NIST SP 800-182 日本語訳

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-182

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PATRICK O’REILLY, EDITOR Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

CO-EDITORS: Larry Feldman Greg Witte G2, Inc. Annapolis Junction, Maryland

THIS PUBLICATION IS AVAILABLE FREE OF CHARGE FROM http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-182

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Penny S. Pritzker, Secretary

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Willie May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-182

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-182, 120 pages (July 2016)

CODEN: NSPUE2

This publication is available free of charge from:

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-182

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.

The editor, Patrick O’Reilly of the Computer Security Division, wishes to thank his colleagues in the Computer Security Division, who provided write-ups on their 2015 project highlights and accomplishments for this annual report (their names are mentioned after each project write-up). The editor would also like to acknowledge Elaine Barker (CSD), Lisa Carnahan (Standards Coordination Office, NIST), Greg Witte and Larry Feldman (G2) for reviewing and providing valuable feedback for this annual report.

The editor would also like to acknowledge Kristen Dill of Dill and Company, Inc. for designing the cover and inside layout for this 2015 annual report.

Any mention of commercial products or organizations is for informational purposes only; it is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the products identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

All names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.

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The Computer Security Division (CSD), a division of the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for developing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for the protection of non-national security federal information systems. CSD’s standards, guidelines, tools and references are developed in an open, transparent, traceable and collaborative manner that enlists broad expertise from around the world. While developed for federal agency use, these resources are voluntarily adopted by other organizations because they are effective and accepted globally.

The need for cybersecurity standards, best practices, tools and references that also address interoperability, usability and privacy continue to be critical for the Nation. CSD aligns its resources to enable greater development and application of practical, innovative security technologies and methodologies that enhance our ability to address current and future computer and information security challenges. Our foundational research and applied cybersecurity programs continue to advance in many areas, including cryptography, automation, roots of trust, identity and access management, advanced security testing and measurement, Internet of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, and public safety networks.

Trust is crucial to the broad adoption of our standards and guidelines, including our cryptographic standards and guidelines. To ensure that our cryptography resources have been developed according the highest standard of inclusiveness, transparency and security, NIST conducted an internal and external formal review of our cryptographic standards development efforts in 2014. We documented and solicited public comment on the principles and rigorous processes we use to engage stakeholders and experts in industry, academia, and government to develop and revise these standards. The final report is now published and serves as a basis for all CSD’s cryptographic development efforts.

Increasing the trustworthiness and resilience of the IT infrastructure is a significant undertaking that requires a substantial investment in the architectural design and development of our systems and networks. A disciplined and structured set of systems security engineering processes that starts with and builds on well-established international standards provides an important starting point. Draft Special Publication 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated Approach to Building Trustworthy Resilient Systems, which was issued in May 2014, helps organizations to develop a more defensible and survivable information technology infrastructure. This resource, coupled with other NIST standards and guidelines, contributes to systems that are more resilient in the face of cyber attacks and other threats.

Strong partnerships with diverse stakeholders are vital to the success of our technical programs. In February 2014, NIST issued the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity as directed in Executive Order 13636. The Framework, created through collaboration between industry and government, consists of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection of the critical infrastructure. Its approach helps owners and operators of the critical infrastructure to manage cybersecurity-related risk.

Active engagement with diverse stakeholders continues to be critical to our success. In the federal space, this interaction is most prominent in our strengthened collaborations with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Committee on National Security Systems to establish a common foundation for information security across the Federal Government. Our cybersecurity awareness, training, and education programs also exemplify the importance of engagements with academic institutions, federal agencies, small and medium businesses and others to increase awareness and enhance the overall cybersecurity posture of the Nation. CSD’s work with Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, Federal Communications Commission and others are all examples of an active and strong engagement, applying security to multiple government mission areas.

For many years, CSD, in collaboration with our global partners across industry, academia, standards bodies, and government, has made great contributions to help secure the nation’s critical information and infrastructure. We look forward to strengthening these relationships as we lead the development and practical application of scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices.

Matthew Scholl

Division Chief

Chief, Computer Security Division

Deputy Chief, Computer Security Division and Acting Associate Director of Operations, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

(Acting Group Manager) Cryptographic Technology Group

Secure Systems and Applications Group

Security Components and Mechanisms Group

Security Outreach and Integration Group²

Security Testing, Validation and Measurement Group

** Editor’s Note:

The Computer Security Division’s computer scientists, mathematicians, IT specialists, support staff and others support CSD’s mission and responsibilities through five groups that are described in the following sections:

Research, develop, engineer, and standardize cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.

The Cryptographic Technology Group’s (CTG) work in the field of cryptography includes researching, analyzing and standardizing cryptographic technology, such as hash algorithms, symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques, key management, authentication, and random number generation. The CTG’s goal is to identify and promote methods to protect communications and storage through cryptographic technologies, encouraging innovative development and helping technology users to manage risk.

In FY 2015, the CTG continued to collaborate with national and international government agencies, academic and research organizations, industry partners, and standards bodies to develop interoperable security standards and guidelines, and to make an impact in the field of cryptography. One example is the culmination of an eight-year standardization effort that led to the publication of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, announced in the Federal Register on August 5, 2015.

The CTG’s cryptographic standards program focuses on cryptographic primitives, algorithms, and schemes; the developed standards and guidelines are specified in FIPSs, NIST Special Publications (SPs), and NIST Interagency or Internal Reports (NISTIRs). Such standards and guidelines have been considered or adopted by the information technology (IT) industry and standards development organizations, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the Trusted Computing Group (TCG), and have been implemented on a variety of platforms.

The CTG is committed to the development of its standards using an open and transparent process -conducting workshops and requesting input and comments from government agencies, private industry, academia and the global cryptographic community. The CTG also examines each of its standards to determine if they need to be revised, withdrawn or re-opened for public comment.

The CTG continues to develop expertise in several critical research areas, such as post-quantum cryptography (PQC), elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), privacy-enhancing cryptography, and lightweight cryptographic schemes for constrained environments. It has collaborated with many universities internationally and presented research results in major cryptography conferences and journals. In addition, it organized workshops on PQC, ECC standards, and lightweight cryptography to discuss research results and develop standardization roadmaps.

The CTG also published several guidelines on cryptographic applications, including key management, public key certificate policies, and trusted platforms. The CTG also participated in the cybersecurity projects of other CSD groups, such as the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) standards, the Federal Cloud Credential Exchange (FCCX), the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP), and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).

Dr. Lily Chen (301) 975-6974 lily.chen@nist.gov

Research, develop, and standardize foundational security mechanisms, protocols, and services.

The SCMG’s security research focuses on the development and management of foundational building-block security mechanisms and techniques that can be integrated into a wide variety of mission-critical U.S. information systems. The group’s work spans the spectrum from near-term hardening and improvement of systems, to the design and analysis of next-generation, leap-ahead security capabilities. Computer security depends fundamentally on the level of trust of computer software and systems. This work, therefore, focuses strongly on assurance-building activities ranging from the analysis of software configuration settings, to advanced trust architectures, and to testing tools that identify flaws in software modules. This work also focuses significantly on increasing the applicability and effectiveness of automated techniques, wherever feasible. The SCMG conducts collaborative research with government, industry, and academia. Outputs of this research consist of prototype systems, software tools, demonstrations, guidelines, and other documentary resources.

Collaborating extensively with government, academia, and the private sector, SCMG works on a variety of topics, such as:

In FY 2015, collaborators and the associated collaborations have included Carnegie Mellon University (test development environment), Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (the practical application of a combinatorial coverage measurement tool), the University of Texas at Arlington (a covering array generation algorithm), Mexico’s Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto Politécnico Nacional (a very large covering array generation and its application to hardware malware detection), Lockheed Martin Corporation (the practical application of covering arrays), United States Marine Corps (USMC) Camp Pendleton (testing and fault location for the tactical data link TADIL-J protocol), University of Texas Dallas and East Carolina University (safety-critical systems testing), Duke University (analysis of software failures), the National Science Foundation (cybersecurity metrics and assurance building), the National Security Agency (NSA) Information Assurance Directorate (security automation standardization), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Communications (security automation standardization), and DHS (incident coordination).

SCMG accomplishments include results of a 2.5-year study with Lockheed Martin (CRADA) showing 20 % test cost reduction with 20 % to 50 % improvement in coverage (8 pilot projects), an analysis of Internet resilience to connectivity disruption attacks, and release of software to test conformance to the newest version of the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1 Biometric Standard.

Mr. Mark (Lee) Badger, (301) 975-3176, lee.badger@nist.gov

Integrate and apply security technologies, standards and guidelines for computing platforms and information systems.

SSAG’s security research focuses on identifying emerging and high-priority technologies, and on developing security solutions that will have a high impact on U.S. critical infrastructure. The group conducted research and development related to both public and private sector use cases. The research considered many aspects of the system’s lifecycle from the earliest stages of technology development through proof-of-concept, reference and prototype implementations, and demonstrations. In addition, the group worked to transfer new technologies to industry; to produce new standards and guidance for federal agencies and industry; and to develop tests, test methodologies, and assurance methods.

SSAG investigated security concerns associated with such areas as mobile devices, cloud computing and virtualization, identity management, access control and authorization management, and software assurance. SSAG’s research helps to meet federal information security requirements that may not be fully addressed by existing technology. The group collaborated extensively with government, academia, and private sector entities.

Example successes from this work include:

In particular, the SSAG led the NIST Security and Forensics Working Group that published draft NISTIR 8006, NIST Cloud Computing - Security Reference Architecture, that aggregates forensics challenges in a cloud ecosystem. The working group has been working on developing a draft of SP 800-173, Guidance for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal-based Information Systems (target release date: spring/summer 2016). In response to the rapidly emerging use of virtualization in enterprise data centers for supporting both in-house mission-critical applications and for providing cloud services, two guidance documents were published: Draft SP 800-125A, Security Recommendations for Hypervisor Deployment, and Draft SP 800-125B, Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM) Protection. In support of the revised FIPS 201, Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, two new PIV-related SP 800-series were released and five SP 800 documents were revised. One of the new publications, SP 800-157, Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials, guides the implementation and deployment of PIV credentials for mobile devices. In addition, the PIV team participated in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cybersecurity Sprint effort with a goal to strengthen the cybersecurity of federal networks, systems, and data through multi-factor authentication using the PIV Card. To improve access to new technologies, the group also chaired, edited, and participated in the development of a wide variety of national and international security standards.

Mr. David Ferraiolo, (301) 975-3046, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Develop, integrate, and promote the mission-specific application of information security standards, guidelines, best practices, and technologies.

The U.S. economy, citizens, and government rely on information technology (IT), so the protection of IT and the information infrastructure is critical. SOIG leverages broad cybersecurity and risk management expertise to develop, integrate, and promote security standards, guidelines, tools, technologies, methodologies, tests, and measurements to address cybersecurity needs in many areas of national and international importance.

The SOIG collaborates with stakeholders to address cybersecurity considerations in many diverse program areas, including the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) supply chain, Smart Grid, Electronic Voting, Cyber Physical and Industrial Control Systems, Health Information Technology, and the National Public Safety Broadband Network. The group produces standards and guidelines through the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) implementation program to help federal agencies build strong cybersecurity risk management programs. In each of these program areas, the group extends outreach to stakeholders across federal, state, and local governments; industry; academia; small businesses; and the public. The SOIG also leads several broad cybersecurity awareness, training, education, and outreach efforts, including the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the Federal Computer Security Managers’ Forum, and the Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA).

Key to the group’s success is the ability to interact with a broad constituency to ensure that SOIG’s program is consistent with national objectives related to or impacted by information security. Through open and transparent public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation, the group works to address critical cybersecurity challenges, enable greater U.S. industrial competitiveness, and facilitate the practical implementation of scalable and sustainable information security standards and practices.

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Advance information security testing, measurement science, and conformance.

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on cryptography for the protection of the information and communications used in electronic commerce, the critical infrastructure, and other application areas. The STVMG supports the testing and validation of the underlying cryptographic modules and cryptographic algorithms based upon established standards. These cryptographic modules and algorithms enable products and systems to provide security services, such as confidentiality, integrity protection, and authentication. Although cryptography provides security, poor designs or weak algorithms can render a product insecure and place highly sensitive information at risk. When protecting sensitive data, federal agencies require assurance that cryptographic products meet established security requirements and use only tested and validated cryptographic modules.

STVMG’s testing-focused activities include validating cryptographic algorithm implementations, cryptographic modules, and Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)-enabled products; developing test suites and test methods; providing implementation guidance and technical support to industry forums; and conducting education, training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with independent cryptographic and security testing laboratories accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent laboratory test report and test evidence, the Validation Program validates an implementation under test. NIST publishes lists of awarded validations through public websites.

Mr. Michael Cooper, (301) 975-8077, michael.cooper@nist.gov

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in December 2002, recognized the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, included the duties and responsibilities for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division (CSD). In December 2014, the 113th Congress updated FISMA as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (Public Law 113-283). NIST CSD responsibilities were unchanged in the update. In 2015, CSD addressed its assignments through the following activities:

In FY 2015, CSD continued to research and develop guidance for a broad array of technical areas, including supply chain risk management; security analytics; cloud, mobile, and privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled security; and cyber-physical and embedded systems. CSD staff and guest researchers have collaborated with global partners from government, industry, and academia, making significant contributions to help secure critical information and the infrastructure. The following sections describe CSD’s programs and project achievements, including extensive research and development for high quality, cost-effective security and privacy mechanisms, standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics that address current and future computer and information security challenges.

Recognizing that the national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of its critical infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in February 2013. This EO directed NIST to work with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework – based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices − for reducing cybersecurity risks to the critical infrastructure.

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) that was developed provides a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and other interested entities identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity-related risk, while protecting business confidentiality, individual privacy, and civil liberties.

In FY 2015, NIST continued to work with a diverse stakeholder community to support CSF use and understanding. This process included:

Since the release of the Framework, NIST’s primary goal has been to raise awareness of the Framework and encourage its use as a tool to help industry sectors and organizations manage cybersecurity risks. NIST has strengthened its collaboration with critical infrastructure owners and operators, industry leaders, government partners, and other stakeholders, building on previous years’ interactions that were crucial to the Framework’s development.

In FY 2016, NIST will continue to conduct stakeholder outreach and will work collaboratively to further understand stakeholder needs regarding tools and resources to enable more effective use of the Framework. NIST will also publish guidance on how NIST’s Risk Management Framework (SP 800-37 revision 1) and the Cybersecurity Framework complement each other. Additionally, NIST will formally gather stakeholder input about Framework use, evolution, and future management through a request for information (RFI). Following the RFI, NIST will conduct a public workshop at NIST in Gaithersburg, Maryland on April 6 and 7, 2016. Periodic program updates will be provided through the Framework website.

http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

Mr. Matt Barrett, 301) 975-6259, matthew.barrett@nist.gov

Mr. Adam Sedgewick, (301) 367-4678, adam.sedgewick@nist.gov

Figure 1 shows many of the national and international standards developing organizations (SDOs) involved in cybersecurity standardization. CSD participates in many cybersecurity standards’ activities in many of these organizations, either in leadership positions or as editors and contributors, including the Biometric Application Programming Interface (BioAPI) Consortium; the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG): Bluetooth Security Expert Group (BT-SEG); the International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T); various groups within the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); the North American Security Products Organization (NASPO); the Trusted Computing Group (TCG); and Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. (ASC X9, Inc.) (e.g., X9F – Data & Information Security Subcommittee). Many of CSD’s publications have been the basis for both national and international standards projects.

The following paragraphs discuss, in particular, CSD staff activities in conjunction with the InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee Cyber Security (CS1), where CSD’s Sal Francomacaro served as the CS1 Vice Chair.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a network of the national standards institutes of 148 countries, with representation by one member per country. The scope of ISO covers the standardization in all fields except electrical and electronic engineering standards, which are the responsibility of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).

Figure 1: SDOs involved in Cybersecurity

The IEC prepares and publishes international standards for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies, including electronics, magnetics and electromagnetics, electroacoustics, multimedia, telecommunication, and energy production and distribution, as well as associated general disciplines, such as terminology and symbols, electromagnetic compatibility, measurement and performance, dependability, design and development, safety, and the environment. (see http://www.iec.ch/about/).

Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) was formed by ISO and IEC to be responsible for international standardization in the field of Information Technology (see http://www.iso.org/iso/jtc1_home.html). JTC 1 develops, maintains, promotes, and facilitates the IT standards required by global markets, meeting business and user requirements concerning:

JTC 1 consists of a number of subcommittees (SCs) and working groups that address specific technologies. SCs that produce standards relating to IT security include:

JTC 1 also has:

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private, nonprofit (501(c)(3)) organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system, and facilitates the development of American National Standards (ANSs) by accrediting the procedures of SDOs.

ANSI promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, advocates U.S. policy and technical positions in international and regional standards organizations, and encourages the adoption of international standards as national standards where they meet the needs of the U.S. user community. ANSI is the sole U.S. representative and dues-paying member of the two major non-treaty international standards organizations: ISO and, via the United States National Committee (USNC), the IEC.

INCITS is an ANSI-accredited SDO that serves as the ANSI Technical Advisory Group (TAG) for ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1. INCITS is sponsored by the Information Technology Industry (ITI) Council, a trade association representing the leading U.S. providers of information technology products and services.

INCITS is organized into Technical Committees that focus on the creation of standards for different technology areas. Technical committees that focus on IT security and IT security-related technologies, or that may require separate security standards include:

As a technical committee of INCITS, CS1 develops national, ANSI-accredited standards in the area of cybersecurity. Its scope encompasses:

Several members of NIST’s CSD staff contribute to CS1’s national and international IT security standards efforts through its membership in CS1.

CSD’s cybersecurity research also plays a direct role in the Cybersecurity Standardization efforts of CS1 at the national level. The following is a description of the national-level progress achieved during FY 2015 by CSD and CS1.

The NIST Policy Machine research and development effort has resulted in three ongoing national standards projects in CS1 in the early stages of development. They include:

Sal Francomacaro also served as cybersecurity standards coordinator in CSD.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

CSD supports identity management standardization activities through participation in national and international standards bodies and organizations. CSD actively participates in the INCITS B10 committee, which is focused on the interoperability of Identification Cards and Related Devices. CSD has contributed and provided valuable feedback to many INCITS B10 standards during the development process. In addition, CSD also actively participates in the B10.8 and B10.12 committees.

The INCITS/B10.8 committee works on International Driver’s License standards and serves as the U.S. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17 Working Group (WG) 10 efforts on the International Standardization of Driver’s License documents. The B10.12 committee develops interoperable standards for Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts, and serves as the U.S. TAG for the international ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 Working Groups 4 and 11. During FY 2015, Mr. Francomacaro served as the U.S. Head of delegation to ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17 WG4 and WG11.

CSD provides technical and editorial support in the development of national and international standards. Specifically, Mr. Ketan Mehta, a CSD staff member, serves as the technical editor of ANSI 504-1, Generic Identity Command Set (GICS). GICS enables PIV, PIV-Interoperable (PIV-I) and Common Access Card (CAC) applications, and others, to be built from a single platform. GICS defines an open platform where identity applications can be instantiated, deployed, and used in an interoperable way between the credential issuers and credential users. During FY 2015, an amendment process was started on INCITS 504 Parts 1 and 2 to better align them with the new NIST SP 800-73-4 (PIV) specifications.

CSD staff also provided significant input to the standards of major interest to U.S. government agencies and U.S. markets. CSD played a role in the development and revision of:

During FY 2016, the INCITS B10 committee, along with the active collaboration of CSD staff, plans to:

CSD staff will continue to actively support relevant ID management standard initiatives, such as ISO/IEC 19286 (Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Privacy-enhancing protocols and services) and ISO/IEC 18328 (ICC managed Devices).

CSD’s investment in these activities is motivated by new technical ideas that emerge from these ISO standards. For example, INCITS 504 is an ID platform that leverages the FIPS 201 infrastructure to support a large number of government and enterprise initiatives. In particular, INCITS 504 aims to support initiatives such as the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). ISO/IEC 24727 aims to create an interoperability framework that increases the resilience and scalability of identity management solutions and to foster domestic and international interoperability.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Mr. Ketan Mehta, (301) 975-8405, ketan.mehta@nist.gov

NIST has been designated by the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) to accelerate the Federal Government’s secure adoption of cloud computing by leading efforts to identify existing standards and guidelines. Where international standards are needed, NIST works closely with U.S. industry, standards developers, other government agencies, and leaders in the global standards community to develop standards that will support secure cloud computing.

As part of this program, Ms. Annie Sokol, CSD, provides technical and editorial representation in the development of national and international standards in both SC 27 and SC38. She was the convener for ISO/IEC 17788 Information technology – Cloud Computing Overview and vocabulary, which is the normative reference to other published and under-development.

Ms. Annie Sokol, (301) 975-2006, annie.sokol@nist.gov

CSD has contributed to the activities of ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC/27, which published ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, and ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on July 1, 2008. ISO/IEC 19790 specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems. These efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic modules to the global community by providing ISO-equivalent standards representing FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules and Derived Test Requirements [DTR] for FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Working Group (WG) 3 completed and published revisions of ISO/IEC 19790:2006 and ISO/IEC 24759:2008, for which Mr. Randall J. Easter of CSD was the principal editor. The revision of ISO/IEC 19790 was published on August 15, 2012. The revision of ISO/IEC 24759 was published on January 31, 2014. Both ISO/IEC standards were also adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). The two ISO/IEC revisions were developed with international support and the collaboration of governments, industry and academia. Revised corrections of both standards were published on December 15, 2015.

The revision of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 addresses new security areas such as: defined software module boundaries; degraded modes of operation; trusted channels; two-factor authentication; software security; mitigation of fault induction and side-channel attacks; operational self-tests for algorithms; and life-cycle assurance from design to end-of-life. Figure 2 is a chart of the ISO/IEC standards, as explained above, in which CSD has played a part during the development process.

In addition to the aforementioned standards, the Technical Standard (TS) ISO/IEC TS 30104:2015, Physical Security Attacks, Mitigation Techniques and Security Requirements, for which Mr. Easter was the editor, was published on May 15, 2015.

Physical security mechanisms are employed by cryptographic modules where the protection of the module’s sensitive security parameters are desired. ISO/IEC 30104 addresses how to express security assurance for products where the risk of the security environment requires the support of such mechanisms. This Technical Specification addresses the following topics:

Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Testing – ISO Standards

CSD’s Mr. Easter is also the principal editor or co-editor of the following draft ISO/IEC documents:

CSD’s contributions to the development of these international standards create a strong foundation for the adoption of and migration from currently used national standards. In particular, this adoption will promote international harmonization for the implementation and testing of cryptographic algorithms and modules, while accommodating individual country preferences in the choice of approved security functions. CSD published a Federal Register notice in August 2015 seeking public comment for migrating from FIPS 140-2 to ISO/IEC 19790:2012. The comment period ended September 2015 (see https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-19743).

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/

Mr. Randall J. Easter, (301) 975-4641, randall.easter@nist.gov

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

During FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project continued to strengthen collaboration through the Joint Task Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative, which includes the Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), and other federal agencies. The JTF partners continue to develop and update key cybersecurity guidelines for protecting federal information and information systems as part of the Unified Information Security Framework. Previously, the JTF developed common security guidance in the critical areas of security controls for information systems and organizations, security assessment procedures to demonstrate security control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date information on the security state of their information systems. In addition, CSD worked with the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), a government-wide program that provides a standardized approach to security assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring for cloud products and services. The team developed a high-impact security control baseline overlay for FedRAMP cloud systems in accordance with NIST standards and guidelines.

In FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project staff worked on the following initiatives:

In FY 2015, the CSD FISMA Implementation project staff completed the following activities:

In FY 2016, CSD FISMA Implementation project staff intend to:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma

Dr. Ron Ross, (301) 975-5390, ron.ross@nist.gov

Ms. Pat Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey, (301) 975-2827, kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

NIST’s CSD supports the development of biometric conformance testing methodology standards and other conformity-assessment efforts through active technical participation in the development of these standards and the development of associated conformance test software, architectures and test suites. These test tools are developed to promote the adoption of these standards and to support users that require conformance to selected biometric standards, product developers and testing labs.

CSD’s project team contributes to the development of biometric standards and participates in the INCITS Technical Committee M1 – Biometrics and ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee (SC) 37 – Biometrics standards bodies. CSD plans to continue this work in FY 2016.

In FY 2015, Biometric Conformance Test Software (BioCTS) for ANSI/NIST-ITL (which targets biometric transactions based on NIST SP 500-290, and SP 500-290 Revision 1 - Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information) received a substantial update. Version 2.0 of the testing software was released and added support for testing for the remaining traditionally encoded record types not previously supported (+12 for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011, and +18 for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 2013). Version 2.0 now supports all traditionally encoded biometric record types between the two versions of the published ANSI/NIST-ITL standards. Additionally, Version 2.0 added many enhanced editing features for traditionally encoded biometric transactions – some new features include: adding and removing records and fields, arranging records and fields, automatically sorting records, displaying the biometric sample image, and enhanced binary data editing features. In addition to the enhanced editing features, BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL received many usability enhancements, as well as updates to some core software functionality, providing a more usable and robust testing tool.

As illustrated in Figure 3, a new feature of BioCTS is the display of the biometric sample, when possible, so that the user can get visual feedback on the biometric data that is under test. The update provides a rich editing environment for binary/traditionally encoded transactions and files, which are difficult for humans to read. Version 2.0 provides a user-friendly way to see each field within a transaction/file, associated test results, and allows for the modification of data (as shown in Figure 4.) All of the new features are detailed in the BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL v2 User Guide (see: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/BiomResCenter/CTA_BETA/BioCTS_AN_ITL_v2_Guide.pdf).

Figure 3: BioCTS displays the biometric sample to provide visual feedback.

The latest version of BioCTS was released in August 2015, together with documentation and sample data. The BioCTS software installer files, as well as the ancillary tools and sample data can be downloaded from the NIST Biometrics website. (see: http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.cfm).

Figure 4: BioCTS provides a rich editing environment for reviewing and updating records.

A number of technical contributions towards the development of ANSI/NIST and international standards were submitted. They included technical contributions on international biometric data interchange formats and their associated conformance testing methodologies, as well as on SP 500-290 Revision 1 and the associated National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) Extensible Markup Language (XML) Schema (see https://tools.niem.gov).

Outreach efforts in FY 2015 in support of biometric standards development and conformity assessment included test tool contributions for the standards developers (in support of ongoing development projects), and presentations on ANSI/NIST and international biometric standards and related conformity assessment activities. The work included the development of technical publications, the review of research papers for external publications, and participation in conference program committees. CSD published NIST Special Publication 500-304, Conformance Testing Methodology Framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 2013, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information in June 2015. Additionally, CSD published NIST SP 500-304 Annex D: Test Notes and Exceptions for the ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2011 Update 2013 Conformance Testing Methodology Framework in July 2015.

BioCTS - Biometric Conformance Test Tool Downloads:

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta_download.cfm

NIST Special Publication 500-304: Conformance Testing Methodology Framework for ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2011 Update: 2013, Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial & Other Biometric Information:

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.500-304.pdf

NIST SP 500-304 Annex D: Test Notes and Exceptions for the ANSI/NIST ITL 1-2011 Update 2013 Conformance Testing Methodology Framework:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/BiomResCenter/CTA_BETA/External_Notes_Exceptions_NIST_SP_500_304_with_Errata.pdf

Mr. Dylan Yaga, (301) 975-6004, dylan.yaga@nist.gov

CSD’s overall Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) effort will provide the next generation of “smart,” co-designed and co-engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components. Specifically, CSD supports the effort by providing cybersecurity and privacy experts who help leverage existing resources and address CPS-specific cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Such challenges are related to personalized health care, emergency response, traffic flow management, and electric power generation and delivery, and many other emerging technical areas. Other phrases that are often referenced along with CPS technologies include:

Composed of heterogeneous, potentially distributed components and systems, CPS provides a promise of increased efficiency and interaction between the digital and physical worlds. However, assuring that these emerging and evolving systems are reliable, robust, resilient, trustworthy, secure, and that they protect the privacy of information (to only list a few concerns) poses a unique cybersecurity challenge.

CPS present unique challenges, including the need for integration with legacy components and allowance for emerging technologies, and real-time response in support of extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability.

Cybersecurity is an important crosscutting discipline that is critical to the safe and resilient design, development and operation of CPS. Addressing the opportunities and challenges of CPS requires a broad collaboration to develop a common foundation, including a consensus definition, vocabulary, reference architecture, and a shared understanding of the essential roles of timing, cybersecurity and data interoperability. CSD is researching the cybersecurity needs of the broader landscape of CPS by leveraging CSD’s expertise in cybersecurity in different domains and applications of CPS (such as industrial control systems, the smart grid, hardware-enabled security, and embedded systems).

In June 2014, NIST established the CPS Public Working Group (PWG), which is open to all, to foster and capture inputs from those involved in CPS, both nationally and globally. CSD is working in collaboration with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) Smart Grid and Cyber-Physical Systems Program Office, NIST’s Physical Measurement Laboratory Time and Frequency Division, ITL’s Software and Systems Division and ITL’s Advanced Networking Technologies Division to lead a working group of government, academic, and industry stakeholders. The CPS PWG consists of five technical subgroups:

Each subgroup consists of co-leaders from academia, industry and NIST. CSD co-leads the Cybersecurity and Privacy subgroup that is focused on identifying strategies for cybersecurity and privacy in CPS, and is working collaboratively with the other subgroups to ensure that cybersecurity is included as a design principle during development.

In September 2015, the CPS PWG published the Draft Framework for CPS that includes the work of the five technical subgroups. The document reflects more than a year’s effort by the CPS PWG, which includes a few hundred members drawn primarily from industry, academia and government. In 2016, the CPS PWG will collect and analyze the comments to the draft and publish the next version of the CPS Framework. The CPS PWG deliverables are technology and business-model neutral, and freely available online and intended for open use by all stakeholders.

Additionally, in 2015, CSD, in conjunction with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, Intelligent Systems Division, finalized SP 800-82 Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security. CSD will also continue to participate in the International Society of Automation (ISA) 99 Committee, which develops and establishes standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and related information that define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems and security practices, and for assessing electronic security performance.

http://www.nist.gov/cps/

Mr. Stephen Quinn, (301) 975-6967, stephen.quinn@nist.gov

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program provides a framework in which many federal agencies come together to coordinate their networking and IT research and development (R&D) efforts. CSD remained committed to the value of communicating its R&D efforts to other federal colleagues and identifying the opportunities to support R&D efforts throughout the Federal Government.

In FY 2015, the NITRD Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CSIA) Interagency Working Group (IWG) monthly meetings provided an opportunity to learn and share information about NIST’s ongoing research with federal program managers of cybersecurity research (see https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/index.php?title=Cyber_Security_and_Information_Assurance_Interagency_Working_Group_(CSIA_IWG)#title). The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 requested the development of a new federal cybersecurity research and development strategic plan, and NIST was a consistent presence at the regular development meetings for the new plan that is intended for release during the month of February 2016. (see Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1353/text, and see strategic plan https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/2016_Federal_Cybersecurity_Research_and_Development_Stratgeic_Plan.pdf).

FY 2015 also included the development of a National Privacy Research Strategy by the members of the National Privacy Research Forum (see https://www.nitrd.gov/cybersecurity/nationalprivacyresearchstrategy.aspx). Naomi Lefkowitz, Senior Privacy Policy Advisor at NIST, and Simson Garfinkel, Senior Advisor in the Information Access Division, shared NIST’s focus on privacy and brought their expertise to the development process for the privacy R&D plan that will be published in FY 2016.

NIST regularly attended the NITRD CSIA Senior Steering Group meetings to share and stay connected with opportunities that supported the development of the new strategic plan for cybersecurity R&D and participated in panel presentations to which the SSG was invited to describe federal directions in cybersecurity R&D at relevant forums and conferences (see https://www.nitrd.gov/nitrdgroups/index.php?title=Cyber_Security_Information_Assurance_Research_and_Development_Senior_Steering_Group_(CSIA_R%26D_SSG)#title).

CSD is also a regular participant in the coordination activities of the federal Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering (SCORE) Committee. SCORE enables technology transfer through the sharing of NIST cybersecurity expertise and publications with researchers throughout the Federal Government. The SCORE committee interacts with federal leaders and reports to the National Science & Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland & National Security. In FY 2015, NIST expertise in supply chain risk management and cryptography was included in SCORE reports.

http://www.nitrd.gov/

Mr. Bill Newhouse, (301) 975-2869, william.newhouse@nist.gov

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment across the United States. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director of NIST. HAVA directs NIST to provide technical support to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, security, and laboratory accreditation. As part of NIST’s efforts, CSD supports the activities of the EAC related to voting equipment security.

In the past year, NIST continued to support the EAC in finalizing changes to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 1.1. These changes sought to improve the auditability of voting systems, provide greater software integrity protections, expand and improve access-control requirements, and help ensure that cryptographic security mechanisms are implemented properly. The EAC approved these updates to the VVSG in March 2015. In addition, NIST completed a set of draft test assertions for the security requirements in the VVSG. This included test assertions in the areas of access control, software setup and validation, polling place security, and the use of public telecommunications networks.

Initial efforts on the next-generation of the VVSG have already begun. In February, NIST and the EAC sponsored the second Future of Voting Systems Symposium. This symposium brought together election officials, voting system manufacturers, voting system test laboratories, standards developers, academics, and federal, state, and local government officials to discuss emerging trends in voting. The discussions at this workshop are being used to define the scope and priorities for the next-generation guidelines.

In FY 2016, NIST and the EAC will establish a set of public working groups to inform the development of a new version of the VVSG. NIST and EAC goals are to accelerate the development and adoption of the VVSG by leading these working groups in close consultation with election officials, the federal and private sectors, standards bodies and EAC committees, academic researchers, and other members of the public. These working groups will focus on voting system technology areas, including accessibility, usability, interoperability, security, and testing and certification.

http://vote.nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Mr. Joshua Franklin, (301) 975-8463, joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Health Information Technology (HIT) enables better patient care through the secure use and sharing of health information. HIT leads to improvements in healthcare quality, reduced medical errors, increased efficiencies in health care delivery and administration, and improved health for the general population. Central to reaching these goals is the assurance of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of health information. CSD works with government, industry, academia, and others to provide security tools, technologies, and methodologies that provide for the security and privacy of health information.

NIST CSD continued its HIT security outreach efforts in FY 2015. NIST and the Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) co-hosted the eighth annual Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule conference, Safeguarding Health Information: Building Assurance through HIPAA Security, in September 2015 in Washington, D.C. The conference offered important sessions that focused on broad topics of interest to the healthcare and health IT security community. Over 600 in-person and virtual attendees from federal, state, and local governments, academia, HIPAA-covered entities and business associates, industry groups, and vendors heard from, and interacted with, healthcare, security, and privacy experts on technologies and methodologies for safeguarding health information and for implementing the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule. Presentations and panel discussions covered a variety of security management and technical assurance topics, including:

The keynote addresses were delivered by Jocelyn Samuels, Director, DHHS/OCR, and Dr. Cris Ewell, Chief Information Security Officer at Seattle Children’s Hospital.

In FY 2016, NIST will work with diverse healthcare stakeholders, including partners in government and industry, to support security capabilities in new areas, such as the Precision Medicine Initiative, and identify opportunities to strengthen the sector’s cybersecurity risk management efforts through the application of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

http://www.nist.gov/healthcare/security/

Mr. Kevin Stine, (301) 975-4483, kevin.stine@nist.gov

Information and communication technologies have rapidly become more numerous and more capable. These technologies increasingly rely on a supply-chain ecosystem that is long, complex, variable, interconnected, globally distributed, and geographically diverse. Outsourcing the development, maintenance, management, and disposal of data and ICT is increasingly common.

These trends have caused organizations acquiring technology to experience a lack of visibility throughout the supply chain (see Figure 5). Such organizations need a better understanding of how the technology being acquired was developed, integrated and deployed. These organizations also need to better understand the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, and quality of the products and services being obtained. This lack of visibility and understanding, in turn, has decreased the acquiring organization’s ability to effectively manage risk inherited from the supply chain.

The Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) program seeks to provide organizations with a standardized and repeatable toolkit of technical and intelligence resources to strategically manage supply-chain risk throughout the entire lifecycle of systems, products and services.

In FY 2015, CSD finalized and published NIST SP 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. This document builds on existing NIST guidance to help federal departments and agencies identify, assess and mitigate ICT supply-chain risk at all organizational levels.

When NIST researched and developed the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, which was published in February 2014, cyber supply-chain risk management (CSCRM) was identified as an area needing further research and guidance (see the NIST Roadmap for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, also published in February 2014). In FY 2015, CSD initiated a project on industry best practices for CSCRM. Initial research was developed into company case studies spanning multiple business sectors. The studies will be analyzed to support a workshop, and a final publication is planned for FY 2016.

Figure 5: Visibility Challenges for Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)

CSD staff continued to join staff members from the Department of Defense in co-chairing a U.S. federal interagency working group on SCRM. The working group evolved from the White House’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) 11, Develop a Multi-Pronged Approach for Global Supply Chain Risk Management, which ended in 2014. In FY 2015, the co-chairs began the process of formalizing the working group under the auspices of the CNSS.

CSD continued working with partners through the Software and Supply Chain Assurance (SSCA) Forum, co-sponsoring four multi-day workshops. The SSCA Working Group (WG) is a key public-private partnership that meets quarterly to discuss current projects, tools, resources, and lessons learned regarding CSCRM. The SSCA WG is co-sponsored by NIST, GSA, DoD and DHS.

In FY 2016, CSD will:

http://csrc.nist.gov/scrm/

ICT SCRM Team email: scrm-nist@nist.gov

Mr. Jon Boyens, Program Lead, (301) 975-5549, jon.boyens@nist.gov

Ms. Celia Paulsen, Technical Lead, (301) 975-5981, celia.paulsen@nist.gov

Source: http://www.pscr.gov/

In February 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act. One portion of this legislation calls for the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public-safety broadband network based on the 3rd Generation Partnership Project’s (3GPP) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) technology. The network will be deployed and operated by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The planned NPSBN will “create a much needed nationwide interoperable broadband network that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical service professionals and other public safety officials stay safe and do their jobs.” (see http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety). NIST is directed to establish a list of certified devices and required components to be used by public-safety officials, vendors, and other interested parties for interacting with the nationwide network. NIST is also directed to conduct research and development that supports the acceleration and advancement of the nationwide network.

In FY 2015, CSD supported the joint National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program with efforts in public-safety mobile-application security, identity management, and enabling cybersecurity capabilities on the PSCR 700 MHz LTE network located in Boulder, Colorado (see http://www.pscr.gov). In June 2015, CSD, in cooperation with the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) International and FirstNet, held a half-day workshop titled “Identifying and Categorizing Data Types for Public Safety Mobile Applications.” The outcome of that workshop will be captured in a forthcoming NIST publication in FY 2016. At PSCR’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference, CSD organized a panel titled “Applied Public Safety Cybersecurity Research” highlighting PSCR’s cybersecurity activities over the previous twelve months in the areas of identity management, mobile application security, and LTE infrastructure cybersecurity.

During FY 2015, CSD published NISTIR 8018, Public Safety Mobile Application Security Requirements Workshop Summary, and NISTIR 8014, Considerations for Identity Management in Public Safety Mobile Networks. In addition, CSD developed an informational survey on mobile application vetting services titled “Mobile Application Vetting Services for Public Safety” and Draft NISTIR 8080, Usability and Security Considerations for Public Safety Mobile Authentication.

CSD participated in the standards development process for LTE technology within the 3GPP, supporting security requirements for public safety that are related to Proximity Services (ProSe), Group Communication System Enablers (GCSE), and Mission Critical Push-To-Talk (MCPTT). In addition, CSD broadened its scope within the IETF to include efforts related to public safety.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue representing public safety in international standardization efforts, such as the IETF and 3GPP. CSD will work to implement and exercise LTE cybersecurity infrastructure capabilities in the PSCR 700 MHz LTE network, conduct research into mobile authentication solutions to support public-safety, and investigate mobile application-security services and solutions to support the security requirements of public-safety mobile applications and devices. CSD will continue to engage the public-safety communications community by organizing workshops and conferences; and participating in events such as APCO’s Annual Meeting, PSRC’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference, and the International Wireless Communications Expo (IWCE).

Ms. Sheila Frankel, (301) 975-3297, sheila.frankel@nist.gov

Dr. Nelson Hastings, (301) 975-5237, nelson.hastings@nist.gov

The major elements of the smart grid are information technology, industrial control systems/operational technology and the communications infrastructure. The infrastructure is used to send command information across the electric grid from generation systems to distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing information between utilities and their customers. Key to the successful deployment of the smart grid infrastructure is the development of the cybersecurity strategy that includes cybersecurity as a design consideration for new and emerging systems, and an approach to adding cybersecurity into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the economic and physical well-being of the nation, and emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical assets.

The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) became a membership-supported organization in January 2013. The SGIP Cybersecurity Working Group (CSWG) was renamed the Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGCC), and continues to be led by Ms. Suzanne Lightman of the CSD in support of responsibilities identified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The SGCC chair is a voting member of the SGIP Technical Committee, and serves as an ex-officio Director of the Board.

During the last year, staff from CSD and ITL’s Software and Systems Division (SSD) worked on developing network security tools that are specifically designed to support next-generation electrical power systems. They concentrated on authenticating the provenance of multicast data streams from emerging power system sensors, called Phasor Measurement Units. By authenticating the sensors to the utility, the utility may trust that sensor measurements are coming from the correct sensors and have not been hijacked.

Multicast authentication of sensor data is challenging, due to the need for low security overhead, tolerance of lossy networks, time-criticality, and high data rates. Researchers augmented an existing authentication scheme to accommodate high-data-rate sensor transmissions that are unbounded in length (no session expiration). Using dual offset key chains to reduce the authentication delay and computational overhead associated with key chain commitment, they developed a new protocol called inf-TESLA that meets the performance requirements imposed by the physical dynamics of the power system.

Their key disclosure mechanism, as well as comparative studies showing a cumulative reduction in the communication overhead and computational cost over existing methods, are outlined in a paper to appear at the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Symposium on Applied Computing.

Significant effort was made to integrate their authentication protocol into existing network simulation software, specifically OPNET, thus providing potential users the ability to evaluate the protocol on their own networks and for their own applications.

Furthermore, in an effort to address the growing interest in co-optimizing cyber and physical components to work together as a system, CSD staff developed mathematical formalism to tradeoff the sensitivity of a dynamic system to attack or perturbation against the authentication overhead incurred by their protocol. This formalism was demonstrated on a power system use case showing the limiting considerations between authentication overhead and stability margins of a wide-area damping controller.

In FY 2016, CSD will coordinate with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) and Smart Grid Program Office on the further development of a Cybersecurity Smart Grid Test Lab, part of the NIST Smart Grid Testbed Facility now under construction. CSD will also collaborate with SSD on cybersecurity research in relation to the IEEE 1588, Precision Time Protocol, a time synchronization standard that is used for the electric grid and other special-purpose industrial automation and measurement networks.

http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid

http://www.sgip.org

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri, (301) 975-8542, victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

Ms. Tanya Brewer, (301) 975-4534, tbrewer@nist.gov

NIST has been the lead for the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) since its inception in 2010. NICE is responsive to President Obama’s declaration that the “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and “America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”

The NICE program seeks to foster, energize, and promote a robust network and an integrated ecosystem of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development.

CSD is leading the NICE program, working from the strengths and energy of more than twenty federal departments and agencies, leveraging each of their relationships with academia and industry sectors to ensure coordination, cooperation, focus, public engagement, technology transfer and sustainability. NIST will highlight these activities, engage various stakeholder groups and create forums for sharing information and leveraging best practices.

The NICE Program Office focuses on the following activities:

The NICE Program Office staff promoted NICE activities through contributions to many events, symposia, forums, competitions, educational outreach meetings, and workshops. The staff continued its leadership to achieve the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Cross-Agency Priority Goal: “Closing Skills Gaps” for the IT/Cybersecurity workforce. The staff focused on reducing cybersecurity workforce gaps and supported the goals of the White House’s “Ready to Work” initiative. In addition, the staff took leadership of the NICE Working Group, a group established to provide a mechanism in which public and private sector participants can develop concepts, design strategies, and pursue actions that advance cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development.

In FY 2015, the NICE Program Office announced that a grant will be awarded to support the development of a visualization tool to show the demand for and availability of critical cybersecurity jobs across the nation. This cybersecurity jobs “heat map” will be developed in partnership with Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) and Burning Glass Technologies. The map will provide data to help employers, job seekers, policy makers, training providers, and guidance counselors in order to meet today’s increasing demand for cybersecurity workers. NICE also provided grant support for the NICE 2015 Conference and Expo, the inaugural National Cybersecurity K-12 Cybersecurity Education Conference, the Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) Community Meeting, and the NICE Challenge Project.

In FY 2016, the NICE Program Office will continue to promote the coordination of existing and future cybersecurity education, training, and workforce activities. The Sixth annual NICE Workshop will take place on November 3-4, 2015 in San Diego, CA (see http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/events.html). NIST will also identify opportunities to extend and integrate the NICE focus on the cybersecurity workforce, education, and training within NIST Special Publications and informational reports, while promoting the value of the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NCWF) and the forthcoming DOD Cyberspace Workforce Strategy as resources that address cybersecurity workforce needs.

http://www.nist.gov/nice/

Mr. Rodney Peterson, NICE Director, (301) 975-8897, rodney@nist.gov

Ms. Danielle Santos, NICE Program Manager, (301) 975-5048, danielle.santos@nist.gov

The CSRC, Computer Security Division’s (CSD) website, is one of the most visited websites at NIST. CSRC encourages the broad sharing of information security tools and practices, provides a resource for information security standards and guidelines, and identifies and links key security web resources to support industry and government users. CSRC is an integral component of all of the work that CSD conducts and produces. It is CSD’s repository for anyone wanting to access these documents and other valuable security-related information. During FY 2015, CSRC had more than 5.9 million page views and downloads.

CSRC is the primary gateway for gaining access to NIST computer security publications, standards, and guidelines, and serves as a vital link to CSD’s customers. Publications are organized to help users locate relevant information quickly and are arranged by topic, relevant security control family, and legal requirements.

In addition to CSRC, CSD maintains a publication announcement mailing list. This free e mail list notifies subscribers about publications that have been posted to the CSRC website, along with announcing new CSD-sponsored events and important news and/or announcements. The e-mail list is a valuable tool for more than 59,000 subscribers from the Federal Government, industry, academia, and individuals with a personal interest in IT security worldwide. Individuals who are interested in subscribing to this list should visit http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/subscribe.html for more information.

During FY 2015, the CSRC has been updated on a daily basis with new information, such as the publication of draft and final documents (FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs and ITL Bulletins) and various project and program webpage updates. An improvement made to the CSRC homepage was to add a new section titled “Draft Publications Request for Comments Deadlines”. This section will help our customers that are interested in submitting comments to our technical publications find the deadline dates for submitting comments to certain publications.

The CSRC website is expected to be redesigned during FY 2016 to provide an improved and flexible user interface.

http://csrc.nist.gov

Questions regarding the CSRC website can be sent to the CSRC Webmasters at: webmaster-csrc@nist.gov.

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly, (301) 975-4751, patrick.oreilly@nist.gov

Ms. Nicole Keller, (301) 975-3648, nicole.keller@nist.gov

(Editor Note: Ms. Judy Barnard was part of this project team until her recent retirement.)

The Federal Computer Security Managers’ (FCSM) Forum is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of security-related information among federal agencies. The Forum, which serves more than 1,100 members, strives to provide an ongoing opportunity for managers of federal information security programs to exchange information security materials in a timely manner, build upon the experiences of other programs, and reduce possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism for NIST to share information directly with federal agency information security managers in fulfillment of NIST’s leadership mandate under FISMA. It assists NIST in establishing and maintaining relationships with other individuals or organizations that are actively addressing information security issues within the Federal Government. CSD’s Patricia Toth serves as the Chairperson and Peggy Himes serves as the Secretariat.

The Forum maintains an extensive email subscription service. Participation in the service is only open to Federal Government employees who participate in the management of their organization’s information system security program. The Forum also holds bimonthly meetings and an annual two-day conference to discuss current issues and developments of interest to those responsible for protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal systems. Events are open to federal employees and their designated support contractors.

Topics of discussion at FCSM meetings in FY 2015 included briefings from various federal agencies on the Supply Chain, the Einstein 3 Accelerated (E3A) Reporting Tool, implementing privacy controls from Appendix J in SP 800-53, the U.S. Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB), the National Cybersecurity Center for Excellence (NCCoE), and SP 800-88 Revision 1, Guidelines for Media Sanitation.

This year’s annual two-day offsite was held at NIST on August 26-27, 2015. Presentations included current technical, operational and management information systems security topics and updates on the information system security activities of OMB, GAO, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the U.S. Census Bureau, DHS, and NIST. Most presentations are available on the FCSM’s website (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/), under “Events.”

The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST and other federal agencies to develop and maintain a strong, proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge. The number of members on the email list has grown steadily and provides a valuable resource for federal security program managers. To join, email your name, affiliation, phone number, title, and confirmation that you are a federal employee to sec-forum@nist.gov; only .gov and .mil email addresses are accepted in the list serve.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Ms. Patricia Toth, Chair, (301) 975-5140, ptoth@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, Administration, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is an organization hosted by NIST for information system security professionals to assist federal agencies in meeting their information system’s security awareness, training, and education responsibilities. FISSEA strives to elevate the general level of information system security knowledge for the Federal Government and the federal workforce. It also seeks to assist the professional development of its members.

FISSEA membership is open to information system security professionals, professional trainers and educators, and managers responsible for information system security training programs in federal agencies, as well as contractors of these agencies and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. Willingness to share products, information, and experiences is all that is required to become a FISSEA member. A working group meets monthly to administer business activities.

FISSEA maintains a website, a mailing list, and participates in a social networking site as a means of communication for its members. CSD assists FISSEA with its operations by providing staff support for several of its activities and by being FISSEA’s host agency.

The 28th Annual FISSEA Conference occurred March 24-25, 2015 at NIST. The FISSEA audience included managers responsible for information systems security awareness, training, certifications, workforce identification, compliance, etc. in federal agencies; contractors providing awareness and training support; and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. Pat Toth, Peggy Himes, and Judy Barnard (NIST), as well as Gretchen Morris (DB Consulting/NASA), and other members of the FISSEA Working Group, were integral to the effort to support the conference.

This year’s theme was “Changes, Challenges, and Collaborations: Effective Cybersecurity Training”. Attendees gained new techniques for developing/conducting training, cost-effective practices, workforce development, and free resources and contacts. Over 200 cybersecurity training professionals attended the two-day conference.

NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Director, Charles Romine, welcomed attendees to the event. We were honored to have Dr. Neil Grunberg, Professor of Military and Emergency Medicine, Uniformed Services University, who provided an inspiring keynote presentation, “Information Security System Educators Must be Leaders.” His talk addressed the leadership and communication skills needed by Cybersecurity Educators

Presenters represented NIST, DHS, the Department of State (DoS), the National Security Agency (NSA), private industry, and academia. Attendees had an opportunity to visit 16 vendors and federal agencies on the second day to share and tell about their specific awareness and training programs.

Figure 6: Pecha-Kucha Participants (left to right): Art Chantker, Potomac Forum, Frank Cicio Jr, iQ4 Corporation, Sandy Toner, ICF International, and Louis Numkin, FISSEA Life Member

FISSEA conferences include Pecha Kucha (Lightning Rounds) sessions. Speakers have 6 minutes 40 seconds for their presentations, and the challenge is in limiting one’s talk to only 20 slides. It’s challenging to do as a speaker and quite fun for the audience to watch, so the Pecha Kucha fast-paced talks proved to be entertaining and educational.

The FISSEA Educator of the Year Award was established to recognize and honor a contemporary who is making special efforts to create, build, manage, or inspire an information systems security awareness, training, or education program. Sam Maroon presented the FISSEA 2014 Educator of the Year posthumously to Shon Harris of Logical Security. Mr. Maroon shared Ms. Harris’ contributions to the cybersecurity education industry by characterizing her contributions in three ways: as a writer, a trainer, and a thought leader. Ms. Harris’ friends and colleagues, Michael Lester and Hamid Dehghan accepted the plaque on her behalf.

Figure 7: Friends and colleagues accepting the FISSEA Educator of the Year on behalf of Ms. Harris

Other traditional FISSEA conference events include announcing the winners of the FISSEA security contest. The FISSEA Security Awareness, Training & Education Contest includes five categories from one of FISSEA’s three key areas of Awareness, Training, and Education. A winner is selected from each category and awarded a certificate. The categories include: (1) an awareness poster; (2) motivational item (e.g., trinkets, pens, stress relief items and t-shirts); (3) an awareness website; (4) an awareness newsletter; and (5) role-based training & education.

Awarded Certificates at the Conference (selected by an impartial judging committee prior to the conference):

Peer’s Choice Awards (selected by peers during the conference):

Another bonus of attending the 2015 FISSEA conference was networking. The conference continues to be a valuable forum for individuals from government, industry, and academia who are involved with information systems/cybersecurity workforce development. Attendees gain insights regarding information security awareness, training, education, certification, and professionalization. Attendees also learn of ongoing and planned training and education programs and cybersecurity initiatives. It provides NIST the opportunity to provide assistance to departments and agencies as they work to meet their FISMA responsibilities. The FISSEA website provides links to the Conference Program, and also links to presentations (http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea).

The next conference will be held at NIST on March 15-16, 2016.

http://csrc.nist.gov/fissea

Ms. Patricia Toth, (301) 975-5140, patricia.toth@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

Since the inception of this Advisory Board in 1987, the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) has successfully renewed its charter with proper authority every two years. The Board plays a central and unique role in providing the government with expert advice concerning information security and privacy issues that may affect federal information systems. Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 reaffirmed the need for this Board by giving it an additional responsibility: to thoroughly review all of the proposed information technology standards and guidelines developed under Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) 278g-3), as amended.

The ISPAB is a federal advisory committee with specific statutory objectives to identify emerging managerial, technical, administrative, and physical safeguard issues related to information security and privacy. The Board was originally created by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) as the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB) within the Department of Commerce. The CSSPAB was chartered in May 1988 in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended. The 2002 FISMA legislation amended the statutory authority of the Board and provided its current name.

The duties of the Board, as stipulated in FISMA, include:

Congress indicated the long-term need for the Board by setting the term of Board members to four years. The charter requires that the NIST Director appoint the Chairperson and all twelve members of the Board. They are selected for their preeminence in the information technology industry or related disciplines.

The 15 U.S.C. 278g-4 charter stipulates that Board members be selected from three main categories, with each category providing four members. Category 1 includes members from outside the Federal Government who are eminent in the information technology industry, at least one of whom is a representative of small or medium-sized companies in such industries. Category 2 also includes members from outside the Federal Government who are eminent in the field of information technology or related disciplines, but who are not employed by or representative of a producer of information. Category 3 includes those from the Federal Government who are experienced in information system management, including those with experience in information security and privacy, at least one of whom should be from the National Security Agency. The categorization of Board members is intended to meet ISPAB’s statutory objectives. Federal members bring a detailed understanding of the federal processing environment; industry brings concerns and experiences regarding product development and market formation, while private computer security experts are able to bring their experiences of commercial cost-effective security measures into Board discussion.

Dr. Peter Weinberger is currently the Chair of ISPAB. Dr. Weinberger, a Computer Scientist from Google, joined the Board in 2008 and assumed the responsibilities of the Chair in January 2015. He is also a Co-Chair of a National Academies study on fundamental work in cybersecurity, and a member of the National Academies study on Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 28, Signals Intelligence Activities. He is well supported by the following Board members (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/membership.html):

Figure 8: From Left to Right – Annie Sokol (Designated Federal Officer, CSD, NIST), Greg Garcia, Ed Roback, Toby Levin, Jeffrey Greene, John Centafont, Dr. Kevin Fu, Dr. Peter Weinberger (Chair, ISPAB), Matt Scholl (Chief, CSD, NIST) Members not included in this picture: Chris Boyer, Dr. Ana Anton, David Cullinane, Gale Stone, and J. Daniel Toler

During FY 2014-2015, ISPAB held three meetings, all in Washington D.C:

In keeping with previous practices at the first meeting of each fiscal year, the Board established a work plan for FY 2015 at the meeting in October 2014. The resulting plan included the following areas of focus:

In aligning with the work-plan focus areas, the Board expanded its work to include the following:

The presenters at each Board meeting were leaders and experts representing private industry, academia, federal agency Chief Information Officers (CIOs), Inspector Generals (IGs) and Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs).

Copies of the current list of members and their biographies, the Board’s charter and past Board activities are located at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab. Information on ISPAB Meetings is published in Federal Register Notices at least 16 days prior to the meeting. Those interested in receiving meeting notices and other notices relating to NIST work in information security and privacy may email their name, affiliation, and address to Annie Sokol at the address below.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab

Ms. Annie Sokol Designated Federal Officer (DFO), ISPAB (301) 975-2006 annie.sokol@nist.gov

Small business owners face a broad range of information security issues. A computer failure or system breach could jeopardize the company’s reputation and may result in significant damage and recovery cost, or going out of business. The small business owner who recognizes the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) reports that over 27 million U.S. companies - more than 99 percent of all U.S. businesses - are SMBs of 500 employees or fewer (see http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/allprofiles12.pdf ). While the threats to individual SMBs may not be significantly different from those facing larger organizations, an SMB frequently has fewer resources available to protect systems, detect attacks, or respond to security issues. A vulnerability common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic base.

To help address information security risk, these businesses require assistance with the identification of security mechanisms and with practical, cost-effective training. Training helps SMB’s use their limited resources most effectively to address relevant and serious threats. In response to this need, NIST, the SBA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) InfraGard program co-sponsor a series of cybersecurity training workshops for small businesses. These workshops provide an overview of cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and techniques, with a special emphasis on information that small business personnel can apply directly.

In FY 2015, six SMB outreach workshops were provided in Reno, Nevada; Fresno, California; Modesto, California; Fairmont, West Virginia; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and McHenry, Maryland. Additionally, the SMB Cybersecurity Outreach Program was briefed to the InfraGard National Congress.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, planning is underway to identify locations and plan cybersecurity workshops in FY 2016.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/sbc/

Ms. Patricia Toth 301-975-5140 patricia.toth@nist.gov

NIST opened a public competition in 2007 to develop a new cryptographic hash algorithm, SHA-3, to augment the hash algorithms specified in FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS). The competition ended on October 2, 2012 when NIST announced the selection of Keccak as the winning algorithm for standardization as the new SHA-3 Standard. NIST consulted with the Keccak designers and the cryptographic community, and developed a SHA-3 standardization plan that was presented at numerous cryptography conferences and posted at the NIST hash website, indicated below, for public feedback.

NIST announced Draft FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, in the Federal Register (79 FR 30549) on May 28, 2014 and requested comments (see https://federalregister.gov/a/2014-12336). The announcement also proposed a revision of the Applicability Clause of the Announcement Section of FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, to allow the use of hash functions specified in either FIPS 180-4 or FIPS 202, modifying the original mandate to use only the hash functions specified in FIPS 180-4. The other sections of FIPS 180-4 remain unchanged. A ninety-day public comment period was provided, which ended on August 26, 2014.

NIST received seven comments on Draft FIPS 202 and one comment on the Draft Revision of the Applicability Clause of FIPS 180-4. All comments received are posted at the NIST hash website. None of the comments opposed the adoption of the SHA-3 Standard or the revision of the Applicability Clause of FIPS 180-4. NIST also received public feedback at the 2014 SHA-3 Workshop and afterwards. All of the comments were carefully reviewed, and changes were made to FIPS 202, where appropriate. NIST made additional editorial changes to improve FIPS 202.

FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, and the revised Applicability Clause of FIPS 180-4 were approved by the Secretary of Commerce and announced in the Federal Register (80 FR 46543) on August 5, 2015 (see https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-19181). FIPS 202 and FIPS 180-4 are available at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/sha-3_standardization.html

Ms. Shu-jen Chang, (301) 975-2940, shu-jen.chang@nist.gov

Random numbers are required for the security for many cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers are used to generate the keys needed for encryption and digital signature applications.

In March 2007, CSD published SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, which contained four deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms, two based on hash functions, one based on the use of block cipher algorithms and one based on the use of elliptic curves. This recommendation was revised as SP 800-90A in January 2012 to include additional capabilities and in June 2015 to remove the DRBG based on the use of elliptic curves, i.e., the DUAL_EC_DRBG, since its security has been in question.

Two additional documents (SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, and SP 800-90C, Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions) are under development, and the initial drafts were made available for public comment in 2012.

SP 800-90B addresses the development and testing of entropy sources, including descriptions of the tests for NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program to validate candidate entropy sources. An entropy source depends on a noise source, which is the root of security for the entropy source. During FY 2015, the CTG developed and tested additional methods for estimating the amount of entropy per noise-source output. An overview of the methodology and preliminary results of new estimators, called predictors, were presented at ShmooCon in the talk “How Random is Your RNG?” Further details and results were published in the paper “Predictive Models for Min-Entropy Estimation” at the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2015) workshop. A new draft of SP 800-90B will be provided for another public comment period in early FY 2016.

SP 800-90C provides basic guidance on the construction of RBGs from the entropy sources validated against the requirements of SP 800-90B and the DRBG mechanisms of SP 800-90A. The CTG plans to provide a new version of this document for public comment prior to the end of the SP 800-90B public-comment period.

A public workshop is planned for FY 2016 to discuss SP 800-90B and 90C.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Mr. John Kelsey, (301) 975-5101, john.kelsey@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher transforms some fixed-length binary data (i.e., a “block”) into seemingly random data of the same length. The transformation is determined by the choice of some secret data called the “key.” The same key is used to reverse the transformation and recover the original block of data. A cryptographic technique that is constructed from a block cipher is called a mode of operation. Several modes of operation have been specified in the SP 800-38 series of publications.

The CTG has nearly completed the development of two AES modes of operation for format-preserving encryption (FPE), based on proposals that were submitted from the private sector. A format can be a sequence of decimal digits, such as a credit card number or a social security number; formats can also be defined for other sets of characters besides decimal digits. FPE is expected to facilitate the retrofitting of encryption to existing applications. For example, FPE could be applied to database systems, so that sensitive data could be targeted for encryption without disrupting the underlying data fields/pathways.

The two modes of operation for FPE, called FF1 and FF3, will be specified in Special Publication 800-38G, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, which will be completed in FY 2016.

In the coming year, the CTG plans to consider technical changes to two other Special Publications in the 800-38 series. In particular, the CTG plans: 1) to solicit public comment on requirements for the generation of non-repeating IVs for the Galois/Counter Mode, specified in SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC; and 2) to revisit the combinations of encryption and authentication that are approved in SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/

Dr. Morris Dworkin, (301) 975-2354, morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Key management is required for applying numerous cryptographic technologies and is considered the most critical aspect associated with the use of cryptography. CSD began to provide guidance in managing the keys used for cryptographic applications in the late 1990s to early 2000s. Several guidance and recommendation documents have been and continue to be developed in the form of NIST Special Publications (SP), which have been periodically updated to address new algorithms and handling procedures. These documents are coordinated with federal agencies and with the cryptographic community, including national and international organizations, industry, and academia. During FY 2015, the following publications were either created or revised.

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, was first published in 2009. This document addresses the key-management issues of currently available cryptographic mechanisms, including the use of Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) and several commonly used security protocols and applications. A revision of this document was provided for public comment in May 2014 that updated the guidance provided in the 2009 version, included an additional section on the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, and substituted a reference to SP 800-52, Revision 1, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, for the TLS section. After the comment period, the draft revision was revised, and published in January 2015.

SP 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General, was first published in 2005, and later revised in 2007 and 2012. Another revision was provided for public comment in FY 2015 that includes information on and references to recent work performed by CSD; removed references to the Dual_EC_DRBG, which was removed from SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators; revised the security-strength tables; and revised the key-state discussion to provide more clarification. The revision was provided for public comment in September 2015 and should be completed in early FY 2016.

SP 800-131A, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, was originally published in January 2011. This document provides specific guidance for transitions to the use of stronger cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms. An update of SP 800-131A was provided for public comment and completed in November 2015. This update removes approval for the Dual_EC_DRBG, deprecates the use of non-approved key-establishment schemes, disallows the use of non-approved key-wrapping methods after 2017, and indicates that the use of the SHA-3 family of hash functions as acceptable.

SP 800-152, A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems (CKMS), provides guidance on the CKMSs to be used by the Federal Government. This document provides refinements of the requirements for CKMS designers that are specified in SP 800-130, A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems. SP 800-152 also provides requirements and recommendations for the service providers of CKMSs used by federal agencies and their contractors, as well as guidance for the federal agencies in selecting a CKMS that supports the security and management policies of those agencies. A draft of this document was provided for public comment in FY 2013, and a workshop was held in March 2013 to discuss the draft. A second draft was provided for comment in FY 2015, and a final version addressing the received comments was published in October 2015.

A new NIST publication is under development that provides guidance on the security strength of a cryptographic key that is used to protect data (i.e., a data-protection key), given the manner in which the key was generated and handled. This document, SP 800-158, Key Management: Obtaining a Targeted Security Strength, involves a considerable amount of new research, since it is an area that has not been fully addressed to date. This publication will be available for public comment in FY 2016.

Additional key-management work to be conducted in FY 2016 includes revision(s) to SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, and SP 800-56B, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, to allow the use of larger key sizes.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Ray Perlner, (301) 975-3357, ray.perlner@nist.gov

Mr. Quynh Dang, (301) 975-3610, quynh.dang@nist.gov

SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, provides recommendations regarding TLS server and client implementations. TLS is a widely used cryptographic protocol that provides communication security for a variety of network applications, such as email, e-commerce, and healthcare.

SP 800-52 was first published in 2005, and SP 800-52 Revision 1 was published in April 2014. Since the revision, CTG has been following developments in TLS implementations, including updates and attacks. In FY 2016, a second revision will be published that considers these developments. This second revision will be a minor update to SP 800-52 Revision 1.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is actively developing extensions that can be used to add functionality to TLS. CSD will continue to review updates and additions to the TLS protocol in FY 2016.

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Elliptic curve cryptography is critical to the adoption of strong cryptography as we migrate to higher security strengths. NIST has standardized elliptic curve cryptography for digital signature algorithms in FIPS 186 and for key establishment schemes in SP 800-56A.

In FIPS 186-4, NIST recommends fifteen elliptic curves of varying security levels for use in these elliptic curve cryptographic standards. However, the provenance of the curves is not fully specified in the standard, leading to recent public concerns that there could be a hidden weakness in these curves. NIST is not aware of any vulnerability in these curves when they are implemented correctly and used as described in NIST standards and guidelines.

However, more than fifteen years have passed since these curves were developed, and the community now knows more about the security of elliptic curve cryptography and practical implementation issues. Advances within the cryptographic community have led to the development of new elliptic curves and algorithms whose designers claim to offer better performance and are easier to implement in a secure manner. Some of these curves are under consideration in voluntary, consensus-based Standards Developing Organizations.

In June 2015, NIST hosted a workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standards to discuss possible approaches to promote the adoption of secure, interoperable and efficient elliptic curve mechanisms. Workshop participants expressed significant interest in the development, standardization and adoption of new elliptic curves. As a result of this input, NIST is considering the addition of new elliptic curves to the current set of recommended curves in FIPS 186-4. In FY 2016, NIST will solicit comments on possible improvements to FIPS 186-4, which may lead to a workshop held later in the year.

Email project team: EllipticCurves@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Andy Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andy.regenscheid@nist.gov

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break the existing infrastructure of public-key cryptography. The focus of the Post-Quantum Cryptography project is to identify candidate quantum-resistant systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers, as well as the impact that such post-quantum algorithms will have on current protocols and security infrastructures.

In FY 2015, NIST researchers held regular seminars. The presentation topics included the latest published results; a synopsis of the security analysis; and status reports in the areas of quantum computation, hash-based signatures, coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and multivariate cryptography. Through these presentations and discussions, the team made significant progress in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the existing cryptographic schemes in each category. The project team is planning to create evaluation criteria for post-quantum cryptography schemes for standardization.

The NIST team continues to be productive in post-quantum cryptography research. The results have been published at the major conferences, such as PQCrypto 2014, and Eurocrypt 2015. NIST researchers have given presentations at conferences and workshops to increase awareness of the upcoming migration. NIST researchers have contributed to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) whitepaper on quantum-safe cryptography. NIST has also sponsored other research, education, and research events.

NIST held the Workshop on Cybersecurity in a Post-Quantum World in March of 2015. The workshop was attended by approximately 140 participants from around the world. Presentations given at the workshop included new proposals for quantum-safe cryptosystems, ideas for how to modify protocols (such as TLS) to include these new cryptosystems, discussions on how to standardize hash-based signatures and key-management issues, as well as new ideas on the cryptanalysis of the many post-quantum systems.

In FY 2016, NIST will continue to explore the security and feasibility of purported quantum-resistant technologies, with the ultimate goal of uncovering the fundamental mechanisms necessary for efficient, trustworthy, and cost-effective information assurance in the post-quantum era. Upon the successful completion of this phase of the project, NIST will be prepared for possible standardization efforts in this area.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/post-quantum-crypto/

Email project team: pqc@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu, (301) 975-6499, yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

Cryptographic functions, such as encryption, digital signatures, and hashing, are implemented as electronic circuits for a wide class of applications. In practice, it is important to be able to minimize the size of these circuits. This problem is closely related to designing small combinational circuits. These circuits use only binary AND, XOR and NEGATION gates, i.e., multiplication, addition, and “+1” in arithmetic modulo 2. A combinational circuit on four variables (X₁, X₂, X₃, and X₄) using AND and XOR gates is depicted in Figure 9.

The red nodes are AND gates; the yellow nodes are XOR gates.

Figure 9: Combinational Boolean Circuit

The project team has shown that finding optimal combinational circuits is MAX-SNP Complete. In practice, this means that it is necessary to settle for methods that design “good” circuits, as opposed to provably optimal circuits. The CTG has developed and implemented new solutions for the circuit-minimization problem. Two patents have been granted related to this work, the last one in FY 2014. These are held jointly between NIST and the University of Southern Denmark.

The CTG is also researching circuit-based security metrics for cryptographic functions. For a function to be secure (in particular, one-way), it must be the case that any circuit that implements it is sufficiently complex. In particular, a function is insecure if it can be implemented by a circuit containing too few Boolean AND gates. This security metric, namely the number of AND gates necessary and sufficient to implement a function, is referred to as its multiplicative complexity. Unfortunately, determining multiplicative complexity is extremely hard (very recently, Magnus Find proved computational intractability conditioned on the existence of one-way functions). Mathematicians attempted to determine multiplicative complexity in the 1970s, but the effort had been largely abandoned by the 1980s. However, the CTG has published circuits that are provably optimal or close to optimal (with respect to multiplicative complexity) for important classes of functions. In the process, we developed tools that have wide applicability for both theoretical and applied research in security and cryptography.

Multiparty computation is a technique that allows a group of people to compute a function of their inputs without revealing the inputs themselves. Examples of this are: i) holding an election; ii) conducting closed-bid auctions in which only the winning bid is determined; iii) proving to a third party that a person’s encrypted attributes satisfy some requirement, such as “over 21 and (U.S. citizen or Canadian citizen)”. The protocols that solve multiparty computation problems often encrypt bits using arithmetic modulo 2. The complexity of such protocols largely depends on the number of multiplications required. Hence, expressing functions as circuit computations with only a few multiplication (AND) gates is important. Some of the published circuits are now the standard reference for benchmarking tools in multiparty computation.

The following is a partial list of new results by our team:

Computing the last term requires three multiplications. So, it is quite surprising that the full expression can be computed using only three multiplications. But, we have shown this to be true for f and all other predicates on four bits. The circuit on the previous page computes f using three multiplications and six additions.

Circuits are posted periodically at http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/~peralta/CircuitStuff/CMT.html

Dr. René Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

There are several emerging areas in which highly constrained devices are interconnected, typically communicating wirelessly with one another, and working in concert to accomplish some task. Examples of these areas include: sensor networks, distributed control systems, the Internet of Things, cyber physical systems, and the smart grid. Security and privacy can be very important in all of these areas. Because the majority of current cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, implementing many of these algorithms with constrained resources can be extremely challenging. If current algorithms can be made to fit into the limited resources of constrained environments, their performance is typically not acceptable.

CTG staff are examining applications in constrained environments to determine whether NIST should develop lightweight cryptographic standards. CTG is communicating with industry experts to understand challenges, limitations and work from other standardization bodies in this area. In FY 2015, CTG organized a NIST workshop on Lightweight Cryptography in Gaithersburg, MD, July 20-21, 2015 to discuss issues related to the security and resource requirements of applications in constrained environments and potential future standardization of lightweight primitive algorithms. The workshop included two invited talks, twenty-four presentations and a panel discussion.

In FY 2015, CTG staff further engaged the international cryptographic community by providing presentations at the Fourth International Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security and Privacy in Bochum, Germany, at the Fast Software Encryption Workshop in Istanbul, Turkey and at the Lightweight Crypto Day, in Haifa Israel. Project summaries and challenges ahead were presented at the Cybersecurity Innovation Forum and to ITL’s Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) group.

In FY 2016, CTG will continue to analyze the resource requirements and performance characteristics of lightweight primitives, and study their use as building blocks to perform various cryptographic objectives. Additionally, CTG is planning to publish a report that describes the current state and challenges in target application areas.

Mr. Lawrence Bassham, (301) 975-3292, lawrence.bassham@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

NIST has implemented a source of public randomness. The service is available at https://beacon.nist.gov/home. It uses two independent, commercially available sources of randomness, each with an independent hardware entropy source and SP 800-90A-approved components.

The NIST Beacon is designed to provide unpredictability, autonomy, and consistency. Unpredictability means that users cannot algorithmically predict bits before they are made available by the source. Autonomy means that the source is resistant to attempts by outside parties to alter the distribution of the random bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access the source in such a way that they are confident of receiving the same random string.

The NIST Beacon posts bit-strings in blocks of 512 bits every 60 seconds. Each such value is time-stamped and signed, and includes the hash of the previous value to chain the sequence of values together. This prevents all parties, even the source, from retroactively changing an output packet without being detected. The NIST Beacon keeps all output packets. At any point in time, the full history of outputs is available to users.

Tables of random numbers have probably been used for multiple purposes at least since the Industrial Revolution. In the digital age, algorithmic pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) have largely replaced these tables. The NIST Beacon expands the use of randomness to multiple scenarios in which neither tables nor PRNGs can be used. The extra functionalities stem mainly from three features. First, the Beacon-generated numbers cannot be predicted before they are published. Second, the public, time-bound, and authenticated nature of the Beacon allows a user application to prove to anybody that it used truly random numbers not known before a certain point in time. Third, this proof can be presented offline and at any point in the future.

Although commercially available physical sources of randomness are adequate as entropy sources for currently envisioned implementations of the NIST Beacon, we are working on developing a source of verifiably random sequences. In collaboration with NIST physicists from the Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML), we aim to use quantum non-locality to build an entropy source whose unpredictability is guaranteed by the laws of physics. This project is funded by NIST’s Innovations in Measurement Science (IMS) Program. IMS funds highly competitive projects designed to explore high-risk, leading-edge research concepts that anticipate the future measurement and standards needs of industry and science. For more information on this collaboration see http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm.

As of the end of FY 2015, the NIST Beacon has been functioning without interruption for more than two years. NIST encourages the community at large to research and publish novel ways in which this tool can be used. A few examples of applications are unpredictable sampling, new authentication mechanisms, and secure multi-party computation.

http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/ct/nist_beacon.cfm

Dr. René Peralta (301) 975-8702 rene.peralta@nist.gov

The security of cryptography today depends on having strong keys and keeping them secret. The ability to generate strong cryptographic keys is directly related to having access to unpredictable random data, but generating truly unpredictable random data on computing devices is hard and unreliable. As a result, weak keys are widely used in cryptographic applications compromising the security of sensitive data protected by them with potentially disastrous consequences.

A primary goal of this project is to provide high-quality, truly unpredictable random data to devices on the Internet to enable them to generate strong cryptographic keys and attest the strength of the keys used to protect data in transit or at rest, thereby enabling cryptographic system strength attestation. Achieving this goal would provide a solid basis for addressing the problems targeted by Cryptographic System Validation (see the next section: Validated Programs, the first project in this section).

Random data obtained from sources of true randomness that are based on unpredictable physical phenomena, such as quantum effects, is much better suited for cryptographic applications. CSD is collaborating with the NIST Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML) to build a quantum source. The aim is to use quantum effects to generate sequences that are guaranteed to be unpredictable, even if an attacker has access to the random source. For more information on this collaboration, see http://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm.

This project aims to develop a system and protocols for obtaining random data with high entropy from one or more remote sources. The high-level architecture is shown in Figure 10 (see next page). The architecture of the Entropy-as-a-Service system consists of two main parts: the client-side and the server-side. The critical components of the system are the quantum device, the EaaS server and a secure device in the client systems capable of providing strong isolation and protection for the cryptographic keys stored inside the device and offering a set of basic cryptographic services.

Client devices mix this data with locally available random data to seed random number generators to generate strong cryptographic keys and other random values independently from the remote sources.

With system architecture and protocols defined, the project team have engaged with industry and academia to obtain feedback on the approach and identify possibilities for collaborative approaches to solving important cybersecurity challenges in the domains of cryptography and supply-chain management, e.g., integrated circuit counterfeiting.

The project team have developed a working prototype and demonstrated it at high-profile cybersecurity forums and academic conferences. The team is continuing to develop the system aiming to stand up a publicly accessible NIST EaaS instance in the near future. In addition, the team is also planning to publish the server and client code on GitHub and invite the public to voluntarily adopt it. Related to this, the project team is planning to work on developing public criteria for reputable EaaS hosts.

Dr. Apostol Vassilev, (301) 975-3221, apostol.vassilev@nist.gov

Mr. Harold Booth, (301) 975-8441, harold.booth@nist.gov

Mr. Robert Staples, (301) 975-4578, robert.staples@nist.gov

Figure 10: High-level architecture of EaaS

Today, wireless networks often provide connections for mobile devices using multiple radio technologies. In such a heterogeneous network, a mobile device may switch its connection between different wireless technologies, such as between cellular and WiFi networks. The procedure for conducting such a switch is called a “handover.” Media-independent handover (MIH) is a set of services specified in IEEE 802.21 to assist the handover. When the services provided by the pervasive heterogeneous networks are extended to other applications, such as Smart Grid applications, the MIH needs to be processed by a group of wireless nodes, such as smart meters, for balancing the network load and for reliability. In this case, the information may need to be delivered to a group of smart meters using a multicast message, which is used to deliver the information. That is, the multicast message is sent from one point-of-service (PoS) to multiple wireless nodes. In some of the application environments, such as sensor networks, the groups are formed dynamically; new nodes can be added to the group, and some nodes in the group may need to be removed. Such groups are managed through multicast signals.

Amendment 2 of IEEE 802.21 provides protection mechanisms for unicast messages − mechanisms that protect messages between a PoS and a single mobile node. In FY 2015, CSD continued work with IEEE 802.21 to develop security solutions for group management in Task Group D of IEEE 802.21. The solutions, specified in IEEE 802.21 Amendment 4, include the mechanisms to distribute group keys and for the protection of multicast messages. Amendment 4 of IEEE 802.21 was published in FY 2015.

In FY 2016, CSD will continue to contribute to a broader scope of IEEE 802 wireless standards.

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

To support OMB Memorandum M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, NIST’s CSD developed SP 800-63, Electronic Authentication Guideline. The OMB memorandum defines four levels of assurance that a federal agency must select, based on a risk assessment to determine the impact of an authentication failure. This guideline covers the remote authentication of users (such as private individuals) interacting with government IT systems over the Internet. It defines technical requirements for each of the four levels of assurance in the areas of identity proofing, tokens, credential binding, management processes, authentication protocols and assertion characteristics. Since the initial release of SP 800-63, the CSD has released two revisions to address changes in modern technology and lessons learned from practical implementations by federal departments and agencies.

Several recent developments have an impact on the way that agencies fulfill their e Authentication requirements:

In addition, market forces have resulted in an inflexion point in how departments and agencies authenticate users. NIST and our private sector partners have observed that some public and private sector identity assurance standards have become outdated or have simply not been adopted. Specifically, SP 800-63 was originally written to address an online world that is much different than today. Innovation has offered new perspectives in how trusted identities can be established. Practical implementations of SP 800-63 have informed us of areas of strengths, weaknesses, and techniques not utilized by federal agencies or the private sector. In addition, federal agencies are the only organizations required to follow NIST SPs. However, as the Federal Government evolves to accept credentials offered by private sector organizations, the applicability of SP 800-63 has expanded beyond agency use. NIST has an obligation to service the expansion of the original SP 800-63 target.

Therefore, in April of 2015, NIST issued a call for comments on the current published version, SP 800-63-2, in order to identify specific topics that could be addressed in a future revision of SP 800-63 (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/eauthentication/sp800-63-2_call-comments.html). NIST received over 40 submissions from individuals, academia, and the public and private sectors. Over 300 distinct comments were identified from these submissions. In addition to the comments that NIST received, vulnerabilities have been discovered in existing online authentication services, specifically in the area of remote identity proofing, which has warranted an accelerated consideration of updated guidance for the Federal Government.

In FY 2016, CSD expects its authentication work to be driven by the needs of the ongoing rapid expansion of online service delivery, commercially available authentication services, results and metrics from NSTIC pilots, and the availability of multi-factor tokens to consumers. Breaches of personal information and the relative availability of personal information has necessitated that NIST reconsider approaches to identity proofing, both in-person and remotely. The paradigm where the starting assumption was that personal data was hard to find has now changed to one where it is acknowledged that this data is readily available online; existing guidance needs to be adjusted to offer organizations cost-effective, yet secure, identity proofing capabilities. The NSTIC pilots have tested innovative alternatives to high-assurance remote proofing, necessitating that SP 800-63 be considerate of these advances in the marketplace. In addition, commercial advances in physical document validation and verification, the proliferation of high-resolution video cameras on commodity computing devices, including mobile phones, as well as new offerings in the delivery of in-person proofing, will influence potential updates to requirements at all levels of assurance.

As many types of biometric sensors become ubiquitous in personal mobile devices, and more and more individuals leverage biometrics in commercial use cases such as mobile payment and online authentication to private sector services, CSD will re-examine the current position of remote, unattended biometric authentication. The existing publication does allow local biometric authentication to unlock a token – a secure technique currently used by popular mobile handset manufacturers. Yet the comments CSD received reveal that some believe this is insufficient, and that centralized biometric authentication used in single- or multi-factor schemes should be allowed in a future revision. CSD will pursue detailed research in the security of remote biometric authentication, examine the efficacy of standardization efforts related to presentation attack detection, and contemplate the long-term impacts of the en-masse theft of biometrics before expanding the current requirements of SP 800-63-2.

The user experience of online authentication will also be a significant consideration in a potential update of SP 800-63. The CSD has observed that the user experience has a direct relationship with individual uptake of authentication services as well as the overall security of any authentication scheme. While CSD does not intend to weaken requirements to accommodate a favorable user experience, understanding the impact of e-Authentication requirements on the user, and to design requirements that do not degrade security but upgrade the user experience, is imperative.

The CSD, therefore, plans to actively consider revisions to SP 800-63-2 in response to the issues noted above and other issues that can be dealt with in time to assist in the intense ongoing efforts to expand online services.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/eauthentication/

Mr. Paul Grassi, (703) 786-8275, paul.grassi@nist.gov

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on many of the standards and specifications supported by CSD. Poor implementations of these standards or specifications may render a particular product insecure, potentially placing sensitive information at risk. CSD operates several validation programs that help provide a level of assurance that products meet established security requirements and conform to published specifications. To that end, the Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement Group (STVMG) develops test suites and test methods; provides implementation guidance and technical support to industry forums; and conducts education, training, and outreach programs.

STVMG’s validation programs work together with independent laboratories that are accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP). Based on the independent laboratory test report and test evidence provided by the labs, the validation programs described below validate the implementation under test. CSD subsequently publishes lists of the validations awarded on public websites.

Current validation programs focus on providing a known level of assurance for cryptographic algorithms and modules. These modules are used within the context of a larger system to provide cryptographic services as a method of protecting the data within the system. As information systems continue to become more complex, the methods used to implement cryptographic services have also increased in complexity. Problems with the use of cryptography are often introduced through the interaction of cryptographic components with the operating environment. This program seeks to specify how cryptographic components are used as part of a defined cryptographic system to solve problems with a measureable level of assurance, and to introduce automated methods of quantifying the level of assurance that has been provided.

In FY 2016, this program will begin the research required to define a reference cryptographic systems architecture and example use cases where cryptographic systems are built from known cryptographic components that cooperate through trust relationships to provide a measureable level of assurance. The architecture should begin at the lowest level with a hardware-based root of trust, and each cryptographic component should be added in successive layers to provide assurance in a systematic way. This should allow the development of tests that would measure the correct implementation of cryptographic components as part of a larger system.

This program will perform research and experimentation in applicable technologies and techniques that will enable the efficient testing of the cryptographic capabilities of each layer, and enable the continuous monitoring capabilities of each cryptographic component, providing the necessary interfaces to establish trust relationships with other cryptographic components. Techniques could include such items as:

Research into this area of cryptographic system validation holds the promise of automating the validation of all cryptographic components, providing a higher assurance with less manual effort. The program will use an approach that was developed for the SCAP product validation effort to embed data elements that instrument the test harnesses used to validate cryptographic systems. This would also provide the instrumentation that could be leveraged to enable a greater level of situational awareness and security measurement, and potentially, to enable continuous monitoring of cryptographic systems.

Mr. Michael Cooper, (301) 975-8077, michael.cooper@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) were developed in collaboration between NIST and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of Canada to support the respective federal user communities for strong, independently tested, and commercially available cryptographic algorithms and modules. Through these programs, NIST and CSE work with international government, public and private sectors as a part of the cryptographic community to achieve standards-based security and assurance of correct implementation. The goal of these programs is to provide federal agencies with a security metric to use in procuring and deploying cryptographic modules, and promote the use of validated algorithms and modules by industry and the public. The testing carried out by independent third-party laboratories accredited by NVLAP, and the validations performed by the CAVP and CMVP programs provide this metric. Federal agencies, industry, and the public can choose cryptographic modules and/or products containing cryptographic modules from the CMVP Validated Modules List and have confidence in the claimed level of security and assurance of correct implementation.

Cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic module testing and validation are based on published NIST standards. Since federal agencies are required to use validated cryptographic modules for the protection of sensitive unclassified information, the validated modules and the validated algorithms that the modules contain represent the culmination and delivery of CSD’s cryptography-based work to the end user.

The CAVP and the CMVP are separate collaborative programs. The CAVP and the CMVP validate algorithms and modules, respectively, which are used in a wide variety of products, including Internet browsers, radios, smart cards, space-based communications, munitions, security tokens, mobile phones, network and storage devices, and products supporting the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and electronic commerce. A module may be a standalone product, such as a virtual private network (VPN) or smart card, or it could be a module embedded in many products, such as a cryptographic-based toolkit. As a result, a small number of modules may be incorporated within hundreds of products. The CAVP validates cryptographic algorithms that may be integrated in one or more cryptographic modules. Figure 11 provides a flow of the CMVP testing and validation process.

Figure 11: General Flow of FIPS 140-2 Testing and Validation

The CAVP and CMVP validation programs provide documented methodologies for conformance testing through defined sets of security requirements. For the CAVP, the validation system documents are designed for each FIPS-approved or NIST-recommended cryptographic algorithm. See the website for a listing (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/). Security requirements for the CMVP are found in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and the associated test metrics and methods in Derived Test Requirements for FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. The four Annexes to FIPS 140-2 reference the underlying cryptographic algorithm standards or methods. The CMVP-developed Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Validation Program provides programmatic and implementation guidance across all of the referenced documents. The information provided in the Derived Test Requirements (DTR) and Implementation Guidance (IG) documents ensures the repeatability of tests and the equivalency of results across the testing laboratories. The IG provides clarity, consistency of interpretation, and insight for successful conformance testing, validation, and revalidation.

The unique position of the validation programs gives the CAVP and CMVP the opportunity to acquire insight during the validation review activities and results in practical, timely, and up-to-date guidance that is needed by the testing laboratories and vendors to move their modules out to the user community in a timely and cost-effective manner and with the assurance of third-party conformance testing. This knowledge and insight provide a foundation for current and future standards and tools development.

The CMVP reviews the cryptographic module validation requests from the testing laboratories and, as a byproduct of the review, is attentive to emerging and/or changing technologies.

Starting with FY 2015, the Security Testing, Validation, and Measurement (STVM) group created a research team whose mission is to conduct research to assist developers of cryptographic modules, testing laboratories, and the user community when developing new standards. The insights from this research into the evolution of operating environments and complex systems allow the CMVP to perform research and development on evolving test metrics and methods and future requirements for cryptographic modules.

The CAVP and the CMVP have stimulated the improved quality and security assurance of cryptographic algorithm implementations and modules. By the end of FY 2015, the CMVP had validated and issued a total of 2,380 cryptographic module validation certificates to more than 475 domestic and international vendors. As shown in Figure 12, the CMVP awarded 197 certificates in FY 2015. The left portion of the graphic illustrates the distribution by submission type, based upon the modification scenarios described in the CMVP Implementation Guidance, including:

The right portion of the diagram shows the number of certificates awarded, based upon each of the four increasing levels of security specified in the FIPS that may be satisfied by a cryptographic module.

Likewise, to date, the CAVP has issued approximately 19,578 validations, representing the algorithm validations of approximately 17 approved algorithms.

Figure 12: FY 2015 FIPS 140-2 Validations

Figure 13: CAVP Validation Status by Fiscal Year

Figure 14: CAVP Validation Status for FY 2015

Figure 15: CAVP Validated Implementation Actual Numbers

The CAVP issued approximately 3,372 algorithm validations in FY 2015, an increase of over 1,000 validations from the previous year. The increase in validations is attributed to other outside programs now requiring CAVP validated implementations (e.g., NIAP).

The CMVP issued 197 module validation certificates in FY 2015. The number of algorithms and modules submitted for validation continues to grow, representing significant growth in the number of validations expected to be available in the future.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM

CMVP Implementation Guidance, G.8

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf

Ms. Jennifer Cawthra, (301) 975-8514, jennifer.cawthra@nist.gov

Dr. Apostol Vassilev, (301) 975-3221, apostol.vassilev@nist.gov

Ms. Sharon Keller, (301) 975-2910, sharon.keller@nist.gov

The CAVP utilizes the requirements and specifications of NIST standards (i.e., FIPS and Special Publications) to develop algorithm validation test suites and automated security testing. The CAVP is responsible for providing assurance that the cryptographic algorithm implementations contained in cryptographic modules are implemented according to the specifications in the standards. The CAVP accomplishes this by designing and developing conformance testing specific to each cryptographic algorithm.

The conformance testing consists of a suite of validation tests for each approved cryptographic algorithm. These validation tests exercise the algorithmic requirements and mathematical formulas detailed in the algorithm to assure that the detailed specifications are implemented correctly and completely. If the implementer deviates from the specifications in the standard or excludes any part of these specifications or requirements, the validation test will detect the deviations and fail. The validation testing will indicate that the algorithm implementation does not function properly or is incomplete.

The cryptographic algorithm validation tests designed and developed by the CAVP are used by independent third-party laboratories accredited by the NVLAP. The laboratory works with vendors to validate their cryptographic algorithm implementations. The suite of validation tests for each algorithm ensures the repeatability of tests and the equivalency of results across the testing laboratories.

There are several types of validation tests, all designed to satisfy the testing requirements of the cryptographic algorithms and their specifications. These include, but are not limited to, Known-Answer Tests, Monte Carlo Tests, and Multi-Block Message Tests. The Known-Answer Tests are designed to examine the individual components of the algorithm by supplying known values to the variables and verifying the expected result. Negative testing is also performed by supplying known incorrect values to assure that the implementation recognizes values that are not allowed. The Monte Carlo Test is designed to exercise the entire implementation under test (IUT). This test is designed to detect the presence of implementation flaws that are not detected with the controlled input of the Known-Answer Tests. The types of implementation flaws detected by this validation test include pointer problems, insufficient allocation of space, improper error handling, and incorrect behavior of the IUT. The Multi-Block Message Test (MMT) is designed to test the ability of the implementation to process multi-block messages, which requires the chaining of information from one block to the next.

During the last few years, the CTG has expanded its publications to contain not only the algorithm’s specifications, but also requirements for an algorithm’s use. Many of these usage requirements do not fall within the scope of the CAVP, because the CAVP focuses on the correctness of the instructions within the algorithm’s boundary. If these additional algorithm usage requirements are not considered applicable to the algorithm’s implementation, they cannot be tested at the algorithm level by the CAVP, but may be tested by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) if the requirements are considered applicable to the cryptographic module. However, some of these usage requirements may be considered to be outside the scope of both the algorithm implementation and cryptographic module. In this latter case, the fulfillment of the requirements is the responsibility of entities using, installing, or configuring applications or protocols that use the cryptographic algorithms. For example, depending on the design of a cryptographic module, it may not be possible for the module to determine whether a specific key is used for multiple purposes, a situation that is strongly discouraged.

The CAVP currently has algorithm validation testing for the following cryptographic algorithms: