[要約] RFC 10015は、(D)TLS 1.2における有限体上のDiffie-Hellman (DH)とRSAという2つの鍵交換方式を非推奨とし、静的な楕円曲線Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)を用いる暗号スイートの使用も控えるよう求めます。対象は(D)TLS 1.2のみです。(D)TLS 1.0とTLS 1.1はRFC 8996で非推奨とされており、(D)TLS 1.3は該当するアルゴリズムを使用しないためです。これらの鍵交換方式を使う暗号スイートの扱いを改めるため、RFC 4162、4279、4346、4785、5246、5288、5289、5469、5487、5932、6209、6347、6367、6655、7905、8422、9325を更新します。
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) N. Aviram
Request for Comments: 10015 July 2026
Updates: 4162, 4279, 4346, 4785, 5246, 5288,
5289, 5469, 5487, 5932, 6209, 6347,
6367, 6655, 7905, 8422, 9325
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
For (D)TLS 1.2, this document deprecates the use of two key exchanges, namely Diffie-Hellman (DH) over a finite field and RSA. It also discourages the use of static Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) cipher suites.
(D)TLS 1.2 の場合、この文書では 2 つの鍵交換、つまり有限フィールド上の Diffie-Hellman (DH) と RSA の使用を非推奨としています。また、静的楕円曲線ディフィーヘルマン (ECDH) 暗号スイートの使用も妨げられます。
These prescriptions apply only to (D)TLS 1.2, since (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by RFC 8996 and (D)TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithms or does not share the relevant configuration options. (There is no DTLS version 1.1.)
(D)TLS 1.0 と TLS 1.1 は RFC 8996 で非推奨となっており、(D)TLS 1.3 は影響を受けるアルゴリズムを使用していないか、関連する構成オプションを共有していないため、これらの規定は (D)TLS 1.2 にのみ適用されます。(DTLS バージョン 1.1 はありません。)
This document updates RFCs 4162, 4279, 4346, 4785, 5246, 5288, 5289, 5469, 5487, 5932, 6209, 6347, 6367, 6655, 7905, 8422, and 9325 to either deprecate or discourage the use of cipher suites using the above key exchange methods in (D)TLS 1.2 connections.
この文書は、RFC 4162、4279、4346、4785、5246、5288、5289、5469、5487、5932、6209、6347、6367、6655、7905、8422、および 9325 を更新して、非推奨にするか、(D)TLS 1.2 接続では、上記のキー交換方法を使用した暗号スイートの使用を推奨しません。
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
これはインターネット標準化トラックの文書です。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
このドキュメントは Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) の成果物です。これは IETF コミュニティのコンセンサスを表しています。この文書は公開レビューを受け、Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) によって公開が承認されています。インターネット標準の詳細については、RFC 7841 のセクション 2 を参照してください。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10015.
この文書の現在のステータス、正誤表、およびそれに対するフィードバックの提供方法に関する情報は、https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10015 で入手できます。
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust および文書の著者として特定された人物。無断転載を禁じます。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
この文書は、BCP 78 およびこの文書の発行日に有効な IETF 文書に関する IETF トラストの法的規定 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) の対象となります。これらの文書には、この文書に関するお客様の権利と制限が記載されているため、注意深くお読みください。この文書から抽出されたコード コンポーネントには、トラスト法的規定のセクション 4.e に記載されている改訂 BSD ライセンス テキストが含まれている必要があり、改訂 BSD ライセンスに記載されているように保証なしで提供されます。
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
2. Non-Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
3. Ephemeral Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
4. RSA
5. Updates to Cipher Suites and TLS ClientCertificateType
Identifiers
5.1. DH Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document
5.2. ECDH Cipher Suites Whose Use Is Discouraged by This
Document
5.3. DHE Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document
5.4. RSA Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document
5.5. TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Deprecated by This
Document
6. Updates to RFC 9325
7. IANA Considerations
8. Security Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Author's Address
(D)TLS 1.2 supports a variety of key exchange algorithms, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) over a finite field, and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).
(D)TLS 1.2 は、RSA、有限体上の Diffie-Hellman (DH)、楕円曲線 Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) などのさまざまな鍵交換アルゴリズムをサポートします。
DH key exchange, over any group, comes in ephemeral and non-ephemeral varieties. Non-ephemeral DH algorithms use static DH public keys included in the authenticating peer's certificate; see [RFC4492] for discussion. In contrast, ephemeral DH algorithms use ephemeral DH public keys sent in the handshake and authenticated by the peer's certificate. Ephemeral and non-ephemeral finite field DH algorithms are called DHE and DH (or FFDHE and FFDH), respectively, and ephemeral and non-ephemeral elliptic curve DH algorithms are called ECDHE and ECDH, respectively [RFC4492].
DH キー交換には、どのグループに対しても、一時的な種類と非一時的な種類があります。非一時的な DH アルゴリズムは、認証ピアの証明書に含まれる静的な DH 公開キーを使用します。議論については[RFC4492]を参照してください。対照的に、エフェメラル DH アルゴリズムは、ハンドシェイクで送信され、ピアの証明書によって認証されたエフェメラル DH 公開キーを使用します。エフェメラルおよび非エフェメラル有限体 DH アルゴリズムは、それぞれ DHE および DH (または FFDHE および FFDH) と呼ばれ、エフェメラルおよび非エフェメラル楕円曲線 DH アルゴリズムは、それぞれ ECDHE および ECDH と呼ばれます [RFC4492]。
In general, non-ephemeral cipher suites are not recommended due to their lack of forward secrecy. Moreover, as demonstrated by the Raccoon attack [RACCOON] on finite field DH, public key reuse (either via non-ephemeral cipher suites or reused keys with ephemeral cipher suites) can lead to timing side channels that may leak connection secrets. For ECDH, invalid curve attacks similarly exploit secret reuse in order to break security [ICA], further demonstrating the risk of reusing public keys. While both side channels can be avoided in implementations, experience shows that in practice, implementations may fail to thwart such attacks due to the complexity and number of the required mitigations.
一般に、非一時的な暗号スイートは、前方秘匿性がないため推奨されません。さらに、有限体 DH に対するラクーン攻撃 [RACCOON] で実証されているように、公開キーの再利用 (非一時的な暗号スイートを介したもの、または一時的な暗号スイートを使用した再利用されたキーのいずれか) により、接続の秘密が漏洩する可能性のあるタイミング サイド チャネルが発生する可能性があります。ECDH の場合、無効曲線攻撃は同様にセキュリティ [ICA] を破るために秘密の再利用を悪用しており、公開鍵を再利用するリスクをさらに示しています。実装では両方のサイド チャネルを回避できますが、経験上、実際には、必要な緩和策の複雑さと数により、実装ではそのような攻撃を阻止できない可能性があります。
Additionally, RSA key exchange suffers from security problems that are independent of implementation choices as well as problems that stem purely from the difficulty of implementing security countermeasures correctly.
さらに、RSA 鍵交換には、実装の選択とは関係のないセキュリティ上の問題や、純粋にセキュリティ対策を正しく実装することの難しさから生じる問題があります。
At a rough glance, the problems affecting FFDHE in (D)TLS 1.2 are as follows:
(D)TLS 1.2 の FFDHE に影響を与える問題は、大まかに次のとおりです。
1. FFDHE suffers from interoperability problems because there is no mechanism for negotiating the group, and some implementations only support small group sizes (see [RFC7919], Section 1).
1. FFDHE は、グループをネゴシエートするメカニズムがなく、一部の実装では小さなグループ サイズしかサポートしていないため、相互運用性の問題に悩まされています ([RFC7919] のセクション 1 を参照)。
2. FFDHE groups may have small subgroups, which enables several attacks [SUBGROUPS]. When presented with a custom, non-standardized FFDHE group, a handshaking client cannot practically verify that the group chosen by the server does not suffer from this problem. There is also no mechanism for such handshakes to fall back to other key exchange parameters that are acceptable to the client. Custom FFDHE groups are widespread (as a result of advice based on [WEAK-DH]). Therefore, clients cannot simply reject handshakes that present custom, and thus potentially dangerous, groups.
2. FFDHE グループには小さなサブグループが含まれる場合があり、これにより複数の攻撃が可能になります [SUBGROUPS]。カスタムの非標準化 FFDHE グループが提示された場合、ハンドシェイク クライアントは、サーバーによって選択されたグループにこの問題が発生していないことを事実上検証できません。また、このようなハンドシェイクが、クライアントが許容できる他の鍵交換パラメータにフォールバックするメカニズムもありません。カスタム FFDHE グループは ([WEAK-DH] に基づくアドバイスの結果として) 広く普及しています。したがって、クライアントは、習慣的な、したがって潜在的に危険なグループを提示するハンドシェイクを単純に拒否することはできません。
3. In practice, some operators use 1024-bit FFDHE groups since this is the maximum size that ensures wide support (see [RFC7919], Section 1). This size leaves only a small security margin versus the current discrete log record, which stands at 795 bits [DLOG795].
3. 実際には、これが幅広いサポートを保証する最大サイズであるため、一部のオペレータは 1024 ビット FFDHE グループを使用します ([RFC7919] のセクション 1 を参照)。このサイズは、現在の個別ログ レコード (795 ビット [DLOG795]) と比較して、わずかなセキュリティ マージンしか残していません。
4. Expanding on the previous point, just a handful of very large computations allow an attacker to cheaply decrypt a relatively large fraction of FFDHE traffic (namely, traffic encrypted using particular standardized groups) [WEAK-DH].
4. 前の点を拡張すると、ほんの一握りの非常に大規模な計算によって、攻撃者は FFDHE トラフィックの比較的大部分 (つまり、特定の標準化されたグループを使用して暗号化されたトラフィック) を安価に復号化することができます [WEAK-DH]。
5. When secrets are not fully ephemeral, FFDHE suffers from the Raccoon side-channel attack [RACCOON]. (Note that FFDH is inherently vulnerable to the Raccoon attack unless constant-time mitigations are employed.)
5. 秘密が完全に一時的ではない場合、FFDHE は Raccoon サイドチャネル攻撃 [RACCOON] の影響を受けます。(一定時間の緩和策が採用されていない限り、FFDH は本質的に Raccoon 攻撃に対して脆弱であることに注意してください。)
The problems affecting RSA key exchange in (D)TLS 1.2 are as follows:
(D)TLS 1.2 の RSA キー交換に影響する問題は次のとおりです。
1. RSA key exchange offers no forward secrecy, by construction.
1. RSA 鍵交換は、その構造上、前方機密性を提供しません。
2. RSA key exchange may be vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack [BLEI]. Experience shows that variants of this attack arise every few years because implementing the relevant countermeasure correctly is difficult (see [ROBOT], [NEW-BLEI], and [DROWN]).
2. RSA 鍵交換は、Bleichenbacher の攻撃 [BLEI] に対して脆弱である可能性があります。経験によれば、関連する対策を正しく実装するのは難しいため、この攻撃の亜種は数年ごとに発生します ([ROBOT]、[NEW-BLEI]、および [DROWN] を参照)。
3. In addition to the above point, there is no convenient mechanism in (D)TLS 1.2 for the domain separation of keys. Therefore, a single endpoint that is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack would affect all endpoints sharing the same RSA key (see [XPROT] and [DROWN]).
3. 上記の点に加えて、(D)TLS 1.2 にはキーのドメイン分離のための便利なメカニズムがありません。したがって、Bleichenbacher の攻撃に対して脆弱な単一のエンドポイントは、同じ RSA キーを共有するすべてのエンドポイントに影響を及ぼします ([XPROT] および [DROWN] を参照)。
This document updates [RFC4162], [RFC4279], [RFC4346], [RFC4785], [RFC5246], [RFC5288], [RFC5289], [RFC5469], [RFC5487], [RFC5932], [RFC6209], [RFC6347], [RFC6367], [RFC6655], [RFC7905], [RFC8422], and [RFC9325] to remediate the above problems, by deprecating and discouraging the use of affected cipher suites, as listed in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5.
この文書は、[RFC4162]、[RFC4279]、[RFC4346]、[RFC4785]、[RFC5246]、[RFC5288]、[RFC5289]、[RFC5469]、[RFC5487]、[RFC5932]、[RFC6209]、[RFC6347]、[RFC6367]、[RFC6655]、[RFC7905]、[RFC8422]、および [RFC9325] は、セクション 5.2、5.3、5.4、および 5.5 にリストされているように、影響を受ける暗号スイートの使用を非推奨および阻止することによって、上記の問題を修正します。
BCP 195 [RFC8996] [RFC9325] contains the latest IETF recommendations for users of the (D)TLS protocol (and specifically, (D)TLS 1.2), and this document updates [RFC9325] in several points. Section 6 details the exact differences. All other recommendations in the BCP documents remain valid.
BCP 195 [RFC8996] [RFC9325] には、(D)TLS プロトコル (具体的には (D)TLS 1.2) のユーザーに対する最新の IETF 勧告が含まれており、この文書はいくつかの点で [RFC9325] を更新しています。セクション 6 では、正確な違いについて詳しく説明します。BCP 文書内の他のすべての推奨事項は引き続き有効です。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
このドキュメント内のキーワード「MUST」、「MUST NOT」、「REQUIRED」、「SHALL」、「SHALL NOT」、「SHOULD」、「SHOULD NOT」、「RECOMMENDED」、「NOT RECOMMENDED」、「MAY」、および「OPTIONAL」は、ここに示すようにすべて大文字で表示されている場合にのみ、BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] で説明されているように解釈されます。
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select non-ephemeral FFDH cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996], and (D)TLS 1.3 does not support FFDH [RFC9846] [RFC9147].) This includes all cipher suites listed in Table 1 in Section 5.1.
(D)TLS 1.2 接続では、クライアントは非一時的な FFDH 暗号スイートを提供してはならず、サーバーは選択してはなりません。((D)TLS 1.0 および TLS 1.1 は [RFC8996] によって非推奨となり、(D)TLS 1.3 は FFDH [RFC9846] [RFC9147] をサポートしないことに注意してください。) これには、セクション 5.1 の表 1 にリストされているすべての暗号スイートが含まれます。
Clients SHOULD NOT offer and servers SHOULD NOT select non-ephemeral ECDH cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.2 connections. (This requirement is already present in [RFC9325]. Note that (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996], and (D)TLS 1.3 does not support ECDH [RFC9846] [RFC9147].) This includes all cipher suites listed in Table 2 in Section 5.2.
(D)TLS 1.2 接続では、クライアントは非一時的な ECDH 暗号スイートを提供すべきではなく、サーバーも選択すべきではありません。(この要件はすでに [RFC9325] に存在します。(D)TLS 1.0 および TLS 1.1 は [RFC8996] によって非推奨となり、(D)TLS 1.3 は ECDH [RFC9846] [RFC9147] をサポートしていないことに注意してください。) これには、セクション 5.2 の表 2 にリストされているすべての暗号スイートが含まれます。
In addition, to avoid the use of non-ephemeral DH, clients SHOULD NOT use and servers SHOULD NOT accept certificates with fixed DH parameters. These certificate types are rsa_fixed_dh, dss_fixed_dh, rsa_fixed_ecdh, and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh as listed in Section 5.5. These values only apply to (D)TLS versions of 1.2 and below.
さらに、非一時的な DH の使用を避けるために、クライアントは使用すべきではなく、サーバーは固定 DH パラメータを持つ証明書を受け入れるべきではありません。これらの証明書タイプは、セクション 5.5 にリストされているように、rsa_fixed_dh、dss_fixed_dh、rsa_fixed_ecdh、および ecdsa_fixed_ecdh です。これらの値は、(D)TLS バージョン 1.2 以下にのみ適用されます。
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select FFDHE cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.2 connections. This includes all cipher suites listed in Table 3 in Section 5.3. (Note that (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996].) FFDHE cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.3 do not suffer from the problems presented in Section 1; see [RFC9846] and [RFC9147]. Therefore, clients and servers MAY offer FFDHE cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.3 connections.
(D)TLS 1.2 接続では、クライアントは FFDHE 暗号スイートを提供してはならず、サーバーは FFDHE 暗号スイートを選択してはなりません。これには、セクション 5.3 の表 3 にリストされているすべての暗号スイートが含まれます。((D)TLS 1.0 および TLS 1.1 は [RFC8996] によって非推奨であることに注意してください。) (D)TLS 1.3 の FFDHE 暗号スイートには、セクション 1 で示された問題は発生しません。[RFC9846] および [RFC9147] を参照してください。したがって、クライアントとサーバーは、(D)TLS 1.3 接続で FFDHE 暗号スイートを提供してもよい(MAY)。
Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select RSA cipher suites in (D)TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that (D)TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996], and (D)TLS 1.3 does not support static RSA [RFC9846] [RFC9147].) This includes all cipher suites listed in Table 4 in Section 5.4. Note that these cipher suites were previously marked as not recommended in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY].
(D)TLS 1.2 接続では、クライアントは RSA 暗号スイートを提供してはならず、サーバーは RSA 暗号スイートを選択してはなりません。((D)TLS 1.0 および TLS 1.1 は [RFC8996] によって非推奨となり、(D)TLS 1.3 は静的 RSA [RFC9846] [RFC9147] をサポートしないことに注意してください。) これには、セクション 5.4 の表 4 にリストされているすべての暗号スイートが含まれます。これらの暗号スイートは、以前に「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] で非推奨としてマークされていたことに注意してください。
The following subsections mention the use of "D" in the "Recommended" column of the "TLS Cipher Suites" and "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registries [TLS-REGISTRY]. See [RFC9847] for information on the use of the "D".
次のサブセクションでは、「TLS Cipher Suites」および「TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の「推奨」列での「D」の使用について説明します。「D」の使用については、[RFC9847] を参照してください。
IANA has set the "Recommended" column to "D" and added this document as a reference for the following entries in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY]:
IANA は、「推奨」列を「D」に設定し、この文書を「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の次のエントリの参照として追加しました。
+==========================================+=====================+
| Cipher Suite | Reference |
+==========================================+=====================+
| TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 | [RFC4346] [RFC6347] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 | [RFC5246] [RFC6347] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+------------------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 1
[RFC9325] specifies that implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate the following cipher suites; accordingly, they appeared with "N" in the "Recommended" column in the IANA "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY]. Per this document, IANA has updated them to have "D" in the "Recommended" column to align with [RFC9847] (and added this document as a reference for each). This document also records the rationale for discouraging use of these cipher suites, and it cites prior analyses and attacks that demonstrate the associated risks (see Section 8).
[RFC9325] は、実装が以下の暗号スイートをネゴシエートすべきではない(SHOULD NOT)と規定しています。したがって、これらは、IANA「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の「推奨」列に「N」と表示されます。この文書に従って、IANA は [RFC9847] に合わせて「推奨」列に「D」を付けるように更新しました (そして、この文書をそれぞれの参照として追加しました)。この文書には、これらの暗号スイートの使用を阻止する根拠も記録されており、関連するリスクを示す以前の分析と攻撃が引用されています (セクション 8 を参照)。
+=============================================+=====================+
| Cipher Suite | Reference |
+=============================================+=====================+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422] |
| | [RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422] |
| | [RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC8422] |
| | [RFC6347] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC8422] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5289] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+---------------------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 2
IANA has set the "Recommended" column to "D" and added this document as a reference for the following entries in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY]:
IANA は、「推奨」列を「D」に設定し、この文書を「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の次のエントリの参照として追加しました。
+===========================================+=====================+
| Cipher Suite | Reference |
+===========================================+=====================+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC4785] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC4279] [RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_PSK_DHE_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 3
IANA has set the "Recommended" column to "D" and added this document as a reference for the following entries in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY]:
IANA は、「推奨」列を「D」に設定し、この文書を「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の次のエントリの参照として追加しました。
+===========================================+=====================+
| Cipher Suite | Reference |
+===========================================+=====================+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 | [RFC4346] [RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 | [RFC5246] [RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC5246] [RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA | [RFC4346] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA | [RFC8996] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA | [RFC4785] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5246] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA | [RFC4279] [RFC6347] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [RFC4279] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA | [RFC4162] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5288] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 | [RFC5487] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC5932] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6209] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 | [RFC6367] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 | [RFC6655] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
| TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | [RFC7905] |
+-------------------------------------------+---------------------+
Table 4
IANA has set the "Recommended" column to "D" and added this document as a reference for the following entries in the "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry [TLS-REGISTRY]:
IANA は、「推奨」列を「D」に設定し、この文書を「TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] の次のエントリの参照として追加しました。
+=======================+=====================+
| Certificate Type | Reference |
+=======================+=====================+
| rsa_fixed_dh (3) | [RFC5246] [RFC9847] |
+-----------------------+---------------------+
| dss_fixed_dh (4) | [RFC5246] [RFC9847] |
+-----------------------+---------------------+
| rsa_fixed_ecdh (65) | [RFC8422] [RFC9847] |
+-----------------------+---------------------+
| ecdsa_fixed_ecdh (66) | [RFC8422] [RFC9847] |
+-----------------------+---------------------+
Table 5
This document updates [RFC9325] with respect to the use of (D)TLS 1.2, and Table 6 lists the exact changes. All of these changes are made in Section 4.1 of [RFC9325].
この文書は、(D)TLS 1.2 の使用に関して [RFC9325] を更新し、表 6 に正確な変更点を示します。これらの変更はすべて [RFC9325] のセクション 4.1 で行われます。
+============================+=============+============+
| | RFC 9325 | RFC 10015 |
+============================+=============+============+
| Non-ephemeral FFDH | SHOULD NOT | MUST NOT |
+----------------------------+-------------+------------+
| Non-ephemeral ECDH | SHOULD NOT | No change |
+----------------------------+-------------+------------+
| Fixed DH certificate types | Unspecified | SHOULD NOT |
+----------------------------+-------------+------------+
| Ephemeral FFDH | SHOULD NOT | MUST NOT |
+----------------------------+-------------+------------+
| Static RSA | SHOULD NOT | MUST NOT |
+----------------------------+-------------+------------+
Table 6
The "TLS Cipher Suites" and "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registries both appear within the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters" registry group [TLS-REGISTRY]. IANA has updated entries in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry [TLS-REGISTRY] as indicated in Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4. IANA has also updated entries in the "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry as indicated in Section 5.5.
「TLS Cipher Suites」レジストリと「TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers」レジストリは両方とも、「Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters」レジストリ グループ [TLS-REGISTRY] 内に表示されます。IANA は、セクション 5.1、5.2、5.3、および 5.4 に示されているように、「TLS 暗号スイート」レジストリ [TLS-REGISTRY] のエントリを更新しました。IANA は、セクション 5.5 に示されているように、「TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers」レジストリのエントリも更新しました。
For each entry listed in Sections 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, IANA has set the "Recommended" column to "D" and updated the entry's Reference column to refer to this document. For information about the use of "D" in the "Recommended" column, see [RFC9847].
セクション 5.1、5.2、5.3、5.4、および 5.5 にリストされている各エントリについて、IANA は「推奨」列を「D」に設定し、この文書を参照するためにエントリの参照列を更新しました。「推奨」列での「D」の使用については、[RFC9847] を参照してください。
Non-ephemeral finite field DH cipher suites (TLS_DH_*), as well as ephemeral key reuse for finite field DH cipher suites, are prohibited due to the Raccoon attack [RACCOON]. Both are already considered bad practice since they do not provide forward secrecy. However, the Raccoon attack revealed that timing side channels in processing TLS premaster secrets may be exploited to reveal the encrypted premaster secret.
非一時的な有限フィールド DH 暗号スイート (TLS_DH_*) および有限フィールド DH 暗号スイートの一時キーの再利用は、Raccoon 攻撃 [RACCOON] のため禁止されています。どちらも前方秘匿性を提供しないため、すでに悪い習慣とみなされています。しかし、Raccoon 攻撃により、TLS プリマスター シークレットを処理する際のタイミング サイド チャネルが悪用されて、暗号化されたプリマスター シークレットが暴露される可能性があることが明らかになりました。
As for non-ephemeral ECDH cipher suites (TLS_ECDH_*), forgoing forward secrecy not only allows retroactive decryption in the event of key compromise but may also enable a broad category of attacks where the attacker exploits key reuse to repeatedly query a cryptographic secret.
非一時的な ECDH 暗号スイート (TLS_ECDH_*) に関しては、前方秘密保持を省略すると、キーが漏洩した場合に遡及的な復号が可能になるだけでなく、攻撃者がキーの再利用を悪用して暗号化秘密を繰り返し照会する広範なカテゴリの攻撃が可能になる可能性があります。
This category includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following examples:
このカテゴリには次の例が含まれますが、必ずしもこれらに限定されるわけではありません。
1. Invalid curve attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse to repeatedly query and eventually learn the key itself. These attacks have been shown to be practical against real-world TLS implementations [ICA].
1. 無効なカーブ攻撃。攻撃者はキーの再利用を悪用してクエリを繰り返し、最終的にキー自体を学習します。これらの攻撃は、現実世界の TLS 実装に対して実用的であることが示されています [ICA]。
2. Side-channel attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and an additional side channel to learn a cryptographic secret. For an example of such an attack, refer to [MAY4].
2. サイドチャネル攻撃。攻撃者はキーの再利用と追加のサイドチャネルを悪用して暗号化秘密を学習します。このような攻撃の例については、[MAY4] を参照してください。
3. Fault attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and incorrect calculations to learn a cryptographic secret. For an example of such an attack, see [PARIS256].
3. フォールト攻撃。攻撃者はキーの再利用と誤った計算を悪用して暗号化秘密を学習します。このような攻撃の例については、[PARIS256] を参照してください。
Such attacks are often implementation-dependent, including the above examples. However, these examples demonstrate that building a system that reuses keys and avoids this category of attacks is difficult in practice. In contrast, avoiding key reuse not only prevents decryption in the event of key compromise, but it also precludes this category of attacks altogether. Therefore, this document discourages the reuse of ECDH public keys.
このような攻撃は、上記の例を含め、多くの場合実装に依存します。ただし、これらの例は、キーを再利用してこのカテゴリの攻撃を回避するシステムを構築するのが実際には難しいことを示しています。対照的に、キーの再利用を回避すると、キーが侵害された場合の復号化が防止されるだけでなく、このカテゴリの攻撃も完全に排除されます。したがって、この文書では ECDH 公開鍵の再利用を推奨しません。
As for ephemeral finite field DH in (D)TLS 1.2 (TLS_DHE_* and TLS_PSK_DHE_*), as explained above, clients have no practical way to support these cipher suites while ensuring they only negotiate security parameters that are acceptable to them. In (D)TLS 1.2, the server chooses the DH group, and custom groups are prevalent. Therefore, once the client includes these cipher suites in its handshake and the server presents a custom group, the client cannot complete the handshake while ensuring security. Verifying the group structure is prohibitively expensive for the client. Using a safelist of known-good groups is also impractical, since server operators were encouraged to generate their own custom group. Further, there is no mechanism for the handshake to fall back to other parameters that are acceptable to both the client and server.
(D)TLS 1.2 (TLS_DHE_* および TLS_PSK_DHE_*) の一時有限フィールド DH に関しては、上で説明したように、クライアントには、受け入れ可能なセキュリティ パラメーターのみをネゴシエートすることを保証しながら、これらの暗号スイートをサポートする実際的な方法がありません。(D)TLS 1.2 では、サーバーが DH グループを選択し、カスタム グループが普及しています。したがって、クライアントがハンドシェイクにこれらの暗号スイートを含め、サーバーがカスタム グループを提示すると、クライアントはセキュリティを確保しながらハンドシェイクを完了できなくなります。グループ構造の検証は、クライアントにとって法外なコストがかかります。サーバー オペレーターは独自のカスタム グループを生成することが推奨されているため、既知の良好なグループのセーフリストを使用することも現実的ではありません。さらに、クライアントとサーバーの両方が受け入れられる他のパラメータにハンドシェイクをフォールバックするメカニズムはありません。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4162] Lee, H.J., Yoon, J.H., and J.I. Lee, "Addition of SEED
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4162, DOI 10.17487/RFC4162, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4162>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, DOI 10.17487/RFC4785, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4785>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC5289] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5289, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5289>.
[RFC5469] Eronen, P., Ed., "DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5469, DOI 10.17487/RFC5469,
February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5469>.
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
[RFC5932] Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher Suites
for TLS", RFC 5932, DOI 10.17487/RFC5932, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5932>.
[RFC6209] Kim, W., Lee, J., Park, J., and D. Kwon, "Addition of the
ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 6209, DOI 10.17487/RFC6209, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6209>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC7905] Langley, A., Chang, W., Mavrogiannopoulos, N.,
Strombergson, J., and S. Josefsson, "ChaCha20-Poly1305
Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7905, DOI 10.17487/RFC7905, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7905>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.
[RFC9847] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9847>.
[BLEI] Bleichenbacher, D., "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks against
Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1",
Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'98, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 1462, pp. 1-12,
DOI 10.1007/BFb0055716, 1998,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055716>.
[DLOG795] Boudot, F., Gaudry, P., Guillevic, A., Heninger, N.,
Thomé, E., and P. Zimmermann, "Comparing the difficulty of
factorization and discrete logarithm: a 240-digit
experiment", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/697,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1_3, 17 August 2020,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/697>.
[DROWN] Aviram, N., Schinzel, S., Somorovsky, J., Heninger, N.,
Dankel, M., Steube, J., Valenta, L., Adrian, D.,
Halderman, J. A., Dukhovni, V., Käsper, E., Cohney, S.,
Engels, S., Paar, C., and Y. Shavitt, "DROWN: Breaking TLS
using SSLv2", Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security
Symposium, August 2016,
<https://drownattack.com/drown-attack-paper.pdf>.
[ICA] Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "Practical
invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH", ESORICS 2015, Part I,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9326, pp. 407-425,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21, 21 September 2015,
<https://link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21.pdf>.
[MAY4] Genkin, D., Valenta, L., and Y. Yarom, "May the Fourth Be
With You: A Microarchitectural Side Channel Attack on
Several Real-World Applications of Curve25519",
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, DOI 10.1145/3133956.3134029,
30 October 2017,
<https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3133956.3134029>.
[NEW-BLEI] Meyer, C., Somorovsky, J., Weiss, E., Schwenk, J.,
Schinzel, S., and E. Tews, "Revisiting SSL/TLS
Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and
Attacks", Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Security
Symposium, August 2014,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/
usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-meyer.pdf>.
[PARIS256] Devlin, S. and F. Valsorda, "The PARIS256 Attack", 8
August 2018, <https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/
us-18-Valsorda-Squeezing-A-Key-Through-A-Carry-Bit-
wp.pdf>.
[RACCOON] Merget, R., Brinkmann, M., Aviram, N., Somorovsky, J.,
Mittmann, J., and J. Schwenk, "Raccoon Attack: Finding and
Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)", 9
September 2020,
<https://raccoon-attack.com/RacoonAttack.pdf>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[ROBOT] Boeck, H., Somorovsky, J., and C. Young, "Return Of
Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)", Proceedings of
the 27th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2018,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/
usenixsecurity18/sec18-bock.pdf>.
[SUBGROUPS]
Valenta, L., Adrian, D., Sanso, A., Cohney, S., Fried, J.,
Hastings, M., Halderman, J. A., and N. Heninger,
"Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman",
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/995, 17 October
2016, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/995/20161017:193515>.
[TLS-REGISTRY]
IANA, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters>.
[WEAK-DH] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
Green, M., Halderman, J. A., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Weak Diffie-
Hellman and the Logjam Attack", October 2015,
<https://weakdh.org/>.
[XPROT] Jager, T., Schwenk, J., and J. Somorovsky, "On the
Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1
v1.5 Encryption", Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.
1185-1196, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813657, October 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813657>.
This document includes many important contributions from Carrie Bartle, who wrote much of the prose and presented it several times at the IETF TLS WG.
この文書には、散文の多くを執筆し、IETF TLS WG で何度か発表した Carrie Bartle からの多くの重要な寄稿が含まれています。
The document was inspired by discussions on the TLS WG mailing list and a suggestion by Filippo Valsorda following the release of the Raccoon attack [RACCOON]. Thanks to Christopher A. Wood for writing up the initial draft of this document. Thanks also to Thomas Fossati, Sean Turner, Joe Salowey, Yaron Sheffer, Christian Buchgraber, John Preuß Mattsson, and Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard for their comments and suggestions.
この文書は、TLS WG メーリング リストでの議論と、Raccoon 攻撃 [RACCOON] の公開後の Filippo Valsorda による提案に触発されて作成されました。この文書の初稿を作成してくれた Christopher A. Wood に感謝します。コメントと提案をくださった Thomas Fossati、Sean Turner、Joe Salowey、Yaron Sheffer、Christian Buchgraber、John Preuß Mattsson、Manuel Pégourié-Gonard にも感謝します。
Nimrod Aviram
Email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com