1, liaisons are maintained with nearly 20 organizations. They include the following:

Dan Benigni also serves as cybersecurity standards coordinator in CSD.

Contact:

Mr. Daniel Benigni, (301) 975-3279, benigni@nist.gov

CSD supports Identity Management standardization activities through participation in national and international standards bodies and organizations. CSD actively participates in InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) B10 committee which is focused on interoperability of Identification Cards and Related Devices. CSD staff serves as Chair and Vice Chair of the B10.12 committee which develops interoperable standards for Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts. CSD staff also serves as the U.S. Head of delegation to Working Group 4 and Working Group 11 of the International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee 17.

In addition to chairing the B10.12 committee, CSD provides technical and editorial support in the development of national and international standards. Specifically, CSD staff serves as the technical editor of ANSI 504-1, Generic Identity Command Set (GICS). GICS provides for Personal Identity Verification (PIV), PIV-I (PIV-Interoperable) and Common Access Card (CAC) card applications (but not limited to these applications) to be built from a single platform. GICS defines an open platform where identity applications can be instantiated, deployed, and used in an interoperable way between the credential issuers and credential users. CSD staff also provides significant input to standards of major interest to U.S. government agencies and U.S. markets. CSD influences the development and revision of ISO/IEC 7816 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit Cards), ISO/IEC 24727 (Identification Cards, Integrated Circuit Card Programming Interfaces), and ISO/IEC 24787 (Biometrics ‘Match On Card’ Comparison).

During FY2012, many of these standards reached important milestones: ANSI 504 was published; ISO/IEC 24727 amendments to part 2, 3, and 4 were published; ISO/IEC 7816 part 4 was updated to add significant functionality: several modifications requested by the U.S. delegation are now part of this standard. CSD provides contributions and feedback on many other INCITS B10 standards projects that support identity management.

CSD’s investment in this section is motivated by the “new technical ideas” that are supported by these standards. For example, ANSI 504 (GICS) is an ID platform that leverages the existing FIPS 201 (PIV) infrastructure to offer support to a larger number of initiatives for both government agencies and enterprises. In particular, it aims to support initiatives like the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). ISO/IEC 24727 aims to create an interoperability framework to increase resilience and scalability of identity management solutions and provide interoperability domestically and internationally.

Contact:

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

During 2011-2012, CSD strengthened its collaboration with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems, in partnership with the Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, which continues to develop key cybersecurity guidelines for protecting federal information and information systems for the Unified Information Security Framework. Previously, the Joint Task Force developed common security guidance in the critical areas of security controls for information systems and organizations, security assessment procedures to demonstrate security control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date information on the security state of their information systems. In addition, CSD worked with the General Services Administration’s (GSAs), Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program to identify security assessment requirements, and prototype a process for approving Third-Party Assessment Organizations (3PAOs) that demonstrate capability in assessing Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) information systems for conformance to NIST standards and guidelines.

In FY2012, CSD worked on the following three initiatives:

In addition to providing a comprehensive process for assessing information security risk, this publication also describes how to apply the process at the three tiers in the risk management hierarchy—the organization level, the mission/business process level, and the information system level. To facilitate ease of use for individuals or groups conducting risk assessments within organizations, this publication also provides a set of exemplary templates, tables, and assessment scales for common risk factors. The templates, tables, and assessment scales give maximum flexibility in designing risk assessments based on the express purpose, scope, assumptions, and constraints established by organizations. The Figure 2 on previous page illustrates a generic risk model with key risk factors.

Figure 2

In FY2012, CSD completed the following activities:

In FY2013, CSD intends to:

http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert

Contacts:

Dr. Ron Ross, (301) 975-5390, ron.ross@nist.gov

Ms. Pat Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Mr. Arnold Johnson, (301) 975-3247, arnold.johnson@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey, (301) 975-2827, kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

CSD staff responds to government, industry, and market requirements for open systems standards by:

CSD continues to work in close partnership with government agencies, industry, and academic institutions to achieve the project goals delineated above. CSD actively participates in a number of biometric standards development projects, contributes to the development of biometric standards, and leads national and international biometric standards bodies. Nationally, CSD’s staff leads InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee 1 (M1) – Biometrics; international efforts include Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) of the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Subcommittee SC 37 - Biometrics - JTC 1/SC 37. CSD plans to continue this work in FY2013.

During FY2012, CSD developed and publicly released one advanced Conformance Test Architecture (CTA) designed to test implementations of the International Standards Organization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) biometric standards called BioCTS2012 for ISO/IEC and another CTA designed to test implementations of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/NIST-ITL 1-2011 (AN-2011) standard.¹ This architecture is called BioCTS2012 for ANSI/NIST 2011.

Eight Conformance Test Suites (CTSs) to test implementations of binary-encoded data formats were developed and released. These test implementations of the first and second generation of binary-encoded data formats developed by the Joint Technical Commission 1 Subcommittee 37 – Biometrics (JTC 1/SC 37) (finger minutiae and finger image, face, and iris image data formats). The CTS set also includes two CTSs designed to support testing of on-card and off-card Personal Identity Verification (PIV) iris data format profiles specified in draft NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-76-2, Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification (released June 2012). These CTSs run under BioCTS 2012 for ISO/IEC.

BioCTS2012 for AN-2011 incorporates over 1,200 test assertions designed to test the requirements of selected Record Types of AN-2011. Other Record Types included in AN-2011 Transactions are detected and their length and location in the transactions are reported. The test assertions implemented in code for BioCTS2012 for AN-2011 are documented in NIST SP 500-295, Conformance Testing Methodology for ANSI/NIST-ITL 2011, American National Standard for Information Systems, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information (September 2012), developed by the NIST/ITL AN-2011 Conformance Testing Methodology Working Group.

These tools were designed to achieve significant functionality, usability, and performance. NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7877, BioCTS 2012: Advanced Conformance Test Architectures and Test Suites for Biometric Data Interchange Formats and Biometric Information Records (September 2012), and a presentation delivered at the last Biometric Consortium conference² discussed these test tools and provided technical implementation details. This work is sponsored, in part, by DHS/US-VISIT.

In FY2013, CSD plans to develop additional CTSs to test implementations of international biometric data interchange formats under development in JTC 1/SC 37 for both binary and Extensible Markup Language (XML) data-encoded formats as well as extending BioCTS for AN-2011 to other record types (for Traditional and XML encoding). CSD plans to research handling large number of files concurrently to increase still further test report capabilities and analysis. CSD will also continue researching and developing additional test environments support (such as web services and tools in the cloud).

A more detailed discussion on the need for conformance testing and roadmaps of conformance test tools development for the following period can be found in NISTIR 7877 and two related presentations delivered during 20123, 4. CSD is currently evaluating the users’ needs for conformance test tools to support testing of additional biometric standard profile implementations.

CSD cochaired the Biometric Consortium conferences and developed the conference technical programs in cooperation with a member of the National Security Agency’s staff. The 2012 annual conference, held September 18-20, 2012 in Tampa, Florida, included nearly 1,700 attendees from 30 countries representing government, industry, and academia. The four-track conference included presentations given by internationally recognized experts in biometric technologies, system and application developers, IT business strategists, and government and commercial officers. It focused on biometric technologies for homeland security, identity management, border crossing, electronic commerce, and other applications.

Dr. Charles H. Romine, Director of the Information Technology Laboratory at NIST, was a keynote speaker. Other keynote and featured speakers were Mr. Steven Martinez, Executive Assistant Director, Science and Technology Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. Peter F. Verga, Chief of Staff for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Dr. Husni Fahmi, Chief of Sub-directorate Population Administration, Head of the e-KPT Technical Team, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia; Mr. Stephen Dennis, Technical Director HSARPA (Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency), Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Duane Blackburn, Multi-Discipline Systems Engineer, MITRE; and Mr. R. S. Sharma, Director General and Mission Director, Unique Identification Authority of India.

The conference program included sessions on federal government programs, advances on biometric technologies (e.g., face recognition, rapid DNA [Deoxyribonucleic acid], iris) and standards, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Biometrics - Identity and Security (BIdS) research, international biometric programs, and an Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) Identity Management session. NIST’s session highlighted achievements and ongoing biometric research, testing, and standards projects delivered by experts from the NIST Information Access and Computer Security Divisions, the Standards Coordination Office, and the Office of Law Enforcement Standards. In addition, a number of workshops and special sessions were held addressing topics such as biometric security, large-scale identity solutions, Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) biometrics, the role of biometrics in the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) identity ecosystem, a new biometrics domain for XML, and biometrics in a cloud computing environment. Over 135 speakers participated in the program. CSD coordinated NIST’s booth at the Technology Expo presented by AFCEA, which was collocated with the conference. The NIST booth showcased NIST/ITL ongoing projects and provided attendees with technology demonstrations and technical information on these projects. CSD plans to continue supporting the Biometric Consortium at its 2013 annual conference scheduled for September 17–19 in Tampa, Florida.

ITL’s Biometric Resource Center: http://www.nist.gov/biometrics

BioCTS 2012 - Biometric Conformance Test Tool Downloads: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.cfm#CTAdownloads

Biometric Consortium website: http://www.biometrics.org

Biometric Consortium 2012 conference program (released presentations are linked): http://www.biometrics.org/bc2012/program.pdf

Mr. Fernando Podio, (301) 975-2947, fernando.podio@nist.gov

Since 2009, NIST has been very active in the area of the Smart Grid. The Computer Security Division (CSD) has provided leadership and expertise to the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel’s Cyber Security Working Group. Leveraging CSD’s broad expertise in relevant areas, CSD is now looking at the cybersecurity needs of the broader landscape of cyber-physical systems.

Cyber-physical systems (CPS), hybrid networked cyber and engineered physical elements codesigned to create adaptive and predictive systems for enhanced performance, are commonly used in the nation’s critical infrastructure. Such systems control the electrical grid, provide clean water, produce chemicals, and underlie transportation systems. CPS are gaining in capability as advances are made in technology, and they are critical to future engines of growth such as advanced manufacturing, as well as safety initiatives such as autonomous driving cars.

Cybersecurity is an important cross-cutting discipline that is critical to provide confidence that CPS and their information and supporting communications and information infrastructure are adequately safeguarded. CPS have many unique characteristics, including the need for real-time response and extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability. However, despite the ubiquity and criticality of CPS, little thought has been given so far to secure design. As a result, there have been successful and major attacks such as Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Gauss that target CPS controlling critical infrastructure.

