RFC 6818 - Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile 日本語訳

原文URL : https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6818
タイトル : RFC 6818 - インターネットX.509公開鍵インフラストラクチャ証明書および証明書失効リスト（CRL）プロファイルの更新
翻訳編集 : 自動生成

[要約] RFC 6818は、インターネットX.509公開鍵基盤証明書および証明書失効リスト（CRL）プロファイルの更新を提案しています。このRFCの目的は、証明書とCRLのプロファイルを改善し、セキュリティと信頼性を向上させることです。

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                            P. Yee
Request for Comments: 6818                                        AKAYLA
Updates: 5280                                               January 2013
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile

インターネットX.509公開鍵インフラストラクチャ証明書および証明書失効リスト（CRL）プロファイルの更新

Abstract

概要

This document updates RFC 5280, the "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". This document changes the set of acceptable encoding methods for the explicitText field of the user notice policy qualifier and clarifies the rules for converting internationalized domain name labels to ASCII. This document also provides some clarifications on the use of self-signed certificates, trust anchors, and some updated security considerations.

このドキュメントは、RFC 5280の「インターネットX.509公開鍵インフラストラクチャ証明書および証明書失効リスト（CRL）プロファイル」を更新します。このドキュメントでは、ユーザー通知ポリシー修飾子のexplicitTextフィールドの受け入れ可能なエンコーディングメソッドのセットを変更し、国際化ドメイン名ラベルをASCIIに変換するためのルールを明確にします。このドキュメントでは、自己署名証明書、トラストアンカー、および更新されたセキュリティに関する考慮事項の使用についても説明します。

Status of This Memo

本文書の状態

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

これはInternet Standards Trackドキュメントです。

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

このドキュメントは、IETF（Internet Engineering Task Force）の製品です。これは、IETFコミュニティのコンセンサスを表しています。公開レビューを受け、インターネットエンジニアリングステアリンググループ（IESG）による公開が承認されました。インターネット標準の詳細については、RFC 5741のセクション2をご覧ください。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6818.

このドキュメントの現在のステータス、エラータ、およびフィードバックの提供方法に関する情報は、http：//www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6818で入手できます。

著作権表示

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

この文書は、BCP 78およびこの文書の発行日に有効なIETF文書に関するIETFトラストの法的規定（http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info）の対象となります。これらのドキュメントは、このドキュメントに関するあなたの権利と制限を説明しているため、注意深く確認してください。このドキュメントから抽出されたコードコンポーネントには、Trust Legal Provisionsのセクション4.eに記載されているSimplified BSD Licenseのテキストが含まれている必要があり、Simplified BSD Licenseに記載されているように保証なしで提供されます。

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................2
      1.1. Terminology ................................................3
   2. Update to RFC 5280, Section 3.2: "Certification Paths and Trust" 3
   3. Update to RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.4: "Certificate Policies" .....3
   4. Update to RFC 5280, Section 6.2: "Using the Path Validation
      Algorithm" ......................................................4
   5. Update to RFC 5280, Section 7.3: "Internationalized
      Domain Names in Distinguished Names" ............................5
   6. Security Considerations .........................................5
   7. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.1: "Normative References" ........7
   8. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.2: "Informative References" ......7
   9. References ......................................................7
      9.1. Normative References .......................................7
      9.2. Informative References .....................................7
  10. Acknowledgements ................................................8

1. Introduction

1. はじめに

This document updates the "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280].

このドキュメントは、「インターネットX.509公開鍵インフラストラクチャ証明書および証明書失効リスト（CRL）プロファイル」[RFC5280]を更新します。

This document makes a recommendation that self-signed certificates used to convey trust anchor data be marked as certificate authority (CA) certificates, which is not always current practice.

このドキュメントでは、トラストアンカーデータの伝達に使用される自己署名証明書を認証局（CA）証明書としてマークすることを推奨していますが、これは常に現在の慣例ではありません。

The use of self-signed certificates as trust anchors in Section 6.2 of [RFC5280] is clarified. While it is optional to use additional information in these certificates in the path validation process, [RFC5937] is noted as providing guidance in that regard.

[RFC5280]のセクション6.2のトラストアンカーとしての自己署名証明書の使用が明確になりました。パス検証プロセスでこれらの証明書の追加情報を使用することはオプションですが、[RFC5937]はその点に関するガイダンスを提供するものとして記載されています。

The acceptable and unacceptable encodings for the explicitText field of the user notice policy qualifier are updated to bring them in line with existing practice.

ユーザー通知ポリシー修飾子のexplicitTextフィールドの受け入れ可能なエンコーディングと受け入れられないエンコーディングが更新され、既存の慣行と一致するようになりました。

The rules in Section 7.3 of [RFC5280] for ASCII encoding of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) as Distinguished Names are aligned with the rules in Section 7.2 of that document that govern IDN encoding as GeneralNames.

識別名としての国際化ドメイン名（IDN）のASCIIエンコードに関する[RFC5280]のセクション7.3のルールは、GeneralNamesとしてのIDNエンコードを管理するそのドキュメントのセクション7.2のルールと整合しています。

In light of some observed attacks [Prins], the Security Considerations section now gives added depth to the consequences of CA key compromise. This section additionally notes that collision resistance is not a required property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key identifiers.

観察されたいくつかの攻撃[プリン]に照らして、[セキュリティに関する考慮事項]セクションでは、CAキーの侵害の結果にさらに深みを与えています。このセクションでは、キー識別子の生成に使用される場合、一方向ハッシュ関数の衝突耐性は必須のプロパティではないことにも注意してください。

This document also adds normative and informative references for Trust Anchor formats and how they may be used to initialize the path validation inputs. These are needed as a result of the changes made in Section 4 of this document.

このドキュメントでは、トラストアンカー形式の規範的で有益な参照と、それらを使用してパス検証入力を初期化する方法についても説明します。これらは、このドキュメントのセクション4で行われた変更の結果として必要です。

1.1. Terminology

1.1. 用語

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

このドキュメントのキーワード「MUST」、「MUST NOT」、「REQUIRED」、「SHALL」、「SHALL NOT」、「SHOULD」、「SHOULD NOT」、「RECOMMENDED」、「MAY」、および「OPTIONAL」は、 RFC 2119 [RFC2119]で説明されているように解釈されます。

2. Update to RFC 5280, Section 3.2: "Certification Paths and Trust"

2. RFC 5280のセクション3.2への更新：「認証パスと信頼」

Add the following paragraph to the end of RFC 5280, Section 3.2:

RFC 5280のセクション3.2の最後に次の段落を追加します。

| Consistent with Section 3.4.61 of X.509 (11/2008) [X.509], we note
| that use of self-issued certificates and self-signed certificates
| issued by entities other than CAs are outside the scope of this
| specification.  Thus, for example, a web server or client might
| generate a self-signed certificate to identify itself.  These
| certificates and how a relying party uses them to authenticate
| asserted identities are both outside the scope of RFC 5280.

3. Update to RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.4: "Certificate Policies"

3. RFC 5280のセクション4.2.1.4への更新：「証明書ポリシー」

RFC 5280, Section 4.2.1.4, the tenth paragraph says:

RFC 5280のセクション4.2.1.4の10番目の段落には、次のように記載されています。

  An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in
  the certificate.  The explicitText field is a string with a
  maximum size of 200 characters.  Conforming CAs SHOULD use the
| UTF8String encoding for explicitText, but MAY use IA5String.
| Conforming CAs MUST NOT encode explicitText as VisibleString or
| BMPString.  The explicitText string SHOULD NOT include any control

| characters (e.g., U+0000 to U+001F and U+007F to U+009F). When | the UTF8String encoding is used, all character sequences SHOULD be normalized according to Unicode normalization form C (NFC) [NFC].

|文字（例：U + 0000からU + 001FおよびU + 007FからU + 009F）。いつ| UTF8Stringエンコーディングが使用されます。すべての文字シーケンスは、Unicode正規化形式C（NFC）[NFC]に従って正規化する必要があります（SHOULD）。

This paragraph is replaced with:

この段落は次のように置き換えられます：

  An explicitText field includes the textual statement directly in
  the certificate.  The explicitText field is a string with a
  maximum size of 200 characters.  Conforming CAs SHOULD use the
| UTF8String encoding for explicitText.  VisibleString or BMPString
| are acceptable but less preferred alternatives.  Conforming CAs
| MUST NOT encode explicitText as IA5String.  The explicitText string
| SHOULD NOT include any control characters (e.g., U+0000 to U+001F
| and U+007F to U+009F).  When the UTF8String or BMPString encoding
  is used, all character sequences SHOULD be normalized according
  to Unicode normalization form C (NFC) [NFC].

4. Update to RFC 5280, Section 6.2: "Using the Path Validation Algorithm"

4. RFC 5280のセクション6.2への更新：「パス検証アルゴリズムの使用」

RFC 5280, Section 6.2, the third paragraph says:

RFC 5280、セクション6.2、3番目の段落は次のように述べています。

  Where a CA distributes self-signed certificates to specify trust
  anchor information, certificate extensions can be used to specify
  recommended inputs to path validation.  For example, a policy
  constraints extension could be included in the self-signed
  certificate to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor
  should be trusted only for the specified policies.  Similarly, a name
  constraints extension could be included to indicate that paths
  beginning with this trust anchor should be trusted only for the
  specified name spaces.  The path validation algorithm presented in
  Section 6.1 does not assume that trust anchor information is provided
  in self-signed certificates and does not specify processing rules for
| additional information included in such certificates.
| Implementations that use self-signed certificates to specify trust
| anchor information are free to process or ignore such information.

This paragraph is replaced with:

この段落は次のように置き換えられます：

Where a CA distributes self-signed certificates to specify trust anchor information, certificate extensions can be used to specify recommended inputs to path validation. For example, a policy constraints extension could be included in the self-signed certificate to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor should be trusted only for the specified policies. Similarly, a name constraints extension could be included to indicate that paths beginning with this trust anchor should be trusted only for the specified name spaces. The path validation algorithm presented in

CAがトラストアンカー情報を指定するために自己署名証明書を配布する場合、証明書拡張機能を使用して、パス検証への推奨入力を指定できます。たとえば、ポリシー制約拡張を自己署名証明書に含めて、このトラストアンカーで始まるパスを、指定されたポリシーに対してのみ信頼する必要があることを示すことができます。同様に、このトラストアンカーで始まるパスを、指定された名前空間に対してのみ信頼する必要があることを示すために、名前制約拡張を含めることができます。に示されているパス検証アルゴリズム

  Section 6.1 does not assume that trust anchor information is provided
| in self-signed certificates and does not specify processing rules for
| additional information included in such certificates.
| However, [RFC5914] defines several formats for representing trust
| anchor information, including self-signed certificates, and [RFC5937]
| provides an example of how such information may be used to initialize
| the path validation inputs.  Implementations are free to make use of
| any additional information that is included in a trust anchor
| representation, or to ignore such information.

5. Update to RFC 5280, Section 7.3: "Internationalized Domain Names in Distinguished Names"

5. RFC 5280のセクション7.3への更新：「識別名の国際化ドメイン名」

RFC 5280, Section 7.3, the first paragraph says:

RFC 5280、セクション7.3、最初の段落は次のように述べています。

  Domain Names may also be represented as distinguished names using
  domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the
  subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension.  As with
  the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute is
  defined as an IA5String.  Each domainComponent attribute represents a
  single label.  To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished
  name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion
| specified in Section 4.1 of RFC 3490.  The label SHALL be considered
| a "stored string".  That is, the AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be
| set.

This paragraph is replaced with:

この段落は次のように置き換えられます：

  Domain Names may also be represented as distinguished names using
  domain components in the subject field, the issuer field, the
  subjectAltName extension, or the issuerAltName extension.  As with
  the dNSName in the GeneralName type, the value of this attribute is
  defined as an IA5String.  Each domainComponent attribute represents a
  single label.  To represent a label from an IDN in the distinguished
  name, the implementation MUST perform the "ToASCII" label conversion
| specified in Section 4.1 of RFC 3490 with the UseSTD3ASCIIRules flag
| set.  The label SHALL be considered a "stored string".  That is, the
| AllowUnassigned flag SHALL NOT be set.  The conversion process is the
| same as is performed in step 4 in Section 7.2.

6. Security Considerations

6. セキュリティに関する考慮事項

This document modifies the Security Considerations section of RFC 5280 as follows. The fifth paragraph of the Security Considerations section of RFC 5280 says:

このドキュメントでは、RFC 5280のセキュリティに関する考慮事項のセクションを次のように変更します。 RFC 5280のセキュリティに関する考慮事項セクションの5番目の段落は、次のように述べています。

  The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor.
  On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will
  permit an attacker to masquerade as them or decrypt their personal
  information.  On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing
| key may have a catastrophic effect.  If an attacker obtains the
| private key unnoticed, the attacker may issue bogus certificates and
| CRLs.  Existence of bogus certificates and CRLs will undermine
| confidence in the system.  If such a compromise is detected, all
| certificates issued to the compromised CA MUST be revoked, preventing
| services between its users and users of other CAs.  Rebuilding after
| such a compromise will be problematic, so CAs are advised to
| implement a combination of strong technical measures (e.g., tamper-
| resistant cryptographic modules) and appropriate management
| procedures (e.g., separation of duties) to avoid such an incident.

This paragraph is replaced with:

この段落は次のように置き換えられます：

  The protection afforded private keys is a critical security factor.
  On a small scale, failure of users to protect their private keys will
  permit an attacker to masquerade as them or decrypt their personal
  information.  On a larger scale, compromise of a CA's private signing
  key may have a catastrophic effect.
|
| If an attacker obtains the private key of a CA unnoticed, the
| attacker may issue bogus certificates and CRLs.  Even if an attacker
| is unable to obtain a copy of a CA's private key, the attacker may be
| able to issue bogus certificates and CRLs by making unauthorized use
| of the CA's workstation or of an RA's workstation.  Such an attack
| may be the result of an attacker obtaining unauthorized access to the
| workstation, either locally or remotely, or may be the result of
| inappropriate activity by an insider.  Existence of bogus
| certificates and CRLs will undermine confidence in the system.  Among
| many other possible attacks, the attacker may issue bogus
| certificates that have the same subject names as legitimate
| certificates in order impersonate legitimate certificate subjects.
| This could include bogus CA certificates in which the subject names
| in the bogus certificates match the names under which legitimate CAs
| issue certificates and CRLs.  This would allow the attacker to issue
| bogus certificates and CRLs that have the same issuer names, and
| possibly the same serial numbers, as certificates and CRLs issued by
| legitimate CAs.

The following text is added to the end of the Security Considerations section of 5280:

5280の[セキュリティに関する考慮事項]セクションの最後に次のテキストが追加されました。

| One-way hash functions are commonly used to generate key identifier
| values (AKI and SKI), e.g., as described in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
| However, none of the security properties of such functions are
| required for this context.

7. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.1: "Normative References"

7. RFC 5280のセクション11.1への更新：「規定の参照」

[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Format", RFC 5914, June 2010.

[RFC5914] Housley、R.、Ashmore、S。、およびC. Wallace、「Trust Anchor Format」、RFC 5914、2010年6月。

8. Update to RFC 5280, Section 11.2: "Informative References"

8. RFC 5280のセクション11.2への更新：「参考情報」

[RFC5937] Ashmore, S. and C. Wallace, "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing", RFC 5937, August 2010.

[RFC5937] Ashmore、S. and C. Wallace、 "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing"、RFC 5937、August 2010。

9. References

9. 参考文献

9.1. Normative References

9.1. 引用文献

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2119] Bradner、S。、「要件レベルを示すためにRFCで使用するキーワード」、BCP 14、RFC 2119、1997年3月。

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

[RFC5280] Cooper、D.、Santesson、S.、Farrell、S.、Boeyen、S.、Housley、R。、およびW. Polk、「Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List（CRL）Profile "、RFC 5280、2008年5月。

[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Format", RFC 5914, June 2010.

[RFC5914] Housley、R.、Ashmore、S。、およびC. Wallace、「Trust Anchor Format」、RFC 5914、2010年6月。

[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2008) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2008, Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.

[X.509] ITU-T勧告X.509（2008）| ISO / IEC 9594-8：2008、情報技術-オープンシステム相互接続-ディレクトリ：公開鍵および属性証明書フレームワーク。

9.2. Informative References

9.2. 参考引用

[RFC5937] Ashmore, S. and C. Wallace, "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing", RFC 5937, August 2010.

[RFC5937] Ashmore、S. and C. Wallace、 "Using Trust Anchor Constraints during Certification Path Processing"、RFC 5937、August 2010。

[Prins] Prins, J. R., "DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach 'Operation Black Tulip'", September 2011, <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/ documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/ 09/05/diginotar-public-report-version-1/ rapport-fox-it-operation-black-tulip-v1-0.pdf>.

[プリンス] Prins、JR、「DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach 'Operation Black Tulip'」、2011年9月、<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ dossiers / documents-en-publications / reports / 2011/09/05 / diginotar -public-report-version-1 / report-fox-it-operation-black-tulip-v1-0.pdf>。

[NFC] Davis, M. and M. Duerst, "Unicode Standard Annex #15: Unicode Normalization Forms", October 2006, <http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.

[NFC] Davis、M.およびM. Duerst、「Unicode Standard Annex＃15：Unicode Normalization Forms」、2006年10月、<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>。

10. Acknowledgements

10. 謝辞

David Cooper is acknowledged for his fine work in editing previous versions of this document.

デビッドクーパーは、このドキュメントの以前のバージョンの編集における彼のすばらしい仕事で認められています。

Author's Address

著者のアドレス

Peter E. Yee AKAYLA 7150 Moorland Drive Clarksville, MD 21029 USA EMail: peter@akayla.com

Peter E. Yee AKAYLA 7150 Moorland Driveクラークスビル、MD 21029米国Eメール：peter@akayla.com