Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6487                                 G. Michaelson
Category: Standards Track                                     R. Loomans
ISSN: 2070-1721                                                    APNIC
                                                           February 2012
             A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates



This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure.


Status of This Memo


This is an Internet Standards Track document.


This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

このドキュメントはインターネットエンジニアリングタスクフォース(IETF)の製品です。これは、IETFコミュニティの総意を表しています。これは、公開レビューを受けており、インターネットエンジニアリング運営グループ(IESG)によって公表のために承認されています。インターネット標準の詳細については、RFC 5741のセクション2で利用可能です。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at


Copyright Notice


Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

著作権(C)2012 IETF信託とドキュメントの作成者として特定の人物。全著作権所有。

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents ( in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

この文書では、BCP 78と、この文書の発行日に有効なIETFドキュメント(に関連IETFトラストの法律の規定に従うものとします。彼らは、この文書に関してあなたの権利と制限を説明するように、慎重にこれらの文書を確認してください。コードコンポーネントは、トラスト法規定のセクションで説明4.eおよび簡体BSDライセンスで説明したように、保証なしで提供されているよう簡体BSDライセンスのテキストを含める必要があり、この文書から抽出されました。

Table of Contents


   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI  5
   4.  Resource Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Serial Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.3.  Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.4.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.5.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.6.  Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.6.1.  notBefore  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.6.2.  notAfter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.7.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.8.  Resource Certificate Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.8.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.8.2.  Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.8.3.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.8.4.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.8.5.  Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.8.6.  CRL Distribution Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.8.7.  Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.8.8.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       4.8.9.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       4.8.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Resource Certificate Revocation Lists  . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   6.  Resource Certificate Requests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.1.  PCKS#10 Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       6.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . 14
     6.2.  CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       6.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields  . . 15
       6.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields  . . . . . 16
     6.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests . 16
   7.  Resource Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.1.  Resource Extension Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     7.2.  Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   9.  Operational Considerations for Profile Agility . . . . . . . . 22
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction
1. はじめに

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates [X.509] for use in the context of certification of Internet Number Resources (INRs), i.e., IP Addresses and Autonomous System (AS) numbers. Such certificates are termed "resource certificates". A resource certificate is a certificate that conforms to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and that conforms to the constraints specified in this profile. A resource certificate attests that the issuer has granted the subject a "right-of-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and/or Autonomous System numbers.

この文書は、インターネット番号リソース(INRS)、すなわち、IPアドレスおよび自律システム(AS)番号の認証の文脈で使用するために[X.509] X.509証明書の標準プロファイルを定義します。このような証明書は、「リソース証明書」と呼ばれています。リソース証明書はPKIXプロフィール[RFC5280]に準拠した証明書であり、それは、このプロファイルで指定された制約に準拠します。リソース証明書は、発行者が対象に付与されたことを証明する「使用権」IPアドレスおよび/または自律システム番号の記載されたセットのため。

This document is referenced by Section 7 of the "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" [RFC6484]. It is an integral part of that policy and the normative specification for certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax used in the RPKI. The document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests, and the relying party (RP) RPKI certificate path validation procedure.


Resource certificates are to be used in a manner that is consistent with the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484]. They are issued by entities that assign and/or allocate public INRs, and thus the RPKI is aligned with the public INR distribution function. When an INR is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this allocation can be described by an associated resource certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and it binds the certificate subject's key to the INRs enumerated in the certificate. One or two critical extensions, the IP Address Delegation or AS Identifier Delegation Extensions [RFC3779], enumerate the INRs that were allocated or assigned by the issuer to the subject.

リソース証明書はRPKI証明書ポリシー(CP)[RFC6484]と一致するように使用されます。これらは、割り当ておよび/または公共INRSを割り当てるエンティティによって発行され、これによりRPKIは公共INR分布関数と整列しています。 INRが割り当てまたはエンティティの数レジストリによって割り当てられた場合、この割り当ては、関連するリソース証明書によって説明することができます。この証明書は数レジストリによって発行され、それが証明書に列挙さINRSへの証明書のサブジェクトのキーをバインドしています。一つまたは2つの重要な拡張機能、IPアドレスの委任または識別子委任拡張AS [RFC3779]、対象に発行者によって割り当てまたは割り当てられたINRSを列挙。

Relying party (RP) validation of a resource certificate is performed in the manner specified in Section 7.1. This validation procedure differs from that described in Section 6 of [RFC5280], such that:


o additional validation processing imposed by the INR extensions is required,

O INR拡張によって課される追加の検証処理が必要とされます、

o a confirmation of a public key match between the CRL issuer and the resource certificate issuer is required, and

O CRL発行者およびリソース証明書発行者の間での公開鍵の一致の確認が必要であり、

o the resource certificate is required to conform to this profile.


This profile defines those fields that are used in a resource certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Any extensions not explicitly mentioned MUST be absent. The same applies to the CRLs used in the RPKI, that are also profiled in this document. A Certification Authority (CA) conforming to the RPKI CP MUST issue certificates and CRLs consistent with this profile.

このプロファイルは、証明書が有効であるために存在しなければならないリソース証明書に使用されているこれらのフィールドを定義します。明示的に言及されていない任意の拡張子が存在してはなりません。同じことがまた、本書で紹介されているRPKIで使用されるのCRLに適用されます。 RPKIのCPに準拠した認証局(CA)は、このプロファイルと一致した証明書とCRLを発行しなければなりません。

1.1. Terminology
1.1. 用語

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].


The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

この文書のキーワード "MUST"、 "MUST NOT"、 "REQUIRED"、、、、 "べきではない" "べきである" "ないもの" "ものとし"、 "推奨"、 "MAY"、および "OPTIONAL" はあります[RFC2119]に記載されているように解釈されます。

2. Describing Resources in Certificates

The framework for describing an association between the subject of a certificate and the INRs currently under the subject's control is described in [RFC3779]. This profile further requires that:


o Every resource certificate MUST contain either the IP Address Delegation or the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation extension, or both.


o These extensions MUST be marked as critical.


o The sorted canonical format describing INRs, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix masks, as defined in [RFC3779], MUST be used for the resource extension field, except where the "inherit" construct is used instead.


When validating a resource certificate, an RP MUST verify that the INRs described in the issuer's resource certificate encompass the INRs of the resource certificate being validated. In this context, "encompass" allows for the issuer's INRs to be the same as, or a strict superset of, the subject's INRs.


3. End-Entity (EE) Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI

As noted in [RFC6480], the primary function of end-entity (EE) certificates in the RPKI is the verification of signed objects that relate to the usage of the INRs described in the certificate, e.g., Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and manifests.


The private key associated with an EE certificate is used to sign a single RPKI signed object, i.e., the EE certificate is used to validate only one object. The EE certificate is embedded in the object as part of a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signed-data structure [RFC6488]. Because of the one-to-one relationship between the EE certificate and the signed object, revocation of the certificate effectively revokes the corresponding signed object.

EE証明書に関連付けられた秘密鍵は、すなわち、EE証明書は1つのオブジェクトのみを検証するために使用され、単一RPKI署名されたオブジェクトに署名するために使用されます。 EE証明書は、暗号メッセージ構文(CMS)署名されたデータ構造[RFC6488]の一部としてオブジェクトに埋め込まれています。なぜならEE証明書と署名されたオブジェクトとの間の1対1の関係で、証明書の失効は、効果的に対応する署名されたオブジェクトを取り消します。

An EE certificate may be used to validate a sequence of signed objects, where each signed object in the sequence overwrites the previous instance of the signed object in the repository publication point, such that only one instance of the signed object is published at any point in time (e.g., an EE certificate MAY be used to sign a sequence of manifests [RFC6486]). Such EE certificates are termed "sequential use" EE certificates.


EE certificates used to validate only one instance of a signed object, and are not used thereafter or in any other validation context, are termed "one-time-use" EE certificates.


4. Resource Certificates

A resource certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields listed in this section. Only the differences from [RFC5280] are noted below.

リソース証明書は、このセクションに記載されているフィールドを含むPKIXプロフィール[RFC5280]と一致し、有効なX.509公開鍵証明書です。 [RFC5280]の相違点のみを以下に記載されています。

Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other fields MUST NOT appear in a conforming resource certificate. Where a field value is specified here, this value MUST be used in conforming resource certificates.


