NIST SP 800-176 日本語訳

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-176

PATRICK O’REILLY, EDITOR Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology

CO-EDITORS:

Larry Feldman Greg Witte G2, Inc.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Dr. Willie E. May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

DISCLAIMER: ANY MENTION OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY; IT DOES NOT IMPLY NIST RECOMMENDATION OR ENDORSEMENT, NOR DOES IT IMPLY THAT THE PRODUCTS MENTIONED ARE NECESSARILY THE BEST AVAILABLE FOR THE PURPOSE.

The Computer Security Division (CSD), a component of the Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for protection of non-national security federal information systems. NIST standards and guidelines are developed in an open, transparent, and collaborative manner that enlists broad expertise from around the world. While developed for federal agency use, these resources are voluntarily adopted by other organizations because they are effective and accepted globally.

The need for cybersecurity standards and best practices that address interoperability, usability and privacy continues to be critical for the Nation. CSD continues to align its resources to enable greater development and application of practical, innovative security technologies and methodologies that enhance our ability to address current and future computer and information security challenges. Our foundational research and applied cybersecurity programs continue to advance in many areas including cryptography, roots of trust, identity and access management, advanced security testing and measurement, cyber-physical systems, and public safety networks.

Trust is crucial to the broad adoption of our standards and guidelines, including our cryptographic standards and guidelines. To ensure that our cryptography resources have been developed according the highest standard of inclusiveness, transparency and security, NIST initiated a formal review of our cryptographic standards development efforts in 2014. We documented and solicited public comment on the principles and rigorous processes we use to engage stakeholders and experts in industry, academia, and government to develop and revise these standards. We anticipate a final report in 2015 that will serve as a basis for our future standards development and revision efforts.

Increasing the trustworthiness and resilience of the IT infrastructure is a significant undertaking that requires a substantial investment in the architectural design and development of our systems and networks. A disciplined and structured set of systems security engineering processes that starts with and builds on well-established international standards provides an important starting point. Draft Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated Approach to Building Trustworthy Resilient Systems, issued in May 2014, helps organizations to develop a more defensible and survivable information technology infrastructure. This resource, coupled with other NIST standards and guidelines, contributes to systems that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks and other threats.

Strong partnerships with diverse stakeholders are vital to the success of our technical programs. In February 2014, NIST issued the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity as directed in Executive Order 13636. The Framework, created through collaboration between industry and government, consists of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection of critical infrastructure. Its approach helps owners and operators of critical infrastructure to manage cybersecurity-related risk. Collaborations continue as NIST works with stakeholders from across the country and around the world. Working closely with standards developing organizations, industry and interagency partners, we are evolving and expanding security automation capabilities to help organizations manage and measure the security of systems and technologies.

Active engagement with diverse stakeholders continues to be critical to our success. In the federal space, this interaction is most prominent in our strengthened collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common foundation for information security across the federal government. Our cybersecurity awareness, training, and education programs also exemplify the importance of engagements with academic institutions, federal agencies, small and medium businesses and others to increase awareness and enhance the overall cybersecurity posture of the Nation.

For many years, CSD, in collaboration with our global partners across industry, academia, and government, has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s critical information and infrastructure. We look forward to strengthening these relationships as we lead the development and practical application of scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices.

To participate in any CSD research areas – whether current or future – or to learn more about our programs and activities, please visit http://csrc.nist.gov.

Matthew Scholl Acting Division Chief

Acting Chief and, Deputy Chief, Computer Security Division

(Acting Group Manager) Cryptographic Technology Group

Security Components and Mechanisms Group

Secure Systems and Applications Group

Security Outreach and Integration Group

Security Testing, Validation and Measurement Group

The Computer Security Division’s computer scientists, mathematicians, IT specialists, support staff and others support CSD’s mission and responsibilities through five groups that are described in the following sections:

Research, develop, engineer, and standardize cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.

The Cryptographic Technology Group’s (CTG) work in the field of cryptography includes researching, analyzing and standardizing cryptographic technology, such as hash algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques, key management, authentication, and random number generation. The CTG’s goal is to identify and promote methods to enhance trust in communications, data, and storage through cryptographic technology, encouraging innovative development and helping technology users to manage risk.

In FY 2014, the CTG continued to make an impact in the field of cryptography, both within and outside the Federal Government, by collaborating with national and international agencies, academic and research organizations, and standards bodies to develop interoperable security standards and guidelines. In addition, the CTG worked with industry partners to promote the use of NIST-approved cryptographic methods.

The NIST cryptographic standards’ program standardizes cryptographic primitives, algorithms, schemes, and guidelines in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPSs), NIST Special Publications (SPs), and NIST Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIRs). The NIST standardized cryptographic tools have been adopted as standards by standards-setting organizations, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), and have been implemented on a variety of platforms.

In FY 2014, in response to public concerns about NIST cryptographic standards -in particular, the DUAL_EC_DRBG, a deterministic random number generator specified in SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators—NIST initiated a review of the cryptographic standards development process. The CTG summarized the development process for each cryptographic standard and provided materials and presentations to the NIST Visiting Committee on Advanced Technology (VCAT) and a NIST Committee of Visitors (COV), consisting of experts invited by the VCAT, to conduct the review. A summary for this review is provided in the Cryptographic Standards and Guidelines Process Review section of this annual report.

CTG researchers were highly engaged and productive in several critical cryptographic areas, such as post-quantum cryptography, elliptic curve cryptography, privacy-enhancing cryptography, and lightweight cryptographic schemes for constrained environments. The CTG has collaborated with many universities internationally, and research results were published in the major cryptography conferences and journals. The CTG also held workshops and conferences, as well as hosted guest researchers.

Several guidelines on cryptographic applications were published in various areas, such as key management, Internet protocols, and trusted platforms. The CTG contributed to other CSD cybersecurity projects, such as the Smart Grid and Personal Identity Verification (PIV) standards. The CTG also worked closely with the Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group of the CSD on FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP), and the Cryptographic Module Validation Programs (CMVP).

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Research, develop, and standardize foundational security mechanisms, protocols, and services.

The SCMG’s security research focuses on the development and management of foundational building-block security mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated into a wide variety of mission-critical U.S. information systems. The group’s work spans the spectrum from near-term hardening and improvement of systems, to the design and analysis of next-generation, leap-ahead security capabilities. Computer security depends fundamentally on the level of trust of computer software and systems. This work, therefore, focuses strongly on assurance-building activities ranging from the analysis of software configuration settings, to advanced trust architectures, and to testing tools that identify flaws in software modules. This work also focuses significantly on increasing the applicability and effectiveness of automated techniques, wherever feasible. The SCMG conducts collaborative research with government, industry, and academia. Outputs of this research consist of prototype systems, software tools, demonstrations, guidelines, and other documentary resources.

Collaborating extensively with government, academia, and the private sector, SCMG works on a variety of topics, such as:

In FY 2014, collaborators and the associated collaborations have included Carnegie Mellon University (test development environment), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (practical application of combinatorial coverage measurement tool), the University of Texas at Arlington (covering array generation algorithm), Mexico’s Centro Nacional de Metrología (constraints for a testing coverage tool), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (practical application for combinatorial coverage measurement), U.S. Air Force Test and Evaluation (a new event sequence testing method), the University of Texas Dallas and East Carolina University (safety-critical systems testing), the National Science Foundation (cybersecurity metrics and assurance building), the National Security Agency (secure software tool chain competition development), and the Department of Homeland Security (incident coordination).

SCMG accomplishments include updates to the Advanced Combinatorial Testing System (ACTS) software and documentation, and the NIST Biometrics Conformance Test Software (BioCTS) 2014 biometric conformance testing tool and test assertions.

Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger, (301) 975-3176, lee.badger@nist.gov

Integrate and apply security technologies, standards and guidelines for computing platforms and information systems.

SSAG’s security research focuses on identifying emerging and high-priority technologies, and on developing security solutions that will have a high impact on the U.S. critical infrastructures. The group conducted research and development on behalf of government and industry from the earliest stages of technology development through proof-of-concept, reference and prototype implementations and demonstrations. In addition, the group worked to transfer new technologies to industry; to produce new standards and guidance for federal agencies and industry; and to develop tests, test methodologies, and assurance methods.

SSAG investigated the security concerns associated with such areas as mobile devices, cloud computing and virtualization, identity management, access control and authorization management, and software assurance. SSAG’s research helps to meet federal information security requirements that may not be fully addressed by existing technology. The group collaborated extensively with government, academia, and private sector entities.

Example successes from this work include:

In particular, the SSAG released an open-source reference implementation of ANSI/INCITS 499, Next Generation Access Control. The group also published SP 800-162, Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations, providing the first authoritative definition of ABAC. In support of the Federal Government’s mobile security initiatives, the group published SP 800-163, Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications, to provide agencies with guidelines on how to test mobile applications for government use. In support of the Federal Government’s cloud computing initiatives, the group led the NIST Security Working Group that published the NIST Cloud Computing - Security Reference Architecture. In support of the recently revised FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, six PIV-related 800-series SPs were revised. In addition to these, draft SP 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials, was published to guide the implementation and deployment of PIV credentials for mobile devices.

To improve access to new technologies, the group also chaired, edited, and participated in the development of a wide variety of national and international security standards.

Mr. David Ferraiolo, (301) 975-3046, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Develop, integrate, and promote the mission-specific application of information security standards, guidelines, best practices, and technologies.

The U.S. economy, citizens, and government rely on information technology (IT), so the protection of the IT and information infrastructure is critical. SOIG leverages broad cybersecurity and risk-management expertise to develop, integrate, and promote security standards, guidelines, tools, technologies, methodologies, tests, and measurements to address cybersecurity needs in many areas of national and international importance.

The SOIG collaborates with stakeholders to address cybersecurity considerations in many diverse program areas, including the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) supply chain, Smart Grid, Electronic Voting, Cyber Physical and Industrial Control Systems, Health Information Technology, and the National Public Safety Broadband Network. The group produces standards and guidelines through the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) implementation program to help federal agencies build strong cybersecurity risk-management programs. In each of these program areas, the group extends outreach to stakeholders across federal, state, and local governments; industry; academia; small businesses; and the public. The SOIG also leads several broad cybersecurity awareness, training, education, and outreach efforts, including the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the Federal Computer Security Managers’ Forum, and the Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA).

Key to the group’s success is the ability to interact with a broad constituency to ensure that SOIG’s program is consistent with national objectives related to or impacted by information security. Through open and transparent public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation, the group works to address critical cybersecurity challenges, enable greater U.S. industrial competitiveness, and facilitate the practical implementation of scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices.

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Advance information security testing, measurement science, and conformance.

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on cryptography for the protection of information and communications used in electronic commerce, critical infrastructures, and other application areas. The STVMG supports the testing and validation of cryptographic modules and the cryptographic algorithms specified in NIST standards. These cryptographic modules and algorithms enable products and systems to provide security services, such as confidentiality, integrity authentication, and source authentication. Although cryptography provides security, poor designs or weak algorithms can render a product insecure and place highly sensitive information at risk. When protecting sensitive data, Federal Government agencies require a minimum level of assurance that cryptographic products meet established security requirements and use only tested and validated cryptographic modules and algorithms.

STVMG’s testing-focused activities include validating cryptographic algorithm implementations, cryptographic modules, and Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)-compliant products; developing test suites and test methods; providing implementation guidance and technical support to industry forums; and conducting education, training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with independent Cryptographic and Security Testing laboratories that are accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent laboratory test report and test evidence, the Validation Program then validates the implementation under test. NIST publishes, through public websites, lists of the validations awarded.

Mr. Michael Cooper, (301) 975-8077, michael.cooper@nist.gov

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in December 2002, recognized the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, included duties and responsibilities for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division (CSD). In 2014, the CSD addressed its FISMA responsibilities through the following activities:

In FY 2014, CSD continued to research and develop guidance for a broad array of technical areas, including supply-chain risk management; security analytics; cloud, mobile, and privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled security; and cyber-physical and embedded systems. The staff and guest researchers within CSD have collaborated with global partners from government, industry, and academia, making significant contributions to help secure critical information and infrastructures. The following sections describe the CSD’s programs and project achievements that include extensive research and development for high-quality, cost-effective security and privacy mechanisms, standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics that address current and future computer and information security challenges.

Recognizing that the national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of its critical infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in February 2013. This EO directed NIST to work with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework – based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices − for reducing cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures.

The Cybersecurity Framework provides a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to help owners and operators of critical infrastructures and other interested entities identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity-related risk, while protecting business confidentiality, individual privacy, and civil liberties.

In FY 2014, NIST continued to work with a diverse stakeholder community to develop the Framework through an open public process. This process included:

Since the release of the Framework, NIST’s primary goal has been to raise awareness of the Framework and encourage its use as a tool to help industry sectors and organizations manage cybersecurity risks. NIST has strengthened its collaboration with critical-infrastructure owners and operators, industry leaders, government partners, and other stakeholders, building on interactions over the previous year that were crucial to the Framework’s development.

In FY 2015, NIST will continue to conduct stakeholder outreach and will work collaboratively with them to further understand stakeholder needs regarding tools and resources to enable a more effective use of the Framework. NIST will conduct additional public workshops, including a forum hosted by the Florida Center for Cybersecurity (FC2) located at the University of South Florida in Tampa on October 29-30, 2014. Periodic updates will be provided and additional events announced through the Framework website.

http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Mr. Adam Sedgewick, (301) 367-4678, adam.sedgewick@nist.gov

Figure 1 (below) shows many of the national and international standards-developing organizations (SDOs) involved in cybersecurity standardization. CSD participates in many cybersecurity standards’ activities in many of these organizations, either in leadership positions or as editors and contributors, including the BioAPI Consortium; the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG): Bluetooth Security Expert Group (BT-SEG); the International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T); various groups within the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); the North American Security Products Organization (NASPO); the Trusted Computing Group (TCG); and Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. (X9) (e.g. Financial Industry Standards X9F). Many of CSD’s publications have been the basis for both national and international standards projects.

The following write-ups discuss the CSD’s standards activities in conjunction with the InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee Cyber Security (CS1), where CSD’s Dan Benigni served as the Chair and U.S. Head of Delegation to subcommittee SC 27, and CSD’s Sal Francomacaro served as the CS1 Vice Chair.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a network of the national standards institutes of 148 countries, with representation by one member per country. The scope of ISO covers the standardization in all fields except electrical and electronic engineering standards, which are the responsibility of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

Figure 1: SDOs involved in Cybersecurity

The IEC prepares and publishes international standards for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies,including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and energy production and distribution, as well as associated general disciplines, such as terminology and symbols, electromagnetic compatibility, measurement and performance, dependability, design and development, safety, and the environment. (http://www.iec.ch/about/)

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) was formed by ISO and IEC to be responsible for international standardization in the field of Information Technology (http://www.iso.org/iso/jtc1_home.html). It develops, maintains, promotes, and facilitates the IT standards required by global markets, meeting business and user requirements concerning:

JTC 1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that produce standards relating to IT security include:

JTC 1 also has:

ANSI is a private, nonprofit (501(c)(3)) organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system, and facilitates the development of American National Standards (ANSs) by accrediting the procedures of SDOs.

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international and regional standards organizations, and encourages the adoption of international standards as national standards where they meet the needs of the U.S. user community. ANSI is the sole U.S. representative and dues-paying member of the two major non-treaty international standards organizations: ISO and, via the United States National Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS is accredited by ANSI, and serves as the ANSI Technical Advisory Group (TAG) for ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1. INCITS is sponsored by the Information Technology Industry (ITI) Council, a trade association representing the leading U.S. providers of information technology products and services.

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that focus on the creation of standards for different technology areas. Technical committees that focus on IT security and IT security-related technologies or that may require separate security standards include:

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops United States, national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses:

The scope of CS1 explicitly excludes the areas of cybersecurity standardization, which is presently under development in INCITS B10, M1, T3, T10, and T11, as well as other standard groups, such as the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), the IEEE, the IETF, the Travel Industry Association of America (TIAA), and Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The CS1 scope of work includes standardization in most of the same cybersecurity areas as are covered in the NIST CSD.

As the U.S. TAG to ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27, CS1 contributes to the SC 27 program of work on IT Security Techniques in terms of U.S. comments and contributions on SC 27 standards projects; U.S. votes on SC 27 standards documents at various stages of development; and nominates U.S. experts to work on various SC 27 projects as editors, co-editors, or in other SC 27 leadership positions. Currently, over a dozen CS1 members are serving as SC 27 document editors or co-editors on various standards projects.

All input from CS1 is processed through INCITS to ANSI, then to SC 27. It is also a conduit for getting U.S.-based new work item proposals and U.S.-developed national standards into the international SC 27 standards development process. In its international efforts, CS1 responded to all calls for U.S. contributions and/or voting positions on all international security standards projects in ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 27 in a consistent, efficient, and timely manner.

NIST’s CSD contributes to many of CS1’s national and international IT security standards efforts through its membership on CS1, where Dan Benigni served as the nonvoting chair and Sal Francomacaro as the NIST Principal voting member. Internationally, there are over 100 published standards, and almost all have been adopted as U.S. national standards. There are more than 100 current international standards projects. During FY 2014, eighteen new standards were published in SC 27, and all of them have been recommended by CS1 for adoption as U.S. national standards.

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role in the Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the national level. The following is a description of the national-level progress achieved during FY 2014 by CSD and CS1.

The NIST Policy Machine research and development has resulted in three ongoing national standards projects in CS1 in the early stages of development. They include:

Dan Benigni also served as cybersecurity standards coordinator in CSD.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

(Editor Note: Mr. Dan Benigni led this program until his recent retirement.)

CSD supports identity management standardization activities through participation in national and international standards bodies and organizations. CSD actively participates in the INCITS B10 committee, which is focused on the interoperability of Identification Cards and Related Devices. CSD has contributed and provided valuable feedback to many INCITS B10 standards in the development process. In addition, CSD also participates in the B10.12 committee. The B10.12 committee develops interoperable standards for Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts, and it is the US TAG (Technical Advisory Group) for the international ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 Working Groups 4 and 11. During FY 2014, Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, a CSD staff member; served as the U.S. Head of delegation to ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 WG4 and WG11.

CSD provides technical and editorial support in the development of national and international standards. Specifically, a CSD staff member serves as the technical editor of ANSI 504-1, Generic Identity Command Set (GICS). GICS enables PIV, PIV-Interoperable (PIV-I) and Common Access Card (CAC) card applications, and others, to be built from a single platform. GICS defines an open platform where identity applications can be instantiated, deployed, and used in an interoperable way between the credential issuers and credential users. During FY 2014, INCITS 504 Parts 1 and 2 have started an amendment process to better align them with the new NIST SP 800-73-4 (PIV) specifications.

CSD staff also provided significant input to standards of major interest to U.S. government agencies and U.S. markets. CSD played a role in the development and revision of:

During FY 2015, the INCITS B10 committee, along with the active collaboration of CSD staff, plans to:

CSD staff will continue to actively support relevant ID management standard initiatives, such as ISO/IEC 19286 (Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) protocols and services ensuring privacy) and ISO/IEC 18328 (ICC managed Devices).

CSD’s investment in these activities is motivated by new technical ideas that emerge from these ISO standards. For example, INCITS 504 is an ID platform that leverages the FIPS 201 infrastructure to support a larger number of government and enterprise initiatives. In particular, INCITS 504 aims to support initiatives such as the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). ISO/IEC 24727 aims to create an interoperability framework that increases the resilience and scalability of identity management solutions and to foster domestic and international interoperability.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

During FY 2014, CSD continued to strengthen its collaboration with the Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), in partnership with the Joint Task Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative. The JTF partners continue to develop and update key cybersecurity guidelines for protecting federal information and information systems as part of the Unified Information Security Framework. Previously, the Joint Task Force developed common security guidance in the critical areas of security controls for information systems and organizations, security assessment procedures to demonstrate security control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date information on the security state of their information systems. In addition, CSD began work with the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) to develop a high-impact security control baseline overlay for FedRAMP cloud systems in accordance with NIST standards and guidelines.

In FY 2014, CSD worked on the following three initiatives:

In FY 2014, CSD completed the following activities:

In FY 2015, CSD intends to:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma

Dr. Ron Ross, (301) 975-5390, ron.ross@nist.gov

Ms. Pat Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey, (301) 975-2827, kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

NIST’s CSD supports the development of biometric conformance-testing methodology standards and other conformity-assessment efforts through active technical participation in the development of these standards and the development of associated conformance-test architectures and test suites. These test tools are developed to promote the adoption of these standards and to support users that require conformance to selected biometric standards, product developers and testing labs. CSD’s project team contributes to the development of biometric standards and leads the InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee M1 – Biometrics and International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee (SC) 37 – Biometrics standards bodies. The CSD plans to continue this work in FY 2015.

The development of the two versions of the Biometric Conformance Test Software (BioCTS) continued. “BioCTS for ANSI/NIST” (which targets biometric transactions based on the NIST SP 500-290, and SP 500-290 Revision 1 - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information) received enhanced testing features for XML files, as well as updates to begin supporting the revision of SP 500-290; for more information see: http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ansi_standard.cfm. “BioCTS for ISO/IEC” (which targets several ISO/IEC biometric data interchange formats and profiles) received updates to add additional conformance test suites (CTSs) for selected PIV Profiles of biometric data formats (as specified in SP 800-76-2), as well as support for ISO/IEC 19794-4:2011 Amendment 2, which is an XML encoding for the finger image data format. The latest versions of BioCTS were released in September 2014, together with documentation and sample data.

Intensive research was performed to study the feasibility of implementing the existing conformance-testing tools within a cloud-computing setting. This research was conducted on an Apache Hadoop platform, investigating implementation requirements, benefits and potential applications for biometric conformance testing. To progress the work beyond the original goal of research, the development of a solution was performed, resulting in a working implementation of an existing CSD BioCTS CTS (developed in Microsoft C#) being incorporated into a Linux and Java-based Apache Hadoop MapReduce job. This work successfully overcame several initial implementation problems, and resulted in a release package and methodology for using BioCTS software in Apache Hadoop (for more information on Apache Hadoop see: https://hadoop.apache.org/). The process, problems, and methods used to overcome them were presented at Global Identity Summit 2014. BioCTS Web, an ASP.NET Web application that runs existing BioCTS CTSs, was updated to support more testing suites. For more information on BioCTS in the Cloud, see: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocts_cloud.cfm.

Figure 2: BioCTS in the Cloud

In addition to the conformance test tools, additional supporting tools were developed and released to benefit users of the test tools. They include a Data Extractor, which allows users to extract data from an ANSI/NIST-ITL formatted file; a Directory Hash Summary program, which allows users to generate a SHA-256 hash value for every file within the a given directory recursively; and enhanced statistical features within BioCTS for both versions of BioCTS. In addition, advanced editing features were incorporated in BioCTS for ANSI/NIST.

Figure 3: Biometric Conformance Test Software by CSD

The BioCTS software installer files, as well the ancillary tools and sample data can be downloaded from: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.cfm.

A number of technical contributions towards the development of ANSI/NIST and international standards were submitted. They included technical contributions on international biometric data interchange formats and their associated conformance testing methodologies, as well as on the SP 500-290 Revision 1 and the associated NIEM XML Schema. A member of the project team, Dylan Yaga, CSD, received the INCITS Standards Service Award for his technical excellence, performance and dedication towards supporting the development of biometric standards. (Further details of Dylan’s award is located in the Honors and Awards section of this annual report - page 77.)

Outreach efforts in FY 2014 in support of biometric standards development and conformity assessment included contributions on the test tools to the standards developers (in support of ongoing development projects), and presentations on ANSI/NIST and international biometric standards and related conformity assessment activities. The work included the development of technical publications, the review of research papers for external publications, and participation in conference program committees. This effort included participation in the program development of the Global Identity Summit conference (previously the Biometric Consortium Conferences), which was held September 16-18, 2014, in Tampa, Florida. The conference included nearly 1500 attendees from 30 countries representing government, industry, and academia. NIST’s CSD supported a booth at the conference’s technical exposition and a member of the project team (Dylan Yaga) presented material regarding the conformance test tool development project. Over 140 speakers participated in the program.

Global Identity Summit conference program including released presentations: http://www.biometrics.org/bc2014/program.pdf

BioCTS 2014 - Biometric Conformance Test Tool Downloads: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.cfm

Mr. Dylan Yaga, (301) 975-6004, dylan.yaga@nist.gov

(Editor Note: Mr. Fernando Podio led this program until his recent retirement.)

The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program provides a framework in which many federal agencies come together to coordinate their networking and IT research and development (R&D) efforts. CSD remained committed to the value of communicating its R&D efforts to other federal colleagues and identifying the opportunities to support R&D efforts throughout the Federal Government.

In FY 2014, the NITRD Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CSIA) Interagency Working Group (IWG) monthly meetings provided an opportunity to learn and share information about ongoing research related to the themes and thrusts expressed in the Strategic Plan for the Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development. NIST’s CSD briefed the IWG on initiatives in privacy engineering, combinatorial testing, android application testing, cyber-physical systems, big data, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), and usability.

With the NITRD CSIA Senior Steering Group, CSD participated in the dialogue and planning that resulted in the creation of the National Privacy Research Forum to address concerns about privacy that were voiced in recent President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) reports and to develop a strategic plan for privacy R&D in FY 2015.

CSD is also a regular participant in the coordination activities of the federal Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering (SCORE) Committee. SCORE enables technology transfer through the sharing of NIST cybersecurity expertise and output. The SCORE committee interacts with federal leaders and reports to the National Science & Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland & National Security.

Mr. Bill Newhouse, (301) 975-2869, william.newhouse@nist.gov

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment across the United States. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director of NIST. HAVA directs NIST to provide technical support to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, security, and laboratory accreditation. As part of NIST’s efforts, CSD supports the activities of the EAC related to voting equipment security.

In the past year, NIST continued to support the EAC in finalizing changes to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 1.1. The security guidelines were updated in FY 2012 to improve the auditability of voting systems, to provide greater software integrity protections, to expand and improve access-control requirements, and to help ensure that cryptographic security mechanisms are implemented properly. In addition, CSD supported the efforts of the EAC and Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) of DOD to improve the voting process for citizens under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act (UOCAVA) by leveraging electronic technologies. The team worked with the TDCG’s UOCAVA Working Group to develop a risk analysis on the technologies used in current UOCAVA voting processes, including vote-by-mail, online voter registration, electronic ballot delivery, and online ballot marking.