In April 2012, CSD hosted a two-day workshop to explore CPS cybersecurity needs, with a focus on research results and real-world deployment experiences across multiple industries, including healthcare, manufacturing, automotive, and the electric Smart Grid. The goals of the workshop were to gain a better understanding of the cybersecurity challenges faced by CPS across multiple industries, and to determine if there are security requirements that are unique to CPS as opposed to strictly cyber or physical systems. More information on this workshop, including the agenda, session abstracts, and slides, is available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cyberphysical-workshop.cfm.

In 2013, CSD plans to host a workshop to identify and evaluate the current and needed CPS standards and practices, as well as tools, technologies, and safeguards that protect CPS. CSD, in conjunction with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, will also be updating SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. CSD will continue participating with the International Society of Automation (ISA) 99 Committee, which develops and establishes standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and related information that define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems and security practices, and for assessing electronic security performance.

Contacts:

Ms. Tanya Brewer, (301) 975-4534, tbrewer@nist.gov

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program provides a framework in which many federal agencies come together to coordinate their networking and information technology (IT) research and development (R&D) efforts. CSD remained committed to the value of communicating its R&D efforts to other federal colleagues and identifying the opportunities to support the R&D efforts of federal colleagues throughout the federal government.

The NITRD Program operates under the aegis of the NITRD Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Technology. The Subcommittee, made up of representatives from each of NITRD's member agencies, provides overall coordination for NITRD activities.

Federal IT R&D, which launched and fueled the digital revolution, continues to drive innovation in scientific research, national security, communication, and commerce to sustain U.S. technological leadership. The NITRD agencies' collaborative efforts increase the overall effectiveness and productivity of these federal R&D investments, leveraging strengths, avoiding duplication, and increasing interoperability of R&D products.

The NITRD Program has its focus on the following research areas:

CSD maintains a strong presence in many of these groups with leadership roles in the CSIA Interagency Working Group (IWG) cochaired by Bill Newhouse and the SEW Education Team cochaired by Dr. Ernest McDuffie. Colleagues from other divisions within the Information Technology Laboratory maintain leadership roles in Faster Administration of Science and Technology Education and Research (FASTER) Community of Practice (CoP), HCI&IM, and SDP. NIST colleagues from the Engineering Laboratory have leadership roles in HCSS and the Senior Steering Group for Cyber-Physical Systems.

The CSIA IWG used its monthly meetings to explore the themes and thrusts expressed in the Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development.¹ This plan represents the culmination of focused interactions with academia and industry on forward-thinking concepts and was published by the CSIA IWG in December 2011. The plan introduces four game-changing themes (Tailored Trustworthy Spaces, Moving Target, Cyber Economic Incentives, and Designed-In Security); describes the need to develop Scientific Foundations which minimize future cybersecurity problems by developing the science of security; identifies the relevant national priorities where CSD can maximize research impact by catalyzing coordination, collaboration, and integration of research activities across federal agencies for maximum effectiveness; and accelerates Transition to Practice by expediting improvements in cyberspace from research findings through focused transition programs.

The breadth of CSD’s work was shared over the course of the year’s monthly meetings. Specific briefings were given on CSD’s efforts in the area of Continuous Monitoring, Smart Grid, and Healthcare IT Security.

In addition to coordination via the NITRD programs, CSD is a regular participant in the coordination activities of the Federal Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering (SCORE) Committee, which was established based on recognition by the architects of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) that expanded R&D coordination was vital to allow the nation to leap ahead of today’s cybersecurity challenges.

On behalf of SCORE, CSD hosted an October 2011 cybersecurity “assumption buster” workshop focused on cloud computing. It was the fourth in a series of workshops designed to explore the assumptions that cyber space is an adversarial domain, and the adversary is tenacious, clever, and capable. By reexamining cybersecurity solutions in the context of these assumptions, the workshops aimed to identify key insights that will lead to novel solutions for some of the nation’s needs.

The SCORE committee interacts with CNCI leadership. CSD not only represents the breadth of its work to this committee, but also shares the progress and relevance of research initiatives from other divisions across NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), such as Foundations of Measurement Science for Information System (Applied and Computational Mathematics Division) and Usability (Information Access Division).

ITL has been charged to lead the nation in utilizing existing and emerging IT to meet national priorities that reflect the country’s broad-based social, economic, and political values and goals. ITL seeks to scale new frontiers in Information Measurement Science to enable international social, economic, and political advancement by collaborating and partnering with industry, academia, and other NIST laboratories to advance science and engineering, setting standards and requirements for unique scientific instrumentation and experiments, data, and communications. The NIST investment in providing leadership in R&D collaboration, particularly CSD’s focus on cybersecurity, remains a focus.

Contacts:

Mr. Bill Newhouse, CSIA IWG, CSIA SSG, and SCORE rep., (301) 975-2869, william.newhouse@nist.gov

Dr. Ernest McDuffie, SEW Education Team, (301) 975-8897, ernest.mcduffie@nist.gov

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment across the United States. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director of NIST. HAVA calls on NIST to provide technical support to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, security, and laboratory accreditation. As part of NIST’s efforts, CSD supports the activities of the EAC and the TGDC related to voting equipment security.

In the past year, CSD supported the EAC in updating the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), VVSG 1.1, by assisting the EAC with the development of a new draft of the guidelines for public comment. The security guidelines were updated to improve the auditability of voting systems, to provide greater software integrity protections, to expand and improve access control requirements, and to help ensure that cryptographic security mechanisms are implemented properly. In addition, CSD supported the efforts of the EAC and the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) of the Department of Defense (DoD) to improve the voting process for citizens under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA) by leveraging electronic technologies. CSD worked with the TDCG’s UOCAVA Working Group to develop a narrative risk analysis on current UOCAVA voting processes, including vote-by-mail and electronic ballot delivery. CSD’s work on voting technologies has also spun off interesting research topics, including the Rabin Beacon project that is discussed separately in this annual report.

In FY2013, CSD will assist the EAC in developing responses to public comments and provide updates to VVSG 1.1 and the associated security test suites. CSD will continue to support the efforts for the EAC and FVAP to improve the voting process for UOCAVA voters. CSD will also continue to expand on research activities, particularly in the areas of risks to voting systems and innovative voting system architectures.

In addition, CSD will support the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) efforts to accredit voting system test laboratories by developing proficiency tests and testing artifacts, and by updating Handbook 150-22 used to accredit voting system test laboratories. CSD plans to engage voting system manufacturers, voting system test laboratories, state election officials, and the academic community to explore ways to increase voting system security and transparency.

http://vote.nist.gov/

Contacts:

Dr. Nelson Hastings, (301) 975-5237, nelson.hastings@nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Mr. Joshua Franklin, (301) 975-8463, joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Health information technology (HIT) makes it possible for healthcare providers to better manage patient care through secure use and sharing of health information, leading to improvements in healthcare quality, reduced medical errors, increased efficiencies in care delivery and administration, and improved population health. Central to reaching these goals is the assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of health information. CSD works actively with government, industry, academia, and others to provide security tools, technologies, and methodologies that provide for the security and privacy of health information.

In FY2012, NIST issued the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule self-assessment toolkit to help organizations better understand the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule, implement those requirements, and assess those implementations in their operational environment. This project enabled NIST to leverage security automation specifications within the context of the healthcare use case.

NIST continued its HIT security outreach efforts. NIST and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) cohosted the fifth annual HIPAA Security Rule conference, “Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security,” in June 2012 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, D.C. The conference offered important sessions that focused on broad topics of interest to the healthcare and health IT security community. Over 500 attendees from federal, state, and local governments, academia, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates, industry groups, and vendors heard from, and interacted with, healthcare, security, and privacy experts on technologies and methodologies for safeguarding health information and for implementing the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. Presentations covered a variety of current topics including updates on OCR’s health information privacy and security audit and enforcement activities; establishing an access audit program; securing mobile devices; securing health information in the Cloud; improving the usability and accessibility of HIT; managing breaches of health information; and the relationship between the HIPAA Security Rule and Meaningful Use.

In FY2013, NIST plans to issue a draft revision to Special Publication (SP) 800-66, An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the HIPAA Security Rule. As part of its continued outreach efforts, NIST also plans to host the sixth annual “Safeguarding Health Information” conference with OCR.

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/index.cfm

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Mr. Matthew Scholl, (301) 975-2941, matthew.scholl@nist.gov

Federal agency information systems are increasingly at risk of both intentional and unintentional supply chain compromise due to the growing sophistication of information and communications technologies (ICT) and the growing speed and scale of a complex, distributed global supply chain. A lack of visibility into, and control over, the ICT supply chain increases the risk technologies will be vulnerable to a variety of threats, including counterfeit materials, malicious software, disruption in logistics, and makes it increasingly difficult for federal agencies to understand their exposure and manage the associated supply chain risks.

The ICT Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) project seeks to provide federal agencies with a standardized, repeatable, and feasible toolkit of technical and intelligence resources to strategically manage supply chain risk throughout the entire life cycle of ICT products, systems and services.

In 2012, CSD continued to collaborate with several industry, standards, academic, and government organizations in order to learn about their efforts related to SCRM, and provide technical input as appropriate. NIST’s CSD issued draft NISTIR 7622, Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems, in FY2012. This draft document provides an initial set of means and methods for reducing the risk associated with ICT supply chain vulnerabilities. It also seeks to equip federal departments and agencies with implementation guidance as well as offer a set of practices acquiring organizations can implement to increase their understanding of, and visibility throughout, the supply chain.

With a grant issued by NIST, the University of Maryland (UMD), Robert H. Smith School of Business, Supply Chain Management Center published a report which inventories the proliferating array of existing public and private sector ICT supply chain initiatives across diverse ICT segment and formulates a framework for defining various initiative within a single SCRM architecture. This framework has three tiers: enterprise risk governance, system integration, and operations. Within each tier, the report defines a core set of attributes or distinct organizational capabilities to facilitate the identification and assessment of gaps in coverage in the ICT SCRM community.

CSD also awarded a grant to UMD’s Supply Chain Management Center to develop a prototype web portal, which will include:

In FY2013, CSD will continue to research and develop tools and guidance to help agencies more effectively manage their ICT supply chain risk. In October 2013, CSD intends to publish final NISTIR 7622, Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems.

CSD also plans to host a workshop in October 2012 to bring together a varied group of stakeholders and thought leaders from industry, academia and government to future NIST/CSD efforts relating to ICT SCRM. Outputs from this workshop will include:

CSD plans to use the proceedings of this workshop to transition into producing a draft Special Publication (SP) 800-161 to provide federal departments and agencies guidance on managing the risk to their ICT supply chains. In addition, a number of small forums with academia, industry, and government stakeholders will also be used to inform the development of draft SP 800-161.

Contacts:

Mr. Jon Boyens, ICT SCRM Project Lead, (301) 975-5549, jon.boyens@nist.gov

Ms. Celia Paulsen, (301) 975-5981, celia.paulsen@nist.gov

In February 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act. One portion of this legislation calls for the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public safety broadband network based on Long-Term Evolution (LTE) technology to be deployed and operated by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The planned National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) is intended to “create a much-needed nationwide interoperable broadband network that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical service professionals and other public safety officials stay safe and do their jobs.” (http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety). In addition, the Director of NIST is called upon to establish a list of certified devices and components to be adhered to when interacting with the nationwide network for the use of public safety officials, vendors, and other interested parties; and to conduct research and development that supports the acceleration and advancement of the nationwide network.

Image Source: http://www.pscr.gov/index.php

In FY2012, CSD advised the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST’s Engineering Laboratory on the security of the proposed NPSBN.

NTIA is helping the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC) develop a Statement of Requirements (SoR) to submit to FirstNet that will describe, in increasing levels of detail, the technical requirements of the NPSBN infrastructure, equipment, and communications. This undertaking has required the involvement of representatives of numerous professional communities and a wide variety of disciplines, including federal, state, local, and tribal officials; public safety and other First Responder personnel; mobile carrier operators; and mobile device vendors. CSD commented and contributed text for the security-related aspects of the SoR.

In FY2013, CSD plans to continue supporting the development and refinement of the NPSTC SoR and represent public safety in international standardization efforts, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), that impact their communication requirements. In addition, CSD will identify gaps between NIST security guidelines and NPSBN security requirements as well as relevant 3GPP LTE specifications. CSD also plans to research some of the currently unresolved issues and risks related to public safety security.

Contacts:

Ms. Sheila Frankel, (301) 975-3297, sheila.frankel@nist.gov

Dr. Nelson Hastings, (301) 975-5237, nelson.hastings@nist.gov

The major elements of the Smart Grid are the information technology, the industrial control systems, and the communications infrastructure used to send command information across the electric grid from generation to distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing information between utilities and their customers. Key to the successful deployment of the Smart Grid infrastructure is the development of the cybersecurity strategy for the Smart Grid. In fact, cybersecurity needs to be designed into the deploying systems that support Smart Grid, and added into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the economic and physical well-being of the nation, and emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical assets.

Markets

Operations

Retailer / RTO/ISO Transmission

Wholesaler

EMS

Aggregator

EMS

WAMS

Service Providers

Distribution Ops

Utility Third-Party

DMS Asset

Mgmt

Demand

CIS

Retail CIS Energy

Response MDMS

Enterprise

Energy Market

Bus

Clearinghouse

Enterprise

Bus

RTO SCADA

Transmission

SCADA

Internet / e-Business

Market

LANs

Substation

Billing Provider Billing

Enterprise

Home / Building

Manager

Bus

Aggregator Metering Distribution System SCADA

Others

Internet / e-Business

Appliances

Electric Electric Storage Vehicle

Actor

Domain Gateway Actor

Comms Path Comms Path Changes Owner / Domain

Thermostat

Distributed Generation

Customer

Distributed Energy Resources

NIST established the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG) in support of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 to address the crosscutting issue of cybersecurity. The CSWG has more than 750 participants worldwide from the private sector (including utilities, vendors, and service providers), academia, regulatory organizations, state and local government, and U.S. federal agencies. Membership in the CSWG has been free and open to all since its inception. Many members participate from around the world by monitoring the minutes and email conversations of the subgroups.

The CSWG membership collaborated to deliver the NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security, in August 2010. Since then the group has focused on specific topics such as risk management processes, key management in the Smart Grid, the Smart Grid security architecture, security testing and certification, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) security, and privacy in the Smart Grid. In addition, the group is conducting security reviews of many Smart Grid-related standards and beginning to develop a User’s Guide for NISTIR 7628.

To complete the work, there are seven subgroups that focus on specific topics. During the development of NISTIR 7628, the subgroups performed detailed technical analyses on an array of security-related topics, and then documented the research, issues, and guidance in specific sections. The approach that has been taken by all subgroups is an open and collaborative process in which any CSWG member is welcome to participate and contribute.

The CSWG creates and disbands subgroups in order to meet present needs. Since the NISTIR 7628 publication, some of the CSWG subgroups have merged, while others are regrouping as they determine their next set of tasks. The CSWG currently consists of the following subgroups:

During the past year, members of the CSWG collaborated with the Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a harmonized electricity sector enterprise-wide risk management process. This was published by DOE as “Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management Process Guideline” in May 2012. The CSWG also collaborated with the National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR) to develop a technical white paper on Smart Energy Profile (SEP) 1.0 and 1.1. The CSWG Lead, Marianne Swanson, also served as a subject-matter expert on the DOE Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ES-C2M2) project.

Members of the CSWG produced a white paper on automating Smart Grid security in December 2011. The group produced a mapping between the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards, version 5, and the high-level security requirements found in NISTIR 7628. For the SGIP’s second version of the Interoperability Process Reference Manual, the group produced a chapter on cybersecurity testing. The group also developed an SGIP document, Guide for Testing the NISTIR 7628 High-level Security Requirements, in order to help utilities and other Smart Grid organizations assess how well they are meeting those high-level security requirements.

The CSWG’s Privacy subgroup developed customizable train-the-trainer privacy briefings for utilities, public utility commissions, and those dealing with consumers. This subgroup also developed a set of recommended practices for how third parties should protect consumers’ privacy when handling customer energy usage data received from a source other than a utility (e.g., an in-home device).

CSD also supports CSWG by assessing the security of cryptographic methods used in security protocols for utilities’ communication and management networks and by developing cryptographic security guidelines for the Smart Grid. During the past year, CSD reviewed and analyzed cryptographic techniques in the Smart Energy Profile (SEP) standards, and provided guidance to the CSWG. The EAX’ block cipher mode of operation, specified in the ANSI C12.22-2008 standard, was intended by industry to serve as a solution for cybersecurity needs in smart meters. CSD reviewed the EAX’ scheme, submitted by members of the ANSI C11.22 SC 17 Committee, and decided not to include it in the toolkit of NIST-approved algorithms. CSD also reviewed the IEC 62541-6 standard (OPC unified architecture - Part 6: Mappings)² and identified issues with the cryptographic methods used in the standard that could potentially create a substantial security risk for communication networks running the standard protocol. CSD provided recommendations to improve the security and performance of this standard.

CSD also represented the CSWG, in collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and Department of Energy/NESCOR, in identifying requirements, features, and capabilities for a cryptographic key-management system for an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). This is an ongoing work project.

Future work includes working with the SGIP — the Committees, the Domain Expert Working Groups, and the Priority Action Plans — to integrate cybersecurity into their work efforts. Collaboration will continue with DOE and NERC to produce a cybersecurity risk management process use case for the electricity sector to accompany the Risk Management Process document. Reviewing and updating NISTIR 7628 will occur in the next year. This will result in the issuance of NISTIR 7628 Revision 1. Afterwards, the group will update the Guide for Testing the NISTIR 7628 High-level Security Requirements to reflect any changes in the high-level security requirements from NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1. Members of the group will produce a white paper on cloud computing and the Smart Grid, as well as the NISTIR 7628 User’s Guide. The Standards subgroup will continue to review documents for the SGIP. CSD will continue to support the CSWG in the evaluation of the cryptographic methods used in security protocols for the communication and management networks used by utility companies.

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/bin/view/SmartGrid/WebHome

Contacts:

Ms. Marianne Swanson, (301) 975-3293, marianne.swanson@nist.gov

Ms. Tanya Brewer, (301) 975-4534, tbrewer@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301) 975-3610, qdang@nist.gov

NIST became the lead for the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) in 2010 based on a recommendation of the Information and Communications Infrastructure – Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC). This recommendation was built out of chapter two of the May 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review titled “Building Capacity for a Digital Nation” and is responsive to President Obama’s declaration that the “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and that “America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”

The goal of NICE is to enhance the overall cybersecurity posture of the United States by accelerating the availability of educational and training resources designed to improve the cyber behavior, skills, and knowledge of every segment of the population, enabling a safer cyberspace for all. NICE addresses this challenging goal by:

This initiative comprises four component areas: 1) National Cybersecurity Awareness; 2) Formal Cybersecurity Education; 3) Cybersecurity Workforce Structure; and 4) Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development.

The Computer Security Division (CSD) is home to the NIST NICE Leadership Team (NNLT), and they focus on the following activities for NICE:

In FY2012, NIST updated the draft NICE Strategic Plan and stewarded the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, developed within NICE’s Cybersecurity Workforce Training and Professional Development Component, through government-wide review. Both documents can be found on the NICE website, http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/.

NIST organized and planned to host the third annual NICE Workshop, “Shaping the Future of Cybersecurity Education, Connecting the Dots in Cyberspace,” from October 30 – November 1, 2012. However, the workshop was cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy. The next NICE workshop will be held in the fall of 2013 and will serve as a forum to develop the connections within the cybersecurity and education communities to make progress on the strategic goals and objectives of NICE.

The NNLT attended more than 100 events, symposia, forums, competitions, educational outreach meetings, and workshops to promote the activities within NICE. In FY2012, the National Cybersecurity Education Council was established with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Education, NIST, and over 50 private sector organizations convened by the National Cyber Security Alliance.

In FY2013, the NNLT plans to develop innovative strategies to support the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) issuance and the governmentwide adoption of cybersecurity function codes that will, for the first time, allow agencies to identify their cybersecurity workforce. The NNLT will also demonstrate the value of framework adoption to government agencies and private sector organizations who are formalizing their cybersecurity training needs. The NNLT will be identifying opportunities to tie the framework to existing and new training initiatives.

The NNLT has cultivated the trust of the Component lead agencies. In FY2013, NNLT will use that trust to best support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) development of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) web portal. All of the Components have identified deliverables and milestones, and the NNLT will work to publicize the accomplishments of the Components.

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

Dr. Ernest McDuffie, NICE Project Lead, (301) 975-8897, ernest.mcduffie@nist.gov

Mr. Bill Newhouse, NICE Program Lead, (301) 975-2869, william.newhouse@nist.gov

Ms. Magdalena Benitez, (301) 975-6182, mbenitez@nist.gov

Ms. Pat Toth, (301) 975-5140, ptoth@nist.gov

The Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC), CSD’s website, is one of the most visited websites at NIST. CSRC encourages broad sharing of information security tools and practices, provides a resource for information security standards and guidelines, and identifies and links key security web resources to support industry and government users. CSRC is an integral component of all of the work that CSD conducts and produces. It is CSD’s repository for anyone wanting to access these documents and other valuable security-related information. During FY2012, CSRC had more than 51 million requests.¹

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, and serves as a vital link to CSD’s customers.

The URL for the Publications homepage is: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. Publications are organized by Topic, Family categories, and Legal Requirements to help users locate relevant information quickly.

During FY2012, the top ten most popular publications were:

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication announcement mailing list. This free email list notifies subscribers about publications that have been posted to the CSRC website. The email list is a valuable tool for more than 20,000 subscribers from the federal government, industry, and academia, and individuals with a personal interest in IT security. Individuals who are interested in subscribing to this list should visit http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html for more information.

Questions on the website should be sent to the CSRC Webmaster at: webmaster-csrc@nist.gov.

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly, (301) 975-4751, patrick.oreilly@nist.gov

Ms. Judy Barnard, (301) 975-5502, jbarnard@nist.gov

The Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum is a group that is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of security-related information among federal agencies. The Forum, which serves more than 1,100 members, strives to provide an ongoing opportunity for managers of federal information security programs to exchange information security materials in a timely manner, build upon the experiences of other programs, and reduce possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism for NIST to share information directly with federal agency information security program managers in fulfillment of NIST’s leadership mandate under FISMA. It also assists NIST in establishing and maintaining relationships with other individuals or organizations that are actively addressing information security issues within the federal government. NIST serves as the Secretariat of the Forum, providing necessary administrative and logistical support. Kevin Stine serves as the Chairperson for the Forum. Participation in Forum meetings is open to federal government employees who participate in the management of their organization’s information security program as well as their designated support contractors. There are no membership dues.

The Forum maintains an extensive email list, holds bimonthly meetings and an annual two-day conference to discuss current issues and developments of interest to those responsible for protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal systems. The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST and other federal agencies to develop and maintain a strong, proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge.

Topics of discussion at Forum meetings in FY2012 included briefings from various federal agencies on a telework reference architecture; National Archives and Records Administration’s (NARA) Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Implementation Guidance for Executive Order 13556; Federal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Security Profile; Combinatorial Methods in Software Testing; NIST SP 800-63-1, Electronic Authentication Guide; Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP); Treasury’s PIV Program Implementation; and Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management.

This year’s annual two-day offsite meeting featured updates on the computer security activities of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), the National Security Staff, and NIST. Technical sessions included briefings on evolving cybersecurity strategies, Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) security mechanisms, the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), Supply Chain Risk Management, Big Data, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), Transportation’s privacy program implementation, and a General Services Administration (GSA) Cloud implementation case study.

The number of members on the email list has grown steadily and provides a valuable resource for federal security program managers. To join, email your name, affiliation, address, phone number, title, and confirmation that you are a federal employee to sec-forum@nist.gov.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Contacts:

Mr. Kevin Stine, Chair, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, Administration, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization run by and for information systems security professionals to assist federal agencies in meeting their information systems security awareness, training, and education responsibilities. FISSEA strives to elevate the general level of information systems security knowledge for the federal government and the federal workforce. FISSEA serves as a professional forum for the exchange of information and improvement of information systems security awareness, training, and education programs. It also seeks to assist the professional development of its members.

During the 2011 conference business meeting, it was announced that NIST would make a deeper commitment to FISSEA. NIST’s plan includes a graceful transition to a NIST program supported by the current Executive Board, and include direct and formal connections with the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE).

FISSEA membership is open to information systems security professionals, professional trainers and educators, and managers responsible for information systems security training programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors of these agencies and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. There are no membership fees to join FISSEA; all that is required is a willingness to share products, information, and experiences. Business is administered by a working group that meets monthly.

FISSEA maintains a website, a mailing list, and participates in a social networking site as a means of improving communication for its members. NIST assists FISSEA with its operations by providing staff support for several of its activities and by being FISSEA’s host agency.

FISSEA membership in 2012 spanned federal agencies, industry, military, contractors, state governments, academia, the press, and foreign organizations to reach over 1,295 members in a total of ten countries. The 700 federal agency members represent 89 agencies from the executive and legislative branches of government.

The 2012 FISSEA conference returned to NIST on March 27-29, 2012, and the theme was “A New Era in Cybersecurity Awareness, Training, and Education.” The theme was chosen to reflect current projects, trends, and initiatives that provide pathways to future solutions. Approximately 184 information systems security professionals and trainers from federal agencies, academia, and industry attended. Attendees received an update on NICE activities, gained new techniques for developing and conducting training, as well as awareness and training ideas, resources, and contacts. Presenters represented NIST, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Interior, the Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD), and the Library of Congress. Presenters also represented private industry and academia. Attendees had an opportunity to visit 22 vendors on the second day. Another bonus of attending the FISSEA conference is networking.

The conference continues to be a valuable forum in which individuals from government, industry, and academia involved with information systems/cybersecurity workforce development – awareness, training, education, certification, and professionalization – may learn of ongoing and planned training and education programs and initiatives.

At each annual conference, an award is presented to a candidate selected as FISSEA Educator of the Year; this award honors distinguished accomplishments in information systems security training programs. Susan Hansche, Avaya Government Solutions/U.S. Department of State was awarded the Educator of the Year for 2011 at the 2012 FISSEA Conference. The annual FISSEA Security Awareness, Training and Education Contest consists of five categories from one of FISSEA’s three key areas of Awareness, Training, and Education. The categories are: (1) awareness poster, (2) motivational item (aka: trinkets - pens, stress relief items, t-shirts, etc.), (3) awareness website, (4) awareness newsletter, and (5) role-based training and education. Winning entries for the security awareness contest are posted to the FISSEA website. The winners for the FY2012 contest were:

New in FY 2012 was a poster session which provided an opportunity to share and tell about their specific awareness and training programs. During the poster session, conference attendees voted for their favorite selection in each category to select the “Peer’s Choice” award. Attendees selected the same newsletter, motivational item, and security training winners as the contest judging committee. However, peers selected the poster submitted by Terri Cinnamon, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Alexis Benjamin, Department of State, as the peer’s choice for website.

The 2013 FISSEA conference is being planned for March 19-21, 2013, at NIST.

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea fisseamembership@nist.gov

Contacts:

Ms. Patricia Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) is a federal advisory committee. It brings together senior professionals from industry, government, and academia to advise NIST, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Secretary of Commerce, and appropriate committees of the U.S. Congress about information security and privacy issues pertaining to unclassified federal government information systems.

In accordance with 15 U.S.C. 278g-4, the ISPAB is rechartered by the Secretary of Commerce for 2012-2013 in pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. The scope and objectives of the Board are to—

The charter (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/ispab_charter-2012-2014.pdf) defines that the Board’s membership consists of twelve members and a Chairperson. The Chairperson is appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, and the Board members are selected for their preeminence in the information technology industry or related disciplines. The term of office for each board member is four years. The ISPAB Board members are:

This advisory board of experienced, dynamic, and knowledgeable professionals provides NIST and the federal government with a rich, varied pool of people conversant with an extraordinary range of topics.

Left to Right: Annie Sokol, Chris Boyer, Kevin Fu, Toby Levin, Ed Roback, Greg Garcia, Phyllis Schneck, Dr. Pat Gallagher (NIST Director), Peter Weinberger, Charles Romine (ITL Director), and Dan Chenok (Chair, ISPAB)

The Board’s membership draws from experience at all levels of information security and privacy work. The members’ careers cover government, industry, and academia. Members have worked in the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, civil service, senior executive service, the military, some of the largest corporations worldwide, small and medium-size businesses, and some of the top universities in the nation. The members’ experience, likewise, covers a broad spectrum of activities including many different engineering disciplines, computer programming, systems analysis, mathematics, management, information technology auditing, privacy, and law. Members also have an extensive history of professional publications and professional journalism. Members have worked (and in many cases, continue to work) on the development and evolution of some of the most important pieces of information security and privacy legislation in the federal government, including the Privacy Act of 1974, the Computer Security Act of 1987, the E-Government Act (including FISMA), and other e-government services and initiatives.

In FY2012, the board lost a valuable member, Joseph Guirreri, who had diligently served the Board for the past six years. In the same year, F. Lynn McNulty, a board member (2005-2011) and a significant contributor to information security in the government, passed away on June 4th.

The Board usually meets three times per year and meetings are open to the public. NIST provides the Board with its Secretariat and meetings are usually located in Washington, D.C. In June 2012, NIST requested to host ISPAB at NIST and showcased a range of research for the Board’s discussion. The Board has received numerous briefings from federal and private sector representatives on a wide range of privacy and security topics in the past year. Areas of interest that the Board followed in FY2011-FY2012 were:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/index.html

Contact:

Ms. Annie Sokol, (301) 975-2006, annie.sokol@nist.gov

What do business invoices have in common with email? If both are done on the same computer, the business owner may want to think more about computer security information – payroll records, proprietary information, client or employee data – as essential to a business’s success. A computer failure or system breach could cost a business anything from its reputation to damages and recovery costs. The small business owner who recognizes the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The vulnerability of any one small business may not seem significant to many people, other than the owner and employees of that business. However, over 25 million U.S. businesses, comprising more than 99 percent of all U.S. businesses, are small and medium-size businesses (SMBs) of 500 employees or less (http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/us11_0.pdf). Therefore, a vulnerability common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic base. SMBs frequently cannot justify the employment of an extensive security program or a full-time expert. Nonetheless, they confront serious security challenges.

The difficulty for these businesses is to identify security mechanisms and training that are practical and cost-effective. Such businesses also need to become more educated in terms of security so that limited resources are well applied to meet the most relevant and serious threats. To address this need, NIST, the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are cosponsoring a series of training workshops on computer security for small businesses. The purpose of the workshops is to provide an overview of information security threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and techniques, with a special emphasis on providing useful information that small business personnel can apply directly.

In FY2012, twenty-five SMB outreach workshops were provided in twenty-four cities: Tulsa, Oklahoma; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Lake Charles, Louisiana; Lafayette, Louisiana; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Slidell, Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; Denver, Colorado; Nashua, New Hampshire; New Haven, Connecticut; Rochester, Minnesota; St Paul, Minnesota; St Cloud, Minnesota; Austin, Texas; San Antonio, Texas; San Diego, California; Los Angeles, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Indianapolis, Indiana; Sacramento, California; Cincinnati, Ohio; Dayton, Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; and Chillicothe, Ohio.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, planning is under way to identify locations for small business information security workshops in FY2013.

http://sbc.nist.gov

Contact:

Mr. Richard Kissel, (301) 975-5017, richard.kissel@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) is responsible for the maintenance and development of the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS 180. A hash algorithm processes a message, which can be very large, and produces a condensed representation of the message, called a message digest. A cryptographic hash algorithm is a fundamental component of many cryptographic functions, such as digital signature algorithms, key-derivation functions, keyed-hash message authentication codes (HMAC), or random number generators. Cryptographic hash algorithms are frequently used in Internet protocols or in other security applications.

In 2005, researchers developed an attack method that threatened the security of the Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1), a NIST-approved hash algorithm. Researchers at NIST and elsewhere also discovered several generic limitations in the basic Merkle-Damgard construct that is used in SHA-1 and most other existing hash algorithms. To address these vulnerabilities, NIST opened a public competition in November 2007 to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm, which would be called “SHA-3,” and would augment the Secure Hash Standard by adding the new hash algorithm.

NIST received sixty-four entries from cryptographers around the world by October 31, 2008, and selected fifty-one first-round candidates in December 2008; fourteen second-round candidates in July 2009; and five third-round candidates – BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak and Skein, on December 9, 2010, to enter the third and final round of the competition. Status reports for the first and second rounds were published as NISTIR 7620, Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition, and NISTIR 7764, Status Report on the Second Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition, respectively.

Submitters of the SHA-3 finalists were allowed to make minor adjustments to their algorithms by January 16, 2011, and the third round of the competition began on January 31, 2011, when the final submissions were posted on NIST’s hash website. A one-year public review period was provided before NIST hosted the (last) Third SHA-3 Candidate Conference (URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/Round3/March2012/) in Washington, D.C. on March 22-23, 2012, to receive public feedback on the finalists.

The cryptographic community provided an enormous amount of expert feedback throughout the competition. Most of the comments were sent to NIST and a public hash forum; in addition, many of the cryptanalysis and performance studies were published as papers in major cryptographic conferences or leading cryptographic journals. Based on the public comments and internal review of the candidates, NIST announced KECCAK as the SHA-3 winner on October 2, 2012, thus ending the five-year-long competition.

KECCAK was selected because of its large security margin, good general performance, excellent efficiency in hardware implementations, flexible design, and because its design and implementation properties complement the existing SHA-2 family of hash algorithms well. The evaluation of the finalists and the selection process was summarized in a third-round report, which was published as NISTIR 7896 in early FY2013.

NIST plans to augment the current hash standard, FIPS 180-4, to include the new SHA-3 algorithm, and publish a draft FIPS 180-5 for public review. After the close of the public comment period, NIST will revise the draft standard, as appropriate, in response to the public comments that NIST receives. A final review, approval, and promulgation process will then follow.

http://www.nist.gov/hash-competition

Contact:

Ms. Shu-jen Chang, (301) 975-2940, shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

FIPS 180 is the SHA standard. This standard has had several revisions. FIPS 180-3 was approved in October 2008 and contained five hash algorithms: SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.

In March 2012, another revision of FIPS 180 was approved: FIPS 180-4. This revision provides a general procedure for creating an initialization hash value, adds two additional secure hash algorithms (SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256) to the SHA standard, and removes a restriction that padding must be done before hash computation begins, which was required in FIPS 180-3. SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256 are more efficient alternatives to SHA-224 and SHA-256 on platforms that are optimized for 64-bit operations. Removing the restriction on the padding operation in the secure hash algorithms potentially allowed more flexibility and efficiency in implementing the secure hash algorithms in many computer network applications.

General guidelines for using hash functions are provided in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-107, Revision 1, Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms. This document provides security guidelines for achieving the desired security strengths for cryptographic applications that employ the approved cryptographic hash functions specified in FIPS 180. SP 800-107 has been revised to address the security properties of SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256, the new hash algorithms approved in FIPS 180-4. Additional security information about Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) has been provided, and the hash-based key-derivation function section has been revised to provide updated information about approved hash-based key-derivation functions that are specified in many other NIST Special Publications.

A draft of the SP 800-107 revision was issued for public comment in September 2011 and was extensively revised to address the received comments and to include discussions of the security of HMAC and randomized hashing for digital signatures. The discussions on hash-based key-derivation functions were revised to incorporate the “extraction-then-expansion” key-derivation procedure specified in SP 800-56C, Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion, and to discuss different approved hash-based key derivation functions. The revision was completed and published in August 2012.

In 2013, work will begin on a new revision of the standard (FIPS 180-5), which will contain the new hash algorithm resulting from the SHA-3 competition discussed in the Hash Algorithms and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-3 Competition section of this report.

Contacts:

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301)-975-3610, quynh.dang@nist.gov

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301)-975-2911, ebarker@nist.gov

Random numbers are needed to provide the required security for most cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers are used to generate the keys needed for encryption and digital signature applications.

In the late 1990s, a project to develop more rigorous requirements and specifications for random number generation (RNG) was initiated in coordination with the American National Standards Institute’s (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The resulting standard (X9.82) is being developed in four parts: Part 1 provides general information; Part 2 will provide requirements for entropy sources; Part 3 provides specifications for deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms; and Part 4 provides guidance on constructing random bit generators (RBGs) from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms. Parts 1, 3 and 4 have been completed; Part 2 is nearing completion.

In March 2007, NIST published SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, which contained the DRBG mechanisms in Part 3 of ANS X9.82, plus an additional DRBG mechanism. This Recommendation was revised as SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, in January 2012 to include additional capabilities identified during the development of Part 4 of ANS X9.82. The document number for SP 800-90 was modified so that two additional documents (i.e., SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation and SP 800-90C, Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions) could be included in a series on random number generation. SP 800-90A is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

SP 800-90B will address the development and testing of entropy sources, including descriptions of the validation tests that will be used by NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program to validate candidate entropy sources. SP 800-90C will provide basic guidance on the construction of RBGs from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms, pointing to Part 4 of ANS X9.82 for additional constructions and examples. Both documents have been provided for public comment at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html.

NIST’s standards activities in FY2013 will include a workshop to discuss the drafts of SP 800-90B and C, and adjudication of the comments received during the public-comment period and the workshop.

Contacts:

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, ebarker@nist.gov

Dr. John Kelsey, (301) 975-5101, john.kelsey@nist.gov

NIST continues to address cryptographic key management for the federal government, and to coordinate this guidance with other national and international organizations, industry, and academia. This guidance has been published as NIST Special Publications (SPs), which are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, specifies approved methods for key establishment using Diffie-Hellman and Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) schemes. This document, which was first published in 2006, is being revised to provide further clarification and additional methods for key derivation; this revision has been made available for public comment at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html and will be completed in FY2013.

A newly approved method for key derivation in SP 800-56A is specified in SP 800-56C, Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion, which was completed in November 2011. SP 800-56C specifies a two-step key-derivation procedure that extracts randomness from a shared secret produced during a key-agreement computation and expands the result into the required keying material. The procedure in SP 800-56C is one of the new key-derivation methods referenced in the revision of SP 800-56A.

Another related publication, SP 800-135, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, was completed in December 2010 and revised in December 2011; this document approves existing application-specific key-derivation functions used in commonly deployed protocols. These key-derivation functions are among the new key-derivation methods referenced in the revision of SP 800-56A.

Part 1 of SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1: General, provides general key-management guidance. This document was first published in 2005, and later revised in 2007. This document has been updated to include information on and references to recent work performed by the CTG; the revision was completed in July 2012.

Part 3 of SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3 Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, was first published in 2009; this document provides application-specific key management guidance and is being revised to reflect recent work on the applications and protocols discussed in the document. The revision will also include an additional section on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. In FY2013, the revision of this document will be provided for public comment.

SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems, is being developed to provide guidance on the framework of a Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS). The first draft of this document was provided for public comment in 2010 and was discussed in a subsequent workshop at NIST in late FY2010. A revised draft of this document that addressed the comments received during the public comment period and during the workshop was provided for a second public-comment period in April 2012 and discussed at a public key management workshop in September 2012. This document will be completed by mid FY2013.

SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS), is under development. This document is intended to provide refinements of the framework requirements in SP 800-130 that are appropriate for use in a CKMS used by the federal government, plus guidance on implementing, procuring, installing, configuring, and operating a Federal CKMS. A table of proposed requirements to be included in SP 800-152 was provided for public comment in August 2012 and discussed at a key management workshop in September 2012. SP 800-152 will continue to be developed during FY2013, including refining the requirements provided for public comment.

SP 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, which discusses the generation of the keys to be managed and used by NIST’s approved cryptographic algorithms, was issued for public comment in August 2011. It addresses the generation of a key using the output of a random bit generator, the derivation of a key from another key, the derivation of a key from a password, and keys generated during the use of a key-agreement scheme. This document was completed in November 2012.

A new publication is under development that is intended to provide guidance on the security strength of a cryptographic key that is used to protect data (i.e., a data-protection key), given the manner in which the key was generated and handled prior to its use to protect the target data. This document, SP 800-158, Key Management: Obtaining a Targeted Security Strength, involves a considerable amount of new research since it is an area that has not been fully addressed to date.

Key Management: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt/

Contacts: Ms. Elaine Barker (301) 975-2911 ebarker@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang (301) 975-3610 qdang@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen (301) 975-6974 llchen@nist.gov

Dr. Allen Roginsky (301) 975-3603 roginsky@nist.gov

FIPS 186, The Digital Signature Standard, specifies three techniques for the generation and verification of digital signatures that can be used for the protection of data: the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), and the Rivest-Shamir Adelman (RSA) algorithm. A digital signature is represented in a computer as a string of bits and is computed using a set of rules and a set of parameters that allow the identity of the signatory and the integrity of the data to be verified.

FIPS 186, first published in 1994, has been revised several times since then, and in April 2012, a list of changes to the current version of the standard, FIPS 186-3, was provided for public comment. The proposed changes included a reduction of restrictions on the use of random number generators and the retention and use of prime number generation seeds, and further aligns the FIPS with Public Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1. The comments received have been incorporated into the draft of a new version of the standard, which will be proposed to the Secretary of Commerce for adoption as FIPS 186-4 in FY2013. FIPS 186-3 and the proposed changes are provided at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html

Contacts: Ms. Elaine Barker (301) 975-2911 ebarker@nist.gov

Dr. Allen Roginsky (301) 975-3603 roginsky@nist.gov

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher transforms data of a fixed length, called the block size, into seemingly random data of the same length. There are many cryptographic methods that feature block ciphers to achieve an information service, such as confidentiality or authentication. Such a method is called a block cipher mode of operation, or, simply, a mode.

NIST has formally approved modes in the area of “key wrapping”, i.e., the protection of the confidentiality and integrity of cryptographic keys. NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, describes existing methods that are approved for key wrapping, and also specifies three deterministic authenticated-encryption modes: the AES Key Wrap (KW) mode, the AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP) mode, and one TDEA mode, called TKW.

NIST is also developing a set of modes in the area of “format preserving encryption” (FPE). A format is a sequence of decimal digits, such as a credit card number or a social security number; formats can also be defined for other sets of characters besides decimal digits. FPE is expected to be very useful because, in order to retrofit encryption to existing applications, it is sometimes necessary for the encrypted data to have the same format as the original data.

NIST intends to approve three schemes of the FFX framework for FPE that were submitted for consideration in recent years: FFX-base, VAES3, and BPS. (The submission documents are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/modes_development.html). A draft SP to specify and approve these methods is expected to be ready for public comment in early 2013.

Contact: Dr. Morris Dworkin (301) 975-2354 morris.dworkin@nist.gov

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve problems that would be intractable for conventional computers. An early breakthrough in this area was Shor’s algorithm, which demonstrated that quantum computers could efficiently factor integers and compute discrete logarithms. These two problems play an essential role in cryptography: they are believed to be hard for classical computers, and they are the basis for nearly all of the public-key cryptosystems that are in widespread use today. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break the existing public-key infrastructure.

The threat posed by quantum computers appears to be serious, but not immediate. While there has been dramatic progress in experimental quantum physics, the construction of large-scale quantum computers still seems to be many years away. Moreover, the discovery of Shor’s algorithm has also motivated researchers to propose so-called “post-quantum” cryptosystems – public-key cryptosystems that would be secure against quantum computers. It is hoped that these cryptosystems will allow us to maintain the public-key infrastructure in a world with quantum computers. For these reasons, NIST has started a project on post-quantum cryptography, with a view to possible future standards.

The primary focus of this project is to identify candidate quantum-resistant systems, based on algebraic codes, lattices, multivariate systems of equations, cryptographic hash functions, or any other construct that may be secure against both quantum and classical computers, as well as the impact that such post-quantum algorithms will have on current protocols and security infrastructures. The project endeavors to establish the viability of algorithms in these areas, the security of which have yet to be explained well even in the classical model, and further, to verify the claims of quantum-resistance as quantum complexity theory matures. In the event that no candidate algorithm survives this examination, NIST intends to establish computer security architectures that are not dependent upon the classical public-key cryptographic algorithms, such as the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm or the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) algorithm.

In FY2012, NIST researchers Stephen Jordan, Yi-Kai Liu, Ray Perlner, and Daniel Smith-Tone internally presented preliminary status reports in the areas of quantum computation, coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and multivariate cryptography, which included detailed surveys of the respective fields, as well as security overviews and specific results. These reports were further supplemented with a presentation from William Whyte and John Schanck from NTRU Cryptosystems on April 25, 2012, discussing the specific countermeasures being deployed in the wake of a serious attack on NTRUSign. NIST also engaged the international cryptographic community with presentations and publications by NIST researchers. At the very end of FY2011, on September 23, 2011, Stephen Jordan presented “Complexity Implications of Quantum Field Theory,” at the Schloss Dagstuhl Workshop on Quantum Cryptanalysis, discussing evidence that more modern quantum field theories may not give rise to greater computational power than the standard quantum circuit model. In the first quarter of FY2012, Daniel Smith-Tone published the paper, “On the Differential Security of Multivariate Cryptosystems,” at the Fourth International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, suggesting a new security metric for multivariate cryptography. Daniel Smith-Tone also published, “The TriTon Transformation,” discussing risky design philosophies in multivariate cryptography at the Third Workshop on Mathematical Cryptology on July 9, 2012. On September 28, 2012, at the Quantum Information Science workshop at the NIST-University of Maryland (UMD) Joint Quantum Institute, Yi-Kai Liu gave a talk on “Applications of Quantum Information in Machine Learning and Cryptography,” which discussed the role played by quantum information in security proofs for lattice-based cryptosystems.

In FY2013, NIST will continue to explore the security capacity of purported quantum-resistant technologies with the ultimate goal of uncovering the fundamental mechanisms necessary for efficient, trustworthy, and cost-effective information assurance in the post-quantum market. Upon the successful completion of this phase of the project, NIST will be prepared for possible standardization.

Contacts:

Dr. Daniel Smith-Tone, (502) 852-6010, daniel.smith@nist.gov

Mr. Ray Perlner, (301) 975-3357, ray.perlner@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu, (301) 975-6499, yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

NIST is developing a Secure Randomness Beacon that will broadcast full-entropy bit-strings. The Beacon could be used in many applications that require a secure random value (e.g., for privacy-enhanced cryptography, multiparty contract bidding, and tamper-proof voting), but is not intended for generating values that must remain secret, such as cryptographic keys. The Beacon will be designed to provide unpredictability, autonomy, and consistency. Unpredictability means that users cannot algorithmically predict bits before they are made available by the source. Autonomy means that the source is resistant to attempts by outside parties to alter the distribution of the random bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access the source in such a way that they are confident that they all receive the same random string.

Strings of bits produced by the Beacon will be posted in blocks of 512 bits every few seconds, with the number of seconds being an adjustable parameter that can vary from one second to a few minutes. Each such value will be provided as an output packet that is sequence-numbered, time-stamped, and signed, and includes the hash of the previous value, in order to chain the sequence of values together and prevent an undetected change of an output package, even by the source. Each packet will be stored for subsequent online access.

In pursuit of this goal, a prototype implementation of a public source of randomness is being developed that is conformant to SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. The Beacon’s engine uses multiple sources of entropy and leverages recently developed tests to validate an entropy source.

During FY2012, NIST continued working on implementing and enhancing the NIST Secure Randomness Beacon. CSD also initiated collaboration with NIST’s Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML) to enhance the input source of entropy for the NIST Randomness Beacon by integrating at least one quantum source, also referred to as a “truly random number.” The joint project, Quantum Randomness as a Secure Resource, received ITL’s Innovations in Measurement Science (IMS) award.

The ITL and PML collaborative work toward the integration of at least one quantum-secure source of entropy for the NIST Randomness Beacon will continue in FY2013. A quantum source will be a sequence of truly random numbers that is guaranteed by the laws of physics to be unknowable in advance of its generation, and uncorrelated with anything in the universe. With such a quantum source, the NIST Randomness Beacon can be used for a variety of security and privacy applications that could lead to unprecedented levels of network security for confidential digital applications, thus setting the foundation for a trusted common standard.

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/nist_beacon.cfm

http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm

Contacts:

Dr. Michaela Iorga, (301) 975-8431, michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Dr. Rene Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

Recently, what are known as “pairings” on elliptic curves have been a very active area of research in cryptography. A pairing is a function that maps a pair of points on an elliptic curve into a finite field. Their unique properties have enabled many new cryptographic protocols that had not previously been feasible.

In particular, identity-based encryption (IBE) is a pairing-based scheme that has received considerable attention. IBE uses some form of a person (or entity’s) identification to generate a public key. This could be an email address, for instance. An IBE scheme allows a sender to encrypt a message without needing a receiver’s public key to have been certified and distributed for subsequent use. Such a scenario is quite useful if the pre-distribution of public keys is impractical. Besides IBE, there are a number of other applications of pairing-based cryptography. These include many other identity-based cryptosystems (including signature schemes), key establishment schemes, functional and attribute-based encryption, and privacy-enhancing techniques, such as the use of anonymous credentials.

In 2008, NIST held a workshop on pairing-based cryptography. While the workshop showed that there was interest in pairing-based schemes, a common understanding was that further study was needed before NIST approved any such schemes. Starting in 2011, members of the Cryptography Technology Group (CTG) have conducted an extensive study on pairing-based cryptographic schemes. This included topics such as: the construction of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, a survey of pairing-based cryptographic schemes, implementation efficiency with respect to the required security, standard activities involving pairing-based schemes, use cases, and practical implications. This work was summarized in a technical report, presented in the first quarter of 2012. Throughout 2012, project members have been identifying use cases for pairing-based cryptography. At the NIST Cryptography for Emerging Technologies and Applications (CETA) Workshop in November 2011, there was a public call for feedback on potential use cases.

Pairing operations appear to be important tools for various cryptographic schemes used in cloud computing and privacy-enhancing environments. Besides IBE, other demanding applications have also motivated the continuation of this study. Short signatures and broadcast encryption are examples of such applications.

Contacts:

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975- 8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Modern cryptography provides powerful tools for protecting private information, but current standards are often blunt instruments for privacy protection. There are many ways CSD can develop and standardize new methods to use cryptography that enhance privacy. For example, public-key certificates used for authentication often reveal more personally identifiable information about the certificate holder than is required for a given application.

What is often at issue in accessing data or resources is not the identity of the customer, but whether the customer is a member of an eligible group. Methods that allow a user to selectively reveal and prove only a specific property (such as that the user is at least 21 years old, has a particular place of residence, or citizenship) are approaching commercial practicality. Other techniques, such as those that will eventually allow us to search encrypted databases, are still in the research stage. However, these techniques are sufficiently advanced that it behooves us to take stock of the state of the art at this point. Still other techniques, such as those that allow us to hold sealed-bid auctions without ever opening the bids, are known to be practical, yet have received little attention by those that might benefit from them. Such applications fall within the scope of what are known as secure multiparty computations.

In FY2012, NIST held a workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptographic Techniques to explore processes, procedures, and potential applications that could benefit from the ability to operate on encrypted data without decrypting it (see http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/pec-workshop.cfm). Participants at the workshop included scientists, privacy advocates, and policy experts. Having planted the seeds for cooperation among these different groups, CSD will continue to pursue this objective in FY2013.

Another major activity for this project was in support of the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) (see http://www.nist.gov/nstic). Different cryptographic techniques that may be important for this initiative are being continuously evaluated.

Contact:

Dr. Rene Peralta, (301) 975-8702, peralta@nist.gov

Pervasive computing is the emerging area in which many highly constrained devices are interconnected, typically communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in concert to accomplish some task. These systems can be found in a wide variety of fields. Sample application areas include: sensor networks, medical devices, distributed control systems, and the Smart Grid. Security can be very important in all of these areas. For example, an unauthorized party should not be able to take control of an insulin pump or the brakes on a car. There are also privacy concerns, particularly in the area of Health IT.

Because the majority of the current cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms do not fit into the constrained resources currently available. If current algorithms can be made to fit into the limited resources of constrained environments, their performance is typically not acceptable. A particular problem is the use of asymmetric (public key) algorithms. These algorithms tend to be much more computational and resource-intensive than can be easily accommodated in such constrained environments.

As a result, NIST is currently focusing on studying the NIST-approved symmetric algorithms in constrained environments. Symmetric algorithms can be used to perform encryption for confidentiality, as well as to generate message authentication codes (MAC) for message authentication. NIST has implemented the current 256-bit version of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256) to provide a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for authentication. Additionally, NIST has implemented the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to provide confidentiality, as well as the cipher-based message authentication code (CMAC) mode for authentication. An outline of these plans was provided at the Workshop on Cryptography for Emerging Technologies and Applications hosted by NIST in November 2011.

During the next year, NIST will investigate algorithms other than those currently in its Cryptographic Toolbox to find algorithms that are optimized for operating in constrained environments. NIST will analyze the resource requirements and performance characteristics of these algorithms, and utilize these block ciphers as building blocks to perform other cryptographic functions beyond encryption.

Contact:

Mr. Lawrence Bassham, (301) 975-3292, lbassham@nist.gov

In FY2012, NIST explored a few new research areas in cryptographic techniques for emerging applications. In particular, the research focused on stream ciphers, secure group communications, group signatures, and circuit complexity.

Currently, the use of AES in the Output Feedback Mode (OFB) mode and the counter (CTR) mode are approved by NIST as block cipher-based stream ciphers. However, classical stream ciphers have performance advantages for software implementations that satisfy high-throughput requirements, or for hardware implementations with constrained resources. The security and performance of some of the well-understood stream ciphers will be studied during FY2013, with a focus on stream ciphers designed for constrained environments.

Secure group communications has been shown to be important in public-safety networks, smart grids, and sensor networks. The existing schemes proposed in the research literature, such as multicast encryption schemes and group key-distribution schemes, have been considered as general solutions, but are less scalable for practical applications. In FY2012, CSD looked into existing results and explored different application scenarios. The requirements and the restrictions were also discussed. In FY2013, NIST will pursue well-tailored solutions for secure group communications.

Group signatures have been investigated for more than two decades. In general, a group signature scheme allows a group member to generate a signature on behalf of the group without revealing information about the specific signer. Numerous schemes have been proposed and analyzed in the research literature. Such an anonymity feature is useful for security applications in cloud computing. In FY2013, NIST will further explore the features and underlying mathematical structures for the existing schemes.

Any function can be described as a circuit with operations modulo 2. If the circuit contains only additions, then the function is linear. Nonlinearity, which is fundamental to cryptographic applications, can be achieved only by the use of multiplications. The standard description of the AES S-Box, which is the nonlinearity component for AES, is that it does inversion in the field of 256 elements. The field’s standard measure of nonlinearity of a function F is the Hamming distance of the spectrum of F to the closest linear spectrum. A different measure of nonlinearity is simply the number of multiplications necessary and sufficient to compute the function. This measure is called “multiplicative complexity.” CSD’s research in Boolean circuit optimization has yielded circuits with optimal or near-optimal multiplicative complexity for a large class of functions. The resulting circuits have large linear components. CSD developed new heuristics for reducing the number of gates in these components. The net result is a significant reduction in the size and/or depth of many circuits used in cryptography. These include a circuit of depth 16 and size 128 for the AES S-Box, as well as reduced size/depth circuits for high-speed cryptography in characteristic 2. Additionally, circuits with a small number of multiplications can be used to significantly improve the communication complexity of secure multiparty computations, as well as the size of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.

Contacts:

Dr. Meltem Sonmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. Rene Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, llchen@nist.gov

Dr. James Nechvatal, (301) 975-5048, james.nechvatal@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

NIST hosted a workshop on Cryptography for Emerging Technologies and Applications on November 7-8, 2011. The purpose of the workshop was to identify the cryptographic requirements for emerging technologies and applications.

The workshop provided an opportunity for the government, industry, research and academic communities to identify cryptographic challenges encountered in their development of emerging technologies and applications, and to learn about NIST’s current cryptographic research activities, programs, and standards development.

In preparation for the workshop, NIST called for the submission of abstracts that highlight the cryptographic challenges identified during the research and development of emerging technologies and applications. Examples of emerging or evolving technology spaces include: sensor and building networks, mobile devices, smart objects/Internet of things, and cyber physical systems (CPSs). Examples of cryptographic requirements for emerging sectors include performance or resource issues, cryptographic services (such as anonymous or group signatures), or key management challenges. Abstract submitters were also encouraged to identify, through their submissions, other areas of cryptography for emerging technologies and applications.

NIST received twenty-eight abstracts. Out of these abstracts, eleven were selected for presentation during the workshop. In addition to these presentations, the workshop included two keynote talks, an invited talk, and six presentations by NIST. An open floor discussion concluded the workshop. The workshop agenda and its slide presentations are available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/ceta-2011-agenda.cfm.

Contacts:

Dr. Michaela Iorga, (301) 975-8431, michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301) 975-3610, quynh.dang@nist.gov

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, ebarker@nist.gov

The FIPS 140, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, standard defines the security requirements for cryptographic modules and is applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptography-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106, and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347. The standard must be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract.

The current version of the standard is FIPS 140-2. A proposed revision, FIPS 140-3, will supersede FIPS 140-2, and is under development as a result of the reexamination and reaffirmation of FIPS 140-2. The draft revision of the standard adds new security requirements that are imposed on cryptographic modules to reflect the latest advances in technology and security, and to mirror other new or updated standards published by NIST in the areas of cryptography and key management. Additionally, software and firmware requirements are addressed in a new area dedicated to software and firmware security, while another new area specifying requirements to protect against non-invasive attacks is also provided.

Draft FIPS 140-3 provides four increasing qualitative levels of security that are intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments. The security requirements cover areas related to the secure design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module physical ports and logical interfaces; roles, authentication, and services; software security; operational environment; physical security; physical security – non-invasive attacks; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The standard provides users with a specification of security features that are required at each of four security levels, flexibility in choosing security requirements, a guide to ensuring that the cryptographic modules incorporate necessary security features, and the assurance that the modules are compliant with cryptography-based standards.

During FY2011, the majority of the resolutions to the public comments received on the second draft were incorporated in the draft FIPS and provided to NIST and CSE Canada for a final internal technical review. In response to comments received on the second draft, the following possible changes or additions to the previous draft document were proposed: a description of the assumed thread models for each security level; an insertion of missing definitions for terms and acronyms; changes to the Trusted Channel requirements; the removal of the Trusted Role; the inclusion of an identity-based authentication mechanism that would be allowed at Security Level (SL) 2; the addition of a self-initiated cryptographic output capability and remote control capability; the inclusion of additional integrity-technique requirements for the software components of a cryptographic module; a restructure of the annexes and enhancement of the requirements for the allowed operator-authentication mechanisms; an update of the list of the non-invasive attacks methods for the security functions; and an update of the requirements for the allowed modifiable operating environments.

During the process of addressing the public comments received on the second draft, NIST determined that additional feedback would be required from the public to resolve gaps and inconsistencies between the comments received for particular sections of the second draft of FIPS 140-3. As a result, NIST requested additional public comments in August 2012 on several clearly identified sections. More details about the project and a timetable can be found at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/FIPS140_3/.

During FY2013, all received comments on the identified issues will be addressed and the final FIPS 140-3 document will be prepared for a final internal review and approval by the Secretary of Commerce.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/FIPS140_3/

Contact:

Dr. Michaela Iorga, (301) 975-8431, michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, was published in February 2005 to satisfy policy directives specified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12). The majority of federal workers now have Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards; however, the PIV card has not yet been embraced as a mechanism for logical access to IT resources. The unavailability of test PIV cards has been identified as an impediment to deployment for this purpose.

To facilitate the development of applications and middleware that support the PIV card, CSD developed a reference set of smart cards. Each set includes sixteen cards: nine valid cards and seven cards that contain invalid data. The valid cards differ in terms of the cryptographic algorithms used to sign the data objects, the types and sizes of the cardholder’s key pairs, and in the presence or absence of optional data objects. The invalid cards include cards that are expired, cards that have certificates that have been revoked, and cards with data objects that have invalid signatures.

This set of test cards includes not only examples that are similar to cards that are currently issued today, but also examples of cards with features that are expected to appear in cards that will be issued in the future. For example, while the certificates and data objects on most, if not all, cards issued today are signed using RSA PKCS #1 v1.5, the set of test cards includes examples of certificates and data objects that are signed using each of the algorithms and key sizes approved for use with PIV cards, including the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Similarly, the infrastructure supporting the test cards provides examples of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses that are signed using each of these signature algorithms. The set of test cards also includes certificates with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) subject public keys, in addition to RSA subject public keys, as is permitted by Table 3-1 of SP 800-78-3, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. The set of test cards, collectively, also includes all of the mandatory and optional data objects listed in Section 3 of SP 800-73-3 Part 1, except for Cardholder Iris Images. Several of the cards include a Key History object, along with retired key management keys. The certificates that appear on the test cards, both the cardholders’ certificates and the content signers’ certificates, were issued from a simple two-level hierarchy.

The initial work of developing the test cards was performed during FY2011. In early FY2012, CSD created a few sets of test cards, which were distributed to organizations that had previously volunteered to serve as beta testers. During the beta-testing period, the test cards were used in a few different environments, and it was determined that no changes needed to be made to the specifications for the cards. In late FY2012, NIST began the production of the final sets of test cards, and the cards are now available as NIST Special Database 33 (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/testcards.html).

For further details on the PIV project, see the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) and FIPS 201 Revision Efforts section.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/testcards.html

Contacts:

Dr. David Cooper, (301) 975-3194, david.cooper@nist.gov

Mr. William Polk, (301) 975-3348, william.polk@nist.gov

To support the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, NIST developed SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline, and its subsequent revision, SP 800-63-1, was published at the end of last year. The OMB policy memorandum defines four levels of authentication in terms of assurance about the validity of an asserted identity. SP 800-63-1 gives technical requirements and examples of authentication technologies that meet the requirements by making individuals demonstrate possession and control of a secret for each of the four levels. In FY2013, NIST plans to develop a minor revision to the SP 800-63-1 identity-proofing requirements to better accommodate medical professionals.

In the course of developing the revision to the Electronic Authentication Guideline, NIST researchers have come across gaps that prevent large-scale adoption of secure authentication online. Two such areas are revocation in complex federated environments and biometric authentication in unattended scenarios.

With regard to revocation, a large number of Identity Management Systems (IDMSs) are being deployed worldwide that use different technologies for the population of their users. With the diverse set of technologies, and the unique business requirements for organizations to federate, there is no uniform approach to the federation process. Similarly, there is no uniform method to revoke credentials or their associated attribute(s) in a federated community. In the absence of a uniform revocation method, NIST researchers have been exploring and developing a model for revocation of credentials and attributes in a federated environment, with a particular focus on identifying missing requirements.

To address the use of biometrics in authentication for transactions online, NIST is considering high-level requirements for the use of biometrics in a multi-factor authentication framework, such as liveness detection (sometimes called biometric spoof detection), biometric template protection (for revoking and renewing biometric credentials), and web services standards for securely and uniformly handling biometric data online. NIST is leading multi-year projects and collaborating with the international research and standards communities in all three of these areas.

With respect to liveness detection, NIST is leading the development of the first standards activity on liveness detection and held a workshop to discuss a framework for measurement, interchangeable data, and testing in March 2012. On the topic of biometric template protection, a paper on “Criteria Towards Metrics for Benchmarking Template Protection Algorithms” was published at this year’s International Conference on Biometrics, the result of a grant from NIST and collaboration with researchers in CSD. This work was followed up with a workshop in July 2012, co-hosted with Fraunhofer and the Biometrics Institute, at the Association Française de Normalisation (AFNOR) (co-located with a biometric standards meeting). Finally, NIST’s continued efforts in the area of biometric web services have yielded NIST SP 500-288, Specification for WS-Biometric Devices, and a reference implementation of the Specification for Web Service Biometric Device (WS-BD) in both Java and .NET.

Contact:

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, llchen@nist.gov

Today, wireless networks often provide connections for end mobile devices using multiple and different radio technologies. In such a heterogeneous network, a mobile device may switch its connection to the network between different wireless technologies. Inter-technology handover has brought many challenges to existing security solutions, such as the delays caused by access authentication for each handover. New trust models for key management are also required. NIST has conducted intensive research in the security for media-independent handover and has actively participated in the IEEE 802 wireless standard activities. In FY2012, the mechanisms to provide services for proactive authentications and key distributions for inter-technology handover have been standardized in Amendment 2 for the IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover Services. The mechanisms will enable secure media-independent handover in heterogeneous networks.

In FY2013, NIST will continue to conduct research on the security mechanisms for next-generation wireless networks and pursue security solutions for group management through participation in the standards activities of the IEEE 802.21d task group.

Contact:

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, llchen@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) were developed by NIST to support the needs of the user community for strong, independently tested, and commercially available cryptographic algorithms and modules. Through these programs, NIST works with private and governmental sectors and the cryptographic community to achieve security, interoperability, and assurance of correct implementation. The goal of these programs is to promote the use of validated algorithms, modules, and products and to provide federal agencies with a security metric to use in procuring cryptographic modules. The testing carried out by independent third-party laboratories accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and the validations performed by the CMVP and CAVP programs provide this metric. Federal agencies, industry, and the public can choose cryptographic modules and/or products containing cryptographic modules from the CMVP Validated Modules List and have confidence in the claimed level of security and assurance of correct implementation.

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module testing and validation are based on underlying published standards and guidance that are developed within the Computer Security Division (CSD) in collaboration with many other organizations. As federal agencies are required to use validated cryptographic modules for the protection of sensitive nonclassified information, the validated modules and the validated algorithms that the modules contain represent the culmination and delivery of the division’s cryptography-based work to the end user.

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate, collaborative programs based on a partnership between NIST’s CSD and the Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC). The programs provide federal agencies — in the United States and Canada — confidence that a validated cryptographic algorithm has been implemented correctly and that a validated cryptographic module meets a claimed level of security assurance. The CAVP and the CMVP validate algorithms and modules used in a wide variety of products, including secure Internet browsers, secure radios, smart cards, space-based communications, munitions, security tokens, storage devices, and products supporting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and electronic commerce. A module may be a standalone product, such as a virtual private network (VPN), smart card or toolkit, or one module may be used in several products; as a result, a small number of modules may be incorporated within hundreds of products. Likewise, the CAVP validates cryptographic algorithms that may be integrated in one or more cryptographic modules.

The two validation programs (the CAVP and CMVP) provide documented methodologies for conformance testing through defined sets of security requirements. Security requirements for the CAVP are found in the individual validation system documents containing the validation test suites that are required to assure that the algorithm has been implemented correctly. The validation system documents are designed for each FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithm. Security requirements for the CMVP are found in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and the associated test metrics and methods in Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2. Annexes to FIPS 140-2 reference the underlying cryptographic algorithm standards or methods. Federal agencies are required to use modules that were validated as conforming to the provisions of FIPS 140-2. The CMVP developed Derived Test Requirements associated with FIPS 140-2 to define the security requirements and the test metrics and methods to ensure repeatability of tests and equivalency in results across the testing laboratories.

General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

Vendor selects a lab; NVLAP Accredited Submits module for testing;

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FIPS 140-2 CST Lab

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The CMVP reviews the cryptographic modules validation requests and, as a byproduct of the review, is attentive to emerging and/or changing technologies and the evolution of operating environments and complex systems during the module validation review activities. Likewise, the CAVP reviews the cryptographic algorithm validation requests submitted by the accredited laboratories. With these insights, the CAVP and CMVP can perform research and development of new test metrics and methods as they evolve. Based on this research, the CAVP and CMVP publish implementation guidance to assist vendors, testing laboratories, and the user community in the latest programmatic and technical guidance. This guidance provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight for successful conformance testing, validation, and revalidation.

FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validated Modules by Year and Level

(November 30, 2012)

The unique position of the validation programs gives CMVP the opportunity to acquire insight during the validation review activities and results in practical, timely, and up-to-date guidance that is needed by the testing laboratories and vendors to move their modules and products out to the user community in a timely and cost-effective manner and with the assurance of third-party conformance testing. This knowledge and insight provide a foundation for future standards development.

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated improved quality and security assurance of cryptographic modules. The latest set of statistics, which are collected quarterly from each of the testing laboratories, shows that 8 percent of the cryptographic algorithms and 61 percent of the cryptographic modules brought in for voluntary testing had security flaws that were corrected during testing. Without this program, the federal government would have had less than a 50 percent chance of buying correctly implemented cryptography. To date, over 1,850 cryptographic module validation certificates have been issued, representing over 4,275 modules that were validated by the CMVP. These modules have been developed by more than 400 domestic and international vendors.

FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validation Certificates by Fiscal Year and Level

(November 30, 2012)

The CAVP issued 2,225 algorithm validations and the CMVP issued 191 module validation certificates in FY2012. The number of algorithms and modules submitted for validation continues to grow, representing significant growth in the number of validated products expected to be available in the future.`

CAVP Validation Status By FYs

Updated As Wednesday, October 03, 2012

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

Contacts:

CMVP Contact:

Mr. Randall J. Easter, (301) 975-4641, randall.easter@nist.gov

CAVP Contact:

Ms. Sharon Keller, (301) 975-2910, sharon.keller@nist.gov

NIST’s Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) and Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) work closely throughout the specification and guideline development process to develop guidance and specifications for cryptographic-based security that can be tested at the algorithm level to provide assurance that the algorithms are implemented correctly. The CTG is responsible for developing Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publications (SPs), which contain guidance for cryptographic-based security. This includes the specification of approved cryptographic algorithms and the development of guidelines for using these cryptographic mechanisms to provide secure and reliable protection for federal information. NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) is responsible for providing assurance that the algorithms are implemented correctly. The CAVP does this by designing and developing conformance testing for implementations of these algorithms.

The conformance tests consist of a suite of validation tests for each approved cryptographic algorithm. These tests exercise the mathematical formulas and the algorithmic requirements detailed in the algorithm to assure that the detailed specifications are implemented correctly and completely. If the implementer deviates from or excludes any part of these instructions or requirements, the validation test will fail, indicating that the algorithm implementation does not function properly or is incomplete.

CAVP developed validation tests are performed by accredited testing laboratories on a vendor’s algorithm implementation using automated known-answer tests, which compare the result from a cryptographic operation with a specific input against the expected result. They provide a uniform way to assure that the cryptographic algorithm implementation adheres to the detailed specifications.

There are several types of validation tests, all designed to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are not limited to, Known-Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, and Multi-Block Message Tests. The Known-Answer Tests are designed to test the conformance of the implementation under test (IUT) to the various specifications in the reference document. This involves testing the components of the algorithm to assure that they are implemented correctly. The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the entire IUT. This test is designed to detect the presence of implementation flaws that are not detected with the controlled input of the Known-Answer Tests. The types of implementation flaws detected by this validation test include pointer problems, insufficient allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test (MMT) is designed to test the ability of the implementation to process multi-block messages, which require the chaining of information from one block to the next.

Automated security testing and test suite development are integral components of the CAVP. The CAVP encompasses validation testing for FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithms. Cryptographic algorithm validation is a prerequisite to the cryptographic module validation performed by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The testing of cryptographic algorithm implementations is performed by independent third-party laboratories. The CAVP develops and maintains a Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System (CAVS) tool that automates the cryptographic algorithm validation testing.

During the last few years, the scope of requirements within the CTG’s publications has expanded to include not only an algorithm’s specification, but also how an algorithm should be used. Many of these requirements are outside the scope of the algorithm boundary and therefore cannot be tested at the algorithm level by the CAVP. Some of the requirements are routinely tested within NIST’s Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), which validates cryptographic modules. Other requirements could potentially be tested by the CMVP, while others cannot; in the latter case, the fulfillment of the requirements is the responsibility of entities using, installing, or configuring applications or protocols that use the cryptographic algorithms. For example, depending on the design of a cryptographic module, it may not be possible for the module to determine whether or not a specific key is used for multiple purposes, a situation that is strongly discouraged.

The CAVS tool currently has algorithm validation testing for the following cryptographic algorithms:

In FY2013, the CAVP expects to augment the CAVS tool to provide, at a minimum, algorithm validation testing for:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp

Contacts:

Ms. Sharon Keller, (301) 975-2910, sharon.keller@nist.gov

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

CSD has contributed to the activities of the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), which issued ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, and ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on July 1, 2008. These efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic modules to the global community.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 WG3 has progressed on the revision of ISO/IEC 19790 and the revision of ISO/IEC 24759 for which Randall J. Easter of CSD is the editor. The revision of 19790 was completed, and it was published August 15, 2012. ISO/IEC 19790:2012 was also adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The first Committee Draft (CD) of 24759 was completed in July 2012 and circulated for national body comment. It is expected that the revision of 24759 will be published in FY2013.

Work is nearing completion on the Technical Report document, ISO/IEC 30104 “Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements,” for which Randall J. Easter of CSD is the editor. A final draft of 30104 was completed in June 2012 and circulated for national body comment.

Work is progressing on a new standard document, ISO/IEC 17825 “Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic,” for which Randall J. Easter of CSD is the editor. The second working draft of 17825 was completed in June 2012 and circulated for national body comment.

National body comments for the above three documents will be addressed at the 45th SC 27 WG 3 meeting to be held in Rome, Italy, in October 2012.

A new work item was proposed (NWIP) at the 44th SC 27 WG 3 meeting, which was held in May 2012, to address “Cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms conformance testing.” It is expected to be approved as a new work item at the 45th SC 27 WG 3 with Randall J. Easter of CSD appointed as editor.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/