4.1. Version
4.1. 版

As resource certificates are X.509 version 3 certificates, the version MUST be 3 (i.e., the value of this field is 2).


RPs need not process version 1 or version 2 certificates (in contrast to [RFC5280]).


4.2. Serial Number
4.2. シリアルナンバー

The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique for each certificate issued by a given CA.


4.3. Signature Algorithm
4.3. 署名アルゴリズム

The algorithm used in this profile is specified in [RFC6485].


4.4. Issuer
4.4. 発行者

The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name.


An issuer name MUST contain one instance of the CommonName attribute and MAY contain one instance of the serialNumber attribute. If both attributes are present, it is RECOMMENDED that they appear as a set. The CommonName attribute MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type PrintableString [X.680]. Issuer names are not intended to be descriptive of the identity of issuer.

発行者名はのCommonName属性の1つのインスタンスを含まなければならないし、serialNumber属性の1つのインスタンスを含むかもしれません。両方の属性が存在する場合、彼らがセットとして現れることが推奨されます。 CommonName属性は[X.680]のprintablestring ASN.1タイプを用いて符号化されなければなりません。発行者名は、発行者の身元の記述であることを意図していません。

The RPKI does not rely on issuer names being globally unique, for reasons of security. However, it is RECOMMENDED that issuer names be generated in a fashion that minimizes the likelihood of collisions. See Section 8 for (non-normative) suggested name-generation mechanisms that fulfill this recommendation.

RPKIは、発行者名はセキュリティ上の理由のために、グローバルに一意であることに依存しません。しかし、発行者名が衝突の可能性を最小限に抑える方法で生成することが推奨されます。 (非規範的)については、セクション8を参照してくださいは、この勧告を履行名世代のメカニズムを示唆しました。

4.5. Subject
4.5. 主題

The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name [RFC4514], and is subject to the same constraints as the issuer name.


In the RPKI, the subject name is determined by the issuer, not proposed by the subject [RFC6481]. Each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name that is unique per issuer. In this context, "distinct" is defined as an entity and a given public key. An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject's key pair has changed (i.e., when the CA issues a certificate as part of re-keying the subject.) Subject names are not intended to be descriptive of the identity of subject.


4.6. Validity
4.6. 有効

The certificate validity period is represented as a SEQUENCE of two dates: the date on which the certificate validity period begins (notBefore) and the date on which the certificate validity period ends (notAfter).


While a CA is typically advised against issuing a certificate with a validity period that spans a greater period of time than the validity period of the CA's certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate, in the context of this profile, a CA MAY have valid grounds to issue a subordinate certificate with a validity period that exceeds the validity period of the CA's certificate.


4.6.1. notBefore
4.6.1. notBeforeの

The "notBefore" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of certificate generation.


In the RPKI, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. Relying Parties SHOULD NOT attempt to infer from this time information that a certificate was valid at a time in the past, or that it will be valid at a time in the future, as the scope of an RP's test of validity of a certificate refers specifically to validity at the current time.


4.6.2. notAfter
4.6.2. notAfterの

The "notAfter" time represents the anticipated lifetime of the current resource allocation or assignment arrangement between the issuer and the subject.


It is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. The same caveats apply to RP's assumptions relating to the certificate's validity at any time other than the current time.


4.7. Subject Public Key Info
4.7. サブジェクト公開鍵情報

The algorithm used in this profile is specified in [RFC6485].


4.8. Resource Certificate Extensions
4.8. リソース証明書エクステンション

The following X.509 v3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming resource certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. Each extension in a resource certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC5280].

次X.509 v3の拡張は、明示的に別段の記載がある場合を除き、準拠リソース証明書中に存在しなければなりません。リソース証明書中の各エクステンションは、クリティカルまたは非クリティカルのいずれかに指定されています。それはそれは認識していない重要な拡張が発生した場合、証明書に使用したシステムは、証明書を拒絶しなければなりません。それは、[RFC5280]を認識されない場合が、非クリティカルな拡張は無視されるかもしれません。

4.8.1. Basic Constraints
4.8.1. 基本制約

The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the resource certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.


The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.


The Path Length Constraint is not specified for RPKI certificates, and MUST NOT be present.


4.8.2. Subject Key Identifier
4.8.2. サブジェクトキー識別子

This extension MUST appear in all resource certificates. This extension is non-critical.


The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the Subject Public Key, as described in Section of [RFC5280].


4.8.3. Authority Key Identifier
4.8.3. 権限キー識別子

This extension MUST appear in all resource certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. In a self-signed certificate, a CA MAY include this extension, and set it equal to the Subject Key Identifier. The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber fields MUST NOT be present. This extension is non-critical.

この拡張は、「自己署名」証明書を発行するCAを除いて、すべてのリソースの証明書に表示される必要があります。自己署名証明書では、CAは、この拡張機能を含む、及びサブジェクト鍵識別子に等しく、それを設定してもよいです。 authorityCertIssuerとauthorityCertSerialNumberフィールドが存在してはなりません。この拡張はノンクリティカルです。

The Key Identifier used for resource certificates is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as described in Section of [RFC5280].


4.8.4. Key Usage
4.8.4. キー使用法

This extension is a critical extension and MUST be present.


In certificates issued to certification authorities only, the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE, and these MUST be the only bits set to TRUE.


In EE certificates, the digitalSignature bit MUST be set to TRUE and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.


4.8.5. Extended Key Usage
4.8.5. 拡張キー使用法

The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension MUST NOT appear in any CA certificate in the RPKI. This extension also MUST NOT appear in EE certificates used to verify RPKI objects (e.g., ROAs or manifests. The extension MUST NOT be marked critical.


The EKU extension MAY appear in EE certificates issued to routers or other devices. Permitted values for the EKU OIDs will be specified in Standards Track RFCs issued by other IETF working groups that adopt the RPKI profile and that identify application-specific requirements that motivate the use of such EKUs.

EKU拡張機能は、ルータまたは他のデバイスに発行したEE証明書に表示されることがあります。 EKUのOIDのための許可された値は、RPKIプロファイルを採用しているが、そのようなのEKUの使用を動機づけるアプリケーション固有の要件を識別し、他のIETFワーキンググループによって発行された標準化過程RFCで指定されます。

4.8.6. CRL Distribution Points
4.8.6. CRL配布ポイント

This extension MUST be present, except in "self-signed" certificates, and it is non-critical. In a self-signed certificate, this extension MUST be omitted.


In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer.


The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this issuer. The RPKI uses the URI [RFC3986] form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanism is a single rsync URI ("rsync://") [RFC5781] that references a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.

CRL配布ポイント(CRLDP)拡張は、この発行者が発行した証明書に関連付けられたCRL(複数可)の位置(複数可)を識別する。 RPKIは、オブジェクト識別のURI [RFC3986]の形式を使用します。各発行者のための単一の包括CRLを参照し、[RFC5781]の好ましいURIアクセス機構は、単一のrsyncのURI(「//のrsync」)です。

In this profile, the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, implying that the CRLIssuer field MUST be omitted, and the distributionPoint field MUST be present. The Reasons field MUST be omitted.


The distributionPoint MUST contain the fullName field, and MUST NOT contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The form of the generalName MUST be of type URI.

distributionPointはのfullNameフィールドを含まなければならない、とnameRelativeToCRLIssuerを含んではなりません。 GeneralNameの形態はタイプURIでなければなりません。

The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single DistributionPoint. The DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one URI value. An rsync URI [RFC5781] MUST be present in the DistributionPoint and MUST reference the most recent instance of this issuer's CRL. Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the rsync URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL.

distributionPoint値のシーケンスは、単一のDistributionPointを含まなければなりません。 DistributionPointは、複数のURI値を含むかもしれません。 rsyncのURI [RFC5781]はDistributionPointに存在する必要がありますし、この発行者のCRLの最新のインスタンスを参照する必要があります。他のアクセス形式のURIは、このCRLの代替アクセス機構を表し、rsyncのURIに加えて使用することができます。

4.8.7. Authority Information Access
4.8.7. 機関情報アクセス

In the context of the RPKI, this extension identifies the publication point of the certificate of the issuer of the certificate in which the extension appears. In this profile, a single reference to the publication point of the immediate superior certificate MUST be present, except for a "self-signed" certificate, in which case the extension MUST be omitted. This extension is non-critical.


This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an rsync URI [RFC5781] MUST be specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST reference the point of publication of the certificate where this Issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). Other accessMethod URIs referencing the same object MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension.

このプロファイルは、オブジェクト識別のURI形式を使用します。好ましいURIアクセス機構 "のrsync" であり、rsyncのURI [RFC5781]は、ID-AD-caIssuersのたaccessMethod値で指定されなければなりません。 URIは、この発行者は、対象(発行者の即時優れた証明書)である証明書の公開の点を参照しなければなりません。同じオブジェクトを参照する他たaccessMethod URIは、この拡張の値のシーケンスに含まれるかもしれません。

A CA MUST use a persistent URL name scheme for CA certificates that it issues [RFC6481]. This implies that a reissued certificate overwrites a previously issued certificate (to the same subject) in the publication repository. In this way, certificates subordinate to the reissued (CA) certificate can maintain a constant Authority Information Access (AIA) extension pointer and thus need not be reissued when the parent certificate is reissued.


4.8.8. Subject Information Access
4.8.8. 件名情報アクセス

In the context of the RPKI, this Subject Information Access (SIA) extension identifies the publication point of products signed by the subject of the certificate.

RPKIの文脈では、このサブジェクト情報アクセス(SIA)拡張は、証明書のサブジェクトによって署名された製品の出版点を識別する。 SIA for CA Certificates。 CA証明書のSIA

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked non-critical.


This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-caRepository, with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST specify an rsync URI [RFC5781]. This URI points to the directory containing all published material issued by this CA, i.e., all valid CA certificates, published EE certificates, the current CRL, manifest, and signed objects validated via EE certificates that have been issued by this CA [RFC6481]. Other accessDescription elements with an accessMethod of id-ad-caRepository MAY be present. In such cases, the accessLocation values describe alternate supported URI access mechanisms for the same directory. The ordering of URIs in this accessDescription sequence reflect the CA's relative preferences for access methods to be used by RPs, with the first element of the sequence being the most preferred by the CA.

この拡張は、rsyncのURI [RFC5781]を指定しなければならないURIののaccessLocationフォームで、ID-AD-caRepositoryのたaccessMethodのインスタンスがなければなりません。このCA、すなわち、すべての有効なCA証明書、公表EE証明書によって発行されたすべての出版物を含むディレクトリにこのURIポイント、現在のCRL、このCA [RFC6481]によって発行されたEE証明書を経由して検証マニフェスト、および署名オブジェクト。 ID-AD-caRepositoryのたaccessMethodを持つ他のaccessDescription要素が存在してもよいです。このような場合、のaccessLocation値が同じディレクトリの代替サポートURIアクセスメカニズムを記述する。このaccessDescriptionシーケンス内のURIの順序は、シーケンスの最初の要素は、ほとんどのCAが好適で、RPのが使用するアクセス方法のためのCAの相対的な好みを反映します

This extension MUST have an instance of an AccessDescription with an accessMethod of id-ad-rpkiManifest,


         id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }
         id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }

with an rsync URI [RFC5781] form of accessLocation. The URI points to the CA's manifest of published objects [RFC6486] as an object URL. Other accessDescription elements MAY exist for the id-ad-rpkiManifest accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate access mechanisms for the same manifest object.

accessLocationのrsyncのURI [RFC5781]の形を有します。 URIは、オブジェクトのURLとして発表されたオブジェクト[RFC6486]のCAのマニフェストを指します。他のaccessDescription要素はのaccessLocation値が同じマニフェストオブジェクトの代替アクセスメカニズムを示すID-AD-rpkiManifestたaccessMethodのために存在してもよいです。 SIA for EE Certificates。 EE証明書のSIA

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked non-critical.


This extension MUST have an instance of an accessMethod of id-ad-signedObject,


         id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }

with an accessLocation form of a URI that MUST include an rsync URI [RFC5781]. This URI points to the signed object that is verified using this EE certificate [RFC6481]. Other accessDescription elements may exist for the id-ad-signedObject accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI access mechanisms for the same object, ordered in terms of the EE's relative preference for supported access mechanisms.

rsyncのURI [RFC5781]を含まなければならないURIの形のaccessLocation有します。このURIは、このEE証明書[RFC6481]を使用して検証される署名されたオブジェクトを指します。他のaccessDescription要素はのaccessLocation値がサポートされるアクセスメカニズムのEEの相対的嗜好の観点で順序付け、同じ目的のために、代替URIのアクセスメカニズムを示すID-AD-signedObjectたaccessMethodのために存在してもよいです。

Other AccessMethods MUST NOT be used for an EE certificates's SIA.


4.8.9. Certificate Policies
4.8.9. 証明書ポリシー

This extension MUST be present and MUST be marked critical. It MUST include exactly one policy, as specified in the RPKI CP [RFC6484]

この拡張が存在しなければならないと重要なマークを付ける必要があります。 RPKI CP [RFC6484]で指定されたように、それは、正確に一つのポリシーを含まなければなりません

4.8.10. IP Resources
4.8.10. IPリソース

Either the IP Resources extension, or the AS Resources extension, or both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST be marked critical.


This extension contains the list of IP address resources as per [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a particular Address Family Identifier (AFI) value. In the context of resource certificates describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, the Subsequent AFI (SAFI) value MUST NOT be used.


This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set of IP address records, or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the IP address resource set of this certificate is inherited from that of the certificate's issuer.


4.8.11. AS Resources
4.8.11. 資源として

Either the AS Resources extension, or the IP Resources extension, or both, MUST be present in all RPKI certificates, and if present, MUST be marked critical.


This extension contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], or it may specify the "inherit" element. Routing Domain Identifier (RDI) values are NOT supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used.


This extension MUST either specify a non-empty set of AS number records, or use the "inherit" setting to indicate that the AS number resource set of this certificate is inherited from that of the certificate's issuer.


5. Resource Certificate Revocation Lists

Each CA MUST issue a version 2 CRL that is consistent with [RFC5280]. RPs are NOT required to process version 1 CRLs (in contrast to [RFC5280]). The CRL issuer is the CA. CRLs conforming to this profile MUST NOT include Indirect or Delta CRLs. The scope of each CRL MUST be all certificates issued by this CA.

各CAには、[RFC5280]と一致しているバージョン2 CRLを発行しなければなりません。 RPは、バージョン([RFC5280]とは対照的に)1つのCRLを処理するために必要とされません。 CRL発行者はCAです。このプロファイルに準拠するCRLは、間接的またはデルタCRLを含んではいけません。各CRLの範囲は、このCAによって発行されたすべての証明書でなければなりません

The issuer name is as in Section 4.4 above.


Where two or more CRLs are issued by the same CA, the CRL with the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.


The algorithm used in CRLs issued under this profile is specified in [RFC6485].


The contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates that have been revoked by the CA.


An RPKI CA MUST include the two extensions, Authority Key Identifier and CRL Number, in every CRL that it issues. RPs MUST be prepared to process CRLs with these extensions. No other CRL extensions are allowed.

RPKI CAは、それが発行するすべてのCRLには、2つの拡張、認証局キー識別子とCRL番号を含める必要があります。 RPには、これらの拡張子を持つCRLを処理するために準備しなければなりません。他のCRL拡張は許可されません。

For each revoked resource certificate, only the two fields, Serial Number and Revocation Date, MUST be present, and all other fields MUST NOT be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.


6. Resource Certificate Requests

A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA MUST support certificate issuance in PKCS#10 and a CA MAY support CRMF requests.

リソースの証明書要求がPKCS#10または証明書要求メッセージ形式(CRMF)のいずれかを使用することができます。 CAは、PKCS#10に証明書の発行をサポートしなければならないし、CAはCRMF要求をサポートするかもしれません。

Note that there is no certificate response defined in this profile. For CA certificate requests, the CA places the resource certificate in the repository, as per [RFC6484]. No response is defined for EE certificate requests.

このプロファイルで定義された証明書応答がないことに注意してください。 CA証明書の要求の場合、CAは、[RFC6484]に従って、リポジトリ内のリソースの証明書を配置します。無回答はEE証明書の要求のために定義されていません。

6.1. PCKS#10 Profile
6.1. PCKS#10のプロフィール

This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to resource certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate.

それが証明書をリソースに関連するこのプロファイルは、[RFC2986]で仕様を洗練します。 PKCS#10に従ってフォーマットされた証明書要求メッセージオブジェクトは、証明書を発行するの最初のステップとしてCAに渡されます。

With the exception of the SubjectPublicKeyinfo and the SIA extension request, the CA is permitted to alter any field in the request when issuing a certificate.


6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
6.1.1. PKCS#10リソース証明書要求テンプレートフィールド

This profile applies the following additional requirements to fields that MAY appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:


Version This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.


Subject This field MAY be omitted. If present, the value of this field SHOULD be empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the CA MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this CA. This field is allowed to be non-empty only for a re-key/reissuance request, and only if the CA has adopted a policy (in its Certificate Practice Statement (CPS)) that permits reuse of names in these circumstances.


SubjectPublicKeyInfo This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with which the key is used. The algorithm used in this profile is specified in [RFC6485].


Attributes [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.


The only attribute used in this profile is the extensionRequest attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains certificate extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in Section 6.3.


This profile applies the following additional constraint to fields that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:


signatureAlgorithm The signatureAlgorithm value is specified in [RFC6485].


6.2. CRMF Profile
6.2. CRMFプロフィール

This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to resource certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in certificate issuance.

それが証明書をリソースに関連するこのプロファイルは、[RFC4211]で証明書要求メッセージフォーマット(CRMF)仕様を洗練します。 CRMFに従ってフォーマットされた証明書要求メッセージオブジェクトは、証明書発行の最初のステップとしてCAに渡されます。

With the exception of the SubjectPublicKeyinfo and the SIA extension request, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when issuing the certificate.


6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
6.2.1. CRMFリソース証明書要求のテンプレートフィールド

This profile applies the following additional requirements to fields that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:


version This field SHOULD be omitted. If present, it MUST specify a request for a version 3 Certificate.


serialNumber This field MUST be omitted.


signingAlgorithm This field MUST be omitted.


issuer This MUST be omitted in this profile.


Validity This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with dates as determined by the CA.


Subject This field MAY be omitted. If present, the value of this field SHOULD be empty (i.e., NULL), in which case the CA MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this CA. This field is allowed to be non-empty only for a re-key/reissuance request, and only if the CA has adopted a policy (in its CPS) that permits the reuse of names in these circumstances.


PublicKey This field MUST be present.


extensions The profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in Section 6.3.


6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
6.2.2. リソース証明書要求の制御フィールド

The following control fields are supported in this profile:


Authenticator Control The intended model of authentication of the subject is a "long term" model, and the guidance offered in [RFC4211] is that the Authenticator Control field be used.


6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
6.3. 証明書の拡張は、証明書要求の属性

The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on these extensions:


BasicConstraints If this is omitted, then the CA will issue an EE certificate (hence no BasicConstraints extension will be included).


The pathLengthConstraint is not supported in this profile, and this field MUST be omitted.


The CA MAY honor the cA boolean if set to TRUE (CA Certificate Request). If this bit is set, then it indicates that the subject is requesting a CA certificate.


The CA MUST honor the cA bit if set to FALSE (EE Certificate Request), in which case the corresponding EE certificate will not contain a Basic Constraints extension.


KeyUsage The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints SubjectType sub-field, when specified.

存在する場合のKeyUsage CAは限り指定されたとき、これは、基本制約SubjectTypeサブフィールドと一致しているとして、KeyCertSignが及びcRLSignのKeyUsageの拡張を尊重するかもしれません。

ExtendedKeyUsage The CA MAY honor ExtendedKeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints SubjectType sub-field, when specified.


SubjectInformationAccess This field MUST be present, and the field value SHOULD be honored by the CA if it conforms to the requirements set forth in Section 4.8.8. If the CA is unable to honor the requested value for this field, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request.

SubjectInformationAccessこのフィールドが存在する必要があり、そしてそれは、セクション4.8.8に記載された要件に準拠している場合、フィールドの値は、CAによって表彰されるべきである(SHOULD)。 CAは、このフィールドの値は、要求を尊重することができない場合は、CAが証明書要求を拒絶しなければなりません。

7. Resource Certificate Validation

This section describes the resource certificate validation procedure. This refines the generic procedure described in Section 6 of [RFC5280].


7.1. Resource Extension Validation
7.1. リソース拡張検証

The IP Resources and AS Resources extensions [RFC3779] define critical extensions for INRs. These are ASN.1 encoded representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range and an AS number set.


Valid resource certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS number resource extension. In order to validate a resource certificate, the resource extension MUST also be validated. This validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource sets:


more specific Given two contiguous IP address ranges or two contiguous AS number ranges, A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is larger than range A.


equal Given two contiguous IP address ranges or two contiguous AS number ranges, A and B, A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same collection of IP addresses or AS numbers described by range B. The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this "equality" comparison.


encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets, X and Y, X "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either "more specific" than or "equal" to a contiguous range element within the set X.


Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of a certification path (see Section 7.2 entails that for every adjacent


pair of certificates in the certification path (certificates 'x' and 'x + 1'), the number resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" the number resources described in certificate 'x + 1', and the resources described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources described in the first certificate in the certification path.

認証パス(証明書「X」及び「X + 1」)、証明書に記載の番号リソース「X」「X + 1」証明書に記載の番号資源を「包含する」、に記載さリソース内の証明書の対トラストアンカー情報は、証明書パス内の最初の証明書に記載したリソースを「包含する」。

7.2. Resource Certification Path Validation
7.2. リソース認証パス検証

Validation of signed resource data using a target resource certificate consists of verifying that the digital signature of the signed resource data is valid, using the public key of the target resource certificate, and also validating the resource certificate in the context of the RPKI, using the path validation process. This path validation process verifies, among other things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n certificates) satisfies the following conditions:


1. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate ('x' + 1);

すべての 'X' で1. {1、...、N-1}、 'X' 証明書の対象が( 'X' + 1)証明書の発行者です。

2. certificate '1' is issued by a trust anchor;
3. certificate 'n' is the certificate to be validated; and
4. for all 'x' in {1, ..., n}, certificate 'x' is valid.
すべてのため4. 'x' は{1、...、N}において、証明書は、 'X' 有効です。

Certificate validation entails verifying that all of the following conditions hold, in addition to the certification path validation criteria specified in Section 6 of [RFC5280]:


1. The certificate can be verified using the issuer's public key and the signature algorithm


2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and To values.


3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present, as defined by this specification, and contains values for selected fields that are defined as allowable values by this specification.


4. No field, or field value, that this specification defines as MUST NOT be present is used in the certificate.


5. The issuer has not revoked the certificate. A revoked certificate is identified by the certificate's serial number being listed on the issuer's current CRL, as identified by the


          CRLDP of the certificate, the CRL is itself valid, and the
          public key used to verify the signature on the CRL is the same
          public key used to verify the certificate itself.

6. The resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource extension data contained in a valid certificate where this issuer is the subject (the previous certificate in the context of the ordered sequence defined by the certification path).


7. The certification path originates with a certificate issued by a trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the certification path where the subject of Certificate 'x' in the certification path matches the issuer in Certificate 'x + 1' in the certification path, and the public key in Certificate 'x' can verify the signature value in Certificate 'x+1'.

7.証明書パスは、トラストアンカーによって発行された証明書を使用して発信し、認証パス中の証明書の「X」の対象が認証に「X + 1」証明書に発行者と一致する証明書パスを横切って署名チェーンが存在しますパス、および証明書の「X」内の公開鍵は、「X + 1」の証明書で署名値を検証することができます。

A certificate validation algorithm MAY perform these tests in any chosen order.


Certificates and CRLs used in this process MAY be found in a locally maintained cache, maintained by a regular synchronization across the distributed publication repository structure [RFC6481].


There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as means of creating a potential denial-of-service (DOS) attack on an RP. An RP executing this procedure MAY apply further heuristics to guide the certification path validation process to a halt in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts to validate such malformed certification path structures. Implementations of resource certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if the certification path length exceeds a locally defined configuration parameter.


8. Design Notes

The following notes provide some additional commentary on the considerations that lie behind some of the design choices that were made in the design of this certificate profile. These notes are non-normative, i.e., this section of the document does not constitute a formal part of the profile specification, and the interpretation of key words as defined in RFC 2119 are not applicable in this section of the document.

以下の注意事項は、この証明書プロファイルの設計で行われた設計上の選択のいくつかの背後にある注意事項にいくつかの追加的な解説を提供しています。これらのノートは、RFC 2119で定義された文書のこのセクションにおいて適用されないように、すなわち、文書のこのセクションは、プロファイル仕様の形式的な部分、およびキーワードの解釈を構成しない、非規範的です。

Certificate Extensions: This profile does not permit the use of any other critical or non-critical extensions. The rationale for this restriction is that the resource certificate profile is intended for a specific defined use. In this context, having certificates with additional non-critical extensions that RPs may see as valid certificates without understanding the extensions is inappropriate, because if the RP were in a position to understand the extensions, it would contradict or qualify this original judgment of validity in some way. This profile takes the position of minimalism over extensibility. The specific goal for the associated RPKI is to precisely match the INR allocation structure through an aligned certificate structure that describes the allocation and its context within the INR distribution hierarchy. The profile defines a resource certificate that is structured to meet these requirements.

証明書エクステンション:このプロファイルは、他の重要または非クリティカル拡張の使用を許可していません。この制限のための理論的根拠は、リソースの証明書プロファイルは、特定の規定された使用のために意図されていることです。 RPが拡張を理解する立場にあったならば、それは矛盾するかに有効性のこの原判決を修飾しまうので、この文脈では、RPは拡張を理解せずに有効な証明書が表示される場合があり、追加の非クリティカル拡張を持つ証明書は、不適切ですいくつかの方法。このプロファイルは、拡張性を超えるミニマリズムの位置をとります。関連RPKIのための具体的な目標を正確に配分し、INRの分布階層内のそのコンテキストを記述する整列証明書構造を介してINR割当構造と一致することです。プロファイルには、これらの要件を満たすように構成されているリソース証明書を定義します。

Certification Authorities and Key Values: This profile uses a definition of an instance of a CA as a combination of a named entity and a key pair. Within this definition, a CA instance cannot rollover a key pair. However, the entity can generate a new instance of a CA with a new key pair and roll over all the signed subordinate products to the new CA [RFC6489].

認証局とキー値:このプロファイルは、名前付きエンティティの組み合わせとキーペアとCAのインスタンスの定義を使用しています。この定義の中で、CAのインスタンスは、鍵ペアをロールオーバーすることはできません。しかし、企業は新しいCA [RFC6489]にすべての署名された下位製品より新しい鍵ペアとロールとCAの新しいインスタンスを生成することができます。

         This has a number of implications in terms of subject name
         management, CRL Scope, and repository publication point

CRL Scope and Key Values: For CRL Scope, this profile specifies that a CA issues a single CRL at a time, and the scope of the CRL is all certificates issued by this CA. Because the CA instance is bound to a single key pair, this implies that the CA's public key, the key used to validate the CA's CRL, and the key used to validate the certificates revoked by that CRL are all the same key value.


Repository Publication Point: The definition of a CA affects the design of the repository publication system. In order to minimize the amount of forced re-certification on key rollover events, a repository publication regime that uses the same repository publication point for all CA instances that refers to the same entity, but with different key values, will minimize the extent of re-generation of certificates to only immediate subordinate certificates. This is described in [RFC6489].


Subject Name: This profile specifies that subject names must be unique per issuer, and does not specify that subject names must be globally unique (in terms of assured uniqueness). This is due to the nature of the RPKI as a distributed PKI, implying that there is no ready ability for certification authorities to coordinate a simple RPKI-wide unique name space without resorting to additional critical external dependencies. CAs are advised to use subject name generation procedures that minimize the potential for name clashes.

サブジェクト名:このプロファイルは、サブジェクト名は、発行者ごとに固有でなければならないことを指定し、(確実な一意性の面で)サブジェクト名はグローバルに一意でなければならないことを指定していません。これは、追加の重大な外部依存関係に頼ることなく、簡単なRPKI全体で一意の名前空間を調整する証明機関のための準備ができて能力がないことを示唆し、分散型PKIなどRPKIの性質によるものです。 CAは、名前の衝突の可能性を最小サブジェクト名生成手順を使用することをお勧めします。

         One way to achieve this is for a CA to use a subject name
         practice that uses the CommonName component of the
         Distinguished Name as a constant value for any given entity
         that is the subject of CA-issued certificates, and set the
         serialNumber component of the Distinguished Name to a value
         that is derived from the hash of the subject public key value.

If the CA elects not to use the serialNumber component of the DistinguishedName, then it is considered beneficial that a CA generates CommonNames that have themselves a random component that includes significantly more than 40 bits of entropy in the name. Some non-normative recommendations to achieve this include:


1) Hash of the subject public key (encoded as ASCII HEX). example: cn="999d99d564de366a29cd8468c45ede1848e2cc14"

1)対象の公開鍵のハッシュ()のASCII HEXとしてエンコード。例:CN = "999d99d564de366a29cd8468c45ede1848e2cc14"

2) A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [RFC4122] example: cn="6437d442-6fb5-49ba-bbdb-19c260652098"

2)汎用一意識別子(UUID)[RFC4122]例:CN = "6437d442-6fb5-49ba-BBDB-19c260652098"

3) A randomly generated ASCII HEX encoded string of length 20 or greater: example: cn="0f8fcc28e3be4869bc5f8fa114db05e1"> (A string of 20 ASCII HEX digits would have 80-bits of entropy)

例:長さ20以上の3)ランダムに生成されたASCII HEXエンコードされた文字列CN =「0f8fcc28e3be4869bc5f8fa114db05e1」>(エントロピーの80ビットを有するであろう20のASCII HEX数字の文字列)

4) An internal database key or subscriber ID combined with one of the above example: cn="<DBkey1> (6437d442-6fb5-49ba-bbdb-19c2606520980)" (The issuing CA may wish to be able to extract the database key or subscriber ID from the commonName. Since only the issuing CA would need to be able to parse the commonName, the database key and the source of entropy (e.g., a UUID) could be separated in any way that the CA wants, as long as it conforms to the rules for PrintableString. The separator could be a space character, parenthesis, hyphen, slash, question mark, etc.

4)上記の例のいずれかと組み合わせた内部データベースキーまたはユーザID:CN =「<DBkey1>(6437d442-6fb5-49ba-BBDB-19c2606520980を)」(発行元CAは、データベースキーを抽出できるようにしたいか、または唯一の発行元CAがcommonNameを、データベースのキーとエントロピー(例えば、UUID)のソースを解析できるようにする必要がありますので、commonNameのから加入者IDは。それ限り、CAが望んでいることをどのような方法で分離することができPrintableStringのための規則に準拠しています。セパレータはなどの空白文字、括弧、ハイフン、スラッシュ、疑問符、かもしれません

9. Operational Considerations for Profile Agility

This profile requires that relying parties reject certificates or CRLs that do not conform to the profile. (Through the remainder of this section, the term "certificate" is used to refer to both certificates and CRLs.) This includes certificates that contain extensions that are prohibited, but that are otherwise valid as per [RFC5280]. This means that any change in the profile (e.g., extensions, permitted attributes or optional fields, or field encodings) for certificates used in the RPKI will not be backward compatible. In a general PKI context, this constraint probably would cause serious problems. In the RPKI, several factors minimize the difficulty of effecting changes of this sort.

このプロファイルは、依拠当事者は、プロファイルに準拠していない証明書やCRLを拒否することが必要です。 (このセクションの残りの部分を通して、用語「証明書」は、証明書とCRLの両方を指すために使用される。)このことは、禁止されている拡張機能が含まれている証明書を含み、それは、[RFC5280]の通りそうでなければ有効です。これは、RPKIに使用される証明書のプロファイルの変化(例えば、拡張は、属性または任意のフィールド、またはフィールド符号化を許可)下位互換性がないことを意味します。一般的なPKIの文脈では、この制約は、おそらく深刻な問題を引き起こします。 RPKIでは、いくつかの要因は、この種の変化をもたらすことの難しさを最小限に抑えます。

Note that the RPKI is unique in that every relying party (RP) requires access to every certificate issued by the CAs in this system. An important update of the certificates used in the RPKI must be supported by all CAs and RPs in the system, lest views of the RPKI data differ across RPs. Thus, incremental changes require very careful coordination. It would not be appropriate to introduce a new extension, or authorize use of an extant, standard extension, for a security-relevant purpose on a piecemeal basis.

RPKIは、そのすべての証明書利用者(RP)内で一意であるこのシステムでのCAによって発行されたすべての証明書にアクセスする必要があることに注意してください。 RPKIデータのビューのRP間で異なっないようRPKIに使用される証明書の重要な更新は、システム内のすべてのCAとのRPによってサポートされなければなりません。したがって、増分変化は非常に慎重に調整を必要としています。断片的にセキュリティ関連の目的のために、新しい拡張機能を導入、または現存する、標準の拡張機能の使用を許可するために適切ではありません。

One might imagine that the "critical" flag in X.509 certificate extensions could be used to ameliorate this problem. However, this solution is not comprehensive and does not address the problem of adding a new, security-critical extension. (This is because such an extension needs to be supported universally, by all CAs and RPs.) Also, while some standard extensions can be marked either critical or non-critical, at the discretion of the issuer, not all have this property, i.e., some standard extensions are always non-critical. Moreover, there is no notion of criticality for attributes within a name or optional fields within a field or an extension. Thus, the critical flag is not a solution to this problem.

一つは、X.509証明書機能拡張の「重要」フラグは、この問題を改善するために使用することができることを想像するかもしれません。しかし、この解決策は包括的ではなく、新たに、セキュリティ上重要な拡張機能を追加することの問題に対処していません。 (そのような拡張は、すべてのCAとのRPによって、普遍サポートする必要があるからである。)また、いくつかの標準的な拡張が重大または非クリティカルのいずれかにマークすることができながら、すべてではない。この性質を持っている、すなわち発行体の裁量で、いくつかの標準拡張機能は常に非クリティカルです。また、名前やフィールド内の任意のフィールドまたは拡張内の属性の重要性という概念はありません。このように、重要なフラグは、この問題に対する解決策ではありません。

In typical PKI deployments, there are few CAs and many RPs. However, in the RPKI, essentially every CA in the RPKI is also an RP. Thus the set of entities that will need to change in order to issue certificates under a new format is the same set of entities that will need to change to accept these new certificates. To the extent that this is literally true, it says that CA/RP coordination for a change is tightly linked anyway. In reality, there is an important exception to this general observation. Small ISPs and holders of provider-independent allocations are expected to use managed CA services, offered by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and potentially by wholesale Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This reduces the number of distinct CA implementations that are needed and makes it easier to effect changes for certificate issuance. It seems very likely that these entities also will make use of RP software provided by their managed CA service provider, which reduces the number of distinct RP software implementations. Also note that many small ISPs (and holders of provider-independent allocations) employ default routes, and thus need not perform RP validation of RPKI data, eliminating these entities as RPs.

典型的なPKIの展開では、いくつかのCAと多くのRPがあります。しかし、RPKIに、本質的RPKI内のすべてのCAもRPです。したがって、新しいフォーマットの下で証明書を発行するために変更する必要がありますエンティティのセットは、これらの新しい証明書を受け入れるように変更する必要がありますエンティティの同じセットです。これは文字通り真である限り、それは変更のためのCA / RPの調整がしっかりとにかくリンクされていることを述べています。実際には、この一般的な観察に重要な例外があります。中小ISPやプロバイダに依存しない割り当ての保有者は、卸売、インターネットサービスプロバイダ(ISP)によって、潜在的に管理するCAの地域インターネットレジストリ(RIRが)によって提供されるサービス、およびを使用することが期待されています。これは、必要な個別のCAの実装の数を減らし、それが簡単に証明書発行のための変更を行うようになります。これは、これらのエンティティはまた、個別のRPソフトウェアの実装の数を減らし、その管理CAサービスプロバイダーによって提供RPソフトウェアを利用する可能性が非常に高いと思われます。また、多くの小規模のISP(プロバイダ非依存の割り当ての保有者が)デフォルトルートを採用することに注意し、ひいてはRPとしてこれらのエンティティをなくす、RPKIデータのRP検証を実行する必要はありません。

Widely available PKI RP software does not cache large numbers of certificates, an essential strategy for the RPKI. It does not process manifest or ROA data structures, essential elements of the RPKI repository system. Experience shows that such software deals poorly with revocation status data. Thus, extant RP software is not adequate for the RPKI, although some open source tools (e.g., OpenSSL and cryptlib) can be used as building blocks for an RPKI RP implementation. Thus, it is anticipated that RPs will make use of software that is designed specifically for the RPKI environment and is available from a limited number of open sources. Several RIRs and two companies are providing such software today. Thus it is feasible to coordinate change to this software among the small number of developers/maintainers.


If the resource certificate profile is changed in the future, e.g., by adding a new extension or changing the allowed set of name attributes or encoding of these attributes, the following procedure will be employed to effect deployment in the RPKI. The model is analogous to that described in [RPKI-ALG], but is simpler.


A new document will be issued as an update to this RFC. The CP for the RPKI [RFC6484] will be updated to reference the new certificate profile. The new CP will define a new policy OID for certificates issued under the new certificate profile. The updated CP also will define a timeline for transition to the new certificate (CRL) format. This timeline will define 3 phases and associated dates:

新しいドキュメントはこのRFCに更新として発行されます。 RPKI [RFC6484]のためのCPは、新しい証明書プロファイルを参照するように更新されます。新しいCPは、新しい証明書プロファイルの下で発行された証明書のための新しいポリシーOIDを定義します。更新されたCPは、新しい証明書(CRL)フォーマットへの移行のためのタイムラインを定義します。このタイムラインは3つの段階と関連する日付を定義します:

1. At the end of phase 1, all RPKI CAs MUST be capable of issuing certificates under the new profile, if requested by a subject. Any certificate issued under the new format will contain the new policy OID.

フェーズ1の終わりに1被験者によって要求された場合、全てRPKI CAは、新しいプロファイルの下で証明書を発行することができなければなりません。新しいフォーマットの下で発行された証明書は、新しいポリシーのOIDが含まれています。

2. During phase 2, CAs MUST issue certificates under the new profile, and these certificates MUST coexist with certificates issued under the old format. (CAs will continue to issue certificates under the old OID/format as well.) The old and new certificates MUST be identical, except for the policy OID and any new extensions, encodings, etc. The new certificates, and associated signed objects, will coexist in the RPKI repository system during this phase, analogous to what is required by an algorithm transition for the RPKI [RPKI-ALG]. Relying parties MAY make use of the old or the new certificate formats when processing signed objects retrieved from the RPKI repository system. During this phase, a relying party that elects to process both formats will acquire the same values for all certificate fields that overlap between the old and new formats. Thus if either certificate format is verifiable, the relying party accepts the data from that certificate. This allows CAs to issue certificates under the new format before all relying parties are prepared to process that format.

2.フェーズ2の間に、CAは、新しいプロファイルの下で証明書を発行しなければなりませんし、これらの証明書は、古いフォーマットの下で発行された証明書と共存しなければなりません。ポリシーOIDを除いて同一でなければならない古いものと新しい証明書を(CAは。だけでなく、古いOID /フォーマットの下で証明書を発行していきます)およびその他任意の新しい拡張機能、エンコーディング、新しい証明書、および関連する署名オブジェクト、意志RPKI [RPKI-ALG]のアルゴリズム遷移によって必要とされるものに類似し、この段階RPKIリポジトリシステムに共存します。 RPKIリポジトリシステムから取得し署名したオブジェクトを処理するときに依拠当事者は、古いまたは新しい証明書フォーマットを利用することができます。このフェーズでは、両方のフォーマットを処理することを選択した依存者は、古いものと新しいフォーマットの間で重複するすべての証明書のフィールドに同じ値を取得します。いずれかの証明書の形式が検証可能であればこのように、依存者はその証明書からデータを受け取ります。これは、すべての信頼者は、その形式を処理するために準備される前に、CAは新しいフォーマットの下で証明書を発行することができます。

3. At the beginning of phase 3, all relying parties MUST be capable of processing certificates under the new format. During this phase, CAs will issue new certificates ONLY under the new format. Certificates issued under the old OID will be replaced with certificates containing the new policy OID. The repository system will no longer require matching old and new certificates under the different formats.


At the end of phase 3, all certificates under the old OID will have been replaced. The resource certificate profile RFC will be replaced to remove support for the old certificate format, and the CP will be replaced to remove reference to the old policy OID and to the old resource certificate profile RFC. The system will have returned to a new, steady state.


10. Security Considerations

The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779] apply to resource certificates. The Security Considerations of [RFC2986] and [RFC4211] apply to resource certificate certification requests.

[RFC5280]と[RFC3779]のセキュリティの考慮事項は、リソースの証明書に適用されます。 [RFC2986]と[RFC4211]のセキュリティの考慮事項は、証明書認証要求をリソースに適用します。

A resource certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the status of resource allocations and assignments, then the information conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the allocation and assignment databases.


This profile requires that the key used to sign an issued certificate be the same key used to sign the CRL that can revoke the certificate, implying that the certification path used to validate the signature on a certificate is the same as that used to validate the signature of the CRL that can revoke the certificate. It is noted that this is a tighter constraint than required in X.509 PKIs, and there may be a risk in using a path validation implementation that is capable of using separate validation paths for a certificate and the corresponding CRL. If there are subject name collisions in the RPKI as a result of CAs not following the guidelines provided here relating to ensuring sufficient entropy in constructing subject names, and this is combined with the situation that an RP uses an implementation of validation path construction that is not in conformance with this RPKI profile, then it is possible that the subject name collisions can cause an RP to conclude that an otherwise valid certificate has been revoked.

このプロファイルは、証明書の署名を検証するために使用される証明書パスは、署名を検証するために使用されるものと同じであることを意味し、発行された証明書に署名するために使用される鍵が証明書を取り消すことができるCRLを署名するために使用されたのと同じキーであることを必要とCRLの証明書を取り消すことができます。 X.509のPKIに必要とされるよりもより厳しい制約であり、証明書と対応するCRLのための別個の検証パスを使用することが可能なパス検証の実装を使用する際のリスクが存在し得ることに留意されたいです。 RPKIでのサブジェクト名の衝突は、CAの結果として存在する場合はサブジェクト名を構築するのに十分なエントロピーを確保することに関連し、ここで提供されるガイドラインを以下、これをRPではない、検証パス構築の実装を使用して、状況と組み合わされていませんこのRPKIプロファイルに準拠して、サブジェクト名の衝突がそうでなければ、有効な証明書が失効していると結論するRPを引き起こす可能性があることも可能です。

11. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to particularly acknowledge the valued contribution from Stephen Kent in reviewing this document and proposing numerous sections of text that have been incorporated into the document. The authors also acknowledge the contributions of Sandy Murphy, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara, and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this document. The document also reflects review comments received from Roque Gagliano, Sean Turner, and David Cooper.


12. References
12.1. Normative References
12.1. 引用規格

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2119]ブラドナーの、S.、 "要件レベルを示すためにRFCsにおける使用のためのキーワード"、BCP 14、RFC 2119、1997年3月。

[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, November 2000.

[RFC2986] Nystrom、M.とB. Kaliski、 "PKCS#10:証明書要求の構文仕様バージョン1.7"、RFC 2986、2000年11月。

[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

[RFC3779]リン、C.、ケント、S.、およびK.ソ、 "IPアドレスとAS識別子のためのX.509拡張機能"、RFC 3779、2004年6月。

[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, September 2005.

[RFC4211] Schaad、J.、 "インターネットX.509公開鍵暗号基盤証明書要求メッセージ・フォーマット(CRMF)"、RFC 4211、2005年9月。

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

[RFC5280]クーパー、D.、Santesson、S.、ファレル、S.、Boeyen、S.、Housley氏、R.、およびW.ポーク、「インターネットX.509公開鍵暗号基盤証明書と証明書失効リスト(CRL)のプロフィール」、RFC 5280、2008年5月。

[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.

[RFC5781]ワイラー、S.、ウォード、D.、およびR. Housley氏、 "rsyncのURIスキーム"、RFC 5781、2010年2月。

[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.

[RFC6484]ケント、S.、香港、D.、ソ、K.、およびR. Watro、 "リソースの公開鍵インフラストラクチャ(RPKI)のための証明書ポリシー(CP)"、BCP 173、RFC 6484、2012年2月。

[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, February 2012.

[RFC6485]ヒューストン、G.、「リソース公開鍵インフラストラクチャで使用するためのアルゴリズムと鍵のサイズのためのプロファイル(RPKI)」、RFC 6485、2012年2月。

[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework", 2000.

[X.509] ITU-T、 "勧告X.509:ディレクトリ - 認証フレームワーク"、2000年。

[X.680] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1:2002, Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", 2002.

[X.680] ITU-T、 "勧告X.680(2002)| ISO / IEC 8824- 1:2002、情報技術 - 抽象構文記法1(ASN.1):基本的な表記法の仕様"、2002年。

12.2. Informative References
12.2. 参考文献

[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, November 2000.

[RFC2985] Nystrom、M.とB. Kaliski、 "PKCS#9:選択したオブジェクトのクラスと属性タイプバージョン2.0"、RFC 2985、2000年11月。

[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.

[RFC3986]バーナーズ - リー、T.、フィールディング、R.、およびL. Masinter、 "ユニフォームリソース識別子(URI):汎用構文"、STD 66、RFC 3986、2005年1月。

[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005.

[RFC4122]リーチ、P.、Mealling、M.、およびR. Salzの、 "汎用一意識別子(UUID)URN名前空間"、RFC 4122、2005年7月。

[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 4514, June 2006.

[RFC4514] Zeilenga、K.、 "ライトウェイトディレクトリアクセスプロトコル(LDAP):識別名の文字列表現"、RFC 4514、2006年6月。

[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

[RFC6480] Lepinski、M.とS.ケント、 "安全なインターネットルーティングをサポートするインフラストラクチャ"、RFC 6480、2012年2月。

[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012.

[RFC6481]ヒューストン、G.、Loomans、R.、およびG.マイケルソン、 "リソース証明書リポジトリの構造用プロフィール"、RFC 6481、2012年2月。

[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.

[RFC6486] Austeinと、R.、ヒューストン、G.、ケント、S.、およびM. Lepinski、 "リソース公開鍵インフラストラクチャのためのマニフェスト(RPKI)"、RFC 6486、2012年2月。

[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.

[RFC6488] Lepinski、M.、チー、A.、およびS.ケントは、RFC 6488、2012年2月 "リソースの公開鍵インフラストラクチャ(RPKI)のためのオブジェクト・テンプレートを署名"。

[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012.

[RFC6489]ヒューストン、G.、マイケルソン、G.、およびS.ケント、 "リソース公開鍵インフラストラクチャにおける認証局(CA)キーロールオーバー(RPKI)"、BCP 174、RFC 6489、2012年2月。

[RPKI-ALG] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", Work in Progress, November 2011.

[RPKI-ALG]ガリアーノ、R.、ケント、S.、およびS.ターナー、 "RPKIのためのアルゴリズムアジリティ手順"、進歩、2011年11月での作業。

Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate


The following is an example resource certificate.


Certificate Name: 9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.cer


Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial: 1500 (0x5dc) Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSAEncryption Issuer: CN=APNIC Production-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s Validity Not Before: Oct 25 12:50:00 2008 GMT Not After : Jan 31 00:00:00 2010 GMT Subject: CN=A91872ED Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (2048 bit) Modulus (2048 bit): 00:bb:fb:4a:af:a4:b9:dc:d0:fa:6f:67:cc:27:39: 34:d1:80:40:37:de:88:d1:64:a2:f1:b3:fa:c6:7f: bb:51:df:e1:c7:13:92:c3:c8:a2:aa:8c:d1:11:b3: aa:99:c0:ac:54:d3:65:83:c6:13:bf:0d:9f:33:2d: 39:9f:ab:5f:cd:a3:e9:a1:fb:80:7d:1d:d0:2b:48: a5:55:e6:24:1f:06:41:35:1d:00:da:1f:99:85:13: 26:39:24:c5:9a:81:15:98:fb:5f:f9:84:38:e5:d6: 70:ce:5a:02:ca:dd:61:85:b3:43:2d:0b:35:d5:91: 98:9d:da:1e:0f:c2:f6:97:b7:97:3e:e6:fc:c1:c4: 3f:30:c4:81:03:25:99:09:4c:e2:4a:85:e7:46:4b: 60:63:02:43:46:51:4d:ed:fd:a1:06:84:f1:4e:98: 32:da:27:ee:80:82:d4:6b:cf:31:ea:21:af:6f:bd: 70:34:e9:3f:d7:e4:24:cd:b8:e0:0f:8e:80:eb:11: 1f:bc:c5:7e:05:8e:5c:7b:96:26:f8:2c:17:30:7d: 08:9e:a4:72:66:f5:ca:23:2b:f2:ce:54:ec:4d:d9: d9:81:72:80:19:95:57:da:91:00:d9:b1:e8:8c:33: 4a:9d:3c:4a:94:bf:74:4c:30:72:9b:1e:f5:8b:00: 4d:e3 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: F4:97:E0:00:47:2A:ED:0F:B8:EC:8C:0C:0B:90:89: 20:9A:FA:10:9B

データ:バージョン:3(0x2の)シリアル:1500(0x5dc)署名アルゴリズム:SHA256WithRSAEncryption発行者:CN = APNIC生産-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0sの妥当性はないの前に:10月25日午前12時50分00秒2008 GMTない後:1月31日夜12時00分○○秒2010 GMT件名:CN = A91872EDサブジェクト公開鍵情報:公開鍵アルゴリズム:rsaEncryption RSA公開鍵:(2048ビット)モジュラス(2048ビット):00:BB:FB:4A:AF:A4:B9:DC:D0:FA: 6F:67:CC:27:39:34:D1:80:40:37:デ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の指数:65537(0x10001)書X509v3拡張子:書X509v3件名キー識別子:F4:97:E0:00:47:2A:ED:0F:B8:EC:8C:0C:0B:90:89:20:9A:FA:10:9B

       X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

X509v3 Key Usage: critical Certificate Sign, CRL Sign


X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:TRUE


X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: URI:rsync:// D60311DCAB08F31979BDBE39/CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNe VWGvnFX_0s.crl

書X509v3 CRL配布ポイント:URI:rsyncを:// D60311DCAB08F31979BDBE39 / CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNe VWGvnFX_0s.crl

Authority Information Access: CA Issuers - URI:rsync:// itory/8BDFC7DED5FD11DCB14CF4B1A703F9B7/CVP QSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s.cer

機関情報アクセス:CAの発行者 - URI:rsyncを:// itory / 8BDFC7DED5FD11DCB14CF4B1A703F9B7 / CVP QSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s.cer

X509v3 Certificate Policies: critical Policy:


Subject Information Access: CA Repository - URI:rsync:// ber_repository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD81 3F432B2086D636/ Manifest - URI:rsync:// epository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD813F432 B2086D636/9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.mft

件名情報アクセス:CAリポジトリ - URI:rsyncを:// ber_repository / A91872ED / 06A83982887911DD81 3F432B2086D636 /マニフェスト - URI:rsyncを:// epository / A91872ED / 06A83982887911DD813F432 B2086D636 / 9JfgAEcq7Q -47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.mft

sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical Autonomous System Numbers: 24021 38610 131072 131074

sbgp-autonomousSysNum:クリティカルな自律システム番号:24021 38610 131072 131074

sbgp-ipAddrBlock: critical IPv4:


Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 51:4c:77:e4:21:64:80:e9:35:30:20:9f:d8:4b:88:60:b8:1f: 73:24:9d:b5:17:60:65:6a:28:cc:43:4b:68:97:ca:76:07:eb: dc:bd:a2:08:3c:8c:56:38:c6:0a:1e:a8:af:f5:b9:42:02:6b: 77:e0:b1:1c:4a:88:e6:6f:b6:17:d3:59:41:d7:a0:62:86:59: 29:79:26:76:34:d1:16:2d:75:05:cb:b2:99:bf:ca:c6:68:1b: b6:a9:b0:f4:43:2e:df:e3:7f:3c:b3:72:1a:99:fa:5d:94:a1: eb:57:9c:9a:2c:87:d6:40:32:c9:ff:a6:54:b8:91:87:fd:90: 55:ef:12:3e:1e:2e:cf:c5:ea:c3:4c:09:62:4f:88:00:a0:7f: cd:67:83:bc:27:e1:74:2c:18:4e:3f:12:1d:ef:29:0f:e3:27: 00:ce:14:eb:f0:01:f0:36:25:a2:33:a8:c6:2f:31:18:22:30: cf:ca:97:43:ed:84:75:53:ab:b7:6c:75:f7:2f:55:5c:2e:82: 0a:be:91:59:bf:c9:06:ef:bb:b4:a2:71:9e:03:b1:25:8e:29: 7a:30:88:66:b4:f2:16:6e:df:ad:78:ff:d3:b2:9c:29:48:e3: be:87:5c:fc:20:2b:df:da:ca:30:58:c3:04:c9:63:72:48:8c: 0a:5f:97:71

署名アルゴリズム:sha256WithRSAEncryption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c):2E:82: 0A:である:59:91 BF:C9:06:EF:BB:B4:A2:71:9E:03:B1:25:8E:29:7A:30:88:66:B4:F2:16: 6E:DF:広告:78:FF:D3:B2:9C:29:48:E3:である:87:5(c):FC:20:2B:DF:DA:CA:30:58:C3:04:C9: 63:72:48:8C:0A:5F:71:97

Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List


The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.


CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl Data: Version: 2 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c CRLNumber: 4 Revoked Certificates: 1 Serial Number: 1 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT Serial Number: 2 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT Serial Number: 4 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT Signature: b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: d9

CRL名:q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crlデータ:バージョン:2署名アルゴリズム:ハッシュ:SHA256、暗号化:RSA発行者:CN =デモ制作APNICのCA - 未本当の使用のために、E=ca@apnic.netこの更新:7月27日(木)06: 30:34 GMT 2006次の更新:金7月28日午前6時30分34秒2006 GMT局キー識別子:キー識別子:AB:AE:88:広告:64:86:B8:11:3B:8E:AC:7cは:3C :05:07:02:51:C2:A9:1C CRLNumber:4失効した証明書:1シリアル番号:1失効日:月7月17日午前5時10分19秒2006 GMTシリアル番号:2失効日:月7月17日05: 12:25 2006 GMTシリアル番号:4失効日:月7月17日午前五時40分39秒2006 GMT署名:B2:5A:E8:7cは:BD:A8:00:0F:03:1A:17:FD:40:図2c:46:0E:D5:64:87:E7:E7:BC:10:7D:B6:3E:39:21:A9:12:F4:5A:D8:B8:D4:BD:57:1A: 7D:2F:7C:0D:C6:4F:27:17:C8:0E:AE:8C:89:FF:00:F7:81:97:C3:A1:6A:0A:F7:D2:46: 06:9A:D1:D5:4D:78:E1:B7:B0:58:4D:09:D6:7C:1E:A0:40:AF:86:5D:8C:C9:48:F6:E6: 20:2E:B9:B6:81:03:0B:51:AC:23:DB:9F:C1:8E:D6:94:54:66:A5:68:52:EE:DD:0F:10: 5D:21:B8:B8:19:FF:29:6F:51:2E:C8:74:5(c):2A:D2:C5: FA:99:EB:C5:C2:A2:D0:96:FC:54:B3:BA:80:4B:92:7F:85:54:76:C9:12:CB:32:EA:1D: 12:7B:F8:F9:A2:5C:A1:B1:06:8E:D8:C5:42:61:00:8C:F6:33:11:29:DF:6E:B2:CC:C3: 7C:D3:F3:0C:8D:5C:49:A5:FB:49:FD:E7:C4:73:68:0A:09:0E:6D:68:A9:06:52:3A:36: 4F:19:47:83:59:DA:02:5B:2A:D0:8A:7A:33:0A:D5:CE:である:B5:A2:7D:8D:59:A1:9D:EE: 60:CE:77:3D:E1:86:9A:84:93:90:9F:34:A7:02:40:59:3A:A5:D1:18:FB:6F:FC:AF:D4: 02:D9

Authors' Addresses


Geoff Huston APNIC


EMail: URI:

電子メール URI:

George Michaelson APNIC


EMail: URI:

電子メール URI:

Robert Loomans APNIC

ロバートLoomans APNIC

EMail: URI:

電子メール URI: