NIST SP 800-195 日本語訳

NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-195

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PATRICK O’REILLY, EDITOR Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

KRISTINA RIGOPOULOS, EDITOR Applied Cybersecurity Division Information Technology Laboratory

CO-EDITORS:

Larry Feldman Greg Witte G2, Inc. Annapolis Junction, Maryland

THIS PUBLICATION IS AVAILABLE FREE OF CHARGE FROM https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-195

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY Kent Rochford, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting Director

This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-195 Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-195, 156 pages (September 2017) CODEN: NSPUE2

This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-195

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.

The editors, Patrick O’Reilly of the Computer Security Division (CSD) and Kristina Rigopoulos of the Applied Cybersecurity Division (ACD), would like to thank their ITL colleagues who provided write-ups on their 2016 project highlights and accomplishments for this annual report (their names are mentioned after each project write-up). The editors would also like to acknowledge Elaine Barker (CSD), Lisa Carnahan (Standards Coordination Office, NIST), Greg Witte and Larry Feldman (G2) for reviewing and providing valuable feedback for this annual report.

The editors would also like to acknowledge Kristen Dill of Dill and Company, Inc. for designing the cover and inside layout for this 2016 annual report.

Any mention of commercial products or organizations is for informational purposes only; it is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the products identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

All names are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.

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Awareness about the importance of strong cybersecurity for maintaining trust in the economy and protecting the nation is at an all-time high. So, too, are the challenges. When it comes to cybersecurity, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a long history of conducting path-breaking research and development, cultivating standards and best practices, and facilitating technology transitions. We rely on open, transparent, and collaborative processes that engage private and public sector participation and attract expertise from around the world. This 2016 report captures our most noteworthy accomplishments.

In 2016, NIST continued to advance fundamental research to support security and interoperability standards and guidelines. This work was led by the Computer Security Division (CSD) in the NIST Information Technology Laboratory (ITL). Among other things, CSD is responsible for developing cybersecurity standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics for the protection of non-national security federal information systems. Recognizing the agency’s need to respond to and anticipate increasing demands for its cybersecurity expertise, NIST established the Applied Cybersecurity Division (ACD) within ITL to support additional applied research and to transition effective cybersecurity technology approaches to government and business sectors nationwide. ACD helps to drive the adoption of appropriate cybersecurity solutions by government and commercial organizations – enabling solutions-oriented collaborative interactions and offering guidance on the use of research results, standards, and best practices. Other parts of NIST also are key contributors to NIST’s cybersecurity portfolio.

Strong partnerships with industry, academia and government are critical to NIST’s cybersecurity program. In 2016, NIST continued to collaborate with stakeholders from across the country and around the world to raise awareness and encourage use of the voluntary Cybersecurity Framework. In this spirit, NIST began to develop an update to the version first published in 2014. NIST also prepared a draft Cybersecurity Framework profile aligned with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices. In addition, NIST developed the draft Baldrige Cybersecurity Excellence Builder self-assessment tool that complements the Cybersecurity Framework and helps organizations to better understand the effectiveness of their cybersecurity risk management efforts.

Looking ahead is vital in the realm of cybersecurity. Knowing that if large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break many of the public-key cryptosystems currently in use and compromise the confidentiality and integrity of digital communication on the Internet and elsewhere, NIST is working closely with the academic community and industry to develop protective cryptographic standards that we all rely upon. Building on its successful tradition of working openly with the worldwide cryptographic community, in 2016 NIST called for submissions for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms for standards. These algorithms must be secure against both quantum and classical computers, and should interoperate with existing communications protocols and networks. After submissions are received late in 2017, NIST plans to spend 3-5 years working with the research community and industry to analyze the candidates before selecting algorithms for standardization.

Identity management is fundamental to security management. In 2016, NIST continued to advance solutions in identity management through projects with partners who manage innovative but practical real-world solutions. Also in the past year, NIST produced an introduction to the concepts of privacy engineering and risk management for federal information systems. The goal is to help decrease privacy risks and enable organizations to make purposeful decisions about resource allocation and effective implementation of controls in information systems. NIST also initiated an update to our Digital Identity Guideline (Special Publication 800-63), which provides technical guidelines to agencies for the implementation of digital authentication. Building from these foundational resources, NIST’s efforts will focus on strengthening the security, privacy, usability and interoperability of digital identity solutions that meet an organization’s identity and access management needs throughout the system lifecycle.

During 2016, NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) moved into a new permanent facility that expanded the Center’s workspace from four to 23 separate, flexible laboratories—including two larger areas capable of safely hosting large equipment, such as automobiles. This additional space allows NCCoE to increase its collaborations and projects. In 2016, the Center published draft practice guides to support industry sectors, including healthcare, financial services, and energy; these guides are now beginning to be put to productive use. NCCoE also published draft documents to support security in key technology areas, such as cloud computing and mobile applications.

The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), led by NIST, is a partnership between government, academia, and the private sector that is focused on promoting a robust network and an ecosystem of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development. In 2016, NIST released an update to the NICE Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (NCWF); it already is being used in the private and public sectors to more effectively identify, recruit, develop and maintain cybersecurity talent. The NICE framework provides a common language to categorize and describe cybersecurity work that helps organizations to build a strong staff to protect systems and data.

Our dedicated staff has accomplished a great deal in 2016, developing standards and working closely with scores of partners and drawing upon hundreds of private and public sector organizations and individuals. This is not a static endeavor. For example, NIST is fully aware of the urgent need to more aggressively address the security challenges of the Internet of Things and, more broadly, our connected world.

We welcome any and all suggestions about where and how we can better provide the nation with the kind of cybersecurity information and tools that it needs in order to advance and protect our economy and our country.

Donna F. Dodson, Chief Cybersecurity Advisor

This Annual Report, formerly the Computer Security Division Annual Report, has been renamed to the Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Cybersecurity Program Annual Report. This change reflects the opportunity to describe the many cybersecurity program highlights and accomplishments from throughout the laboratory. This Annual Report is organized into several sections, each identified by a title page.

Please note: This Annual Report covers the Federal Government’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 from October 1, 2015 to September 30, 2016.

ITL, an operating unit under NIST, contains seven divisions. Five of these seven divisions are involved with cybersecurity efforts at NIST. Throughout this Annual Report, there are some references to particular division activities, and to work by groups within those divisions. Primarily, the authors have attributed accomplishments to ITL, since ITL staff have been involved with each cybersecurity program included in this Annual Report. At the end of each program/project write-up, one or more points of contact are provided and may be used to address questions or request for more information. Many sections also include additional references that readers may find valuable.

Below is a condensed hierarchical chart of ITL’s structure:

Charles Romine, Director

Jim St. Pierre, Deputy Director

(5 of the 7 divisions (identified below) are involved with the ITL Cybersecurity Program)

Abdella Battou, Division Chief

Kevin Stine, Division Chief

Matthew Scholl, Division Chief

Shahram Orandi, Division Chief

Ram Sriram, Division Chief

ITL’s Cybersecurity Program is very excited to share these achievements and accomplishments made during the 2016 Fiscal Year in this Annual Report.

This section contains a list of the major activities that were accomplished during FY 2016 by the ITL Cybersecurity Program. Detailed explanations of these activities are provided in the next section.

The E-Government Act, Public Law 107-347, passed by the 107th Congress and signed into law by the President in December 2002, recognized the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. Title III of the E-Government Act, titled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, included the duties and responsibilities for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory. There are multiple divisions within ITL that are involved with cybersecurity programs/projects. The work is being conducted collaboratively between the divisions. In December 2014, the 113th Congress updated FISMA as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (Public Law 113-283). NIST ITL responsibilities were unchanged in the update. In 2016, the ITL Cybersecurity Program addressed its assignment through the following major activities:

The 2015 annual report; cryptography (cryptographic standards used for the Federal Government, block cipher modes of operation, key management, random bit generator (RBG), Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) cryptography, transitioning the use of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths); mobile security (enterprise telework, remote access and bring-your-own device (BYOD), mobile device security – cloud and hybrid builds): application whitelisting; cyber threat sharing; cybersecurity event recovery; data-centric system threat modeling; de-identifying government datasets; asset management – financial services; guidelines for checklist users and developers; networks of “things”; personal identification verification (PIV); protecting Controlled Unclassified Information within nonfederal information systems and organizations; securing Apple Operating System (OS) X; security content automation protocol (SCAP); systems engineering; trustworthy email; and virtual machine (VM) protection.

Cryptography (post-quantum cryptography, lightweight cryptography, NIST cryptographic standards and guidelines development process); mobile security (mobile devices, infrastructure and platforms); attribute metadata; automation support for security control assessments; catalyzing the identity ecosystem; de-identification of personal information; Long-Term Evolution (LTE) architecture overview and security analysis; PIV; policy machine (access control framework); public safety mobile applications; SCAP; security of interactive and automated access management using Secure Shell (SSH); software identification (SWID) tags; strategic U.S. Government engagement in international standardization; trusted geolocation in the cloud; and vulnerability description ontology (VDO).

This facility was made possible by the state of Maryland and Montgomery County, Maryland, and has almost 60,000 square feet of modern physical space and IT systems. The new facility expanded the Center’s workspace from four to twenty-two separate, flexible laboratories— including two larger areas capable of safely housing large equipment (including a vehicle that will be used in an upcoming project on auto-related cybersecurity issues). This additional space allows NCCoE to increase its collaboration and to undertake new projects.

With a mission of energizing and promoting a robust network and an ecosystem of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development, this plan lays out important goals for the cybersecurity workforce. (See: http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/about/strategicplan.html)

This profile can be used as a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers and is aligned with manufacturing sector goals and industry best practices.

The BCEB, aligned to the Cybersecurity Framework, is a self-assessment tool to help organizations better understand the effectiveness of their cybersecurity risk management efforts. (See: https://www.nist.gov/baldrige/products-services/baldrige-cybersecurity-initiative)

NIST announced a Call for Proposals to solicit, evaluate, and standardize quantum-resistant public key cryptography (a.k.a. post-quantum cryptography (PQC)) algorithms through a Federal Register Notice (FRN). The team solicited public comments regarding requirements and evaluation criteria, which were subsequently finalized. NIST plans to spend three to five years analyzing the submitted algorithms before selecting algorithms for standardization, during which time NIST will engage with the research community through conferences and workshops.

To better understand the need for dedicated lightweight cryptography, ITL has created a portfolio of lightweight primitives through an open process. ITL will evaluate and recommend algorithms based on profiles, which consist of a set of design goals, physical characteristics of target devices, performance characteristics imposed by the applications, and security characteristics.

ITL continues to conduct research into post-quantum cryptography (PQC), quantum algorithms, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), privacy-enhancing cryptography, and lightweight cryptographic schemes for constrained environments.

After working with industry on the protocol necessary to exchange cryptographic test data in an automated fashion, the development of the cryptographic algorithm testing service to be hosted at NIST was begun, with the full implementation expected to take approximately one year. (See: http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/acvt)

In software testing, the oracle problem refers to determining the expected output for a given set of inputs. A determination of the expected output normally requires human involvement or a mathematical model of the specification. ITL has developed an oracle-free software testing method for which NIST filed a patent application. The test settings for an input factor may represent ranges of values (called equivalence classes) for which the output is expected to remain unchanged.

A command-line interface was developed that tests the MRTs themselves for conformance to the specification, in addition to testing American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/NIST-ITL Transactions. An initial graphical user interface was also developed to allow an easy-to-use software suite for end users. National standard bodies were encouraged to further the advancements of biometric data interchange format standards.

The International Standards Organization, which is developing the next-generation telecommunications standard, LTE (Long Term Evolution), is ensuring that features critical to Public Safety are incorporated into the standards.

In continued support of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12) and Federal Information Processing Standard 201-2 (FIPS 201-2), the NIST Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Program updated and refined several supporting documents.

As a natural follow-up to the publication of security guidelines for hypervisor deployment for server virtualization, ITL published SP 800-125B, Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM) Protection, after extensive public comments, followed by a conference paper titled “Analysis of Virtual Networking Options for Securing Virtual Machines.” ITL also submitted two Special Publications and three conference papers on Virtualization Security to ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27/WG4 as a NIST/US Contribution. The submissions have now resulted in the ISO/IEC working draft 21878.

ITL provided assistance to agencies and the private sector through many outreach programs, including the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE), the Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), and the Federal Computer Security Managers’ Forum.

NIST solicited recommendations from the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) on draft standards and guidelines regarding information security and privacy issues.

ITL published the final public draft of SP 800-160, Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems, to address the engineering-driven actions necessary to develop more defensible and survivable systems—including the components that compose and the services that depend on those systems.

Work began on SP 800-53 Revision 5, Security and Privacy Controls for Systems and Organizations, with a pre-draft call for comments, adjudication of those comments, and coordination with partners within the Joint Task Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative. SP 800-53 provides organizations with the security controls necessary to appropriately strengthen their systems and the environments in which those systems operate.

This draft provides guidance to federal agencies for the protection of Controlled Unclassified Information when such information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations.

ITL’s Internet Infrastructure Protection (IIP) program works with industry to develop the measurement science and new standards necessary to ensure the robustness, scalability, and security of the global Internet.

The ITL usability team’s research focused primarily in four areas: passwords, understanding user behavior, cryptography, and privacy.

ITL produced reference data and test methods for computer forensics and software quality to support the needs of the software assurance, law enforcement, and forensics communities for quality and efficiency improvements.

These outreach activities help to ensure a clear comprehension of standards and guidelines, help share ongoing and planned activities, and help ensure that guidelines are scoped in a collaborative, open, and transparent manner. ITL public workshops addressed a diverse range of information security and technology topics, including:

The 2016 ITL Cybersecurity Program Annual Report (formerly titled Computer Security Division Annual Report) was produced and released as a NIST SP. Former CSD annual reports from fiscal years 2003 through 2015 are available on the Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) at https://csrc.nist.gov/Publications/Search?requestStatusList=1,3&requestSeriesList=3,1,4,2,8,13,7,9,6,5,10,11,12&requestSortOrder=7&requestDisplayOption=brief&itemsPerPage=25&requestControlFamilyType=All&requestTopicType=All&requestControlFamilyList=&requestTopicList=15&request

In FY 2016, ITL continued to research and develop guidance in a broad array of technical areas, including supply chain risk management; forensics, software, security analytics, usability and security, cloud, mobile, and privacy-enhancing technologies; hardware-enabled security; cyber-physical and embedded systems; and other projects. ITL staff and guest researchers have collaborated with global partners from government, industry, and academia, making significant contributions to help secure critical information and the infrastructure. The following sections describe ITL’s Cybersecurity Program achievements, including extensive research and development for high-quality, cost-effective security and privacy mechanisms, standards, guidelines, tests, and metrics that address current and future computer and information security challenges.

(Editors’ Note: Acronyms used throughout this Annual Report are generally defined when first used. A complete list of Acronyms used in this report is provided in Appendix A of this Annual Report.)

Figure 1 shows many of the national and international standards-developing organizations (SDOs) involved in cybersecurity standardization. Various ITL staff participate in many cybersecurity standards’ activities either in leadership positions or as editors and contributors, including the American National Standards Institute (ANSI); the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC); the Biometric Application Programming Interface (BioAPI) Consortium; the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG); Bluetooth Security Expert Group (BT-SEG); the International Telecommunications Union - Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T); various groups within the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); the North American Security Products Organization (NASPO); the Trusted Computing Group (TCG); and Accredited Standards Committee X9, Inc. (ASC X9, Inc.) (e.g., X9F – Data & Information Security Subcommittee). Many of ITL’s publications have been the basis for both national and international standards projects.

The following paragraphs discuss ITL staff activities in conjunction with the InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee Cybersecurity 1 (CS1), where ITL’s Sal Francomacaro serves as the CS1 Vice Chair. CS1 is the U.S. counterpart for the ISO/IEC SC27 committee for IT Security.

ITL staff actively participate with JTC1/SC27 and its working groups to develop standards for the protection of information and Information and Communications Technology (ICT). This includes generic methods, techniques and guidelines to address both security and privacy aspects, such as:

Figure 1: SDOs involved in Cybersecurity

ITL staff also engages in active liaison and collaboration with appropriate bodies to ensure the proper development and application of SC 27 standards and technical reports in relevant areas.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

ITL has continued the development of an advanced Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) framework called the Policy Machine, which was designed to be in alignment with an emerging ANSI/INCITS standard under the title of “Next Generation Access Control” (NGAC).

The NIST Policy Machine research and development effort has resulted in three ongoing national standards projects in CS1 in the early stages of development. They include:

Mr. David Ferraiolo, (301) 975-3046, david.ferraiolo@nist.gov

Mr. Serban Gavrila, (301) 975-4343, serban.gavrila@nist.gov

ITL has contributed to the activities of ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC/27, which published ISO/IEC 19790, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on March 1, 2006, and ISO/IEC 24759, Test Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, on July 1, 2008. ISO/IEC 19790 specifies the security requirements for a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems. These efforts bring consistent testing of cryptographic modules to the global community by providing ISO-equivalent standards representing FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules and Derived Test Requirements [DTR] for FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. Mr. Randall Easter (CSD) continues as the principal editor for these standards.

ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 Working Group (WG) 3 completed and published revisions, followed with updated corrections, of ISO/IEC 19790:2006 and ISO/IEC 24759:2008. The revision of ISO/IEC 19790 was published on August 15, 2012. The revision of ISO/IEC 24759 was published on January 31, 2014. Both ISO/IEC standards were also adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) (see: http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ISO%2FIEC+19790%3A2012). The two ISO/IEC revisions were developed with international support and the collaboration of governments, industry and academia. Revised corrections of both standards were published on December 15, 2015.

The revision of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 addresses new security areas, such as defined software module boundaries, degraded modes of operation, trusted channels, two-factor authentication, software security, mitigation of fault induction and side-channel attacks, operational self-tests for algorithms, and lifecycle assurance from design to end-of-life.

Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Testing – ISO Standards is a chart of the ISO/IEC standards, as explained above, in which CSD has played a part during the development process.

Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Testing – ISO Standards

In addition to the aforementioned standards, International Standards ISO/IEC 17825, Testing methods for the mitigation of non-invasive attack classes against cryptographic modules, is expected to be published in January 2017 and ISO/IEC 18367, Cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms conformance testing, is on target to be published during December 2016. Mr. Easter was the editor of both standards.

International Standard ISO/IEC 17825 specifies the non-invasive attack mitigation test metrics for determining conformance to the requirements specified in ISO/IEC 19790 for Security Levels 3 and 4. The test metrics are associated with the security functions specified in ISO/IEC 19790. Testing will be conducted at the defined boundary of the cryptographic module and using Input/Output (I/O) available at the defined boundary .

International Standard ISO/IEC 18367 describes conformance testing methods for cryptographic algorithms and security mechanisms. Conformance testing assures that an implementation of a cryptographic algorithm or security mechanism is correct whether implemented in hardware, software or firmware. It also confirms that it runs correctly in a specific operating environment. Testing may consist of known-answer or Monte Carlo testing, or a combination of test methods. Testing may be performed on the actual implementation or modeled in a simulation environment.

The test methods used by testing laboratories to test whether the cryptographic module conforms to the requirements specified in ISO/IEC 19790 and the test metrics specified in this International Standard for each of the associated security functions specified in ISO/IEC 19790 are specified in ISO/IEC 24759. The test approach employed in this International Standard is an efficient “push-button” approach: the tests are technically sound, repeatable and have moderate costs.

ITL is also the principal editor or co-editor of other ISO/IEC documents. ITL’s contributions to the development of these international standards create a strong foundation for the adoption of and migration from currently used national standards. In particular, this adoption will promote international harmonization for the implementation and testing of cryptographic algorithms and modules, while accommodating individual country preferences in the choice of approved security functions.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/

Mr. Randall J. Easter (240) 361-8777 randall.easter@nist.gov

In the area of Identity Tokens and Secure elements, ITL has provided the technical and editorial support of Mr. Ketan Mehta (CSD) in the development and amendment of American National Standard (ANS) 504, Generic Identity Command Set (GICS). GICS enables Personal Identity Verification (PIV), PIV-Interoperable (PIV-I) and Common Access Card (CAC) applications, and others, to be built from a single platform. GICS defines an open platform where identity applications can be instantiated, deployed, and used in an interoperable way between the credential issuers and credential users that aligns with the last revision of the NIST SP 800-73-4, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, (PIV) specifications.

During FY 2017, ITL staff plans to:

ITL staff will continue to actively support relevant ID management standard initiatives, such as ISO/IEC 19286, Integrated circuit card (ICC) Privacy-enhancing protocols and services, and ISO/IEC 18328, ICC managed devices.

ITL participates in the development of online authentication specifications. These specifications are developed by the Fast Identities Online (FIDO) alliance, which is a consortium of private organizations. ITL also participates in the development of similar specifications (called WebAuthn) for web browsers that are being developed by the W3C consortium. Both the FIDO and WebAuthn specifications enable relying parties to create cryptographic tokens on the end-user’s device and subsequently use this cryptographic token to authenticate the end user. These specifications provide multi-factor authentication directives, and they are designed to mitigate common threat vectors for Internet communications, such as phishing, man-in-the-middle, and replay attacks.

ITL participates in the development of an ISO/IEC standard (ISO/IEC 7501) for electronic Passports. Specifically, ITL is contributing to the development of passport data structure and its access control. ITL reviews and comments on authentication protocols that are developed to ensure strong user authentication and to protect personally identifiable passport data.

ITL is also participating in the development of an ISO standard (ISO/IEC 18013) for an International Mobile Driver License (DL). During 2016, ITL gathered and discussed functional and security requirements for Mobile DLs. ITL is now developing two models for the Mobile DLs, namely, offline and online models. Once these models are correctly defined, ITL plans to write technical specification for each model.

Mr. Salvatore Francomacaro, (301) 975-6414, salvatore.francomacaro@nist.gov

Mr. Ketan Mehta, (301) 975-8405, ketan.mehta@nist.gov

During FY 2016, ITL has been designated by the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) to accelerate the Federal Government’s secure adoption of cloud computing by leading efforts to identify existing standards and guidelines. Where standards are needed, ITL works closely with U.S. industry, standards developers, other government agencies, and leaders in the global standards community to develop standards that will support secure cloud computing.

This standardization effort supports federal agencies in adopting and implementing cloud computing infrastructures. This standard work includes standards development within the voluntary, consensus-based standards ecosystem and the development of NIST standards and guidelines for federal agencies, as required by government mandates. The ITL staff participates in developing standards for many aspects of cloud computing. ITL participation helps to ensure the alignment of NIST standards with those of ISO/IEC sub-committees, such as SC 27, SC 38 and their U.S. counterparts, ANSI/INCITS CS1 and Cloud 38. The large number of standards being developed in SC 27 covering areas (such as security, privacy, supply chain, personally identifiable information (PII) processing or virtualization security) interweave with many cloud computing standards being developed by these subcommittees.

Ms. Annie Sokol is a member of ITL’s Cloud Computing team and the CSD representative in the standards development program. ITL provides technical and editorial representation in the development of national and international standards in both SC 27 and SC38. Ms. Sokol is currently the co-editor of ISO/IEC 19941, Information technology– Cloud computing–Interoperability and portability, which is intended to establish a common understanding of cloud computing interoperability and portability. This document is of interest to cloud stakeholders focusing on cloud service agreements concerning interoperability or portability among cloud services. The ISO/IEC 19941 work aligns with ITL staff involvement in the SC 38 development of ISO/IEC 19086-4 (DIS), Information technology–Cloud computing–Service level agreement (SLA), which has four parts. Of particular interest, ISO/IEC 19086 – Part 1 was published in 2016 and establishes a set of common cloud SLA building blocks (e.g. concepts, terms, definitions, contexts) that can be used to create cloud Service Level Agreements (SLAs).

Ms. Annie Sokol (301) 975-2006 annie.sokol@nist.gov

CSD’s Biometric Standards and Associated Conformity Assessment Testing Tools team contributes to the development of biometric standards. The team reviews standards documents, develops contributions and feedback and participates in technical and editorial discussions to substantiate NIST and ITL’s goals in the biometric field. The team participates in the International Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical Committee M1 – Biometrics standards body and related subcommittees. The team also participates in the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee (SC) 37 – Biometrics standards body.

Mr. Dylan Yaga (301) 975-6004 dylan.yaga@nist.gov

Recognizing that the national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of its critical infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in February 2013. This EO directed NIST to work with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework—based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices—for reducing cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructures.

The Cybersecurity Framework that was developed provides a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach to help critical infrastructure owners and operators—as well as other interested entities— to identify, assess, and manage cybersecurity-related risk, while protecting business confidentiality, individual privacy, and civil liberties.

In FY 2016, ITL continued to work with a diverse stakeholder community to support the use and understanding of the Cybersecurity Framework. This process included:

Since the release of the Framework, NIST’s primary goal has been to raise awareness of the Framework, and encourage its use as a tool to help industry sectors and organizations manage cybersecurity risks.

In FY 2017, ITL will continue to conduct stakeholder outreach and will work collaboratively to further understand stakeholder needs regarding tools and resources to enable more effective use of the Framework. Additionally, in early 2017, NIST will publish a minor update to the Framework and will minimize any disruption to current Framework users by focusing on clarification and refinement. NIST will also publish guidance on how Federal agencies can use the Cybersecurity Framework, particularly illustrating how the Risk Management Framework (Special Publication (SP) 800-37 Revision 1, Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A Security Life Cycle Approach) and Cybersecurity Framework can work together to help agencies develop, implement, and continuously improve their information security programs.

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

Team email: cyberframework@nist.gov

Mr. Matt Barrett, (301) 975-6259, matthew.barrett@nist.gov

Mr. Jeff Marron, (301) 975-3846, jeffrey.marron@nist.gov

The FISMA Implementation Project focuses on:

During FY 2016, the ITL FISMA Implementation project continued to strengthen collaboration through the Joint Task Force (JTF) Transformation Initiative, which includes the Department of Defense (DOD), the Intelligence Community (IC), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), and various federal agencies. The JTF partners continue to develop and update key cybersecurity guidelines for protecting federal information and information systems as part of the Unified Information Security Framework. Previously, the JTF developed common security guidance in the critical areas of security controls for information systems and organizations, security assessment procedures to demonstrate security control effectiveness, security authorizations for risk acceptance decisions, and continuous monitoring activities to ensure that decision makers receive the most up-to-date information on the security state of their information systems. In addition, ITL worked with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop guidelines for automation support for security control assessments on a security capability basis and in accordance with the NIST RMF.

In FY 2016, the ITL FISMA Team worked on the following initiatives:

The FISMA Team also collaborated with DOD, the IC, DHS, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the General Services Administration (GSA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Inspectors General (IGs) on multiple projects to ensure consistency with FISMA-related guidance and to protect information in a way that is commensurate with risk. In addition, the FISMA Team served as co-chairs on the Committee on National Security Systems working groups.

In FY 2016, the FISMA Team completed the following activities:

In FY 2017, the FISMA Team intend to:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma

The ITL FISMA Team email is: sec-cert@nist.gov

Dr. Ron Ross, (301) 975-5390, ron.ross@nist.gov

Mr. Nedim Goren, (301) 975-5233, nedim.goren@nist.gov

Ms. Kelley Dempsey, (301) 975-2827, kelley.dempsey@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

ITL research in information technology, including cybersecurity, cloud computing, big data, the Smart Grid and other cyber-physical systems; aims to improve the products and services that bring great advancements to U.S. national and economic security and the quality of life. Much of this research pertains to the trustworthiness of these information technologies and the systems in which they are incorporated. Given concerns about how information technologies may affect privacy at individual and societal levels, the ITL Privacy Engineering Program (PEP) supports the development of trustworthy information systems by applying measurement science and system engineering principles to the creation of frameworks, risk models, guidance, tools, and standards that protect privacy, and by extension, civil liberties. The PEP also seeks to promote NIST and ITL leadership in privacy research and privacy-enhancing technologies.

The PEP was formally established as a program in FY 2016 as part of ACD. In 2014, the PEP team initiated research with two workshops to explore the foundations of privacy engineering and risk management and published a draft of NISTIR 8062, An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal Systems, in May 2015 to introduce a novel set of privacy engineering objectives and a privacy risk assessment framework (see http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf).

In FY 2016, the PEP focused resources in the following areas: developing a near-term strategic plan, finalizing NISTIR 8062, and coordinating with other NIST programs and research efforts to address and integrate privacy. The strategic plan is organized around the basic goals of advancing the development of privacy engineering and risk management processes and the deployment of privacy-enhancing technologies, as well as positioning NIST as a leader in privacy research.

To further the development of processes for privacy engineering and risk management (and inform its finalization of NISTIR 8062), the PEP team conducted outreach with stakeholders, researched privacy assessment and risk mitigation methods, and supported the use of its Privacy Risk Assessment Methodology (PRAM) inside and outside the Federal Government. The PEP team also worked extensively with OMB on the revision of Circular A-130, which lays out new requirements for federal agencies to address privacy risk in their information systems to ensure that the Circular and the PEP were in alignment on privacy risk management.

As a result of these efforts, the PEP team has revised NISTIR 8062 to more clearly introduce the concepts of privacy engineering and risk management, clarify the rationale for the introduction of a set of privacy engineering objectives and a risk model, and include a roadmap for the development of comprehensive privacy risk management guidance for federal agencies that parallels NIST guidance for information security.

The PEP also co-hosted a workshop in September 2016 with the Department of Transportation to gather input on changes to the privacy controls in Appendix J of NIST SP 800-53, which is undergoing its fifth revision. The workshop initiated the first stage of executing the guidance roadmap that the PEP will continue in FY 2017.

An important role for the PEP is a collaboration and coordination with other NIST programs and research efforts to better integrate privacy in the pursuit of more trustworthy systems.

Of particular note, the PEP put its preliminary concepts into practice with the PRAM, a set of worksheets that take an organization through a privacy risk assessment of its systems. Working with the ITL Trusted Identities Group (TIG), the PEP team supports the TIG grant awardees’ use of the PRAM to evaluate privacy risks and develop mitigating controls in their pilots. The PEP team also used the PRAM for privacy evaluations of information systems in partnership with federal agencies, including DHS and GSA. The lessons learned from these PRAM evaluations have been critical to the PEP team’s understanding of the practical aspects of applying privacy risk management concepts in system development.

The program also collaborated on many other projects, including a partnership PEP with TIG on a building block at the NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) to use the new privacy engineering objectives (see https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/project-descriptions/privacy-enhanced-identity-brokers-project-description-draft.pdf). There was also collaboration with CSD and NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) on the big data and cyber-physical systems frameworks and related efforts, and with ITL’s Information Access Division (IAD) to support a successful Build-the-Future proposal on de-identification, a process used to prevent a person’s identity from being associated with information.

Figure 3: Collaboration Between PEP and Other NIST Programs in FY 2016 illustrates a number of projects from the programs described above that PEP collaborated on in FY 2016. These projects can be categorized as applied privacy projects or guidance and frameworks.

The program worked across public and private-sector organizations to advance NIST’s role in privacy. The PEP team participated in the Internet Policy Task Force’s Privacy Working Group (see https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/internet-policy-task-force) and now hold leadership positions in the Federal Privacy Council (established by Executive Order in FY 2016), and the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program’s Privacy Research Interagency Working Group, whose work included drafting the National Privacy Research Strategy (see https://www.nitrd.gov/cybersecurity/nationalprivacyresearchstrategy.aspx), the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, and the Fast Identity Online Alliance.

The PEP team presented its research at major conferences, including the RSA Conference, the International Association of Privacy Professionals Global Summit and Privacy Academy, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers International Workshop on Privacy Engineering, the Privacy + Security Forum, the TRUSTe Privacy Risk Summit, and the Computing Community Consortium’s Privacy by Design Workshop, among others.

The PEP team contributed to ongoing standards and framework development efforts in various organizations, including the Identity Ecosystem Steering Group, the Fast Identity Online Alliance, and the ISO.

In FY 2017, the PEP will publish the final version of NISTIR 8062, slated to be released in January 2017 (see http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf). The PEP will also work on developing privacy risk management guidance for federal agencies, beginning with a revision of the privacy controls in NIST SP 800-53. The program will continue to collaborate with other NIST programs as they seek to address privacy challenges and will work with stakeholders to promote privacy engineering and risk management practices. The PEP team will also continue to seek leadership opportunities in public and private-sector organizations to position NIST on the leading edge of privacy research. Finally, The PEP will explore new areas for privacy research that have broad-based application and support federal agency mission-critical needs in managing privacy risk.

Figure 3: Collaboration Between PEP and Other NIST Programs in FY 2016

https://www.nist.gov/itl/privacy-engineering

PEP Team email: privacyeng@nist.gov

Ms. Naomi Lefkovitz, (301) 975-2924, naomi.lefkovitz@nist.gov

Ms. Ellen Nadeau, (202) 306-4033, ellen.nadeau@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Mr. Sean Brooks was part of this project team and has since left NIST.)

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) relies on a complex, globally distributed, and interconnected supply chain ecosystem to provide highly refined, cost-effective, and reusable solutions. This ecosystem is composed of various entities with multiple tiers of outsourcing, diverse distribution routes, assorted technologies, laws, policies, procedures, and practices, all of which interact to design, manufacture, distribute, deploy, use, maintain, and manage ICT products and services.

The factors that allow for low-cost, interoperability, rapid innovation, a variety of product features, and other benefits, also increase the risk of a compromise to the ICT supply chain, which may result in risks to the end user. These ICT supply chain risks may include an insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, and the insertion of malicious software and hardware as well as poor manufacturing and development practices in the ICT supply chain.

Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) is the process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the distributed and interconnected nature of ICT product and service supply chains. It covers the entire life cycle of a system (including design, development, maintenance, and destruction), as supply chain threats and vulnerabilities may intentionally or unintentionally compromise an ICT product or service at any stage.

In FY 2016, ITL continued to research the state of Cyber SCRM in both the public and private sectors, related standards and initiatives, effective practices, and metrics. ITL partnered with a team composed of representatives from the Federal Government (GSA and DHS), the insurance industry (Zurich and Beecher Carlson) and academia (the University of Maryland) to begin fundamental research and build the tools necessary to measure and assess the actual effectiveness of cybersecurity strategies and controls. The effort will use voluntary, secure and anonymized risk assessments based on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to begin developing a large-scale anonymized data set that will, for the first time, demonstrate cause and effect relationships between cyber supply chain capability levels and organizational performance outcomes over time.

Also in FY 2016, ITL co-chaired, with the Department of Defense, the primary interagency working group on cyber SCRM to revise CNSS Directive (CNSSD) No. 505, Supply Chain Risk Management, which assigns responsibilities and establishes minimum criteria for the development and deployment of capabilities for SCRM of National Security Systems. ITL also co-chaired the Software and Supply Chain Assurance (SSCA) Forum and Working Groups, the purpose of which is to bring together a stakeholder community of government, industry, and academic experts in this field. Meetings are held quarterly and cover a variety of subjects of interest to attendees.

In April 2016, ITL held a workshop regarding an update to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). During the workshop, information was gathered in a breakout session regarding attendees’ views about improving how SCRM is covered in the CSF. Several ideas were proposed, and NIST plans to incorporate the feedback into an updated version of the CSF.

In May 2016, ITL hosted a forum event led by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) about their Trustworthy Supplier Framework (TSF), a prototype toolbox that maps various existing standards and practices to the controls provided in NIST SP 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. The TSF is intended to increase the utility of existing standards to buyers and program managers making supplier selections, while simultaneously allowing suppliers flexibility in meeting procurement requirements. The forum provided an opportunity for ITL to understand the needs of stakeholders in this arena. The information will be used by IDA in their further development of the Trustworthy Supplier Framework and by ITL in future updates to SP 800-161 and other related publications.

In FY 2017, ITL will continue to collaborate with stakeholders in government, industry, and academia to conduct research, produce needed standards and guidance, and seek opportunities to create greater awareness across all sectors and types and sizes of organizations. ITL will:

http://csrc.nist.gov/scrm/

ICT SCRM Team email: scrm-nist@nist.gov

Mr. Jon Boyens, (301) 975-5549, jon.boyens@nist.gov

Ms. Celia Paulsen, (301) 975-5981, celia.paulsen@nist.gov

ITL supports the development of biometric conformance testing methodology standards and other conformity assessment efforts through active technical participation in the development of these standards and the development of associated conformance test software, architectures and test suites, collectively known as Biometric Conformance Test Software (BioCTS). These test tools are developed to promote the adoption of these standards and to support users, product developers, and testing labs that require conformance to selected biometric standards. ITL contributes to the development of biometric standards and participates in the INCITS Technical Committee M1 – Biometrics and related subcommittees and in ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 Subcommittee (SC) 37 – Biometrics standards bodies. ITL plans to continue this work in FY 2017.

In FY 2016, the BioCTS team released refined versions of existing software and researched the use of machine-readable data to accelerate conformance test development and increase support for profiles and user-defined requirements.

There were two updates to the BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL (AN) software suite in FY 2016. These updates were primarily focused on enhancing the underlying codebase, increasing performance, and adding more user-friendly features. The testing architecture has been updated to be more maintainable and more robust. The update represents a complete overhaul of the BioCTS for AN’s initial release in 2012. A list of changes made to BioCTS for AN can be found in the Changelog (see https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Biometric-Conformance-Test-Software).

In addition to updates to BioCTS software, the team released an updated ANSI/NIST-ITL Data Extractor, illustrated in Figure 4: ANSI/NIST-ITL Extractor Software which shows the internal data records within an ANSI/NIST-ITL file. The Data Extractor allows data (images, text, etc.) to be saved from an ANSI/NIST-ITL formatted file, as well as providing a high-level overview of the file and its internal structure.

Figure 4: ANSI/NIST-ITL Extractor Software

The BioCTS team researched the new Machine Readable Tables (MRTs) for the ANSI/NIST-ITL Biometric Standard (AN-MRTs) to determine their suitability for integration into conformance testing efforts. The AN-MRTs encode many of the human-readable requirements specified in the base ANSI/NIST-ITL Biometric Standard (and related profiles, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (EBTS)) in a manner that can be parsed and understood by software. The BioCTS team developed software capable of parsing and testing these tables to ensure a valid MRT format using MRT Schema documents and MRT element definitions. The results of our tests were documented and provided to the authors of the AN-MRTs for incorporation into future versions of the tables for the benefit of all MRT users. The software used to develop these results may be released in the future as a standalone tool for validating and analyzing AN-MRT files. The new BioCTS software will use the AN-MRTs as an external resource. This will allow updates to be made to the MRTs to incorporate the latest conformance requirements, correct errors, or conduct experiments without releasing an updated version of BioCTS itself.

An initial version of this software began development in FY 2016, and this effort is expected to continue in FY 2017.

BioCTS - Biometric Conformance Test Tools:

https://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biometric-conformance-test-software-biocts

BioCTS for ANSI/NIST-ITL User Guide:

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Biometric-Conformance-Test-Software/publications

Mr. Dylan Yaga, (301) 975-6004, dylan.yaga@nist.gov

NIST’s Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) effort will provide the next generation of “smart” co-designed and co-engineered interacting networks of physical and computational components. Specifically, ITL supports the effort by providing cybersecurity and privacy expertise to address CPS-specific cybersecurity and privacy challenges. Such challenges are related to emerging technical areas, such as personalized health care, emergency response, traffic-flow management, and electric power generation and delivery. Other phrases that are often referenced along with CPS technologies include:

CPS aims for increased efficiency and interaction between the digital and physical worlds. Ensuring that these emerging and evolving systems are reliable, trustworthy, secure, and that they protect the privacy of information poses a unique cybersecurity challenge. Other challenges of CPS include the need for an integration with legacy components and allowance for emerging technologies as well as real-time response in support of extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability.

Cybersecurity and privacy considerations are critical to the safe and resilient design, development, and operation of CPS. Addressing both the opportunities and challenges of CPS requires a broad collaboration to develop a common foundation, including a consensus definition, vocabulary, reference architecture, and a shared understanding of the essential roles of timing, cybersecurity, and data interoperability. ITL is researching the cybersecurity and privacy needs of the broader landscape of CPS by applying their subject-matter expertise in cybersecurity and privacy to various instances of CPS. These instances may include industrial control systems, the smart grid, hardware-enabled security, and embedded systems, to name a few.

In FY 2016, ITL provided leadership for the Cybersecurity and Privacy subgroup of the CPS Public Working Group (PWG)—which focused on identifying strategies for cybersecurity and privacy in CPS as well as working collaboratively with the other subgroups to ensure the inclusion of cybersecurity as a design principle during the development processes.

After publishing a Draft Framework for CPS in September 2015—which compiled the work of the five PWG technical subgroups—the CPS PWG published version 1.0 of the Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems in May 2016. The document is the culmination of several years’ work by the CPS PWG, which includes several hundred members drawn primarily from industry, academia, and government. As a follow-on to the Framework’s release, in August 2016, ITL, in collaboration with NIST’s Engineering Lab, hosted the Trustworthiness Launch Workshop at NIST in Gaithersburg, MD. A key goal for the workshop was to promote interaction around integrated goals for trustworthy cyber-physical systems to lay the foundation for future trustworthiness in science.

In July 2016, ITL published NIST SP 800-183, Networks of ‘Things’, which offers an underlying and foundational understanding of IoT by exploring the components that belong to most distributed systems. In FY 2017, foundational and applied research will be conducted in the areas of CPS and IoT. ITL will also continue to participate in the International Society of Automation (ISA) 99 Committee, which develops and establishes standards, recommended practices, technical reports, and related information that define procedures for implementing electronically secure industrial automation and control systems and security practices.

https://www.nist.gov/cps/

Mr. Jeff Marron, (301) 975-3846, jeffrey.marron@nist.gov

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

NISTs Industrial Control System (ICS) cybersecurity effort is focused on providing guidance and insight into the domain of securing connected physical systems. ITL, in collaboration with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, is developing and implementing guidance aimed at effectively securing ICS—initially focusing on Smart Manufacturing Environments. Utilizing a cybersecurity performance test bed for ICS, NIST will measure the performance of these systems when instrumented with cybersecurity protections, in accordance with the best practices and requirements prescribed by national and international standards and guidelines. Examples of such standards and guidelines include ISA/IEC-62443, Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) Security, and NIST SP 800-82, Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security.

Industrial control systems are an essential component in manufacturing environments; increasing reliance on technology, communication, and the interconnectivity of ICS and IT has expanded the number of potential vulnerabilities and increased the potential risk to manufacturing operations. While these manufacturing systems become ‘smarter’ and increasingly connected (providing a tremendous increase of value and efficiency), they also present a new challenge regarding how cybersecurity can be effectively applied to the connected domain.

The ICS team has utilized existing standards, in conjunction with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, to develop a target Profile for applying cybersecurity protections within manufacturing environments. The development of this profile helps establish a roadmap for reducing cybersecurity risk for manufacturers in a way that is aligned with manufacturing-sector goals and industry best practices. The profile also tailors the existing cybersecurity control language to account for unique requirements in these operational environments.

In FY 2016, leading a session during the 2016 Cybersecurity Framework Workshop, the team solicited feedback from industry partners to help advance the development of the profile. The draft Cybersecurity Framework Manufacturing Profile was published as a whitepaper that solicited comments from the public. The Profile focuses on desired cybersecurity outcomes and can be used as a roadmap to identify opportunities for improving the current cybersecurity posture of a manufacturing system.

In FY 2017, NIST will continue its research in the ICS domain to include incorporating feedback and finalizing the Manufacturing Profile, implementing the defined cybersecurity protections onto the cybersecurity performance test bed, and measuring and understanding the performance impacts of implemented cybersecurity protections.

https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/cybersecurity-smart-manufacturing-systems

http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/documents/csf-manufacturing-profile-draft.pdf

http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf

Mr. Jeffrey Cichonski, (301) 975-3293, jeffrey.cichonski@nist.gov

Mr. Keith Stouffer, (301) 975-3877, keith.stouffer@nist.gov

The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) program provides a framework in which many federal agencies come together to coordinate their networking and IT research and development (R&D) efforts. NIST remains committed to the value of communicating its R&D efforts to other federal colleagues and identifying the opportunities to support R&D efforts throughout the Federal Government.

In FY 2016, the NITRD Cybersecurity and Information Assurance (CSIA) Interagency Working Group (IWG) monthly meetings provided an opportunity to learn and share information about NIST’s ongoing research. Participants also learned about connections with the February 2016 Federal Cybersecurity Research and Development Strategic Plan (see https://www.nitrd.gov/cybersecurity/publications/2016_Federal_Cybersecurity_Research_and_Development_Strategic_Plan.pdf). With Mr. Bill Newhouse serving as the NIST co-chair of the CSIA IWG, NIST helped guide the agenda for the monthly meetings to explore the defensive elements and critical elements in the R&D Strategic Plan.

In FY 2016, members of the National Privacy Research Forum published a National Privacy Research Strategy, and a new Privacy R&D Interagency Working Group (IWG) was established, co-chaired by Naomi Lefkovitz, and Simson Garfinkel (ITL), who brought their expertise to the development process for the privacy R&D plan. (see https://www.nitrd.gov/Publications/PublicationDetail.aspx?pubid=65)

NIST is a regular participant in the coordination activities of the federal Special Cyber Operations Research and Engineering (SCORE) Committee. SCORE enables technology transfer through the sharing of NIST cybersecurity expertise and publications with researchers throughout the Federal Government. The SCORE committee interacts with federal leaders and reports to the National Science & Technology Council’s Committee on Homeland & National Security.

http://www.nitrd.gov/

Mr. Bill Newhouse, (301) 975-0232, william.newhouse@nist.gov

In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to encourage the upgrade of voting equipment across the United States. HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC), chaired by the Director of NIST. HAVA directs NIST to provide technical support to the EAC and TGDC in efforts related to human factors, security, and laboratory accreditation. Voting security team members from ITL conduct research and develop guidelines and best practices for voting system security.

The primary objective of NIST’s work is to support the development of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), a broad set of equipment guidelines used by the EAC to certify voting systems. The current version of these guidelines is VVSG 1.1, which was approved by the EAC in March 2015. Initial efforts on the next revision of the VVSG have already begun. Beginning in 2015, NIST established public working groups to gather input and conduct the collaborative research necessary for the development of further guidelines/standards. These working groups consist of three election groups and four technology groups focused on human factors, cybersecurity, interoperability, and testing. The overall goal of the working groups is to lay the groundwork for a revision of the VVSG, as many jurisdictions are facing the need for a technology refresh since many voting systems are more than ten years old.

In the months leading up to the November 2016 election, NIST engaged with DHS, EAC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to help states better identify and manage their cybersecurity risks to election systems and voting systems for the upcoming election. This group ensured that election officials were aware of existing resources that are available to help them (including the guidelines and best practices that exist for voting and other IT systems, cyber hygiene scanning services by DHS, and threat and vulnerability bulletins).

In FY 2017, the voting working group will focus its efforts on the next revision of the VVSG. Based on feedback from the TGDC and election officials around the country, the new revision is expected to address new technologies and election use cases that have become commonplace in election systems. Additionally, the cybersecurity group plans to investigate security considerations and develop guidance in the areas of voter registration, electronic pollbooks, blank ballot delivery, ballot marking, auditing, and election-night reporting.

https://vote.nist.gov

Mr. Andrew Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

Mr. Joshua Franklin, (301) 975-8463, joshua.franklin@nist.gov

Improving computer security depends on improving software, that is, on reducing the number and severity of vulnerabilities in code. To achieve fewer vulnerabilities, it is essential to know what kinds of vulnerabilities and weaknesses there are and to know how to find them so they can be fixed. The Software Assurance Metrics and Tool Evaluation (SAMATE) program has two primary components: the Static Analysis Reference Dataset (SARD) and the Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE). In FY 2016, NIST produced a report on Dramatically Reducing Software Vulnerabilities and a workshop report on Software Measure and Metrics to Reduce Security Vulnerabilities.

There have been five SATEs since the program began in 2008. The most recent exposition was held in 2014. In FY 2016, planning commenced for SATE VI.

http://samate.nist.gov

Dr. Paul Black, (301) 975-4794, paul.black@nist.gov

Digital evidence includes data on computers and mobile devices, including audio, video, and image files as well as software and hardware. Digital evidence can be a part of investigating most crimes, since material relevant to the crime may be recorded in digital form. Methods for securely acquiring, storing and analyzing digital evidence quickly and efficiently are critical. ITL promotes the efficient and effective use of computer technology to investigate crimes. The project team develops tools for testing computer forensic software, including test criteria and test sets. ITL also maintains the National Software Reference Library – a vast archive of published software applications that is an important resource for both criminal investigators and historians.

The National Software Reference Library (NSRL) is designed to collect software from various sources and incorporate file profiles computed from this software into a Reference Data Set (RDS) of information. The RDS can be used by law enforcement, government, and industry organizations to review files on a computer by matching file profiles in the RDS. This will help alleviate much of the effort involved in determining which files are important as evidence on computers or file systems that have been seized as part of criminal investigations. The NSRL also provides a research environment to promote the development of new forensics techniques and other applications in computer science.

In FY 2016, the NSRL published four releases of the RDS, which continues to be the premier software resource. There are currently 21,000 applications and 200,000,000 files. The project team completed a project with the Stanford University Library to preserve thousands of first-generation computer packages. In FY 2017, the NSRL was expanded to include mobile apps.

Computer Forensics Tool Testing Project

There is a critical need in the law enforcement community to ensure the reliability of computer forensic tools. The goal of the Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT) project at NIST is to establish a methodology for testing computer forensic software tools by the development of general tool specifications, test procedures, test criteria, test sets, and test hardware. The project is intended to provide the information necessary for toolmakers to improve tools, for users to make informed choices about acquiring and using computer forensics tools, and for interested parties to understand the capabilities of the tools. A capability is required to ensure that forensic software tools consistently produce accurate and objective test results. The project team’s approach for testing computer forensic tools is based on well-recognized international methodologies for conformance testing and quality testing.

In FY 2016, the CFTT project was expanded to allow forensics testers to use the NIST testing methodology in their own labs and to produce standardized test reports. Currently, the project supports disk imaging testing and will be expanded to support hard-disk write blocking and mobile forensics in 2017. The CFTT project also maintains the Forensics Tool Catalog and the Computer Forensics Reference Dataset.

http://www.nsrl.nist.gov and

http://www.cftt.nist.gov

Mr. Doug White, (301) 975-4761, doug.white@nist.gov

Dr. Jim Lyle, (301) 975-3270, james.lyle@nist.gov

In February of 2012, Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act. One portion of this legislation calls for the establishment of a nationwide, interoperable public-safety broadband network based on the 3rd Generation Partnership Project’s (3GPP) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) technology. The network will be deployed and operated by the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). The planned Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) will “create a much-needed nationwide interoperable broadband network that will help police, firefighters, emergency medical service professionals and other public safety officials stay safe and do their jobs” (see http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety). NIST is directed to establish a list of certified devices and required components to be used by public safety officials, vendors, and other interested parties for interacting with the nationwide network. NIST is also directed to conduct research and development that supports the acceleration and advancement of the nationwide network.

Source: http://www.pscr.gov/

In FY 2016, CSD, ACD, and the NCCoE supported the joint National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and NIST Public Safety Communications Research (PSCR) program with efforts in public-safety mobile-application security, identity management, data and application isolation technologies, and enabling cybersecurity capabilities on the PSCR 700 MHz LTE demonstration network located in Boulder, Colorado (see http://www.pscr.gov). At PSCR’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference in June 2016, CSD and ACD organized and moderated a panel called “Public Safety and Network Security Enhancements,” led two breakout sessions on LTE Network Security, and had a booth highlighting the cybersecurity-related efforts of PSCR.

Figure 5: CSD and ACD researchers highlighting their work at the June 2016 Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Meeting hosted by PSCR.

During FY 2016, CSD and ACD published NISTIR 8080: Usability and Security Considerations for Public Safety Mobile Authentication, and NISTIR 8135: Identifying and Categorizing Data Types for Public Safety Mobile Applications Workshop Report. In addition, CSD and ACD released draft NISTIR 8136; Mobile Application Vetting Services for Public Safety - an Informal Survey, for public comment.

CSD and ACD participated in the standards development process for LTE technology within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) supporting security requirements for public safety that are related to Proximity Services (ProSe), Group Communication System Enablers (GCSE), and Mission Critical Push-to-Talk (MCPTT). In addition, CSD and ACD broadened its scope within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to include efforts related to public safety.

In FY 2017, CSD and ACD will work to implement and exercise cybersecurity capabilities in the PSCR 700 MHz LTE demonstration network, conduct research into mobile authentication solutions to support the different public-safety disciplines, and investigate mobile application-security services to support the security requirements of public-safety mobile applications. CSD and ACD will continue to engage the public-safety communications community by organizing workshops and conferences and participating in events such as the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO) Annual Meeting, PSRC’s Annual Public Safety Broadband Stakeholder Conference, and the International Wireless Communications Expo (IWCE).

Ms. Sheila Frankel (301) 975-3297 sheila.frankel@nist.gov

Dr. Nelson Hastings (301) 975-5237 nelson.hastings@nist.gov

The major elements of the smart grid are Information Technology, industrial control systems/operational technology, and the communications infrastructure. The infrastructure is used to send command information across the electric grid from the generation systems to the distribution systems, and to exchange usage and billing information between utilities and their customers. The key to the successful deployment of the smart grid infrastructure is the development of a cybersecurity strategy that includes cybersecurity as a design consideration for new and emerging systems and an approach to adding cybersecurity into existing systems. The electric grid is critical to the economic and physical well-being of the nation, and emerging cyber threats targeting power systems highlight the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical assets.

The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) became a membership-supported organization in January 2013. The SGIP Cybersecurity Working Group (CSWG) was renamed the Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee (SGCC), and continues to be led by a NIST representative in support of responsibilities identified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The SGCC chair is a voting member of the SGIP Technical Committee and serves as an ex-officio Director of the Board.

In FY 2016, researchers from CSD, ACD, and the Software and Systems Division (SSD) worked on developing security tools for networks specifically designed to support the next-generation electrical power systems. The researchers concentrated on authenticating the provenance of multicast data streams from emerging power system sensors called Phasor Measurement Units. By authenticating the sensors to the utility, the utility can trust that their sensor measurements are coming from the correct sensors and have not been hijacked.

Multicast authentication of sensor data is challenging, due to the need for low-security overhead, tolerance of lossy networks, time-criticality, and high data rates. Researchers augmented an existing authentication scheme to accommodate high-data-rate sensor transmissions that are unbounded in length (meaning that there is no session expiration). Using dual-offset key chains to reduce authentication delay and the computational overhead associated with key chain commitment, they developed a new protocol called inf-TESLA that meets the performance requirements imposed by the physical dynamics of the power system. Significant effort was made to integrate their authentication protocol into existing network simulation software, specifically Optimized Network Engineering Tools (OPNET), thus providing potential users with the ability to evaluate the protocol on their own networks and for their own applications.

Furthermore, in an effort to address the growing interest in co-optimizing cyber and physical components to work together as a system, NIST researchers developed mathematical formalism to trade off the sensitivity of a dynamic system to attack or perturbation against the authentication overhead incurred by their protocol. This formalism was demonstrated on a power system use case showing the limiting considerations between authentication overhead and stability margins of a wide-area damping controller. The project continues to be a work-in-progress and was presented and published at ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection Conference 2016 in Ghent, Belgium.

Timing has also become a cyber-physical security issue with the onset of utilities detecting issues in receiving and distributing time to enable distributed real-time measurement and control. In particular, the concern of the threat of spoofing and jamming has led to efforts in determining redundant sources of traceable time. The first step is developing monitoring and anomaly detection capabilities. The effort included working with the North American Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI) Time Synchronization Task Force to begin the effort in researching requirements and documenting guidelines for industry to provide assured timing. One alternative time distribution method to the Global Positioning System (GPS) is the IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP)—a time synchronization protocol that is used for the electric grid and other special-purpose industrial automation and measurement networks. Discussions have begun with the NIST Time and Frequency Division about experimental designs to provide a Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) scale that would be maintained as a NIST (UTC(NIST)) PTP service over a large geographical expanse.

In FY 2017, CSD will coordinate with NIST’s Engineering Laboratory (EL) and Smart Grid Program Office on the further development of a Cybersecurity Smart Grid Test Lab—part of the NIST Smart Grid Testbed Facility now under construction. CSD will also collaborate with the University of New Hampshire and ITL’s Software and Systems Division on cybersecurity research. The IEEE 1588 Security Working Group is developing a new Annex to secure time distribution through (a) PTP integrated authentication and integrity verification, (b) external transport security mechanisms, (c) architecture guidance, and (d) monitoring and management guidance. The research will focus on developing a full security scheme with emphasis on PTP integrated authentication and integrity verification and monitoring/detection of the network’s timing performance.

http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid

http://www.sgip.org

Ms. Suzanne Lightman, (301) 975-6442, suzanne.lightman@nist.gov

Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri, (301) 975-8542, victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) is a partnership among government, academia, and the private sector that is focused on cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development. The mission of NICE is to energize and promote a robust network and ecosystem of cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development. NICE fulfills this mission by coordinating with government, academic, and industry partners to build on existing successful programs, facilitate change and innovation, and bring leadership and vision to increase the number of skilled cybersecurity professionals helping to keep our nation secure.

NICE is building on its current efforts based on its Strategic Plan—delivered to Congress in April 2016 as required by the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014—which was written with engagement and deliberation among NICE partners. The three primary goals of the plan are to: 1) accelerate learning and skills development, 2) nurture a diverse learning community, and 3) guide career development and workforce planning. NICE partners will continue to develop appropriate implementation strategies and metrics for this plan.

In FY 2016, the NICE team at NIST worked to set a solid staffing foundation for future progress. They assembled new internal team members that includes leads for academic engagement, industry engagement, government engagement, and a program manager. These, in combination with the existing NICE Director and NICE Deputy Director, completed the staffing needs for the NICE Program Office at NIST.

Many NICE communication mechanisms were also established in FY 2016. These include the NICE Public Working Group (see https://www.nist.gov/itl/applied-cybersecurity/nice/about/working-group), the NICE Quarterly eNewsletter (see https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/search/enewsletter), and an increased presence of NICE at cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development events across the country.

Figure 6: The NICE Lead for Academic Engagement, Mrs. Davina Pruitt-Mentle, speaking with an attendee at the 20th Annual Colloquium for Information Systems Security Education Conference in Philadelphia.

In addition to NICE’s continued coordination with academic and industry partners, NICE also continued its leadership in working with government partners on initiatives such as the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy, and implementation of the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act.

In FY 2016, NICE announced grant awards for five Regional Alliances and Multi-stakeholder Partnerships to Stimulate (RAMPS) cybersecurity education and workforce development. The RAMPS grants will bring together K-12, higher education, and local employers in regions across the nation (see https://www.nist.gov/nice/regional-alliances-and-multistakeholder-partnerships-stimulate-ramps). NICE also provided grant support for the 2015 NICE Conference and Expo, the 2015 National K-12 Cybersecurity Education Conference, the Center of Academic Excellence (CAE) Community Meeting, the National Cybersecurity Summit, the NICE Challenge Project, and the Cybersecurity Jobs Heat Map.

In FY 2017, NICE plans to:

http://www.nist.gov/nice

Mr. Rodney Petersen, (301) 975-8897, nice.nist@nist.gov

Ms. Danielle Santos, (301) 975-5048, danielle.santos@nist.gov

The CSRC website is a vast repository of valuable information relating to cybersecurity research by NIST personnel in ITL and is one of the busiest and most expansive websites at NIST. CSRC encourages the broad sharing of information security tools and practices, provides a resource for information security standards and guidelines, and identifies and links key security web resources to support industry and government users. Several divisions within ITL rely on the CSRC website to post program/project information, research and testing, software tools, and other information that is essential to NIST’s customers worldwide. The CSRC website is home to many of the standards, guidelines, and other technical series documents that are valuable to the general public. The Publications Released in FY 2016 section of this annual report provides additional details. During FY 2016, CSRC had more than 6.2 million page views and downloads.

The CSRC team maintains a publication announcement mailing list with more than 73,630 subscribers from government, industry, and academia—as well as individuals with a personal interest in IT security worldwide. This free email list notifies subscribers about publications that have been posted to the CSRC website, along with announcing new NIST-sponsored cybersecurity events and important news and/or announcements.

During FY 2016, the CSRC was updated daily, providing new information such as draft and final versions of technical series documents (e.g., FIPS, SPs, NISTIRs and ITL Bulletins) and updates to various program and project webpages. The CSRC team has made progress on plans for a complete redesign of the current CSRC website, including a content management system (CMS). Updating CSRC with a CMS will provide a user-friendly environment and experience. The first phase of the project, the publications section; has been completed. All technical and non-technical publications (e.g., white papers, conference papers, presentations) have been successfully integrated into the new system.

The CSRC team has spent the last portion of FY 2016 migrating the content from the current website into the CMS, and in FY 2017, a beta test site of the entire CSRC is expected to be made available. The CSRC team plans to continue testing the new website and to review feedback received, with the plan for full transition to the updated site in FY 2017.

http://csrc.nist.gov

Questions regarding the CSRC website can be sent to the CSRC Webmasters at:

webmaster-csrc@nist.gov

Mr. Patrick O’Reilly, (301) 975-4751, patrick.oreilly@nist.gov

Ms. Nicole Keller, (301) 975-3648, nicole.keller@nist.gov

The Federal Computer Security Managers’ (FCSM) Forum is sponsored by NIST to promote the sharing of security-related information among federal agencies. The Forum, which serves more than 1,200 members, strives to provide an ongoing opportunity for managers of federal information security programs to exchange information security materials in a timely manner, build upon the experiences of other programs, and reduce possible duplication of effort. It provides a mechanism for NIST to share information directly with federal agency information security managers in fulfillment of NIST’s leadership mandate (under FISMA). It also assists NIST in establishing and maintaining relationships with other individuals or organizations that are actively addressing information security issues within the Federal Government. During FY 2016, NIST’s Patricia Toth served as the Chairperson, and ACD served as the Secretariat of the Forum, with administrative and logistical support from NIST’s Peggy Himes.

The Forum maintains an extensive email subscription service. Participation in the service is restricted to those Federal Government employees with a role in the management of their organization’s information system security program. The Forum conducts bi-monthly meetings and an annual two-day conference for a discussion of current issues and topics of interest to those responsible for protecting sensitive (unclassified) federal systems. Events are open to federal employees and their designated support contractors.

Topics of discussion at FCSM meetings in FY 2016 included briefings on: software-aided security control selection, best practices for privileged user personal identity verification, the Cybersecurity Framework, the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) - Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), an update on vetting the security mobile applications, and the U.S. Government Configuration Baselines (USGCB).

FY 2016’s annual two-day offsite was held at NIST on August 16-17, 2016. Presentations included the current technical, operational and management information systems security topics and updates on the information system security activities of OMB, GAO, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), NARA, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Census Bureau, DHS, and NIST. Most presentations are available online (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/events.html).

The following is a list of presentations that were given at the annual two-day offsite meeting (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/events.html for links to the presentations):

The Forum plays a valuable role in helping NIST (and other federal agencies) develop and maintain a strong, proactive stance in the identification and resolution of new strategic and tactical IT security issues as they emerge. The email list of interested parties has steadily increased in size and provides a valuable resource for federal security program managers.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/forum/

Ms. Victoria Yan Pillitteri, (301)975-8542, victoria.pillitteri@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

Ms. Jody Jacobs, (301) 975-4728, jlj3@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Pat Toth worked on this initiative until she took another position at NIST.)

The Federal Information Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA), founded in 1987, is a NIST organization to assist federal agency professionals with meeting information system security awareness, training, and education responsibilities. FISSEA strives to elevate the general level of information system security knowledge for the Federal Government and the federal workforce. It also seeks to assist the professional development of its members.

FISSEA membership is open to information system security professionals, professional trainers and educators, managers responsible for information system security training programs in federal agencies, contractors of these agencies, and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. All that is required to become a FISSEA member is a willingness to share products, information, and experiences. A working group meets monthly to administer business activities.

FISSEA communicates with its membership through a website, a mailing list, and a social networking site. The ACD staff assists FISSEA with its operations by providing staffing support for several of its activities (and by acting as FISSEA’s host agency).

The 29th Annual FISSEA Conference occurred March 15-16, 2016 at NIST, and the theme was “The Quest for the Unhackable Human: The Power of Cybersecurity Awareness and Training.” The 250+ attendees were made up of managers (specifically those responsible for information systems security awareness, training, certifications, workforce identification, compliance, etc. in federal agencies), contractors providing awareness and training support, and faculty members of accredited educational institutions who are involved in information security training and education. The attendees learned about new techniques for developing/conducting training, cost-effective practices, workforce development, and free resources and contacts.

NIST’s Pat Toth, Peggy Himes, and members of the FISSEA Technical Working Group were integral to the effort to support the 2016 Annual Conference. NIST ITL Director, Charles Romine, opened the event as the welcoming speaker, and ten-year-old Reuben Abishai Paul, Founder and CEO of CyberShaolin & Prudent Games, gave the keynote address “R U #Unhackable?” Presenters at the event represented NIST, DHS, Department of State (DoS), National Security Agency (NSA), National Institute of Health (NIH), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), private industry, and academia. The attendees had an opportunity to visit vendors and federal agencies on the second day to discuss their specific awareness and training programs, and the Pecha Kucha fast-paced talks proved to be both entertaining and educational.

The FISSEA Educator of the Year Award is an annual recognition to honor a contemporary individual who is making special efforts to create, build, manage, or inspire an information systems security awareness, training, or education program. Susan Hansche (DHS) presented the FISSEA 2016 Educator of the Year Award to Gretchen Morris (DB Consulting Group/NASA). Gretchen’s vast knowledge-base, strong work ethic, her dedication to the improvement of information security awareness and training, and her commitment to coordinating the annual FISSEA Security Contest made her the perfect recipient for the award.

Figure 7: Susan Hansche, DHS, presented the FISSEA 2015 Educator of the Year Award to Gretchen Morris, DB Consulting/NASA on March 15, 2016.

Other traditional FISSEA conference events include announcing the winners of the FISSEA Security Awareness, Training & Education Contest, which includes six categories from one of FISSEA’s three key areas: awareness, training, and education. A winner is selected from each category and awarded a certificate. The categories covered the topics described below, including a new section this year related to video-based training.

In FY 2016, awarded certificates were selected by an impartial judging committee and included:

Peer’s Choice Award winners were selected by peers during the conference and included:

Another benefit of attending the 2016 FISSEA conference was the networking opportunities. The conference continues to be a valuable forum for attendees to learn about ongoing and planned training and education programs and initiatives. It also provides NIST the opportunity to help departments and agencies with fulfilling FISMA responsibilities. The 30th Annual FISSEA Conference will be held at NIST on March 14-15, 2017.

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Federal-Info-Systems-Security-Educators-Assoc

Mr. Clarence Williams, (240) 672-8723, clarence.williams@nist.gov

Ms. Peggy Himes, (301) 975-2489, peggy.himes@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Pat Toth worked on this initiative until she took another position at NIST.)

The Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB) was initiated in 1987 and has successfully renewed its charter with proper authority every two years. The legislative history for Public Law 100-235 and Public Law 107-347 underscores that Congress intended that the Board should be a continuing body. The Board plays a central and unique role in providing the government with expert advice concerning information security and privacy issues that may affect federal information systems. No other similar group of experts meets regularly to review information security issues involved in unclassified Federal Government computer systems and networks. Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 reaffirmed the need for this Board by giving it additional responsibilities: to thoroughly review all proposed information technology standards and guidelines developed under Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), as amended.

The ISPAB is a federal advisory committee with specific statutory objectives to identify emerging managerial, technical, administrative, and physical safeguard issues related to information security and privacy.

The duties of the Board, as dictated in the Act, are:

Congress indicated the long-term need for the Board by setting the terms of Board members to four years. The Board’s charter requires that the NIST Director appoint the Chairperson and all twelve members of the Board, each of whom is selected for her/his preeminence in the IT industry or related disciplines.

Mr. Chris Boyer took over leadership from Dr. Peter Weinberger and was officially appointed by the NIST Director as the ISPAB Chair on May 1, 2016. Chris Boyer (Assistant Vice President, Global Public Policy at AT&T Services Inc.) has been a member of the Board since June 2012. In addition to his official role representing AT&T, he serves as AT&T’s point of contact to the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC), a federal advisory committee tasked with providing advice to the president on matters of national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP).

The ISPAB Board currently has ten members supporting the Chair (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/membership.html). This year, the Board was pleased to welcome Ms. Patricia Hatter as a new member (see https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2016/08/nists-information-security-and-privacy-advisory-board-adds-industry-member). The following are current Board members:

During FY 2016, ISPAB held three meetings that were located at the U.S. Access Board Conference Room in Washington, D.C:

The presenters at each Board meeting were leaders and experts representing private industry, academia, federal agency CIOs, Inspectors General, and Chief Information Security Officers.

In keeping with previous practices, at the first meeting of the fiscal year, the Board established a work plan for FY 2016. The resulting plan included the following areas of focus:

Aligning with work-plan focus areas, the Board continues to monitor the following critical areas:

The Board submitted two recommendation letters based on the Board work from each meeting in this fiscal year. Records of the submitted letters and the received responses are accessible from http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documentation.html.

Copies of the current list of members and their biographies, the Board’s charter, and past Board activities are located at https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/ISPAB. Information on ISPAB meetings is published in Federal Register Notices at least 16 days prior to the meeting. Those interested in receiving meeting notices and other notices relating to NIST information security and privacy work may email their name, affiliation, and address to Matthew Scholl at the email address below.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/

Mr. Matthew Scholl (301) 975-2941 matthew.scholl@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Annie Sokol worked on this initiative until she was assigned to other projects.)

Small business owners face a broad range of information security issues. A computer failure or system breach could jeopardize the company’s reputation and may result in significant damage and recovery cost—or even business closure. The small business owner who recognizes the threat of computer crime and takes steps to deter inappropriate activities is less likely to become a victim.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) reports that over 27 million U.S. companies − more than 99 % of all U.S. businesses − are SMBs of 500 employees or fewer (see http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/allprofiles12.pdf). While the threats to individual small and medium-size businesses may not be significantly different from those facing larger organizations, a SMB frequently has fewer resources available to protect systems, detect attacks, or respond to security issues. A vulnerability common to a large percentage of SMBs could pose a threat to the nation’s information infrastructure and economic base.

To help address information security risks, these businesses require assistance with the identification of security mechanisms and with practical, cost-effective training. Training helps SMB’s use their limited resources most effectively to address relevant and serious threats. In response to this need, NIST, the SBA, and the FBI InfraGard program co-sponsor a series of cybersecurity training workshops for small businesses. These workshops provide an overview of cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, and corresponding protective tools and techniques, with a special emphasis on information that small business personnel can apply directly.

In FY 2016, SMB outreach workshops took place in:

Additionally, as part of the President’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP), NIST partnered with the SBA, the FTC, and the Department of Energy (DoE) to develop and provide five cybersecurity training webinars to reach small businesses and small business stakeholders through 68 SBA District Offices, nine NIST Manufacturing Extension Partnership Centers, and other regional networks across the country.

In collaboration with the SBA and the FBI, planning is underway to identify locations and plan cybersecurity workshops in FY 2017.

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Small-Business-Community

Mr. Jeffrey Marron (301) 975-3846 Jeffrey.Marron@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Pat Toth worked on this initiative until she took another position at NIST.)

NIST opened a public competition in November 2007 to select a new cryptographic hash algorithm for standardization. The “SHA-3” competition ended in October 2012. NIST standardized the winning algorithm, Keccak, in FIPS 202 as the new SHA-3 Standard. Announced on August 5, 2015, FIPS 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, is available at: https://csrc.nist.gov/Publications/Search?requestSeriesList=3&requestStatusList=1,3&requestDisplayOption.=brief&requestSortOrder=5&itemsPerPage=All.

FIPS 202 defines four fixed-length hash functions (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512), and two variable-length eXtendable Output Functions (XOFs), SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. FIPS 202 also supports a flexible scheme for domain separation between different functions derived from Keccak, which ensures that different named functions will produce unrelated outputs.

NIST extended this scheme to allow users to customize their use of the function by defining a new, customizable version of the SHAKE functions, called cSHAKE, and specifying two cSHAKE variants—cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256—for a 128- and 256-bit security strength, respectively, in DRAFT SP 800-185, SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash.

Draft SP 800-185 defines three additional SHA-3-derived functions that provide new functionality. They are:

Published on August 4, 2016, Draft SP 800-185 is available on the CSRC website. NIST invited the public to review the draft and provide comments before September 30, 2016. NIST is in the process of addressing the received comments, and will post the final version of SP 800-185 when the comments are resolved.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/sha-3_standardization.html.

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

(Editors’ Note: Shu-jen Chang supported this program until her recent retirement)

Random numbers are required for the secure use of most cryptographic algorithms. For example, random numbers are used to generate the keys needed for encryption and digital signature applications. The CSD Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) began work on the specification of random bit generators in the late 1990s. SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, was published in 2007, and revised as SP 800-90A in 2012 and 2015. This document specifies several deterministic algorithms that can be used for the generation of pseudorandom bits – a sequence of bits produced by an algorithm, rather than a random physical phenomenon that produces a truly random sequence.

Two additional documents (SP 800-90B and SP 800-90C) are under development, and drafts were made available for public comment in 2012 and 2016.

SP 800-90B, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation:

SP 800-90B addresses the development and testing of entropy sources. Figure 8: Entropy Source Model illustrates the model that the Recommendation uses to describe an entropy source and its components: a noise source, health tests, and an optional

Figure 8: Entropy Source Model

In Figure 8: Entropy Source Model, the noise source contains the entropy-providing activity (e.g., ring oscillators); if the activity being sampled does not produce binary data, then the noise source includes a digitization process. Health tests are intended to detect whether the noise source and the entropy source (as a whole) continues to operate as expected. The optional conditioning component is responsible for reducing bias and/or increasing the entropy rate of the bits to eventually be output by the entropy source.

SP 800-90B includes descriptions of the tests for NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) to validate candidate entropy sources. During FY 2016, the CTG continued the development and testing of methods for estimating the amount of entropy per noise-source output.

A draft of the document was provided for public comment in January 2016. A companion python code package was also made available to assist reviewers in evaluating the entropy estimation methods published in the draft (see https://github.com/usnistgov/SP800-90B_EntropyAssessment).

A workshop was held in May 2016 to discuss the document, and the public comment period ended shortly thereafter. The SP 800-90B development team has been reviewing the comments received during the public comment period and plans to finalize an initial version of the document in FY 2017.

The latest draft of SP 800-90B is available via the Special Publications page: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

SP 800-90C, Recommendation for Random Bit Generator (RBG) Constructions:

SP 800-90C provides basic guidance on the construction of Random Bit Generators (RBGs) from the entropy sources validated against the requirements of SP 800-90B and the Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBG) algorithms of SP 800-90A. SP 800-90C includes constructions for both non-deterministic random bit generators (NRBGs; also known as true random number generators) and deterministic random bit generators (also known as pseudorandom number generators). Two general models are provided in SP 800-90C, as shown in Figures 8 and 9.

Figure 9: XOR-NRBG

Figure 9: XOR-NRBG depicts the construction of one of the NRBGs – the XOR-NRBG. In this construction, each bit output by the entropy source (as discussed in SP 800-90B) is exclusive-ORed with a bit of output from a DRBG algorithm specified in SP 800-90A.

Figure 10: DRBG and Oversampling NRBG

Figure 10: DRBG and Oversampling NRBG depicts the construction used for the DRBGs and the second NRBG design – the Oversampling NRBG. The difference between the two is the availability of the entropy source and the frequency of requesting output from the entropy source. For a DRBG, an entropy source is only required for seeding the DRBG; after the initial seeding process, further requests for entropy-source output depend on the implementation and application. For the Oversampling NRBG, the entropy source must always be available and is accessed whenever bits are requested from the NRBG by a consuming application.

The latest draft of SP 800-90C is available via the Special Publications page: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html.

The RBG development team has the following goals for FY 2017:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Mr. John Kelsey, (301) 975-5101, john.kelsey@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

The engine for many of the techniques in NIST’s cryptographic toolkit is a block cipher algorithm, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm or the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA). A block cipher transforms some fixed-length binary data (i.e., a “block”) into seemingly random data of the same length. The transformation is determined by the choice of some secret data called the “key.” The same key is used to reverse the transformation and recover the original block of data. A cryptographic technique (e.g., for encryption and/or authentication) that is constructed from a block cipher is called a ‘mode of operation.’

Several modes of operation have been specified in the SP 800-38 series of publications. The latest installment in the series, Special Publication 800-38G, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Format-Preserving Encryption, was published in March 2016. It specifies two AES modes of operation, called FF1 and FF3, for inclusion in the “toolkit” of approved cryptographic algorithms. FF1 and FF3 are format-preserving encryption (FPE) modes, based on proposals that were submitted from the private sector.

Previously approved confidentiality modes are designed for binary data; ciphertext resulting from these modes may be longer than the original plaintext and may result in format problems when used by existing devices or software.

FPE modes such as FF1 and FF3 are designed for any kind of data, including non-binary formats, such as credit card numbers and social security numbers. The ciphertext resulting from an FPE mode has the same length and format as the original plaintext. Consequently, FPE modes can facilitate the retrofitting of encryption technology to existing devices or software, where a conventional encryption mode might not be feasible.

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/

Dr. Morris Dworkin, (301) 975-2354, morris.dworkin@nist.gov

Key management is required for applying numerous cryptographic technologies and is considered one of the most critical aspects associated with the use of cryptography. The Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) began providing guidance in managing the keys used for cryptographic applications in the late 1990s to early 2000s. NIST Special Publications have been periodically updated to address new algorithms and handling procedures. These documents are coordinated with federal agencies and with the cryptographic community, including national and international organizations, industry, and academia.

During the development and subsequent revision of these key-management documents, the development team coordinates with members of NIST’s Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) to develop validation tests and address issues that arise during the validation processes.

In FY 2016, the following publications were either created or revised:

SP 800-57, was first published in 2005, and later revised in 2007 and 2012. SP 800-57, Part 1 contains basic key-management guidance, including:

Another revision of the document was completed in January 2016 that includes information on and references to new and revised documents developed by the CTG (e.g., SP 800-152, as discussed below); the removal of references to the Dual_EC_DRBG, which was removed from SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators; a revision of the security-strength tables; and a revision of the key-state discussion to provide more clarification.

SP 800-57, Part 1 is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf.

SP 800-131A was originally published in January 2011. This document provides specific guidance for transitions to the use of stronger cryptographic keys and more robust algorithms. An update of SP 800-131A was completed in November 2015. This update removes approval for the Dual_EC_DRBG that was specified in SP 800-90A; deprecates the use of non-approved key-establishment schemes; disallows the use of non-approved key-wrapping methods after 2017; and indicates that the use of the SHA-3 family of hash functions is acceptable, in addition to the use of the SHA-2 family of hash functions and some applications of SHA-1.

SP 800-131A is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf.

SP 800-152 provides guidance on the CKMS to be used by the Federal Government. This document contains requirements for CKMS design, implementation, procurement, installation, configuration, management, operation and use. Many of these requirements are refinements of the requirements for CKMS designers that are specified in SP 800-130: A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems. Other requirements are intended for the service providers of a CKMS used by federal agencies and their contractors. Guidance is also provided for the federal agencies in selecting CKMSs that support the security and management policies of those agencies.

This document was completed in October 2015 and is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-152.pdf.

SP 800-56A was originally published in 2006, and revised in 2007 and 2013. This document specifies Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) key-establishment schemes, both elliptic curve and finite field versions. Key establishment is a procedure that results in keying material that is shared between the participants. A key-establishment scheme is defined by a cryptographic algorithm, together with an identification of other information that must be available by both parties when establishing keys. The schemes are intended for use in communication protocols (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS), one of the protocols used by the Internet). The key-establishment schemes in SP 800-56A use public key algorithms, and each participant in a key-agreement transaction uses a pair of keys—a public key and a private key.

Both key-agreement and key-transport schemes are specified in the document. A key-agreement scheme is a procedure in which both parties in a key-establishment transaction contribute information that is used in generating a cryptographic key. The key-agreement process includes the generation of a shared secret (which is not itself considered to be a cryptographic key), and the derivation of keying material using the shared secret. Several key-agreement schemes are specified in SP 800-56A. Figure 11: (See next page) Key-Agreement Example below provides a simplified example of a key-agreement scheme. In this example, each party:

Figure 11: Key-Agreement Example

Key transport is a key-establishment method whereby one party selects a symmetric key and sends it securely to one or more other parties. In SP 800-56A, key transport can be performed following the key-agreement process depicted in Figure 11 using a key that was derived during that process. Figure 12: Key-Transport Example provides an example of a key transport scheme. In this example,

Figure 12: Key-Transport Example

The current version of SP 800-56A is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4.pdf.

SP 800-56A has been under revision during FY 2016. This revision will:

The revision of SP 800-56A will be available for public comment in FY 2017.

SP 800-56C specifies techniques for the derivation of keys from a shared secret generated during a key-establishment scheme defined in SP 800-56A and SP 800-56B using a two-step extraction-then-expansion procedure. SP 800-56A is discussed above. SP 800-56B: Recommendation for Pairwise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br1.pdf.

SP 800-56C uses either HMAC or the Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) algorithm during the two-step process. HMAC is specified in FIPS 198-1: The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), and CMAC is specified for AES in SP 800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode of Authentication. FIPS 198-1 is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf; SP 800-38B is available at: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38b.pdf.

The current version of SP 800-56C is available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-56c.pdf.

SP 800-56C is being revised to:

The revision of SP 800-56C will be available for public comment in FY 2017.

A new NIST publication is under development that provides guidance on the search resistance of a bit string output from an approved cryptographic algorithm (e.g., a cryptographic key or encrypted data). Search resistance is a (rough) measure of the amount of secrecy that can be provided by a bit string, given the genealogy (i.e., how it was generated), handling (i.e., what happened to it after it was generated), the usage (i.e., what algorithm it will be used with), length, and any other secret values and processes associated with the generation and handling of that bit string. When approved algorithms are used, this document is intended to provide methods for determining the search resistance of the bit string. This document, SP 800-158: Key Management: The Search resistance of Bit Strings Output by Cryptographic Algorithms, has involved a considerable amount of new research, since it is an area that has not been addressed to date. This publication will be available for public comment in FY 2017.

A new document was started in FY 2016 on key storage and recovery (e.g., key backup and archiving). This document is intended to serve as a guideline for the storage and recovery of cryptographic keys that are not under the direct control of the entity using those keys (e.g., the owner). This includes the backup and archiving of copies of the keys and the metadata associated with them. The document will also discuss the recovery of those keys when required (e.g., by the key’s owner or the owner’s organization).

During FY 2017, the CTG is expecting to accomplish the following tasks:

http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/key_mgmt

Ms. Elaine Barker, (301) 975-2911, elaine.barker@nist.gov

Mr. Ray Perlner, (301) 975-3357, ray.perlner@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Allen Roginsky, (301) 975-8136, allen.roginsky@nist.gov

SP 800-52: Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations, provides recommendations regarding TLS server and client implementations. TLS is a widely used cryptographic protocol that provides communication security for a variety of network applications, such as email, e-commerce, and healthcare.

SP 800-52 was first published in June of 2005, and SP 800-52 Revision 1 was published in April of 2014. Since the revision, CTG has been following developments in TLS implementations, including updates and attacks. In FY 2016, a second revision began that considers these developments. This second revision will be posted for public review and comment in FY 2017.

CTG has been contributing to the development of testssl.sh (see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh), an open-source program that tests TLS-enabled servers, providing information about the protocols and cipher suites supported, in addition to checking for some well-known flaws. In FY 2017, CTG will be contributing code to testssl.sh that tests a TLS server’s configuration for conformance to SP 800-52 Revision 2. CTG intends to make a draft version of this code available when the draft of SP 800-52 Revision 2 is posted for public comment.

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is actively developing extensions that can be used to add functionality to TLS. CTG will continue to review updates and additions to the TLS protocol in FY 2017.

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Elliptic curve cryptography is critical to the adoption of strong cryptography as we migrate to higher security strengths. NIST has standardized elliptic curve cryptography for digital signature algorithms in FIPS 186: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and for key establishment schemes in SP 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography.

In FIPS 186-4, NIST recommends fifteen elliptic curves of varying security strengths for use in these elliptic curve cryptographic standards. However, the provenance of the curves is not fully specified in the standard, leading to recent public concerns that there could be a hidden weakness in these curves. NIST is not aware of any vulnerability in these curves when they are implemented correctly and used as described in NIST standards and guidelines.

More than fifteen years have now passed since these curves were developed, and the community now knows more about the security of elliptic curve cryptography and practical implementation issues. Advances within the cryptographic community have led to the development of new elliptic curves and algorithms whose designers claim to offer better performance and are easier to implement in a secure manner. Some of these curves are under consideration in voluntary, consensus-based Standards Developing Organizations.

In FY 2016, NIST solicited comments on possible improvements to FIPS 186-4. In particular, comments were requested on the possibility of adding new elliptic curves to the current recommended set—as well as adding new digital signature schemes. Throughout 2016, NIST began resolving the comments and revising FIPS 186-4. It is expected that the revised draft version of FIPS 186-5 will be available for public comment in FY 2017.

Email project team: EllipticCurves@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. Andy Regenscheid, (301) 975-5155, andrew.regenscheid@nist.gov

In recent years, there has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, they will be able to break the existing infrastructure of public-key cryptography. The focus of the Post-Quantum Cryptography project is to identify candidate quantum-resistant systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers—as well as the impact that such post-quantum algorithms will have on current protocols and security infrastructures.

NIST researchers have held regular seminars throughout FY 2016. The presentation topics include the latest published results and security analyses, as well as status reports on quantum computation, hash-based signatures, coding-based cryptography, lattice-based cryptography, and multivariate cryptography. Through these presentations and discussions, the project team has made significant progress in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the existing cryptographic schemes in each category.

In April 2016, NIST published NISTIR 8105: Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography, which shared the team’s current understanding about the status of quantum computing and post-quantum cryptography. The report also outlined NIST’s initial plan to move forward in this area. At Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto) 2016, NIST announced that it would begin the Post-Quantum Standardization Process, a thorough multi-year effort with the objective of creating new quantum-resistant cryptographic standards for public-key encryption and digital signatures (see www.nist.gov/pqcrypto). These functionalities are much more complex than AES or SHA-3, and will require fundamentally new techniques to address several open research questions in this area (for example, how to measure security against quantum attacks when a quantum computer has not yet been built). In August 2016, NIST issued draft submission requirements and evaluation criteria for public comment. (see https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/08/02/2016-18150/request-for-comments-on-post-quantum-cryptography-requirements-and-evaluation-criteria)

The NIST team also continues to be productive in post-quantum cryptography research. The results have been published at major conferences, such as Embedded Security in Cars (ESCARS), Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC), PQCrypto, and Eurocrypt. NIST researchers have given presentations at conferences and workshops to increase awareness of the upcoming migration. NIST has also sponsored other research, education, and research events.

In FY 2017, NIST will continue to explore the security and feasibility of purported quantum-resistant technologies, with the ultimate goal of uncovering the fundamental mechanisms necessary for efficient, trustworthy, and cost-effective information assurance in the post-quantum era. The Post-Quantum Standardization Process will begin in early FY 2017, with the issuance of the finalized submission requirements and evaluation criteria. There will be a one-year period during which quantum-resistant algorithms may be submitted for possible standardization. After the submission period, there will be a public workshop in FY 2018, followed by multiple rounds of evaluation and analysis.

https://www.nist.gov/pqcrypto

Email project team: pqc@nist.gov

Dr. Dustin Moody, (301) 975-8136, dustin.moody@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Dr. Yi-Kai Liu, (301) 975-6499, yi-kai.liu@nist.gov

Cryptographic functions, such as encryption, digital signatures, and hashing, are implemented as electronic circuits for a wide class of applications. In practice, it is important to be able to minimize the size of these circuits. This problem is closely related to designing small combinational circuits. These circuits use only binary AND, XOR and NEGATION gates, i.e., multiplication, addition, and “+1” in arithmetic modulo 2. A combinational circuit on four variables (X1, X2, X3, and X4) using AND and XOR gates is depicted in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Combinational Boolean Circuit

The project team has shown that finding optimal combinational circuits is MAX SNP-complete. In practice, this means that it is necessary to settle for methods that design “good” circuits, as opposed to provably optimal circuits. The CTG has developed and implemented new solutions for the circuit-minimization problem. Two patents have been granted related to this work, the last one in FY 2014. These are held jointly between NIST and the University of Southern Denmark.

The CTG is also researching circuit-based security metrics for cryptographic functions. For a function to be secure (in particular, one-way), it must be the case that any circuit that implements it is sufficiently complex. In particular, a function is insecure if it can be implemented by a circuit containing too few Boolean AND gates. This security metric, namely the number of AND gates necessary and sufficient to implement a function, is referred to as its multiplicative complexity. Unfortunately, determining multiplicative complexity is extremely hard.

The CTG has published circuits that are provably optimal or close to optimal (with respect to multiplicative complexity) for important classes of functions. In the process, we developed tools that have wide applicability for both theoretical and applied research in security and cryptography.

Multiparty computation is a technique that allows a group of people to compute a function of their inputs without revealing the inputs themselves. Examples of this are: i) holding an election; ii) conducting closed-bid auctions in which only the winning bid is determined; and iii) proving to a third party that a person’s encrypted attributes satisfy some requirement, such as “over 21 and (U.S. citizen or Canadian citizen).” The protocols that solve multiparty computation problems often encrypt bits using arithmetic modulo 2. The complexity of such protocols largely depends on the number of multiplications required. Hence, expressing functions as circuit computations with only a few multiplication (AND) gates is important. Some of the published circuits are now the standard reference for benchmarking tools in multiparty computation.

The following is a partial list of new results by our team:

f = x₁x₂ + x₁x₃ + x₁x₄ + x₂x₃ + x₂x₄ + x₁x₂x₃ + x₁x₂x₄ + x₁x₂x₃x₄.

In 2017, plans are in place to begin the implementation of combinational circuits in ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) hardware. The team will also map the multiplicative complexity of all functions of six variables and will code a new heuristic for simultaneously reducing the size and depth of circuits.

Circuits are posted periodically at:

http://cs-www.cs.yale.edu/homes/~peralta/CircuitStuff/CMT.html

Dr. Rene Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

There are several emerging areas in which highly constrained devices are interconnected and working in concert to accomplish a task. Examples of these areas include automotive systems, sensor networks, healthcare, distributed control systems, the Internet of Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, and the smart grid. Security and privacy can be very important in these areas. Because most of the modern cryptographic algorithms were designed for desktop/server environments, many of these algorithms cannot be implemented in the constrained devices used by these applications. When current NIST-approved algorithms can be engineered to fit into the limited resources of constrained environments, their performance may not be acceptable. For these reasons, NIST started a lightweight cryptography project in 2013 that was tasked with determining the need and developing a strategy for the standardization of lightweight cryptographic algorithms.

CTG staff are examining applications in constrained environments to determine whether NIST should develop lightweight cryptographic standards. This includes communicating with industry experts to understand the challenges and limitations and following the work of other standardization bodies in this area. In FY 2015, CTG organized a Lightweight Cryptography Workshop to discuss issues related to the security and resource requirements of applications in constrained environments and potential future standardization of lightweight primitive algorithms. Using input gathered at the workshop in FY 2016, CTG released draft NISTIR 8114, Draft Report on Lightweight Cryptography for public comments. This report provides an overview of the lightweight cryptography project at NIST, and describes a plan for the standardization of lightweight cryptographic algorithms. This plan involves the creation of profiles that will target specific applications and requirements where conventional cryptography may not be suitable.

CTG is organizing the second NIST workshop on Lightweight Cryptography, taking place at the beginning of FY 2017 to discuss the plan outlined in the draft report before it is finalized. The next steps in the plan include working with industry to create an initial set of profiles and the selection of algorithms that meet profile requirements.

Mr. Lawrence Bassham, (301) 975-3292, lawrence.bassham@nist.gov

Dr. Kerry McKay, (301) 975-4969, kerry.mckay@nist.gov

Dr. Meltem Sönmez Turan, (301) 975-4391, meltem.turan@nist.gov

NIST has implemented a source of public randomness, which is available at https://beacon.nist.gov/home. It uses two independent, commercially-available sources of randomness, each with an independent hardware entropy source and SP 800-90A-approved components.

The NIST Beacon is designed to provide unpredictability, autonomy, and consistency. Unpredictability means that users cannot algorithmically predict bits before they are made available by the source. Autonomy means that the source is resistant to attempts by outside parties to alter the distribution of the random bits. Consistency means that a set of users can access the source in such a way that they are confident of receiving the same random string.

The NIST Beacon posts bit-strings in blocks of 512 bits every 60 seconds. Each such value is time-stamped and signed to form a packet that also includes the hash of the previous value to chain the sequence of values together. This prevents all parties, even the source, from retroactively changing an output packet without being detected. The NIST Beacon keeps all output packets. At any point in time, the full history of outputs is available to users.

Tables of random numbers have probably been used for multiple purposes at least since the Industrial Revolution. In the digital age, algorithmic pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) have largely replaced these tables. The NIST Beacon expands the use of randomness to multiple scenarios in which neither tables nor PRNGs can be used. The extra functionalities stem mainly from three features. First, the Beacon-generated numbers cannot be predicted before they are published. Second, the public, time-bound, and authenticated nature of the Beacon allows a user application to prove to anybody that it used truly random numbers not known before a certain point in time. Third, this proof can be presented offline and at any point in the future.

Although commercially available physical sources of randomness are adequate as entropy sources for currently envisioned implementations of the NIST Beacon, the NIST

Randomness Beacon project team is working on developing a source of verifiably random sequences. In collaboration with NIST physicists from the Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML), the project team aims to use quantum non-locality to build an entropy source whose unpredictability is guaranteed by the laws of physics. In FY 2016, a major milestone was achieved, namely, a strong loophole-free test of local realism (where individual particles are governed by elements of reality, even if these elements are hidden from us) (see https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2015/11/nist-team-proves-spooky-action-distance-really-real).

The project team has also made progress in reaching a goal of helping other institutions set up other interoperable sources. This is important because multiple sources can be combined in such a way that all sources would have to be compromised in order to degrade the common random strings.

As of the end of FY 2016, the NIST Beacon has been functioning without interruption for more than three years. During this time, the project team has received valuable input from a growing community of users. As a result, the project team will provide an enhanced version of the service during FY 2017. The enhancements are mainly intended to enable interoperability.

NIST encourages the community-at-large to research and publish novel ways in which this tool can be used.

https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-randomness-beacon

Dr. Rene Peralta (301) 975-8702 rene.peralta@nist.gov

Today, wireless networks have been integrated into modern communication systems that connect mobile devices using multiple radio technologies. Such heterogeneous networks demand integrated security solutions. The NIST team has worked closely with different working groups in the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee since 2006 and made solid contributions to the security solutions for wireless networks. The NIST team has been involved in the IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.21 working groups to develop standards for cryptographic key management schemes for the mobility environment.

NIST cryptographic standards have been extensively used in the wireless standards developed in the IEEE 802 community. In FY 2016, the NIST team actively worked with the IEEE 802.1 security group in using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) specified in NIST Special Publication 800-38D for Media Access Control (MAC) security (MACsec) solutions.

In FY 2016, NIST researchers continuously collaborated with the IEEE 802.21 Working Group to develop solutions for multicast group key distribution and coauthored a paper titled “Security Multicast Group Key Management and Key Distribution in IEEE 802.21.” The paper has been accepted by the Security Standardization Research Conference 2016 (SSR 2016) and will be presented on December 5-6, 2016.

In FY 2017, the NIST team will continue to contribute to IEEE 802 wireless standards and provide guidance for NIST cryptographic standard usage in wireless and mobility applications.

Dr. Lily Chen (301) 975 -6974 lily.chen@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG) began studying the use of blockchains, which have been suggested as a solution for many applications. A blockchain is a distributed database that maintains a continuously growing list of records called blocks that are secured from revision using a hash function. Each block contains a link to the previous block. A new block is added to the chain only when multiple parties (possibly mutually untrusting parties) agree to its accuracy. In essence, a blockchain is a mutually agreed-upon record of history.

Figure 14: Example of a Blockchain

Figure 14: Example of a Blockchain illustrates three blocks in a blockchain, where each block contains at least one transaction, a nonce and the hash value of the previous block in the chain.

The most well-known example of the use of a blockchain is BitCoin and similar digital currencies. However, the use of blockchains has been proposed for other applications, such as smart contracts and various ledgering applications.

Many organizations have suggested applications for the use of blockchains, some of which may not be appropriate. The CSD is investigating the use of blockchains to determine which application types are appropriate for using blockchains and which are not. The CTG is monitoring the proposed uses of cryptography to assure that current cryptographic techniques are used properly and whether new techniques are required.

During FY 2016, the CTG participated in two blockchain workshops: the “DC Blockchain Summit” in March and the “Blockchain and Healthcare Workshop” in September. The CTG took an active role in the September workshop by reviewing papers and providing presentations on blockchains and the CTG standards that might be useful for future blockchain work. The CSD also began testing the use of several blockchain nodes.

During FY 2017, in addition to continuing familiarization with the use of blockchains and monitoring the cryptography proposed, the CTG is planning to participate in a blockchain study group sponsored by American Standards Committee X9, the financial services committee of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI).

Ms. Elaine Barker, 301-975-2911, ebarker@nist.gov

Dr. Lily Chen, (301) 975-6974, lily.chen@nist.gov

Mr. John Kelsey, (301) 975-5101, kelsey@nist.gov

Dr. Rene Peralta, (301) 975-8702, rene.peralta@nist.gov

Mr. Dylan Yaga, (301) 975-6004, dylan.yaga@nist.gov

The security of cryptography today depends on having strong keys and keeping them secret. The ability to generate strong cryptographic keys is directly related to having access to unpredictable random data, but generating truly unpredictable random data on computing devices is hard and unreliable. As a result, weak keys are widely used in cryptographic applications, thus compromising the security of the sensitive data protected by them − potentially with disastrous consequences.

A primary goal of this project is to provide high-quality, truly unpredictable random data to devices on the Internet to enable them to generate strong cryptographic keys and attest the strength of the keys used to protect data in transit or at rest, thereby enabling cryptographic system strength attestation. Achieving this goal would provide a solid basis for achieving the goals of the Automated Cryptographic Validation Testing project (see http://csrc.nist.gov/projects/acvt/ ) as well as addressing the problems targeted by the Cryptographic Programs and Laboratory Accreditation (see the next section: Validated Programs, the first project in that section), where entropy estimation has persisted as one of the most difficult and labor-consuming activities, causing problems for all parties involved: the industry, the testing laboratories and the government validators.

Random data obtained from sources of true randomness that are based on unpredictable physical phenomena, such as quantum effects, is much better suited for cryptographic applications. CSD is collaborating with the NIST Physical Measurement Laboratory (PML) to build a quantum source. The aim is to use quantum effects to generate sequences that are guaranteed to be unpredictable, even if an attacker has access to the random source. For more information on this collaboration, see https://www.nist.gov/pml/div684/random_numbers_bell_test.cfm/

This project aims to develop a system and protocols for obtaining random data with high entropy from one or more remote sources. The high-level architecture is shown in Figure 15: (See next page) High-level Architecture of EaaS. The architecture of the Entropy-as-a-Service system consists of two main parts: the client-side and the server-side. The critical components of the system are the quantum device, the EaaS server and a secure device in the client systems that is capable of providing strong isolation and protection for the cryptographic keys stored inside the device and offering a set of basic cryptographic services.

The EaaS server is continuously fed random data from the attached quantum source. The data enters a FIFO (first in, first out)-like buffer in the server’s Random Access Memory (RAM), and, when a client request arrives, the server reads the top value from the buffer, signs and encrypts it, and then sends it to the requester. The FIFO buffer shifts after every request and when new data comes from the random source. The EaaS server ensures that the FIFO buffer is erased prior to server shutdown and never paged to disk. Open implementations can help ensure that this occurs.

The client system consists of a classic computing device enabled with a dedicated hardware component capable of storing secret cryptographic keys and seeds. A dedicated software application bridges the communication between EaaS and the hardware component. Examples of secure hardware components are the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), TrustZone technology in Advanced Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) Machine (ARM) processors, and Identity Protection Technology in Intel processors. If a client system or device doesn’t have a secure hardware component, it can still use EaaS. The presence of a hardware component simply provides further guarantees to the system or device user, when present.

EaaS uses HTTP to transfer entropy payloads from the service to clients. To secure this transmission, the server encrypts the data using the client’s provided public key and digitally signs the payload with the server’s own private key.

Client devices mix this data with locally available random data to seed random number generators to generate strong cryptographic keys and other random values independently from the remote sources.

With the conceptual system architecture and protocols defined, the project team continues to engage with industry and academia to obtain feedback on the approach and identify possibilities for collaborative approaches to solving important cybersecurity challenges in the domains of cryptography and supply-chain management (e.g., integrated circuit counterfeiting). The team published a peer-reviewed paper on EaaS in IEEE Computer, a top professional journal, in September 2016. The team also started a collaboration with a team of researchers at the University of Florida who won a NIST research grant to explore ways to leverage EaaS in protecting against integrated circuit counterfeiting and thereby help secure the supply chain. The University of Florida researchers will start their project in FY 2017.

The team continues to develop the system to provide a publicly accessible NIST EaaS instance in FY 2017. During the summer of FY 2016, the team hosted a Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship (SURF) student who developed a sample EaaS-client implementation with a

Figure 15: High-level Architecture of EaaS

proper cryptographic mixing of random data obtained from multiple EaaS instances and local sources. The team plans to publish the server and client code on GitHub in FY 2017 and invite the public to voluntarily adopt it. Related to this, the project team is planning to work on developing public criteria for reputable EaaS hosts. The team succeeded in obtaining NIST funding to hire contractors to help with the implementation and hosting of the EaaS server; the contractor team has been identified, and the project will start in FY 2017.

Dr. Apostol Vassilev (301) 975-3221 apostol.vassilev@nist.gov

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) was established on July 17, 1995 by NIST to validate cryptographic modules conforming to the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and other FIPS cryptography-based standards. FIPS 140-2 was released on May 25, 2001 and supersedes FIPS 140-1.

The current implementation of the CMVP is shown in Figure 16: Current Validation Flow below. The CMVP leverages the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredited Cryptographic and Security testing (CST) laboratories for validation testing against the derived test requirements (DTR), implementation guidance (IG), and applicable CMVP programmatic guidance. According to existing guidance, the CST laboratories must perform 100 % independent testing of the modules submitted by the vendors.

The structure and the rules under which the CMVP operates worked well for the level of the technology utilized by the Federal Government when the program was created more than two decades ago. As technology has advanced, however, the module testing process no longer satisfies the current industry and government operational needs. Testing is exceedingly long—well beyond typical product-development cycles across a wide range of technologies. The resulting validated modules often do not provide useful interfaces for integration into IT systems to enable run-time monitoring of modules for compliance with FISMA.

NIST recognizes the need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cryptographic module testing to reduce the time and cost required for testing, while providing a high level of assurance for Federal Government consumers.

The principal goals of this project are to collaborate with commercial or open source producers of cryptographic capabilities and government consumers of FIPS 140-validated modules to: