Network Working Group                                         S. Bradner
Request for Comments: 3751                                    Harvard U.
Category: Informational                                     1 April 2004
                   Omniscience Protocol Requirements

Status of this Memo


This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.


Copyright Notice


Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.




There have been a number of legislative initiatives in the U.S. and elsewhere over the past few years to use the Internet to actively interfere with allegedly illegal activities of Internet users. This memo proposes a number of requirements for a new protocol, the Omniscience Protocol, that could be used to enable such efforts.


1. Introduction
1. はじめに

In a June 17, 2003 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, entitled "The Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security Risks Compromise the Potential of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks?," U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the chair of the committee, said he was interested in the ability to destroy the computers of people who illegally download copyrighted material. He said this "may be the only way you can teach somebody about copyrights." "If we can find some way to do this without destroying their machines, we'd be interested in hearing about that," Mr Hatch was quoted as saying during a Senate hearing. He went on to say "If that's the only way, then I'm all for destroying their machines." [Guardian]

2003年6月17日米上院司法委員会の公聴会では、発明の名称「明るいアイデアのダークサイド:個人と国家安全保障は、ピアツーピアファイル共有ネットワークの可能性を損なうリスクでした?」米上院議員オリン・ハッチ(R -Utah)、委員会の議長は、彼が違法著作物をダウンロードする人々のコンピュータを破壊する能力に興味があったと述べました。彼は、これが「あなたは著作権について誰かに教えることができる唯一の方法かもしれない。」と述べました「私たちは自分のマシンを破壊することなく、これを行うためにいくつかの方法を見つけることができれば、我々はそれについて聞くことに興味があると思い、」ミスターハッチは、上院の公聴会の際に語ったと伝えられました。彼が言うようになった「ことが唯一の方法だ場合、私は自分のマシンを破壊するためのすべてです。」 [ガーディアン]

Mr. Hatch was not the first U.S. elected official to propose something along this line. A year earlier, representatives, Howard Berman (D-Calif.) and Howard Coble (R-N.C.), introduced a bill that would have immunized groups such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) from all state and federal laws if they disable, block, or otherwise impair a "publicly accessible peer-to-peer file-trading network."


The attitude of some of the copyright holders may be that it's OK for a few honest people to have their computers or networks executed as long as the machines and networks of the dishonest are killed. But it is not likely that any measurable error rate would be acceptable to the public. Clearly, anyone implementing laws of this type need some way to reduce the error rate and be sure that they are dealing with a real bad guy and not an innocent bystander.


Part of determining if someone is a "bad guy" is determining his or her intent. Historically, western jurisprudence has required that prosecutors show that a person intended to commit a crime before that person could be convicted of committing that crime. [Holdsworth, Restatement, Prosser, United States v. Wise, Garratt v. Dailey] Because it can be quite difficult to establish a person's intent lawmakers have, in some cases, reduced the requirement for prosecutors to establish intent and mere possession is now proof enough of intent.

誰かが「悪い男は」自分の意思を決定しているかどうかを判断するの一部。歴史的に、西部の法学は、検察官がその人の前に罪を犯すことを意図した人が、その犯罪を犯し有罪判決を受けたことができることを示すことが必要とされてきました。 [ホールズワース、修正再表示、プロッサー、米国対ワイズ、GarrattのV。デイリー]人の意図議員を確立することは非常に困難なことがあるので、いくつかのケースでは、検察側が意図と単なる所有を確立するための要件は、現在の証拠である減少しています意図の十分。

This memo proposes a set of requirements for a new protocol to be used by prosecutors to determine a person's intent, thus reducing the need to dilute the historical legal requirement to show intent and by groups such as the MPAA and RIAA to be sure they are dealing with lawbreakers and not 60 year old non computer users.


2. Omniscience Protocol Requirements

For the purpose of these requirements, I will assume that the OP is implemented using a client-server model, where the OP client is installed on the user's computer and the server is installed on a computer run by a law or copyright enforcement organization. OP Clients would register with all OP Servers that pertain to the legal jurisdiction in which the client is located each time the computer is started. OP Servers would then, on whatever schedule they have been configured to use, send OP Queries to OP Clients to find out if the computer operator has engaged in an illegal act of interest to the operator of the OP Server. Future versions of the OP might operate using a peer-to-peer model if the copyright enforcement people can ever get over their visceral disgust at the very concept of peer-to-peer networks.

これらの要件の目的のために、私はOPはOPクライアントは、ユーザーのコンピュータにインストールされたクライアント・サーバ・モデルを使用して実装されており、サーバーが法律や著作権執行機関が運営するコンピュータにインストールされていることを前提としています。 OPクライアントは、クライアントがコンピュータを起動するたびに配置されている法的管轄権に関連するすべてのOPサーバに登録します。 OPサーバはその後、彼らが使用するように設定されているものは何でもスケジュールで、コンピュータのオペレータはOPサーバのオペレータに関心の違法行為に従事しているかどうかを調べるためにOPクライアントにOPクエリを送信します。著作権の執行人々がこれまでピア・ツー・ピア・ネットワークの概念そのもので彼らの内臓嫌悪感を乗り越えることができればOPの将来のバージョンでは、ピア・ツー・ピア・モデルを使用して動作することがあります。

For the purpose of this memo, I will use copyright infringement as an example of an illegal act that the OP protocol could be used to expose. The OP has numerous possible applications beyond ferreting out copyright infringement. For example, the OP would be of great assistance to instructors trying to determine if their students are producing original work or engaging in plagiarism. The same function would be invaluable to newspaper editors checking up on reporter's dispatches.

このメモの目的のために、私はOPプロトコルを公開するために使用することができることが違法行為の例として、著作権侵害を使用します。 OPは、著作権侵害をferretingを超え、多くの可能な用途を有します。例えば、OPは、学生がオリジナル作品を制作または盗作に従事しているかどうかを判断しようとしているインストラクターへの大きな支援となるであろう。同機能は、記者の派遣にまでチェックする新聞の編集者に非常に貴重になります。

Also for the purpose of this memo, I assume that an evil-doer (also referred to as a miscreant) is in full control of a computer and that OP Servers will generally be operated by "Good guys." (See Functional Requirements FR5-7 for requirements to ensure that the latter is the case.) In the context of this memo, "evil-doer" and "miscreant" are defined as individuals or groups of individuals who perform acts that the operator of an OP Server has a legally recognized right to prevent. In the context of this memo, "good guys" refers to individuals or groups of individuals who have a legally recognized right to prevent certain acts that computer users may attempt to do with their computers. The use of this term is not meant to convey any value judgment of the morality, forward thinking nature, public spiritedness, or the monetary worth relative to most of humanity of such individuals or groups of individuals.

また、このメモの目的のために、私は悪-行為者は(も悪党と呼ばれる)は、コンピュータを完全に制御しており、そのOPサーバーは、一般的に運営されることを前提とし、「善玉。」 (後者のケースであることを保証するための要件のための機能要件FR5-7を参照。)このメモの文脈において、「悪-行為者」と「悪党」はオペレータのこと行為を行う個人の個人またはグループとして定義されOP Serverは防ぐために法的に認め権利を有します。このメモの文脈では、「善玉」は、コンピュータのユーザーが自分のコンピュータで行うことを試みることが一定の行為を防ぐために、法的に認められ権を持っている個人の個人またはグループを指します。この用語の使用は、道徳、前方思考の性質上、公共spiritedness、またはそのような個人または個人のグループの人類のほとんどに金銭的価値の相対のいずれかの価値判断を伝えるためのものではありません。

2.1. Operational Requirements
2.1. 運用要件

OR1: The OP client must be able to install itself into all types of computers over the objections of the computer user.


        Discussion: The OP client would be installed by legal mandate in
        all new computers, but since there are hundreds of millions of
        existing computers, the OP client must be able to install itself
        in all of these existing computers in order to afford universal
        coverage of all possible miscreants.  This installation must be
        accomplished even if the user, many of whom have full
        administrative control over their computers, tries to prevent

OR2: True OP clients must not be findable by the computer user by any means, including commercial virus detectors, but all hackers' programs that mimic OP clients must be easily findable by commercial virus detectors.


        Discussion: Since anyone whose intent was to violate the law
        would not want the OP client to be watching their action, they
        would try to disable the OP client.  Thus the OP Client, once
        installed, should be invisible to all methods a user might
        employ to discover it.  Users must be able to find and remove
        any virus or worm that tries to masquerade as an OP client to
        escape detection.

OR3: The OP must be able to communicate through uncooperative firewalls, NATs, and when the computer is disconnected from the Internet.


        Discussion: Since the evil-doer may have control of a local
        firewall or NAT, the OP must be able to communicate with the OP
        server, even when the firewall or NAT has been configured to
        block all unused ports.  Also, since the evil-doer might try to
        hide his or her evil-doing by disconnecting the computer from
        the network, the OP must be able to continue to communicate,
        even under these circumstances.  Meeting this requirement may
        require that the OP client be able to reconfigure the user's
        machine into a cell phone or to implement GMPLS-WH [GMPLS-WH].

OR4: Neither the operation of the OP client or the OP server must be able to be spoofed.


        Discussion: The user must not be able to create their own
        version of an OP client that can fool the OP server.  Nor can it
        be possible for someone to create their own OP server that can
        be used to query OP clients.

Discussion: Because of the potential for a user to hide their illicit activities by mimicking the operation of the OP client on their machine, it must not be possible to do so. In the same vein, because of the potential for violating the user's privacy, it must not be possible for a non-authorized OP server to be seen as authorized by OP clients. Since there will be an arbitrary, and changing, number of OP servers, at least one for each type of protected material, OP authentication and authorization must be able to be accomplished with no prior knowledge of a particular OP server by the OP client.

ディスカッション:ので自分のマシン上でOPクライアントの操作を模倣することにより、その不法行為を隠すために、ユーザの可能性のため、そうすることであってはなりません。 OPクライアントによって認可などの非認可OPサーバが見られるようにするために、同じ静脈では、理由はユーザーのプライバシーを侵害の可能性のため、それが可能であってはなりません。 OPサーバの、任意の、および変更数、保護された素材の種類ごとに少なくとも一つ存在するので、OP認証および許可は、OPクライアントによって特定のOPサーバの事前知識を用いて達成することができなければなりません。

OR5: The OP client must be able to be installed on any portable device that can be used to play protected material or execute protected software.

OR 5:OPクライアントは、保護された素材を再生したり、保護されたソフトウェアを実行するために使用することができます任意のポータブルデバイスにインストールすることができなければなりません。

        Discussion:  Since small, portable devices, such as MP3 players,
        are becoming the preferred method of playing back prerecorded
        music and videos, they must all include OP clients.  OP clients
        must be able to be automatically installed on all such existing
2.2. Functional Requirements
2.2. 機能要件

FR1: The OP client must be able to determine the user's intent.


        Discussion: Just knowing that the user has a copy of a protected
        work on their system does not, by itself, mean that the copy is
        illegal.  It could easily be a copy that the user purchased.
        The OP must be able to tell if a copy is an illegal copy with
        complete reliability.  The OP must be able to differentiate
        between an original, and legal, copy and a bit-for-bit illegal
        reproduction.  The OP client must be able to differentiate
        between copies that were created for the purpose of backup, and
        are thus generally legal, and those copies created for the
        purpose of illegal distribution.  In the case of some types of
        software, the OP client must be able to determine the intent of
        the user for the software.  An example of this need is related
        to the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and similar
        laws around the world.  These laws outlaw the possession of
        circumvention technology, such as crypto analysis software, in
        most cases.  Some exemption is made for legitimate researchers,
        but without an OP it is quite hard to determine if the
        circumvention technology is to be used for research or to break
        copyright protections for the purpose of making illegal copies
        of protected material.  With the OP, the DMCA, and laws like it,
        can be rewritten so that circumvention technology is legal and
        developers can find out if their security protocols are any
        good, something which may be illegal under current law.

FR2: The OP client must be able to remotely differentiate between illegal material and other material with the same file name.


        Discussion: A user might create a file that has the same
        filename as that of a protected work.  The OP must not be fooled
        into thinking that the user's file is a protected one.

FR3: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the filename has been changed.


        Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected
        work by just changing its name.

FR4: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the user has modified the work in some way.


        Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected
        work by modifying the work, for example, by prepending,
        appending, or inserting extra material, or by changing some of
        the protected work.  The OP must be able to make a legal determination that a modified work is no longer legally the same
        as the original if the amount and type of modification exceed a
        subjective threshold.

FR5: The OP client must not be able to be run by a hacker, and the OP interface into a user's computer must not be able to be exploited by a hacker.


        Discussion: OP clients will be attractive targets for hackers
        since they will have full access within a user's computer.  The
        interface between the OP client and server must be secure
        against all possible hacking attacks.

FR6: The OP client must be able to discern the motives of the operator of the OP server and not run if those motives are not pure.


        Discussion: Since it cannot be assumed that the operators of the
        OP server will always have the best motives, the OP client must
        be able to reject requests from the OP server if the operator of
        the server has an evil (or illegal) intent.  For example, the OP
        client must block any operation that might stem from a vendetta
        that the OP server operator might have against the user.

FR7: The OP client must not be able to be used to extract information from a user's computer that is unrelated to illegal copies.


        In order to minimize the threat to the privacy of the user, the
        OP client must not be able to be used to extract information
        from the user's computer that is not germane to determining if
        the user has illegal copies of works or intends to use protected
        works in illegal ways.

FR8: The OP client must be able to differentiate between protected material that was placed on the user's computer by the user and any material placed by others.


        Discussion: It must not be possible for a third party to put
        protected material on a user's computer for the purpose of
        incriminating the user.  The OP client must be able to know,
        with certainty, who placed material on each computer, even in
        the cases where a third party has physical access to an
        unprotected computer or when the third party knows the user's
        logname and password.

FR9: The OP client must only implement the laws that apply to the specific computer that it is running on.


        Discussion: Since the Internet crosses many legal boundaries, an
        OP client will have to know just where, in geo-political space,
        the computer it is running in is currently located in order to
        know what set of laws to apply when it is scanning the user's
        computer.  The OP client must also be able to be automatically
        updated if the laws change or the computer is moved to a
        location where the laws are different.  Note that this
        requirement also implies that the OP client knows where its OP
        server is located to know if the client and server are both in
        the same legal jurisdiction.  The OP client must know what to
        do, or not do, when they are not in the same legal jurisdiction.
        The OP client must also include a mechanism to automatically
        retrieve any applicable new laws or court decisions and properly
        interpret them.
3. Security Considerations

The OP requires strong authentication of the clients and servers to ensure that they cannot be spoofed. It also requires the use of strong integrity technology to ensure that the messages between the client and server cannot be modified in flight. It also requires strong encryption to be sure that the communication between the client and the server cannot be observed. All of this is required in an environment where many of the users are in full control of their computers and will be actively hostile to the reliable operation of the protocol. Good luck.


4. Informative References

[Garratt v. Dailey] Supreme Court of Washington, 6 Wash. 2d 197; 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)

【Garratt Vデイリー。]ワシントン6ウォッシュの最高裁判所197 2D。 279 P.2d 1091(1955)

[GMPLS-WH] Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) for Worm Holes, work to be in process


[Guardian] "Senator proposes destruction of file-swapping computers." The Guardian, June 19, 2003. ( 0,12271,980890,00.html)

[ガーディアン]「上院議員は、ファイル交換コンピュータの破壊を提案しています。」ガーディアン、6月19日、2003年( 0,12271,980890,00.html)

[Holdsworth] Holdsworth, W., History of English Law 680-683 (1938)


[Processer] Prosser, W., et al., "Prosser and Keeton on Torts," Hornbook Series, 5th ed., 1984


[Restatement] 1. Restatement of the Law: sec 13 Torts (American Law Institute) (1934)

[再表示] 1リステイトメント:秒13人の不法行為(アメリカ法協会)(1934)

[United States v. Wise] 550 F.2d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir.)

[米国V。ワイズ] 550 F.2d 1180、1194(第九巡回、)

5. Authors Address

Scott Bradner Harvard University 29 Oxford St. Cambridge MA, 02138


EMail: Phone: +1 617 495 3864

メールアドレス:sob@harvard.edu電話:+1 617 495 3864

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