Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Sharma, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9654 Netskope Inc
Obsoletes: 8954 August 2024
Updates: 6960
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used to check the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP request message.
RFC 8954オンライン証明書ステータスプロトコル（OCSP）のオプションのNonCE拡張機能にサイズの制約を課しました。OCSPは証明書のステータスを確認するために使用され、NonCE拡張子は特定のOCSP要求メッセージにOCSP応答メッセージを暗号化するために使用されます。
Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce value that is longer than 32 octets. This document also modifies the "Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the encoding format and values for easier implementation and understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.
一部の環境では、32オクテットより長いノンセ値を生成する暗号化アルゴリズムを使用しています。このドキュメントは、RFC 6960の「NonCE」セクションを変更して、実装と理解を容易にするためのエンコード形式と値を明確に定義および区別します。このドキュメントは、OCSPの更新されたASN.1モジュールとRFC 6960を更新するRFC 8954を廃止します。
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
これは、インターネット標準トラックドキュメントです。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
このドキュメントは、インターネットエンジニアリングタスクフォース（IETF）の製品です。IETFコミュニティのコンセンサスを表しています。公開レビューを受けており、インターネットエンジニアリングステアリンググループ（IESG）からの出版が承認されています。インターネット標準の詳細については、RFC 7841のセクション2で入手できます。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654.
このドキュメントの現在のステータス、任意のERRATA、およびそのフィードバックを提供する方法に関する情報は、https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654で取得できます。
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
著作権（c）2024 IETF Trustおよび文書著者として特定された人。無断転載を禁じます。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
このドキュメントは、BCP 78およびIETFドキュメント（https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info）に関連するIETF Trustの法的規定の対象となります。この文書に関するあなたの権利と制限を説明するので、これらの文書を注意深く確認してください。このドキュメントから抽出されたコードコンポーネントには、セクション4.Eで説明されている法的規定のセクション4.Eで説明されており、修正されたBSDライセンスで説明されている保証なしで提供されるように、改訂されたBSDライセンステキストを含める必要があります。
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. OCSP Extensions
2.1. Nonce Extension
3. Security Considerations
3.1. Replay Attack
4. IANA Considerations
5. References
5.1. Normative References
5.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
Acknowledgements
Author's Address
The Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960]. The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a response. It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids replay attacks. This extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954] limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP requester and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.
NonCe拡張は、[RFC6960]のセクション4.4.1で以前に定義されていました。NonCEは暗号化されてOCSPリクエストと応答を結合します。OCSP応答の新鮮さを保証し、リプレイ攻撃を回避します。この拡張機能は[RFC8954]で更新されました。[RFC8954]は、最大NONCEの長さを32オクテットに制限します。32オクテットより長いノンセを生成する暗号化アルゴリズムをサポートするために、このドキュメントでは、非CEの最大許可されたサイズを128オクテットに更新します。さらに、このドキュメントでは、OCSPリクエストターとレスポンダーが最小長さ32オクテットのNonCEを使用することを推奨しています。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
「必須」、「必要」、「必須」、「shall」、「shall」、「suff」、 "not"、 "becommended"、 "becommented"、 "may"、 "optional「このドキュメントでは、BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174]で説明されているように解釈されます。
The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in [RFC6960] and the Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] to limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the specifications of any of the other extensions defined in [RFC6960].
OCSPリクエストと応答のメッセージ形式は[RFC6960]で定義されており、NonCe拡張機能は[RFC8954]で更新されました。[RFC6960]は、X.509バージョン3証明書で採用されている拡張モデルに基づいて、OCSPメッセージの標準拡張機能も定義します（[RFC5280]を参照）。[RFC8954]は[RFC6960]のセクション4.4.1を置き換えて、NonCE値の最小長と最大長を制限します。このドキュメントは、許容される最大NONCEの長さを128オクテットに拡張し、[RFC6960]で定義されている他の拡張機能の仕様を変更しません。
The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as one of the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce, while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce. If the Nonce extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1 octet and can be up to 128 octets. Implementations compliant with [RFC8954] will not be able to process nonces generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified in [RFC8954].
NONCEは、リクエストとリプレイ攻撃を防ぐためのリクエストと応答を暗号化します。Nonceは、リクエストのRequestExtensionsの1つとして含まれています。応答では、ResponseExtensionsの1つとして含まれています。リクエストと応答の両方で、nonceはオブジェクト識別子ID-PKIX-OCSP-Nonceによって識別され、extnValueは非CEのエンコード値です。NonCe拡張が存在する場合、NonCeの長さは少なくとも1オクテットでなければならず、最大128オクテットにすることができます。[RFC8954]に準拠した実装は、[RFC8954]で指定された制限（32オクテット）を超えるサイズで、新しい仕様ごとに生成された非速度を処理することはできません。
An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document MUST use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension.
このドキュメントの拡張機能を実装するOCSPリクエスト担当者は、NonCe拡張機能のNonCEに対して32オクテットの最小長さを使用する必要があります。
An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension MUST accept Nonce lengths of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. A responder MAY choose to respond without the Nonce extension for requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and 15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.
NonCE拡張をサポートするOCSP Responderは、少なくとも16オクテットのNonCe長を受け入れ、32オクテットを含む必要があります。Responderは、NonCeの長さが1オクテットと15オクテットまたは33オクテットと128オクテットの間にある要求に対して、NonCe拡張機能なしで応答することを選択できます。
Responders that implement the extension in this document MUST reject any OCSP request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or greater than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
このドキュメントに拡張機能を実装するレスポンダーは、[RFC6960]のセクション4.2.1で説明されているように、MalformedRequest Ocspresponsestatusを使用して、0オクテットまたは128オクテットを超えるノンセを持つOCSP要求を拒否する必要があります。
The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility with older OCSP requesters that follow [RFC6960].
非CEの値は、暗号化的に強力な擬似ランダム数ジェネレーターを使用して生成する必要があります（[RFC4086]を参照）。1オクテットの最小nonce長は、[RFC6960]に続く古いOCSPリクエストターとの後方互換性を提供するために定義されます。
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a 32-octet Nonce in hexadecimal format.
以下は、16進形式の32オクテットのnonCEを備えたエンコードされたOCSP NonCE拡張の例です。
30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
c8
Here is the decoded version of the above example. Offset, Length, and Object Identifier are in decimal.
上記の例のデコードされたバージョンは次のとおりです。オフセット、長さ、およびオブジェクト識別子は小数点です。
Offset Length
0 47 : SEQUENCE {
2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
: (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
15 32 : OCTET STRING
: DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
: E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
: }
: }
The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid. Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that the response is the most recent response from the server and not an old copy.
一般に、OCSPのセキュリティ上の考慮事項は[RFC6960]で説明されています。証明書の以前のOCSP応答が期限切れになっていないが、その証明書のステータスが変更された間隔では、そのOCSP応答のコピーを使用して、証明書のステータスがまだ有効であることを示すことができます。OCSP応答に要求者のNonCE値を含めることで、応答が古いコピーではなくサーバーからの最新の応答であることが保証されます。
The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request and respond with an earlier response from the server without the Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields in the OCSP response.
NonCe拡張機能は、リプレイ攻撃を避けるために使用されます。OCSPレスポンダーは、要求者がリクエスト[RFC5019]にNonCE拡張機能を送信した場合でも、OCSP応答でNonCE拡張機能を送信しないことを選択する可能性があるため、Path On-Pathの攻撃者はOCSP要求を傍受し、以前の応答で応答できます。NONCE拡張機能のないサーバー。これは、OCSP応答のこのフィールドとnextupDateフィールドの間に短時間間隔を使用するようにサーバーを構成することで軽減できます。
For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes A.1 and A.2, IANA has assigned the following object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0):
付録A.1およびA.2のASN.1モジュールの場合、IANAは「PKIXモジュール識別子のSMIセキュリティ」レジストリ（1.3.6.1.1.5.5.7.0）に次のオブジェクト識別子（OID）を割り当てました。
+=======+=====================+
| Value | Description |
+=======+=====================+
| 111 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-88 |
+-------+---------------------+
| 112 | id-mod-ocsp-2024-08 |
+-------+---------------------+
Table 1
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.
[Err5891] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the entirety of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata ID 5891 [Err5891] as well.
このセクションには、OCSPのASN.1モジュールが含まれ、[RFC8954]のセクション5全体を置き換えます。Errata ID 5891 [ERR5891]も対処します。
Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998 version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module replaces the module in Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].
付録A.1には、OCSPのすべての構文要素について、1998年のASN.1のバージョンに準拠するASN.1モジュールが含まれています。このモジュールは、[RFC6960]の付録B.1のモジュールを置き換えます。
Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module present in Appendix A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1. This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module per the policy of the PKIX Working Group.
付録A.2には、ASN.1の2008バージョンに準拠する付録A.1に存在するモジュールに対応するASN.1モジュールが含まれています。このモジュールは、[RFC5912]のセクション4のモジュールと[RFC6960]の付録B.2を置き換えます。2008 ASN.1モジュールが提供されていますが、付録A.1のモジュールは、PKIXワーキンググループのポリシーごとに標準モジュールのままです。
OCSP-2024-88
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
response OCTET STRING }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
-- The format for GeneralizedTime is
-- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
-- [RFC5280]
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
-- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
-- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
-- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
-- number of unused bits] in the responder's
-- certificate)
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }
-- Object Identifiers
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END
OCSP-2024-08
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
Extensions{}, EXTENSION
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }
Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
... }} OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))
Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
... }} OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType RESPONSE.&id ({ResponseSet}),
response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
&Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}
basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
{ BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{ sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithMD5 |
sa-rsaWithMD2,
... }},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-nonce |
re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
... }} OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
-- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
-- (excluding the tag and length and number
-- of unused bits)
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{ re-ocsp-crl |
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
CrlEntryExtensions,
... }} OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
OPTIONAL }
-- Certificate Extensions
ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }
-- Request Extensions
re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }
re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-response }
re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
-- Response Extensions
re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }
-- Object Identifiers
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END
The authors of this document thank Mohit Sahni for his work to produce [RFC8954].
この文書の著者は、Mohit Sahniが彼の作品を生産してくれたことに感謝します[RFC8954]。
The authors also thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns, Tomas Gustavsson, and Carl Wallace for their feedback and suggestions.
著者はまた、Russ Housley、Corey Bonnell、Michael Stjohns、Tomas Gustavsson、Carl Wallaceのフィードバックと提案に感謝します。
Himanshu Sharma (editor)
Netskope Inc
2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
Santa Clara, California 95054
United States of America
Email: himanshu@netskope.com
URI: www.netskope.com