Finally, CSD began working with NIST’s Systems and Software Division (SSD) to explore applying software assurance concepts to electronic voting systems. The initial work in this area applies the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list of software weaknesses to voting systems. The CWE was used to assist in the categorization of reported vulnerabilities within voting voting-system security security-analysis reports. Additionally, the vulnerabilities within the CWE are being mapped to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)—both the current and upcoming standard.

Proposed plans for FY 2015, NIST will continue researching the applicability of software assurance concepts to electronic voting systems and continue to support efforts to improve the voting process for UOCAVA voters. Additionally, CSD will continue security research efforts to support future standards development efforts, particularly in the areas of risks to voting systems and innovative voting system architectures.

http://vote.nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Mr. Joshua Franklin, (301) 975-8463, joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Health Information Technology (HIT) enables better patient care through the secure use and sharing of health information. HIT leads to improvements in healthcare quality, reduced medical errors, increased efficiencies in care delivery and administration, and improved population health. Central to reaching these goals is the assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of health information. CSD works with government, industry, academia, and others to provide security tools, technologies, and methodologies that provide for the security and privacy of health information.

NIST CSD continued its HIT security outreach efforts in FY 2014. NIST and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) co-hosted the seventh annual HIPAA Security Rule conference, Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security, in September 2014 in Washington, D.C. The conference offered important sessions that focused on broad topics of interest to the healthcare and health IT security community. Over 600 in-person and virtual attendees from federal, state, and local governments, academia, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates, industry groups, and vendors heard from, and interacted with, healthcare, security, and privacy experts on technologies and methodologies for safeguarding health information and for implementing the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. Presentations and panel discussions covered a variety of security management and technical assurance topics, including:

Keynote addresses were delivered by Darren Dworkin, Senior Vice President of Enterprise Information Systems and Chief Information Officer (CIO) of Cedars-Sinai Health System, and Daniel Solove, the John Marshall Harlan Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School.

In FY 2015, NIST CSD will continue to work with diverse healthcare stakeholders, including partners in government and industry, to identify opportunities to strengthen the sector’s cybersecurity risk management efforts by using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. As part of its continued outreach efforts, NIST CSD also plans to co-host the eighth annual Safeguarding Health Information conference with OCR.

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Information and communication technologies (ICT) rely on a complex, globally distributed, and interconnected supply-chain ecosystem that is long, has geographically diverse routes, and consists of multiple tiers of outsourcing. In addition, Federal Government information systems have rapidly expanded in terms of capability and number, with an increased reliance on outsourcing and commercially available products.

These trends have caused federal departments and agencies to have a lack of visibility and understanding throughout the supply chain of how the technology being acquired is developed, integrated and deployed, as well as the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, and quality of the products and services. This lack of visibility and understanding, in turn, has decreased the control that federal departments and agencies have with regard to the decisions impacting the inherited risks traversing the supply chain and the ability to effectively manage those risks. Figure 4 (below) shows how ICT supply-chain risk may be derived from adversarial or non-adversarial threats, as well as external or internal vulnerabilities. The likelihood of an event and the potential impact of an event are also key factors.

This project seeks to provide federal agencies with a standardized, repeatable, and feasible toolkit of technical and intelligence resources to strategically manage supply-chain risk throughout the entire lifecycle of systems, products and services.

In FY 2014, CSD reviewed and addressed comments from the initial public draft of SP 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. This document provides guidance to federal departments and agencies on identifying, assessing, and mitigating ICT supply-chain risks at all levels in their organizations and utilizes and builds on existing guidance in the unified information security framework. A second public draft of the document was published in June 2014.

Figure 4: ICT Supply Chain Risk

In June 2014, the University of Maryland Supply Chain Management Center of the R. H. Smith School of Business completed the fourth phase of a multi-year research project through a NIST grant awarded in 2013. Previous phases of the project resulted in the development of a Cyber Risk Portal where users can conduct ICT supply-chain risk self-assessments and gain access to a number of resources. This phase of the project deployed wide-scale testing of the portal and made improvements to the security infrastructure and applications.

NIST awarded the University of Maryland Supply Chain Management Center an additional grant in 2014 to define an effective engagement model that will enable representatives of stakeholder organizations to come together in person and online to learn how to map and manage their critical ICT supply-chain risks using the portal-based tool set. The project will be completed in April 2015.

In FY 2015, CSD will:

ICT SCRM Team email: scrm-nist@nist.gov

Mr. Jon Boyens, (301) 975-5549, jon.boyens@nist.gov

Ms. Celia Paulsen, (301) 975-5981, celia.paulsen@nist.gov

Source: http://www.pscr.gov/

In February 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act. One portion of this legislation calls for the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public-safety broadband network based on the 3rd Generation Partnership Project’s (3GPP) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) technology. The network will be deployed and operated by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The planned National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) will “create a much needed nationwide interoperable broadband network that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical service professionals and other public safety officials stay safe and do their jobs.”(http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety). NIST is directed to establish a list of certified devices and required components to be used by public safety officials, vendors, and other interested parties for interacting with the nationwide network. NIST is also directed to conduct research and development that supports the acceleration and advancement of the nationwide network.

In FY 2014, CSD supported the joint National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program (http://www.pscr.gov) with efforts in public-safety mobile-application security, identity management, and enabling cybersecurity capabilities on the PSCR 700 MHz LTE demonstration network located in Boulder, Colorado. In February 2014, CSD, in cooperation with the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International and FirstNet, held a half-day workshop titled “Public Safety Mobile Application Security Requirements”. The outcome of that workshop is captured in Draft NISTIR 8018, Public Safety Mobile Application Security Requirements Workshop Summary. At PSRC’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference in June 2014, CSD organized and moderated a panel titled “Mobile Applications Security for Public Safety”.

CSD developed Draft NISTIR 8014, Considerations for Identity Management in Public Safety Mobile Networks, that provides a brief introduction to identity management, summarizes existing guidance (including OMB-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD12): Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors; and NIST SP 800-63-2, Electronic Authentication Guideline), and describes possible identity tokens/credentials that could be supported by mobile devices.

CSD participated in the standards development process for LTE technology within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) supporting security requirements for public safety that are related to Proximity Services (ProSe), Group Communication System Enablers (GCSE), and Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT). In addition, CSD broadened its scope within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to include efforts related to public safety.

In FY 2015, CSD will continue representing public safety in international standardization efforts, such as the IETF and 3GPP. CSD will work to implement and exercise cybersecurity capabilities in the PSCR 700 MHz LTE demonstration network, conduct research into mobile authentication solutions to support the different public-safety disciplines, and investigate mobile application-security services to support the security requirements of public-safety mobile applications. CSD will continue to engage the public-safety communications community by organizing workshops and conferences; and participating in events such as APCO’s Annual Meeting, PSRC’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference, and the International Wireless Communications Expo (IWCE).

Ms. Sheila Frankel, (301) 975-3297, sheila.frankel@nist.gov

Dr. Nelson Hastings, (301) 975-5237, nelson.hastings@nist.gov

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) will provide the next generation of “smart,” co-design and co-engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components. CPS is commonly used in the nation’s critical infrastructure and includes systems in the electric grid, manufacturing, healthcare, and transportation sectors. Composed of heterogeneous, potentially distributed components and systems, CPS provides a promise of increased efficiency and interaction between the digital and physical worlds. However, assuring that these emerging and evolving systems are reliable, robust, resilient, trustworthy, secure, and that they protect the privacy of information poses a unique cybersecurity challenge.

CPS present unique challenges, including the need for integration with legacy components and allowance for emerging technologies, and real-time response in support of extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability. Cybersecurity is an important crosscutting discipline that is critical to the safe and resilient design, development and operation of CPS. Addressing the opportunities and challenges of CPS requires a broad collaboration to develop a common foundation to work from, including a consensus definition, vocabulary, reference architecture, and a shared understanding of the essential roles of timing, cybersecurity and data interoperability. CSD is researching the cybersecurity needs of the broader landscape of CPS, by leveraging CSD’s expertise in cybersecurity in different domains and applications of CPS (such as industrial control systems, smart grid, hardware-enabled security, and embedded systems).

In June 2014, NIST established the CPS Public Working Group (PWG), which is open to all, to foster and capture inputs from those involved in CPS, both nationally and globally. CSD is working in collaboration with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems Program Office, NIST’s Physical Measurement Laboratory Time and Frequency Division, ITL’s Software and Systems Division and ITL’s Advanced Networking Technologies Division to lead a public-private working group of government, academia, and industry stakeholders. The CPS PWG consists of five technical subgroups:

Each subgroup consists of co-leads from academia, industry and NIST. CSD co-leads the Cybersecurity and Privacy subgroup focused on identifying strategies for cybersecurity and privacy in CPS, and will work collaboratively with the other subgroups to ensure that cybersecurity is included as a design principle during development.

In 2015, the CPS PWG will publish an integrated Framework that includes the work of the five technical subgroups and begin work on a CPS Technology Roadmap, which will identify opportunities for a coordinated effort on key technical challenges. The CPS PWG deliverables will be technology and business-model neutral, and freely available online and intended for open use by all stakeholders.

Additionally, in 2015, CSD, in conjunction with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, Intelligent Systems Division, will finalize SP 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security. CSD will also continue to participate in the International Society of Automation (ISA) 99 Committee, which develops and establishes standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and related information that define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems and security practices, and for assessing electronic security performance.

http://www.nist.gov/cps/

http://www.nist.gov/cps/cpspwg.cfm

Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri, (301) 975-8542, victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

Figure 5: Smart Meter

The major elements of the smart grid are: information technology, industrial control systems/operational technology, and the communications infrastructure. The infrastructure is used to send command information across the electric grid from generation to distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing information between utilities and their customers. Key to the successful deployment of the smart grid infrastructure is the development of the cybersecurity strategy that includes cybersecurity as a design consideration for new and emerging systems, and an approach to adding cybersecurity into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the economic and physical well-being of the nation, and emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical assets.

The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) became a membership-supported organization in January 2013. The SGIP Cybersecurity Working Group (CSWG) was renamed the Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGCC), and continues to be led by a NIST representative in support of responsibilities identified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The SGCC chair is a voting member of the SGIP Technical Committee, and serves as an ex-officio Director of the Board. In addition, the SGIP SGCC continues to include additional leadership by a management team comprised of three volunteer vice-chairs (representing the Department of Energy (DOE), an electric utility, and a smart grid vendor) and a volunteer secretariat.

In 2014, the SGCC contributed to the update of NISTIR 7628 Revision 1, Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, which was published in September, following a public comment period and comment resolution by the SGCC members. The revision updates and expands the development strategy, cryptography and key management, privacy, vulnerability classes, research and development topics, standards review, and key power-system use cases to reflect changes in the smart grid environment since 2010. In addition to the revision of NISTIR 7628, the SGCC have focused on developing documents to be published through SGIP on cybersecurity risk management, a User’s Guide for NISTIR 7628, cloud computing for the smart grid, and a mapping between NISTIR 7628 and the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Work in these areas is completed through SGCC subgroups, which are created and disbanded on an as-needed basis.

The SGCC also continues to support the SGIP Catalog of Standards (CoS), a compendium of standards, practices, guidelines and other technical documents considered relevant for the development of a robust, secure, and interoperable smart grid. Through the ongoing efforts of the SGCC, these documents are reviewed for cybersecurity, and recommendations are made for including cybersecurity in future revisions and in the implementation of the standards. CSD supports the SGCC in assessing the security of the cryptographic methods used in these standards, practices, guidelines, and other technical documents. In many cases, the standards bodies have taken the results of the reviews and modified the standards or documents to address NIST recommendations. The SGCC has worked closely with some of the standards bodies to ensure that the recommendations are interpreted correctly and that the mitigation strategies selected meet the intent of the NISTIR 7628 high-level security requirements. The result is cybersecurity “baked-in” to the standards, rather than “bolted-on” after the standard is implemented.

Future activities include working with the SGIP Committees, Domain Expert Working Groups, and Priority Action Plans to integrate cybersecurity into their work efforts. Additionally, the SGIP SGCC will continue to collaborate with industry, academia, other working groups, and government agencies to address the cybersecurity needs for the smart grid.

In FY 2015, CSD will continue to support the SGCC in the evaluation of the cryptographic methods used in standards, practices, guidelines, and other technical documents for inclusion in the SGIP CoS. In addition to the SGIP SGCC activities, CSD will also coordinate with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) and Smart Grid Program Office on the development of a Cybersecurity Smart Grid Test Lab, part of the NIST Smart Grid Testbed Facility now under construction. CSD will also collaborate with ITL’s Software and Systems Division on cybersecurity research in relation to the IEEE 1588, Precision Time Protocol, a standard on time synchronization that is used for the electric grid and other special-purpose industrial automation and measurement networks.

http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid

http://www.sgip.org

Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri, (301) 975-8542, victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

Ms. Tanya Brewer, (301) 975-4534, tbrewer@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301) 975-3610, qdang@nist.gov

NIST has been the lead for the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) since its inception in 2010. NICE is responsive to President Obama’s declaration that the “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and “America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”

NICE is an initiative that enhances the overall cybersecurity posture of the United States by accelerating the availability of educational and training resources designed to improve the cybersecurity skills, and knowledge of our nation’s students and workforce.

NIST’s CSD is leading the NICE initiative working from the strengths and energy of more than 20 federal departments and agencies leveraging each of their relationships with academia and industry sectors to ensure coordination, cooperation, focus, public engagement, technology transfer and sustainability. NIST will highlight these activities, engage various stakeholder groups and create forums for sharing information and leveraging best practices.

CSD is home to the NIST NICE Leadership Team that focuses on the following activities:

The NICE leadership team attended many events, symposia, forums, competitions, educational outreach meetings, and workshops to promote the activities within NICE. The team continued its leadership of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Cross-Agency Priority Goal: “Closing Skills Gap” for IT/Cybersecurity focused on reducing cybersecurity workforce gaps and supported the goals of the White House’s Ready to Work initiative.

In FY 2015, CSD will continue to promote the coordination of existing and future cybersecurity education, training, and workforce activities. The Fifth annual NICE Workshop will take place on November 5-6, 2014 in Columbia, Maryland (http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/events.html). The CSD will also identify opportunities to extend and integrate the NICE focus on cybersecurity workforce, education, and training within NIST Special Publications and informational reports while promoting the value of the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NCWF) and the forthcoming Department of Defense Cyberspace Workforce Strategy as resources that address cybersecurity workforce needs.

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

Mr. Bill Newhouse, NICE Program Manager, (301) 975-2869, william.newhouse@nist.gov

Dr. Ernest McDuffie (retired), FY 2014 NICE Lead

The CSRC, CSD’s website, is one of the most visited websites at NIST. CSRC encourages the broad sharing of information security tools and practices, provides a resource for information security standards and guidelines, and identifies and links key security web resources to support industry and government users. CSRC is an integral component of all of the work that CSD conducts and produces. It is CSD’s repository for anyone wanting to access these documents and other valuable security-related information. During FY 2014, CSRC had more than 54 million page views and downloads.

Figure 6: CSRC Website Visitors For Past 5 Years

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, and serves as a vital link to CSD’s customers. Publications are organized to help users locate relevant information quickly and are arranged by topic, relevant security control family, and legal requirements.

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication announcement mailing list. This free e-mail list notifies subscribers about publications that have been posted to the CSRC website, along with announcing new CSD-sponsored events and important news or announcements. The e-mail list is a valuable tool for more than 56 000 subscribers from the Federal Government, industry, academia, and individuals with a personal interest in IT security worldwide. Individuals who are interested in subscribing to this list should visit http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html for more information.

During FY 2014, the CSRC underwent what the CSD terms as “Quick Fixes” to the CSRC website. These “Quick Fixes” will improve the overall navigation experience on CSRC. The CSRC homepage was streamlined by providing hot topics (these hot topics are the most popular projects/programs that have webpages), updated references in the Useful Resources section, and an improved News and Events section. The homepage was condensed to reduce the amount of scrolling on the page. Another improvement made to the CSRC website was the dropdown menus, which appear on all pages. In previous years, the division’s projects/programs listings were placed under the division’s group layout. Now, the projects/programs listings are under their own category (Ex. Education & Outreach category, a project falling under this category: Small and Medium-Sized Business (SMB) Outreach). The CSRC team created an A to Z listing of the webpages for all of CSD’s projects/programs in order to ease the finding of a particular area.

Plans for FY 2015 for the CSRC website will include moving the CSRC website to a content management system (CMS). Moving to a CMS is expected to improve the website’s functionality.

Questions on the website can be sent to the CSRC Webmaster at: webmaster-csrc@nist.gov.

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly (301) 975-4751 patrick.oreilly@nist.gov

Ms. Judy Barnard (301) 975-5502 jbarnard@nist.gov

The Federal Computer Security Program Managers’ Forum is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of security-related information among federal agencies. The Forum, which serves more than 1100 members, strives to provide an ongoing opportunity for managers of federal information security programs to exchange information security materials in a timely manner, build upon the experiences of other programs, and reduce possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism for NIST to share information directly with federal agency information security program managers in fulfillment of NIST’s leadership mandate under FISMA. It assists NIST in establishing and maintaining relationships with other individuals or organizations that are actively addressing information security issues within the Federal Government. NIST’s CSD serves as the Secretariat of the Forum, providing necessary administrative and logistical support. Patricia Toth serves as the Chairperson.

The Forum maintains an extensive email subscription service. Participation in the service is only open to Federal Government employees who participate in the management of their organization’s information system security program. The Forum also holds bimonthly meetings and an annual two-day conference to discuss current issues and developments of interest to those responsible for protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal systems.

Topics of discussion at Forum meetings in FY 2014 included briefings from various federal agencies on Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Implementation Activities, Cross Agency Priority (CAP) Goals, Automated Assessment Practicals, Automated Assessment Concepts Supporting Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM), NIST’s Role in Ongoing Assessments, Ongoing Authorization Clarifying and Amplifying Guidance, and the National Cybersecurity Framework.

This year’s annual two-day offsite meeting featured updates on the computer security activities of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), General Services Administration (GSA), Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and NIST. Technical sessions included briefings on updates from NIST Computer Security Division (CSD), FedRAMP Overview and Security Processes, Supply Chain Risk Management, Ongoing Authorization, Fiscal Service’s Risk-Based ISCM Strategy, Derived PIV Credentials, Cybersecurity Training, Incident Response, White House Initiatives, FY 2015 FISMA Metrics and recent updates to the FISMA publications.

The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST and other federal agencies to develop and maintain a strong, proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge. The number of members on the email list has grown steadily and provides a valuable resource for federal security program managers. To join, email your name, affiliation, address, phone number, title, and confirmation that you are a federal employee to sec-forum@nist.gov.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Ms. Patricia Toth, Chair, (301) 975-5140, ptoth@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, Administration, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization run by NIST for information system security professionals to assist federal agencies in meeting their information system’s security awareness, training, and education responsibilities. FISSEA strives to elevate the general level of information system security knowledge for the Federal Government and the federal workforce. It also seeks to assist the professional development of its members.

FISSEA membership is open to information system security professionals, professional trainers and educators, and managers responsible for information system security training programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors of these agencies and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. To become a FISSEA member; all that is required is a willingness to share products, information, and experiences. A working group meets monthly to administer business activities.

FISSEA maintains a website, a mailing list, and participates in a social networking site as a means of communication for its members. NIST’s CSD assists FISSEA with its operations by providing staff support for several of its activities and by being FISSEA’s host agency.

FISSEA membership in 2014 spanned federal agencies, industry, military, contractors, state governments, academia, the press, and foreign organizations in a total of ten countries. The 700 federal agency members represent 89 agencies from the executive and legislative branches of government.

The 27th Annual FISSEA Conference occurred March 18-20, 2014, at NIST. Approximately 180 information system security professionals and trainers attended from federal agencies, academia, and industry.

This year’s theme was, “Partners in Performance: Shaping the Future of Cybersecurity Awareness, Education, and Training.” The program team solicited presentations that reflected current projects, trends, and future initiatives in federal security programs. Attendees gained new techniques for developing/conducting training, cost-effective practices, workforce development, free resources and contacts, as well as an update on National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) activities.

Keynote presentations were given by: Dr. Ron Ross, NIST Fellow, CSD; Ambassador Karen Kornbluh, Executive Vice President of External Affairs for Nielsen, former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and Ms. Linda Cureton, Chief Executive Officer and Founder of Muse Technologies, Inc. (former NASA CIO).

Presenters represented NIST, DHS, DOS, NSA, NASA, IRS, private industry and academia. Attendees had an opportunity to visit fifteen vendors on the second day. A Government Best Practice Poster and Demonstration session was held on the third day, which provided an opportunity for agencies to share and tell about their specific awareness and training programs. In addition, there was a panel discussion of former FISSEA Educator of the Year recipients - influential leaders who have demonstrated a superior level of expertise, effectiveness, and dedication to the advancement of the information system security awareness, training and education profession. They discussed their best and worst ideas for improving cybersecurity programs, shared significant activities, and answered questions.

2014 FISSEA Educator of the Year Award: Sam Maroon, FITSI Foundation / Wounded Warrior Cyber Combat Academy

The FISSEA Educator of the Year Award was established to recognize and honor a contemporary who is making special efforts to create, build, manage, or inspire an information system security awareness, training, or education program. This year’s Educator of the Year award was presented to Sam Maroon, Federal IT Security Institute (FITSI) Foundation/ Wounded Warrior Cyber Combat Academy. The nomination letter recommending him for this award made the following statements: “Mr. Maroon deserves this award for his unflagging work supporting this country’s injured servicemen and women in transitioning them to the cyber battlefield through the Wounded Warrior Cyber Combat Academy. … He has donated at least 300 hours of his own personal time…” The full nomination letters are posted on the FISSEA website.

FISSEA conference events also included announcing the winners of FISSEA contests and awarding prize drawings. The FISSEA Security Awareness, Training & Education Contest includes five categories from one of FISSEA’s three key areas of Awareness, Training, and Education. The winner is selected from each category and awarded a certificate. The categories include: (1) awareness poster, (2) motivational item (e.g., pens, stress relief items, t-shirts), (3) awareness website, (4) awareness newsletter, and (5) role-based training & education.

The winners of the 2014 FISSEA Awareness, Training and Education Contest are:

Peers Choice Award winners voted on at the March Conference:

Attendee networking is a valuable benefit of attending the FISSEA conference. The conference continues to be a valuable forum in which individuals from government, industry, and academia who are involved with information systems/cybersecurity workforce development (awareness, training, education, certification, and professionalization) learn of ongoing and planned training and education programs and initiatives. It provides NIST the opportunity to provide assistance to departments and agencies as they work to meet their FISMA responsibilities.

The 2015 FISSEA conference is planned for March 24-25, 2015, at NIST.

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea

fisseamembership@nist.gov

Ms. Patricia Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) is a federal advisory committee with specific statutory objectives to identify emerging managerial, technical, administrative, and physical safeguard issues related to information security and privacy. The Board was originally created by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) as the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) within the Department of Commerce. The CSSPAB was chartered in May 1988 in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, 5 U.S.C., App. In December 2002, Public Law 107-347, The E-Government Act of 2002, Title III, The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Section 21 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-4) amended the statutory authority of the Board and renamed it the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board.

Since the inception of this Advisory Board in 1987, ISPAB successfully renewed its charter with proper authority every two years. The legislative history for Public Law 100-235 and Public Law 107-347 underscores that Congress intended that the Board be a continuing body. The Board plays a central and unique role in providing the government with expert advice concerning information security and privacy issues that may affect federal information systems. No other similar group of experts meets regularly to review information security issues involved in unclassified Federal Government computer systems and networks. Also, Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 reaffirmed the need for this Board by giving it additional responsibilities: to thoroughly review all of the proposed information technology standards and guidelines developed under Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), as amended.

Congress indicated the long-term need for the Board by setting the term of Board members at a minimum of four years. The charter (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/ispab_charter_2014-2016.pdf) requires that the NIST Director appoint the Chairman and all twelve members of the Board. They are selected for their preeminence in the information technology industry or related disciplines.

The Charter also stipulates that Board members be selected from three main categories, with each category providing four members. Category 1 includes members from outside the Federal Government who are eminent in the information technology industry, at least one of whom is representative of small or medium-sized companies in such industries. Category 2 also includes members from outside the Federal Government and not employed by or representative of a producer of information, but who are eminent in the field of information technology, or related disciplines. Category 3 includes experienced information system managers from the Federal Government, including those with experience in information security and privacy, at least one of whom should be from the National Security Agency. The categorization of Board members is intended to meet ISPAB’s statutory objectives. Federal members bring a detailed understanding of the federal processing environment; industry brings concerns and experiences regarding product development and market formation, while private computer security experts are able to bring their experiences of commercial cost-effective security measures into Board discussion.

Presently, the ISPAB Chairperson is Matt Thomlinson, Senior Vice President, Microsoft Security, who assumed the chair in October 2012. He is supported by the following Board members:

During FY 2014, ISPAB held three meetings, all in Washington D.C:

During the December 2013 meeting, the Board developed a FY 2014 work plan. The resulting plan included the following areas of focus:

In addition to the work-plan focus areas, the Board also considered the following topics during FY 2014:

The presenters at each Board meeting were leaders and experts representing private industry; academia; federal agency CIOs, IGs and CISOs.

Copies of the current list of members and their biographies, the Board’s charter and past Board activities are located at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab. Information on ISPAB Meetings is published in Federal Register Notices at least 16 days prior to the meeting. Those interested in receiving meeting notices and other notices relating to NIST work in information security and privacy may email their name, affiliation, and address to Annie Sokol at the address below.

Ms. Annie Sokol, Designated Federal Officer (DFO), ISPAB, (301) 975-2006, annie.sokol@nist.gov

Small business owners face a broad range of information security issues. A computer failure or system breach could jeopardize the company’s reputation and may result in significant damage and recovery cost or going out of business. The small business owner who recognizes the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) reports that over 27 million U.S. companies - more than 99 percent of all U.S. businesses - are SMBs of 500 employees or fewer (http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/allprofiles12.pdf). While the threats to individual small and medium-size businesses (SMBs) may not be significantly different from those facing larger organizations, a SMB frequently has fewer resources available to protect systems, detect attacks, or respond to security issues. A vulnerability common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic base.

To help address information security risk, these businesses require assistance with the identification of security mechanisms and with practical, cost-effective training. Training helps SMB’s use their limited resources most effectively to address relevant and serious threats. In response to this need, NIST, the SBA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) co-sponsor a series of cybersecurity training workshops for small businesses. These workshops provide an overview of cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and techniques, with a special emphasis on information that small business personnel can apply directly.

In FY 2014, NIST, in collaboration with the FBI and the SBA, focused on implementing a three-year renewal of the co-sponsorship agreement that governs this cybersecurity workshop outreach program.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/sbc/

Ms. Patricia Toth, 301-975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

(Editor Note: Mr. Richard Kissel led this program until his recent retirement.)

NIST opened a public competition in 2007 to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm, SHA-3, to augment the hash algorithms specified in the Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-4. The competition ended on October 2, 2012 when NIST announced the selection of Keccak as the winning algorithm for standardization as the new SHA-3 Standard. NIST consulted with the Keccak designers and the cryptographic community, and then developed a SHA-3 standardization plan, which was presented at numerous cryptography conferences in 2013, and posted at the NIST hash website, indicated below, for public feedback.

On May 28, 2014, NIST CSD announced Draft FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, in the Federal Register (79 FR 30549) and requested comments. The announcement also proposed a revision of the Applicability Clause (#6) of the Announcement Section of FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, to allow the use of hash algorithms specified in either FIPS 180-4 or FIPS 202 for federal applications that require a cryptographic hash algorithm. The revision was necessary because the original text in FIPS 180-4 mandates the use of hash algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4 only. The other sections of FIPS 180-4 remain unchanged. The ninety-day public comment period for Draft FIPS 202 and the revision in FIPS 180-4 ended on August 26, 2014.

The CSD also hosted a SHA-3 workshop at the University of California, Santa Barbara, on August 22, 2014 to obtain feedback on the proposed SHA-3 Standard, and on additional modes of operation based on SHA-3 that are being considered for standardization. Approximately 75 participants from around the world attended the workshop.

The CSD received much feedback throughout the year, especially during the week of the workshop. Official comments received on Draft FIPS 202 and on the revision of the Applicability Clause of FIPS 180-4 are posted at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/fips-202-public-comments-aug2014.html. CSD is in the process of addressing these comments, and incorporating them, as appropriate, in the final versions of FIPS 202 and FIPS 180-4, to be approved by the Secretary of Commerce. NIST will announce the final approval by the Secretary in the Federal Register.

Information about the SHA-3 standardization effort is available at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/sha-3_standardization.html.

Ms. Shu-jen Chang, (301) 975-2940, shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

Random numbers are required for the security for many cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers are used to generate the keys needed for encryption and digital signature applications.

In the late 1990s, a project to develop more rigorous requirements and specifications for random number generation (RNG) was initiated in coordination with the American National Standards Institute’s (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. The resulting standard (American National Standard (ANS) X9.82) contains four parts: Part 1 provides general information; Part 2, which is nearing completion, will provide requirements for entropy sources; Part 3 provides specifications for deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms; and Part 4 provides guidance on constructing random bit generators (RBGs) from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms.

In March 2007, CSD published SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, which contained the DRBG mechanisms in Part 3 of ANS X9.82, plus an additional DRBG mechanism. This recommendation was revised as SP 800-90A in January 2012 to include additional capabilities identified during the development of Part 4 of ANS X9.82.

In September 2013, articles from major news organizations, based on leaked classified documents, raised public concern that one of the DRBGs specified in SP 800-90A could contain a backdoor, namely, the Dual_EC_DRBG, which is based on the use of elliptic curves. This weakness could allow attackers to successfully predict the secret cryptographic keys that form the foundation for the assurances provided by security products. CSD immediately published an ITL Bulletin (September 2013, visit the CSRC ITL Bulletins page http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsITLSB.html) that provided a high-level discussion of the issues, reopened the SP 800-90 series of publications for public comment, and recommended that the Dual_EC_DRBG no longer be used, pending the resolution of the comments. In April 2014, another public comment period was held on a revision of SP 800-90A that removed the Dual_EC_DRBG from the document. An additional public comment period was held in late 2014 that included additional changes suggested during the April 2014 comment period.

Two additional documents (SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, and SP 800-90C, Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions) are under development, and the initial drafts were made available for public comment in 2012. SP 800-90B addresses the development and testing of entropy sources, including descriptions of the validation tests for NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program to validate candidate entropy sources. SP 800-90C provides basic guidance on the construction of RBGs from entropy sources and DRBG mechanisms. These documents have undergone further changes as a result of the public comments and discussions with industry representatives. Updated drafts will be provided for another public comment period in early FY 2015.

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Mr. John Kelsey, (301) 975-5101, john.kelsey@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher transforms some fixed-length binary data (i.e., a “block”) into seemingly random data of the same length. The transformation is determined by the choice of some secret data called the “key.” The same key is used to reverse the transformation and recover the original block of data. A cryptographic technique that is constructed from a block cipher is called a mode of operation.

NIST’s CSD is developing AES modes of operation for format-preserving encryption (FPE), based on proposals that were submitted from the private sector. A format can be a sequence of decimal digits, such as a credit card number or a social security number (SSN); formats can also be defined for other sets of characters besides decimal digits. FPE produces ciphertext with the same format as the corresponding plaintext, so that, for example, an encrypted SSN still looks like a valid SSN. FPE is expected to facilitate the retrofitting of encryption to existing applications. For example, FPE could be applied to database systems, so that the sensitive data could be targeted for encryption without disrupting the underlying data fields/pathways.

Draft SP 800-38G, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, which was released for public comment in July 2013, included three methods for FPE called FF1, FF2, and FF3. These methods are modes of operation of the AES that are intended to support a security strength of 128 bits or more.

As part of the public review of Draft SP 800-38G and as part of its routine consultation with other agencies, NIST was advised by the National Security Agency that the FF2 mode in the draft could not support 128 bits of security strength for some use cases. NIST independently confirmed this assessment, and in June 2014, NIST’s CSD announced its intention to remove FF2 from the document.

The FF2 mode was designed for the payment card industry and submitted for NIST’s consideration in 2011 by VeriFone Systems, Inc. NIST’s analysis does not imply any practical vulnerability for the implementations of FF2 in the payment card industry. Nevertheless, in order for FF2 to meet NIST’s security requirements for other potential applications, VeriFone Systems, Inc. has indicated that it will submit a revised proposal for NIST CSD to review. Meanwhile, CSD expects to finalize SP 800-38G with FF1 and FF3 in FY 2015.

Dr. Morris Dworkin, (301) 975-2354, morris.dworkin@nist.gov

NIST’s CSD continues to provide guidelines on cryptographic key management for the Federal Government, and to coordinate with other national and international organizations, industry, and academia.

SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, was first published in August 2009. This publication specifies approved methods for automated key establishment using Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) key-transport and key-agreement schemes. In an RSA key-transport scheme, one party (called the sender) generates a key to be used in subsequent communications and sends it to another party (called the receiver), encrypted using the receiver’s public key. In a key-agreement scheme, two parties contribute information that is used by each party to compute a shared secret, which is then used to derive a key that is known by both parties. The 2009 version approved the use of 1024- and 2048-bit keys for both key-transport and key-agreement schemes, and in the case of the key-agreement schemes, specified two approved methods for key derivation, both using an approved hash function. SP 800-56B has been revised to remove the use of 1024-bit keys because they no longer provide adequate protection for federal information, and to approve the use of 3072-bit keys. This revision also includes the approval of additional key-derivation methods specified in SP 800-56C, Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion, and SP 800-135, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, and the use of Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC), as well as a hash function, during the key-derivation process. HMAC is specified in FIPS 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). The revision of SP 800-56B was published in September 2014.

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, was first published in 2009. This document addresses the key-management issues of currently available cryptographic mechanisms, including the use of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and several commonly used security protocols. A revision of this document was provided for public comment in May 2014 that updated the guidance provided in the 2009 version, included an additional section on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol and removed the TLS section, which is now being addressed in SP 800-52 Revision 1, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations. The final version of SP 800-57, Part 3 will be published in early 2015.

SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS), is under development to provide guidance on the CKMSs to be used by the Federal Government. This document provides refinements of the requirements for CKMS designers that are specified in SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems. SP 800-152 also provides requirements and recommendations for the service providers of CKMSs used by federal agencies and their contractors, as well as guidance for the federal agencies in selecting a CKMS that supports the security and management policies of those agencies. A draft of this document was provided for public comment in FY 2013, and a workshop was held in March 2013 to discuss the draft. A second draft has been under development throughout FY 2014 to address the received comments and issues raised at the workshop. This draft will be available for public comment in December 2014.

A new NIST publication is under development that provides guidance on the security strength of a cryptographic key that is used to protect data (i.e., a data-protection key), given the manner in which the key was generated and handled prior to its use to protect the target data. This document, SP 800-158, Key Management: Obtaining a Targeted Security Strength, involves a considerable amount of new research, since it is an area that has not been fully addressed to date. This publication will be available for public comment in FY 2015.

Additional key-management work to be conducted in FY 2015 includes revisions to the following publications:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Ray Perlner, (301) 975-3357, ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301) 975-3610, quynh.dang@nist.gov

SP 800-52 Revision 1, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, provides recommendations regarding TLS server and client implementations. TLS is a widely used cryptographic protocol that provides communication security for a variety of network applications, such as email, e-commerce, and healthcare.

The first version of SP 800-52, published in 2005, was withdrawn in March 2013. In September 2013, CSD announced Draft SP 800-52 Revision 1. Changes to the document were made based on comments received during the public comment period, which ended in mid-December 2013. The final version of SP 800-52 Revision 1 was published in April 2014.

SP 800-52 Revision 1 is a significant update to the original guidance and includes recommendations providing higher levels of security. New recommendations include the support of TLS versions 1.1 and 1.2, guidance on certificate profiles and validation methods, TLS extensions, and support for a greater variety of cryptographic algorithms.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is actively developing extensions that can be used to add functionality to TLS. The CSD’s Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) will review updates and additions to the TLS protocol in the second half of FY 2015. If there are changes that should be incorporated into SP 800-52, the development of a new revision will begin.

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break the existing infrastructure of public-key cryptography. The focus of the Post Quantum Cryptography project is to identify candidate quantum-resistant systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers, as well as the impact that such post-quantum algorithms will have on current protocols and security infrastructures.

In FY 2014, CSD researchers internally presented status reports in the areas of quantum computation, coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and multivariate cryptography, which included detailed surveys of the respective fields, as well as security overviews and specific results. The project members also created evaluation criteria to compare proposed post quantum cryptosystems with the end goal of standardization.

CSD staff also engaged the international cryptographic community with presentations and publications. Presentations were made at the 2014 Conference on Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication, and Cryptography, CRYPTO 2014, and PQCrypto 2014 Conference. CSD staff were invited to give talks at QCrypt 2014, and at the PQCrypto 2014 Conference. A CSD staff member gave a course on quantum algorithms. CSD staff helped organize the joint NIST-University of Maryland Workshop on Quantum Information and Computer Science. CSD also contributed to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute whitepaper on quantum-safe cryptography. The CSD also hosted two leading experts in the field, Dr. Jintai Ding and Dr. Vadim Lyubashevsky, for extended visits.

In FY 2015, the CSD will continue to explore the security capacity of purported quantum-resistant technologies with the ultimate goal of uncovering the fundamental mechanisms necessary for efficient, trustworthy, and cost-effective information assurance in the post-quantum market. Upon the successful completion of this phase of the project, CSD will be prepared for possible standardization efforts in this area. The CSD will hold a workshop on cybersecurity in a post-quantum world in March of 2015.

Email project team: pqc@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu, (301) 975-6499, yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

The privacy-enhancing cryptography project seeks to promote the use of communication protocols that do not reveal unneeded private information of the communicating parties. There are many technical challenges in doing this, as it is typically hard to separate private data from general data (e.g. to convert a third-party-signed date-of-birth certificate into a certificate indicating that a person is of voting age). Zero-knowledge (ZK) proof techniques and their variants can be used to accomplish this for a large class of assertions. These techniques allow one party to prove to another party that a given statement is true, without conveying any additional information apart from the fact that the statement is indeed true. However, even though many such ZK protocols are practical, adoption by industry is slow. CSD’s CTG is also following the progress of emerging technologies, such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). FHE could potentially solve a large class of problems by allowing computation on encrypted data without decryption. CTG has also shown that the NIST Randomness Beacon (discussed below) can be used as a primitive in secure multi-party computation, such as sealed-bid online auctions, in which losing bids are never opened.

Team members continue to work in collaboration with the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) program and the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange (FCCX) project. In this context, CTG has served as evaluators and in technical support roles. Information about NSTIC and FCCX is available at http://www.nist.gov/nstic/.

Current communication security standards are primarily designed for two-party communication. CTG believes that future protocols, such as those for identification, commercial transactions, and social media, will necessitate standards for three-party communications (e.g., two parties involved in a commercial transaction and a third party that serves as an enabler of some aspects of the transaction). This is particularly important if standards are to provide privacy protection. CTG has developed some basic protocols for this purpose. One such protocol allows for privacy-preserving identification with the aid of a mediator. In this protocol, the issuer of an assertion, such as “John Smith is an employee of the Department of Commerce,” does not need to know who the consumer of the assertion is, yet it can encrypt the assertion with a key only known to that consumer (i.e. the mediator cannot see the unencrypted assertion).

Dr. René Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

In September 2013, news reports about leaked classified documents raised concerns over the trustworthiness of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual_EC_DRBG), which is included in SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators. In response to these concerns, NIST initiated an internal review, reopened public comment on SP 800-90A, and invited an independent review of its standards development processes.

As a first step, NIST’s CSD solicited public comments to obtain feedback on the following: the processes used to develop standards, and the mechanisms used to engage experts in industry, academia and government to develop them. As part of this process, the team compiled information about the principles, processes and procedures that drive NIST cryptographic standards development efforts. This supports guidance to help the public understand how such standards are developed. This information was published in draft NISTIR 7977, NIST Cryptographic Standards and Guidelines Development Process.

NIST’s federal advisory committee, the Visiting Committee on Advanced Technology (VCAT), was asked to review NIST’s cryptographic standards program. The VCAT formed a Committee of Visitors (COV) with invited experts from standards organizations, industry, and the cryptographic research community to assist in this review. During three meetings in April and May 2014, the COV reviewed NIST’s cryptographic standards development process, including the events that led up to the inclusion of the Dual_EC_DRBG in SP 800-90A; the development of the SP 800-38 series of block cipher modes; and the selection and status of the recommended elliptic curves in FIPS 186-4, the Digital Signature Standard. As part of the review, the COV provided recommendations for process improvement, as well as some specific technical considerations and criteria for NIST’s cryptographic standards and processes.

Based on the COV’s recommendations, the VCAT produced a report detailing recommendations for NIST’s cryptographic standards program. The VCAT recommendations called for NIST to increase its staff of cryptography experts and implement more explicit processes for ensuring openness and transparency to strengthen its cryptography efforts.

NIST has posted the full VCAT report, including the individual recommendations from the COV, on the NIST website, as well as the briefing documents provided to assist in the review.

NIST CSD is working to implement the recommendations of the VCAT. In response to comments received from the public, and the recommendations from the VCAT and COV, NIST CSD is working on a revision to NISTIR 7977 that will provide more detailed processes and procedures. These additions will ensure that there is a clear record of the contributions to NIST standards and guidelines, and will establish a maintenance process that ensures that publications remain current. Additionally, NIST will continue to strengthen capabilities with new hires, guest researchers, contracts and external collaborations with researchers, industry and standards organizations. Finally, NIST CSD will work with the cryptographic community to evaluate other technical concerns raised by the VCAT’s review and take appropriate remediating actions.

http://www.nist.gov/director/vcat/index.cfm

http://www.nist.gov/director/vcat/cryptographic-standards-guidelines-process.cfm

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Cryptographic functions, such as encryption, digital signatures, and hashing, are implemented as electronic circuits for a wide class of applications. In practice, it is important to be able to minimize the size of these circuits. This problem is closely related to designing small combinational circuits. These circuits use only binary AND, XOR and NEGATION gates, i.e. multiplication, addition, and “+1” in arithmetic modulo 2. A combinational circuit on four variables is depicted below. The project team has shown that finding optimal combinational circuits is MAX-SNP Complete. In practice, this means that it is necessary to settle for heuristics that design “good” circuits, as opposed to provably optimal circuits. The CSD’s CTG has developed and implemented new heuristics for the circuit minimization problem. Two patents have been granted related to this work, the last one in FY 2014. These are held jointly between NIST and the University of Southern Denmark.

CSD’s CTG is also researching circuit-based security metrics for cryptographic functions. For a function to be secure (one-way), it must be the case that any circuit that implements it is sufficiently complex. In particular, a function is insecure if it can be implemented by a circuit containing too few Boolean AND gates. This security metric, namely the number of AND gates necessary and sufficient to implement a function, is referred to as its multiplicative complexity. Unfortunately, determining multiplicative complexity is extremely hard. Mathematicians attempted this in the 1970s, but the effort had been largely abandoned by the 1980s. CTG has been able to compute tight bounds for the multiplicative complexity of an important class of functions: the symmetric functions. In the process, the CTG research team developed tools that have wide applicability for both theoretical and applied research in security and cryptography.

Multiparty computation is a technique that allows a group of people to compute a function of their inputs without revealing the inputs themselves. Examples of this are: i) holding an election; ii) conducting closed-bid auctions in which only the winning bid is determined; iii) proving to a third party that an entity’s encrypted attributes satisfy some requirement, such as “over 21 and (US citizen or Canadian citizen)”. The protocols that solve multiparty computation problems often encrypt bits using arithmetic modulo 2. The complexity of such protocols largely depends on the number of multiplications required − hence, the importance of expressing functions as circuit computations with few multiplication (AND) gates. Some of the published circuits are now the standard reference for benchmarking tools in multiparty computation.

A partial list of new results consists of:

Additionally, our circuits use no more than seven nonlinear gates (XOR, XNOR). This is quite hard. Consider the following predicate (arithmetic is modulo 2):

f = x₁ + x₂ + x₃ + x₄ + x₁x₂ + x₁x₃ + x₁x₄ + x₂x₃ + x₂x₄ + x₁x₂x₃ + x₁x₂x₄ + x₁x₂x₃x₄.

Computing the last term requires three multiplications. So it is quite surprising that the full expression can be computed using only three multiplications; however, this has been shown to be the case for f and all other predicates on four bits. The circuit depicted below computes f using 3 multiplications and 6 additions.

Figure 7: Combinational Boolean Circuit

The page http://cs-www.cs.yale.edu/homes/~peralta/CircuitStuff/CMT.html contains many of our results.

Dr. René Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

There are several emerging areas in which highly constrained devices are interconnected, typically communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in concert to accomplish some task. Examples of these areas include: sensor networks, healthcare, distributed control systems, the Internet of Things, cyber physical systems, and the smart grid. Security and privacy can be very important in all of these areas. Because the majority of current cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms do not fit into the constrained resources. If current algorithms can be made to fit into the limited resources of constrained environments, their performance is typically not acceptable.

CSD’s Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) is studying the use of the NIST-approved symmetric-key algorithms in constrained environments. CTG has developed microcontroller implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to provide both confidentiality and the AES-based message authentication code, Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC), for authentication. Additionally, CTG has implemented the 256-bit version of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256) to provide a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for authentication. SHA-3, as specified in Draft FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, and a variant of Keccak using an 800-bit permutation has also been implemented. CTG has demonstrated that SHA-3 allows a more efficient construction for computing Message authentication codes (MACs) than the HMAC construction, which is required when using SHA-256. CTG has also investigated other, non-NIST-approved algorithms for constrained environments.

CTG has also begun to examine applications in constrained environments to determine whether NIST should develop a lightweight encryption standard. CTG has talked with industry experts to understand challenges, limitations, and work from other standardization bodies in this area. Also, CTG has had internal discussions on additional considerations for a lightweight standard, as restrictions on its use would be necessary in order to prevent the adoption of a lightweight cipher where the strong protection of AES is required.

CTG is preparing a report that describes the current state and challenges in target application areas, and provides a survey of lightweight primitives, including block and stream ciphers that have been proposed for constrained environments. CTG researchers also studied efficient implementations of the Boolean functions used in lightweight primitives and published Multiplicative Complexity of Boolean Functions on Four and Five Variables at the Third International Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security & Privacy (LightSec 2014).

In FY 2015, CTG will continue to analyze the resource requirements and performance characteristics of lightweight primitives, and study their use as building blocks to perform various cryptographic objectives. Additionally, CTG will investigate specific application areas in order to determine functionality and resource requirements in the area of cryptography for constrained environments.

Mr. Lawrence Bassham, (301) 975-3292, lawrence.bassham@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

NIST has implemented a source of public randomness. The prototype, called the Beacon, uses two independent, commercially available sources of randomness, each with an independent hardware entropy source.

The Beacon is designed to provide unpredictability, autonomy, and consistency. Unpredictability means that users cannot algorithmically predict bits before they are made available by the source. Autonomy means that the source is resistant to attempts by outside parties to alter the distribution of the random bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access the source in such a way that they are confident that they all receive the same random string.

The Beacon posts bit-strings in blocks of 512 bits every 60 seconds. Each such value is time-stamped and signed by NIST, and includes the hash of the previous value to chain the sequence of values together. This prevents all, even the Beacon itself, from retroactively changing an output packet without being detected. The Beacon keeps all output packets and makes them available online at https://beacon.nist.gov/home.

Tables of random numbers have probably been used for multiple purposes, at least since the Industrial Revolution. In the digital age, algorithmic random number generators have largely replaced these tables. The NIST Randomness Beacon expands the use of public randomness to multiple scenarios in which the latter methods cannot be used. The extra functionalities stem mainly from three features. First, the Beacon-generated numbers cannot be predicted before they are published. Second, the public, time-bound, and authenticated nature of the Beacon allows a user application to prove to anybody that it used truly random numbers not known before a certain point in time. Third, this proof can be presented offline and at any point in the future. For example, the proof could be mailed to a trusted third party, encrypted and signed by an application, only to be opened if needed and authorized.

Although commercially available physical sources of randomness are adequate as entropy sources for currently envisioned applications of the Beacon, NIST is working on developing a source of verifiably random sequences. Given that it is impossible to construct such sequences in any classical physical context, CSD is collaborating with the NIST Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML) to build a quantum source. The aim is to use quantum effects to generate sequences that are guaranteed to be unpredictable, even if an attacker has access to the random source. For more information on this collaboration, see http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm.

Figure 8: A Space-time Diagram Illustrating a Locality-loophole-free Bell Test

Since the bits posted by the Beacon are public, these bits are not to be used as secret values, such as cryptographic keys or seeds for random number generators used in the construction of cryptographic keys. NIST encourages the community-at-large to research and publish novel ways in which this tool can be used. Some examples of applications are unpredictable sampling, new authentication mechanisms, and secure multi-party computation. To learn more about the NIST Randomness Beacon project, please visit the project’s website at: http://beacon.nist.gov.

Dr. René Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

Today, wireless networks often provide connections for mobile devices using multiple and different radio technologies. In such a heterogeneous network, a mobile device may switch its connection between different wireless technologies. The procedure for conducting such a switch is called a “handover.” Media-independent handover (MIH) is a set of services specified in IEEE 802.21 to assist the handover. When the services provided by the pervasive heterogeneous networks are extended to other applications, such as Smart Grid applications, the MIH needs to be processed by a group of wireless nodes, such as smart meters, for balancing the network load and for reliability. In this case, the information may need to be delivered to a group of smart meters using a multicast message, which is used to deliver the information. That is, the message is sent from one point-of-service (PoS) to multiple wireless nodes. In some of the application environments, such as sensor networks, the groups are formed dynamically. That is, new nodes can be added to the group, and some nodes in the group may need to be removed. Such groups are managed through multicast signals.

Amendment 2 of IEEE 802.21 provides protection mechanisms for unicast messages, that is, mechanisms that protect messages between a PoS and a single mobile node. However, the protection for multicast messages and group management signals is critical. In FY 2014, CSD has worked with IEEE 802.21 to develop security solutions for group management in Task Group D of IEEE 802.21. The solutions, specified in IEEE 802.21 Amendment 4, include the mechanisms to distribute group keys and for the protection of multicast messages. A draft of Amendment 4 has been approved through sponsor ballot. In FY 2015, CSD will continue to contribute to a broader scope of IEEE 802 wireless standards.

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on many of the standards and specifications supported by NIST’s CSD. Poor implementations of these standards or specifications may render a particular product insecure, potentially placing sensitive information at risk. CSD operates several validation programs that help provide a level of assurance that products meet established security requirements and conform to published specifications. To that end, the Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group (STVMG) develops test suites and test methods; provides implementation guidance and technical support to industry forums; and conducts education, training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with independent laboratories that are accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent laboratory test report and test evidence, the validation programs described below validate the implementation under test. The CSD subsequently publishes lists of the validations awarded on public websites.

Current validation programs focus on providing a known level of assurance for cryptographic algorithms and modules. These modules are used within the context of a larger system to provide cryptographic services as a method of protecting the data within the system. As information systems continue to become more complex, the methods used to implement cryptographic services have also increased in complexity. Problems with the use of cryptography are often introduced through the interaction of cryptographic components with the operating environment. This program seeks to specify how cryptographic components are used as part of a defined cryptographic system to solve problems with a measureable level of assurance, and to introduce automated methods of quantifying the level of assurance that has been provided.

This program will begin the research required to define a reference cryptographic systems architecture and example use cases where cryptographic systems are built from known cryptographic components that cooperate through trust relationships to provide a measureable level of assurance. The architecture should begin at the lowest level with a hardware-based root of trust, and each cryptographic component should be added in successive layers to provide assurance in a systematic way. This should allow the development of tests that would measure the correct implementation of cryptographic components as part of a larger system.

This program will perform research and experimentation in applicable technologies and techniques that will enable the efficient testing of the cryptographic capabilities of each layer, and continuous monitoring capabilities of each cryptographic component, providing the necessary interfaces to establish trust relationships with other cryptographic components. Techniques could include such items as:

Research into this area of cryptographic system validation holds the promise of automating the validation of all cryptographic components, providing a higher assurance with less manual effort by using SCAP-based ideas to embed data elements that instrument the test harnesses used to validate cryptographic systems. This would also provide the instrumentation that could be leveraged to enable a greater level of situational awareness and security measurement, and potentially, to enable continuous monitoring of cryptographic systems.

Mr. Michael Cooper, (301) 975-8077, michael.cooper@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) were developed in collaboration between NIST and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of Canada to support the respective federal user communities for strong, independently tested, and commercially available cryptographic algorithms and modules. Through these programs, NIST and CSE work with international government, public and private sectors as a part of the cryptographic community to achieve standards-based security and assurance of correct implementation. The goal of these programs is to provide federal agencies with a security metric to use in procuring and deploying cryptographic modules and promote the use of validated algorithms and modules by industry and the public. The testing carried out by independent third-party laboratories accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP), and the validations performed by the CAVP and CMVP programs provide this metric. Federal agencies, industry, and the public can choose cryptographic modules and/or products containing cryptographic modules from the CMVP Validated Modules List and have confidence in the claimed level of security and assurance of correct implementation.

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module testing and validation are based on published NIST standards. As federal agencies are required to use validated cryptographic modules for the protection of sensitive non-classified information, the validated modules and the validated algorithms that the modules contain represent the culmination and delivery of the CSD’s cryptography-based work to the end user.

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate collaborative programs. The CAVP and the CMVP validate algorithms and modules, respectively, that are used in a wide variety of products, including Internet browsers, radios, smart cards, space-based communications, munitions, security tokens, mobile phones, network and storage devices, and products supporting the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and electronic commerce. A module may be a standalone product, such as a virtual private network (VPN) or smart card, or it could be a module embedded in many products, such as a cryptographic-based toolkit. As a result, a small number of modules may be incorporated within hundreds of products. The CAVP validates cryptographic algorithms that may be integrated in one or more cryptographic modules.

Figure 9: General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

The CAVP and CMVP validation programs provide documented methodologies for conformance testing through defined sets of security requirements. For the CAVP, the validation system documents are designed for each FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithm. See the website for a listing (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/). Security requirements for the CMVP are found in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and the associated test metrics and methods in Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (DTR). The four Annexes to FIPS 140-2 reference the underlying cryptographic algorithm standards or methods. The CMVP-developed Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Validation Program (IG) provides programmatic and implementation guidance across all of the referenced documents. The information provided in the DTR and IG documents ensures the repeatability of tests and the equivalency in results across the testing laboratories. The Implementation Guidance provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight for successful conformance testing, validation, and revalidation.

The unique position of the validation programs gives the CAVP and CMVP the opportunity to acquire insight during the validation review activities and results in practical, timely, and up-to-date guidance that is needed by the testing laboratories and vendors to move their modules out to the user community in a timely and cost-effective manner and with the assurance of third-party conformance testing. This knowledge and insight provide a foundation for current and future standards and tools development.

The CMVP reviews the cryptographic module validation requests from the testing laboratories and, as a byproduct of the review, is attentive to emerging and/or changing technologies. These insights into the evolution of operating environments and complex systems allow, the CMVP to perform research and development on evolving test metrics and methods and future requirements for cryptographic modules. This research is used to assist developers of cryptographic modules, testing laboratories, and the user community when developing new standards.

Figure 10: FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validated Modules by Calendar Year and Level

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated improved quality and security assurance of cryptographic algorithm implementations and modules. The latest set of statistics, which are collected quarterly from each of the testing laboratories, shows that 5 % (dropped from 7 % in FY 2013) of the cryptographic algorithms and 54 % (increased from 35 % in FY 2013) of the cryptographic modules brought in for voluntary testing had security flaws that were corrected during testing. By the end of FY 2014, the CMVP had validated and issued a total of 2258 cryptographic module validation certificates that represent 5785 modules. These modules have been developed by more than 475 domestic and international vendors. Likewise, to date, the CAVP has issued approximately 15 963 validations, representing the algorithm validations of approximately 17 approved algorithms.

Figure 11: FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Validation Certificates by Fiscal Year and Level

Figure 12: CAVP Validation Status by FYs

Figure 13: CAVP Validation Status for FY 2014

The CAVP issued approximately 2200 algorithm validations in FY 2014. Included in this total, is the 3000th Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) validation, a significant milestone for the CAVP. The CMVP issued 191 module validation certificates in FY 2014. The number of algorithms and modules submitted for validation continues to grow, representing significant growth in the number of validations expected to be available in the future.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

CMVP Contact: Dr. Apostol Vassilev, (301) 975-3221, apostol.vassilev@nist.gov

CAVP Contact: Ms. Sharon Keller, (301) 975-2910, sharon.keller@nist.gov

Figure 14: CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP), a collaborative program between NIST and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of Canada, utilizes the requirements and specifications of NIST standards (i.e., FIPS and Special Publications), to develop algorithm validation test suites and automated security testing. The CAVP is responsible for providing assurance that the cryptographic algorithm implementations contained in cryptographic modules are implemented according to the specifications in the standards. The CAVP accomplishes this by designing and developing conformance testing specific to each cryptographic algorithm.

The conformance testing consists of a suite of validation tests for each approved cryptographic algorithm. These validation tests exercise the algorithmic requirements and mathematical formulas detailed in the algorithm to assure that the detailed specifications are implemented correctly and completely. If the implementer deviates from the specifications in the standard or excludes any part of these specifications or requirements, the validation test will detect the deviations and fail. The validation testing will indicate that the algorithm implementation does not function properly or is incomplete.

The cryptographic algorithm validation tests designed and developed by the CAVP are performed by independent third-party laboratories accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). The laboratory works with vendors to validate their cryptographic algorithm implementations. The suite of validation tests for each algorithm ensures the repeatability of tests and the equivalency in results across the testing laboratories.

There are several types of validation tests, all designed to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are not limited to, Known-Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, and Multi-Block Message Tests. The Known-Answer Tests are designed to examine the individual components of the algorithm by supplying known values to the variables and verifying the expected result. Negative testing is also performed by supplying known incorrect values to assure that the implementation recognizes values that are not allowed. The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the entire implementation under test (IUT). This test is designed to detect the presence of implementation flaws that are not detected with the controlled input of the Known-Answer Tests. The types of implementation flaws detected by this validation test include pointer problems, insufficient allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test (MMT) is designed to test the ability of the implementation to process multi-block messages, which require the chaining of information from one block to the next.

During the last few years, the CTG has expanded its publications to not only contain the algorithm’s specifications, but also to include requirements on an algorithm’s use. Many of these usage requirements do not fall within the scope of the CAVP because the CAVP focuses on the correctness of the instructions within the algorithm’s boundary. If these additional algorithm usage requirements are not considered applicable to the algorithm’s implementation, they cannot be tested at the algorithm level by the CAVP, but may be tested by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) if the requirements are considered applicable to the cryptographic module. However, some of these usage requirements may be considered to be outside the scope of both the algorithm implementation and cryptographic module. In this latter case, the fulfillment of the requirements is the responsibility of entities using, installing, or configuring applications or protocols that use the cryptographic algorithms. For example, depending on the design of a cryptographic module, it may not be possible for the module to determine whether a specific key is used for multiple purposes, a situation that is strongly discouraged.

The CAVP currently has algorithm validation testing for the following cryptographic algorithms:

In FY 2015, the CAVP expects to add algorithm validation testing for:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp

Ms. Sharon Keller (301) 975-2910 sharon.keller@nist.gov

Ms. Elaine Barker (301) 975-2911 elaine.barker@nist.gov

CSD has contributed to the activities of the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), which issued ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, and ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on July 1, 2008.

These efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic modules to the global community by providing ISO-equivalent standards representing NIST FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules and Derived Test Requirements [DTR] for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 WG 3 completed and published revisions of ISO/IEC 19790:2006 and ISO/IEC 24759:2008, for which Randall J. Easter of NIST’s CSD was the principal editor. The revision of ISO/IEC 19790 was published on August 15, 2012. The revision of ISO/IEC 24759 was published on January 31, 2014. Both ISO/IEC standards were also adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The two ISO/IEC revisions were developed with international support and the collaboration of governments, industry and academia. The NIST CMVP and the NVLAP-accredited testing laboratories worked closely with ISO in the standards revision.

ISO/IEC 19790:2012 specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems. This international standard defines four security levels for cryptographic modules to provide for a wide spectrum of data sensitivity (e.g. low value administrative data, million dollar funds transfers, life-protecting data, personal identity information, and sensitive information used by a government) and a diversity of application environments (e.g. a guarded facility, an office,

Figure 15: Cryptographic Module Testing – ISO Standards

The security requirements cover areas relative to the design and implementation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; the operational environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks.

CSD’s Randall J. Easter is the principal editor of the following draft ISO/IEC documents:

CSD’s contributions to the development of these international standards create a strong foundation for the adoption of and migration from currently used national standards. In particular, this adoption will promote the international harmonization for the implementation and testing of cryptographic algorithms and modules, while accommodating individual country preferences in the choice of approved security functions.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/

Mr. Randy Easter, (301) 975-4641, randall.easter@nist.gov

The SCAP Validation Program performs conformance testing to ensure that products correctly implement SCAP, as defined in SP 800-126 Revision 2, The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.2. Conformance testing is necessary because SCAP is a complex collection of eleven individual specifications that work together to support various use cases. A single error in product implementation could result in undetected vulnerabilities or policy noncompliance within an organization’s networks.

Figure 16: SCAP 1.2 Validation Process

The test requirements for SCAP 1.2 are defined in NISTIR 7511 Revision 3, Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Version 1.2 Validation Program Test Requirements. In general, vendors may opt for product validation for one or more SCAP capabilities or operating systems. Currently, the program offers testing on Microsoft Windows and Red Hat Enterprise Linux platforms. The validation process starts when a vendor voluntarily submits an SCAP-enabled product to a NVLAP-accredited laboratory. Once the lab completes product testing, and all validation requirements are met, the lab submits a test report to the SCAP Validation Program for review. NIST reviews the test report and will award a validation if all requirements have been met. Once a validation is awarded, the SCAP Validation Record is sent to the lab, and the newly validated product is posted on the SCAP Validated Products web page.

The SCAP Validation Program resources web page (http://scap.nist.gov/validation) was introduced in FY 2013, and was updated in FY 2014 to provide the public with a centralized location for all resources and information necessary for preparing products for SCAP 1.2 validation. Resources include documentation, a list of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), the SCAP validation-test content, and tools for validating and processing SCAP data streams. The SCAP validation-test content should be used by vendors for quality assurance testing prior to entering formal SCAP testing with an NVLAP accredited laboratory. The open-source tools that are available for download may be used by SCAP content authors for testing SCAP source content. The SCAP Content Validation Tool (SCAPVal) may be used to determine if the content conforms to the SCAP specification. Open-source SCAP reference implementation tools, such as the SCAP Reference Implementation Tool, may be used to process SCAP data streams.

End users may use information on the SCAP Validation web page to learn about SCAP validation and find products that have been awarded validations. The validation records that are posted on the SCAP Validated Products page state the product version that was tested in the laboratory, along with details about the validation, such as the tested platforms, SCAP capabilities, the validation test suite version, and the lab that performed the product test.

In FY 2014, five products successfully completed testing and were awarded validations. Several products are in various stages of validation testing and are expected to be awarded validations in FY 2015. The current list of SCAP 1.2 validated products may be found on the SCAP Validated Products list at https://nvd.nist.gov/SCAP-Validated-Tools/.

In FY 2015, the SCAP Validation Program plans to provide enhanced testing support and will focus on validation test content for new operating systems. Expansion plans also include improvements in automated testing capabilities.

http://scap.nist.gov/validation

Ms. Melanie Cook, (301) 975-5259, melanie.cook@nist.gov

Figure 17: Government Employees Use PIV Cards for Facility Access

In response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12), Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, was developed and was approved by the Secretary of Commerce in February 2005. HSPD-12 called for the creation of a new identity credential for federal employees and contractors. FIPS 201 is the technical specification for both the PIV identity credential and the PIV system that produces, manages, and uses the credential. Within NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), this work is a collaborative effort of the Information Access Division (IAD) and CSD. CSD activities in FY 2014 directly supported the recently revised FIPS 201-2 by updating the relevant publications associated with FIPS 201-2 and by developing two new publications. CSD performed the following activities during FY 2014 in support of HSPD-12:

In FY 2015, CSD will continue to focus on updating the relevant publications associated with FIPS 201-2, including developing two new publications: SP 800-156, Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export, and SP 800-166, Guidelines for Testing Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials. CSD will also continue to provide technical and strategic inputs to the PIV-related initiatives.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo, (301) 975-6972, hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Dr. David Cooper, (301) 975-3194, david.cooper@nist.gov

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Mr. Ketan Mehta, (301) 975-8405, ketan.mehta@nist.gov

The objective of the NIST Personal Identity Verification Program (NPIVP) is to validate PIV components for conformance to the specifications in FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, and its companion documents. The two PIV components that come under the scope of NPIVP are the PIV Smart Card Application and the PIV Middleware. NPIVP test facilities that perform the two types of tests are the Cryptographic and Security Testing (CST) Laboratories that have been accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). As of September 2014, there were nine such facilities.

The interface specifications for the PIV Smart Card Application and PIV Middleware are found in a FIPS 201-associated document, namely, SP 800-73 (the latest published version SP 800-73-3) - Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. The conformance tests for these specifications are detailed in SP 800-85A (the latest published version is SP 800-85A-2) - PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines. To implement these tests and to generate conformance test reports, CSD also developed an integrated toolkit called “PIV Interface Test Runner,” which conducts tests on both PIV Card Application and PIV Middleware products, and provides the toolkit to accredited NPIVP test facilities.

In 2014, CSD’s activity focused on the transitioning of PIV Card Application and PIV Middleware products from FIPS 201-1 to FIPS 201-2 compliance. Coordinating with the test facilities, FIPS 201-1 products were identified and placed on the Removed Products List (RPL). Nine PIV card application products and fifteen PIV middleware products were affected. With this change, there are 27 NPIVP validated PIV card application products, and five PIV Middleware products listed.

In addition, NPIVP is closely involved in ensuring that all changes in PIV companion documents, such as SP 800-73-4, SP 800-76-2, Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification, and SP 800-78-4, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification, are fully reflected in the updated versions of the conformance test documents, SP 800-85A and SP 800-85B, as well as in the “PIV Interface Test Runner” toolkit. Currently, the NPIVP team is guiding the development of the “PIV Interface Test Runner” toolkit for validating PIV Card application and PIV Middleware products for conformance to the specifications in SP 800-73-4, SP 800-76-2 and SP 800-78-4.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli, (301) 975-5013, mouli@nist.gov

Ms. Hildegard Ferraiolo, (301) 975-6972, hildegard.ferraiolo@nist.gov

The model for Cloud Computing is defined in SP 800-145, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing. The foundational technology that facilitates the use of a computing infrastructure for cloud-computing services is virtualization. At the core of a virtualized infrastructure is the virtualized host that provides an abstraction of the hardware (e.g., CPU, memory) that enables multiple computing stacks (comprised of the operating system, middleware, and applications) to be run on a single physical machine. The efficiency of such a dynamic and distributed processing environment is counterbalanced by the interoperability, portability, and security challenges inherent to this computing environment. NIST’s CSD is working in parallel on several projects (introduced below) that aim to accelerate the Federal Government’s adoption of secure cloud computing by collaborating with standards bodies, and public and private sectors in developing security, interoperability and portability standards and guidance.

During FY 2013, the NIST Cloud Computing Team continued to promote the development of publications, national and international standards, and specifications in support of the United States Government’s (USG) effective and secure use of cloud computing, as well as providing technical guidance to USG agencies for secure and effective cloud-computing adoption. CSD supports many of the technical standards activities supported by the NIST Cloud Computing Program, with a particular focus on cloud-computing security. Activities included the following:

CSD staff members:

In support of USG cloud-computing mandates, CSD staff members provided leadership for several public cloud working groups operating under the NIST Cloud Computing Program. These working groups focus on meeting the high priority requirements contained in SP 500-293, U.S. Government Cloud Computing Technology Roadmap.

CSD staff chaired or co-chaired several significant cloud computing efforts in 2014:

CSD staff members participated in various standards development organizations, two of which are ISO/IEC JTC 1 Sub Committee 38 – Distributed Application Platforms and Services (SC 38) and ISO/IEC JTC 1 Sub Committee 27 – IT Security Techniques (SC 27). In SC 38, CSD acts as the co-convener for a collaborative ISO/ITU-T initiative on cloud computing taxonomy that includes publication of ISO/IEC 17788 – Information Technology – Cloud computing – Overview and Vocabulary, and ISO/IEC 17789 Information technology – Cloud computing – Reference Architecture. These standards are a joint collaborative work between ITU-T and ISO, and they are approved to be available at no charge. Notably, the genesis for this international body of work is the widely accepted and used cloud-computing definition found in SP 800-145, NIST Definition of Cloud Computing.

There are three new standards under development:

CSD staff members are also actively participating in the development of cloud-computing security standards, primarily through INCITS CS1, SC 27, which is responsible for cloud-computing security standards for ISO. CSD has provided technical contributions based on SP 500-299 and continues to advocate for secure, non-proprietary solutions. There is a continued contribution to a number of cloud-related standards, including the recently approved international standard, ISO/IEC 27018, Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for protection of personal identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors, ISO/IEC WD 27036-4, Information technology – Information security for supplier relationships – Part 4: Guidelines for security of Cloud services, and the commencement of a study period on cloud components, controls and capabilities.

In FY 2014, the CSD members of the NIST cloud-computing team continued research in key areas of cloud security, cloud interoperability and portability, cloud metrics, cloud services, and cloud SLAs. They also presented the results of cloud-computing research and development, introduced the standards and specifications under development, and provided the status of the NIST Cloud-Computing Program in a variety of domestic and international conferences and workshops. CSD staff continues to engage industry and federal agencies for inputs and collaborative work through working groups, publications, and networking.

Additional information about the NIST Cloud Computing Program is available at:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/CloudComputing/StandardsRoadmap

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/CloudComputing/CloudSecurity

http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/bin/view/CloudComputing/CloudForensics

Dr. Michaela Iorga, Chair, Cloud Computing Security Workgroup, (301) 975-8431, michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Ms. Annie Sokol, Co-Chair, Cloud Computing Standards Roadmap, (301) 975-2006, annie.sokol@nist.gov

Mr. Daniel Benigni, 2014 Chair, INCITS CS1 (Cybersecurity) - U.S. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to the ISO/IEC international committee JTC1/SC27 (IT Security Techniques), (For 2015 – contact Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro – contact information below)

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, Vice-Chair, INCITS CS1 (Cybersecurity) - U.S. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to the ISO/IEC international committee JTC1/SC27 (IT Security Techniques), (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Cryptographic Key Management Issues in Cloud Infrastructures

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli, (301) 975-5013, mouli@nist.gov

Dr. Michaela Iorga, (301) 975-8431, michaela.iorga@nist.gov

Figure 18: Policy Machine Operating Environment

In FY 2014, CSD continued the research and development of a virtualization-based, enterprise-wide controlled delivery of data services for advanced cloud computing through Access Control. This included the publication of a detailed Policy Machine specification as NISTIR 7987, Policy Machine: Features, Architecture, and Specification, in May 2014. The team also published a description of the benefits and an approach of the Policy Machine’s integration of Access Control and Data Services as a conference paper, On the Unification of Access Control and Data Service, in the proceedings of the IEEE 15th International Conference of Information Reuse and Integration, August 2014. In addition, CSD released its reference implementation of the Policy Machine as open source (available at GitHub).

NIST and other members of an Ad Hoc INCITS working group are developing a three-part Policy Machine standard, under the title of Next Generation Access Control (NGAC), under three sub-projects:

The Policy Machine’s architecture was the basis for the NGAC work within INCITS. An initial standard from this work was published in 2013 and is now available from the ANSI e-standards store as INCITS 499 – NGAC Functional Architecture (NGAC–FA). The standard resulting from Project 2195–D: NGAC Generic Operations & Abstract Data Structures (NGAC-GOADS), has begun the approval process, and is expected to reach the second Public Review stage in the summer of 2015.

In FY 2015, CSD plans to issue a new version of its open-source distribution to reflect new features and enhanced performance, and publish a NISTIR 7987 revision to reflect greater consistence with NGAC’s suite of standards.

http://csrc.nist.gov/pm/

Mr. David Ferraiolo, (301) 975-3046, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Serban Gavrila, (301) 975-4242, serban.gavrila@nist.gov

In FY 2014, CSD continued its research in key areas of cloud and virtualization security by producing two conference papers and one SP:

The focus of research for FY 2015 in the area of Virtualized Infrastructures is two-pronged. The first approach will focus on identifying the security requirements for various use cases involved in offering cloud services using virtualized infrastructures and analyzing the protection options to meet those security requirements in terms of their features, security strengths and architectural foundation. The second approach will focus on deriving secure configuration operations in a specific area of virtualized infrastructure – the Virtual Network – leveraging state-of-the-art architectural paradigms, such as the Software-defined network (SDN). The security recommendations for Hypervisor deployment will cover two areas: one based on architectural choices, and the other based on configuration parameters. For developing the configuration parameters that form the basis of security recommendations, the following approach will be adopted:

Dr. Ramaswamy Chandramouli, (301) 975-5013, mouli@nist.gov

Smart phones have become both ubiquitous and indispensable for consumers and business people alike. Although these devices are relatively small and inexpensive, they can be used for voice calls, simple text messages, sending and receiving emails, browsing the web, online banking and e-commerce, social networking, and many functions once limited to laptop and desktop computers. Smart phones and tablet devices have specialized built-in hardware, such as photographic cameras, video cameras, accelerometers, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, and removable media readers. They also employ a wide range of wireless interfaces, including infrared, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), Bluetooth, Near Field Communications (NFC), and one or more types of cellular interfaces that provide network connectivity across the globe. Naturally, just as consumers and businesses can realize productivity gains from these technologies, so can government agencies.

Like any new technology, smart phones present new capabilities, but also a number of new security and privacy challenges. As the pace of the technology life cycles continues to increase, current Information Assurance (IA) standards and processes must be updated and new technologies adopted to allow government users to employ the latest technologies that consumers can use without sacrificing privacy and security.

NIST is conducting research in software-assurance methodologies for smart phone software (i.e., applications, commonly referred to as “apps”) and is working with other government agencies and industry to bridge the security gaps present with today’s smart phones. For example, NIST developed an app-vetting system and framework for managing an organization’s app-vetting process with respect to the organization’s security and privacy policies and requirements. This system was used by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to vet apps prior to being deployed on thousands of military mobile devices for use in the current U.S. war theater, the 2013 Presidential Inauguration, and the 2014 Boston Marathon.

NIST’s work in mobile security has earned the 2014 Government Computer News (GCN) award for Information Technology Excellence and the 2013 U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award. For FY 2015, NIST will continue to develop and transition mobile security-related technologies, publish guidance on issues of mobile security, and provide mobile security expertise to industry and other government agencies.

Dr. Steve Quirolgico, (301) 975-8426, steveq@nist.gov

Dr. Jeffrey Voas, (301) 975-6622, jeff.voas@nist.gov

Dr. Tom Karygiannis, (301) 975-4728, karygiannis@nist.gov

Internet Protocol (IP) Version 6 (IPv6) is an updated version of the current Internet Protocol, IPv4. The primary motivations for the development of IPv6 were to increase the number of unique IP addresses available for use and to handle the needs of new Internet applications and devices. In addition, IPv6 was designed with the following goals: increased ease of network management and configuration, expandable IP headers, improved mobility and security, and the quality of service controls. IPv6 has been, and continues to be, developed and defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

FY 2012 was a significant year for the deployment of IPv6 in the United States Government (USG). OMB’s Memo of September 10, 2010, Transition to IPv6, required all government agencies to “upgrade public/external facing servers and services (e.g., web, email, Domain Name System (DNS), Internet Service Provider (ISP) services) to operationally use IPv6 by the end of FY 2012.” NIST worked with the USGv6 Task Force and with individual government agencies to achieve this goal. NIST developed an online monitor to demonstrate which high-level government domains have met this goal with respect to DNS services, email, web servers, and Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). In FY 2013, NIST and OMB continued to use this monitor to measure USGv6 compliance with OMB’s requirement.

Additional OMB IPv6 requirements were mandated for FY 2014. Agencies were required to “upgrade internal client applications that communicate with public Internet servers and supporting enterprise networks to operationally use IPv6 by the end of FY 2014.” NIST developed online diagnostic tools to help agencies verify compliance to this requirement.

The NIST IPv6 Test Program, whose goal is to provide assurance on IPv6 product conformance and interoperability, continues to operate. In FY 2015, NIST will continue to manage and evolve the USGv6 Test Program and to help federal agencies fulfill OMB mandates and monitor compliance to those mandates. The NIST program is a collaboration between CSD and the Advanced Networking Technology Division.

http://www.antd.nist.gov/usgv6

Ms. Sheila Frankel, (301) 975-3297, sheila.frankel@nist.gov

Mr. Douglas Montgomery, (301) 975-3630, dougm@nist.gov

With the advance of current computing technologies and the diverse environments in which these technologies are used, security issues, such as situational awareness, trust management, preservation of privacy in access control, and privilege-management systems, are becoming increasingly complex. Practical and conceptual guidance for these topics is needed.

In FY 2014, the following research was accomplished for this project:

In FY 2015, CSD will continue the above research, and present the most updated results in CSD’s CSRC website. CSD expects that this project will:

See Figure 19 on next page for chart of Access Control and Privilege Management.

Dr. Vincent Hu, (301) 975-4975, vhu@nist.gov

Mr. David Ferraiolo, (301) 975-3046, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov